A COMPARATIVE STUDY: WHERE AND WHY DOES THE EU IMPOSE SANCTIONS

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Abstract:

The use of the EU instrument of political and economic sanctions has continually been rising since 1987. However, the sanctions are used differently according to geographic vicinity, political motivation, and which security objectives the EU promotes. Clara Portela explored the European sanction regime for the period 1987-2003 and showed that the EU has different political motivations and objectives for each region and that, in particular, geographic vicinity plays a significant role for the application for sanctions. This article relates to Portela´s analytic approach from 2005 and verifies her hypotheses for the period 2005-2015. In summary, the article shows that the EU still focuses on geographic vicinity and security relevance. Only the area of sanction application has changed, moving from Eastern Europe to the Middle East.

Keywords: EU foreign policy, sanctions, Eastern Europe, European Security Strategy, European Studies, International Relations, Southern Mediterranean, Russia.

Título en Castellano: Un estudio comparativo: Dónde y por qué la UE impone sanciones

Resumen:

La utilización de sanciones políticas y económicas por parte de la UE ha ido creciendo de forma continuada desde 1987.Sin embargo las sanciones se utilizan de forma diferente dependiendo del cercanía geográfica, la motivación política y los objetivos de seguridad que promueve la UE. Clara Portela ha estudiado el régimen de sanciones de la UE en el periodo 1987-2003 mostrando que la UE tiene diferentes motivaciones políticas y objetivos dependiendo de la región y que, de modo particular, la cercanía geográfica juega un papel significativo en la imposición de sanciones. Este artículo toma como punto de partida su aproximación analítica desde 2005 y verifica sus hipótesis en el período 2005-2013.En suma, el artículo muestra que la UE todavía se centra en su vecindad geográfica y en su relevancia en términos de seguridad. Solamente ha cambiado el área de aplicación, pasando de Europa Oriental a Oriente Medio.

Palabras clave: Política exterior de la UE, sanciones, Europa del Este, Estrategia de Seguridad Europea, Estudios Europeos, Relaciones Internacionales, Sur del Mediterráneo, Rusia

1.Introduction

The European Union (hereafter abbreviated EU) wants to shape international relations, to be recognized as a strong international actor than as a so called "soft power".[2] Consequently, the EU has to take over responsibilities with "hard measures"[3] in the sphere of international affairs. Furthermore, the EU has to be a global actor, as they stated in 2003 in the key document "European Security Strategy" (hereafter abbreviated ESS), but they also state: "Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important".[4] Recently, this fact can be demonstrated when we take a look at the European sanction policy.[5] The EU sanction practices have increased in total numbers and are enforced by all its member states, even when the political and economic costs are high as we see in the example of Russia.[6] "Never before has a target of the strategic importance of Russia been sanctioned to this degree", emphasize a study of the Programme for the Study of International Governance (PSIG) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva[7]. It indicates the relevance of sanctions as a strategic European foreign instrument. However, since the 1980s, the EU has been imposing sanctions against third countries. In 2005 Clara Portela in her study "Where and why does the EU impose sanction" focused in particular on the interplay between the geographic location, conflict type and political objectives of the autonomous EU sanction practice in the period 1987-2004.[8] She emphasizes the EUs' use of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument[9] - and in particular in its geography vicinity. Her analysis emphasizes that, in particular, EU neighbor states are significantly sanctioned for directly security-related objectives, whereas far away states are sanctioned for indirectly security-related objectives and rather seldom. The data set of the period of analysis covers the period until 2003. Surprisingly, the correlation has not been yet analyzed. Thus, her results of a correlation towards geographic vicinity and objectives of security relevance between 1987-2003 has to be proved in the period between 2004-2015.[10] Therefore, the leading research issues are based on Portela´s article and have the same research question: "where and why (objective) the EU imposed sanction in the period 2004-2015 and whether there exists a correlation to its geographic vicinity."[11] The aim of this essay is to explore if Portela´s results are still valid. This article has been divided into five parts. The first and the second part deals with the EU sanction regime as a political instrument and lists a detailed table with all imposed sanction in the period 2004-2015. The third part is concerned with the methodology used for this study.

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2 See in the detail the whole discussion in this article: Hyde-Price, Adrian (2006): "'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, Nº 2, pp. 217-234.

3 Kreutz, Joachim (2005): "Hard measures from a soft power? Sanctions policy of the European Union", Bonn, Bonn International Center for Conversion.

[4] This quotation sows clearly the discrepancy between the international claim of the EU and its implemented politics. EU Document: 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12.12.2003, pp. 8.

5 In official documents the EU uses the phrase "restrictive measures" instead of sanctions; for this analysis sanction is used as a synonym. In the second chapter the meaning of sanction will be discussed and defined.

6 Fischer, Sabrina (2015): "EU-Sanktionen gegen Russland. Ziele, Wirkung und weiterer Umgang", SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 26.

[7] Moret, Erica; Bierstreker, Thomas; Giumelli, Francesco; Portela, Clara et al. (2016): "The new deterrent? International sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine Crisis. Impacts, Costs and Further Actions". Programme for the Study of International Governance (PSIG). Geneva, p. 7.

[8] Portela, Clara : Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?, *Politique européenne*, Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005).

9 Smith, Karen (2014): *European Foreign Policy in a Changing World,* 3rd ed,, London, Polity Press.

[10] This article analyses only the period till 19 March.2015 and orients to the document entitled "European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force" (2015).

[11] This article does not analyze or evaluate the normative dimension, affectivity or efficiency of EU sanction regimes. The analysis looks at the security relevance of the objectives, as well as the interplay between objectives and the geographic proximity of the targets.

The fourth section presents the findings of the research, focusing on the three key themes: A) objectives of sanctions, B) conflict types, C) geographic location and the correlations, D) between the geographic location and conflict type and E) geographic location and objectives of sanctions. The last part resumes the hypotheses, compares them with Portelas results and discusses the research question. The article ends with an outlook on the further EU sanction in future as an instrument of foreign European policy.

2. Sanction Policy of the EU

2.1.Sanctions as a Foreign Political Instrument

Sanctions are measures imposed by a sender (state, international organization like EU or in cooperation) consisting in the interruption of normal international relation or benefits (like development aid) that are imposed by a misconduct of the target state.[12] In general, sanctions are used as a punishment tool to influence target states behavior to compel it to cease or reserve the rule. Throughout this article, the term sanction will refer to the definition of Hufbauer et al.: "[sanctions are] deliberated government-inspired withdrawal of (...) trade or financial relations (to obtain) foreign policy goals."[13] The EU defines in detail its understanding of a sanction in three key documents "Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", "Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" and "The EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures". Therefore, the EU uses sanction regimes as a normal foreign policy instrument within the framework of GASP.[14] The objectives of sanctions range from securing human rights to crisis management.[15] Thus, Hazel Smith defines the European Foreign Policy as: "The foreign policy of the European Union is the capacity to make and implement policies as from road that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the European Union."[16] The EU imposes sanctions as a foreign policy tool to enforce its own interests in third countries. The EU wants to influence the policy or behavior of a country, region, government, organization or single persons: "In general terms, the EU imposes its restrictive measures to bring as from out a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of a country, government, entities or individuals. They are a preventive, non-punitive, instrument which should allow the EU to respond swiftly to political challenges and developments."[17]

Thus, the EU uses sanction regimes as an economic power tool to enforce a European coherent and sustained foreign policy.[18] In this sense the sanctions are based on the argumentation of the UN.[19]

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[12] Portela, Clara (2010): "European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?", London, Routledge, pp. 1-26.

[13] Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; et al. (1985): Economic sanctions reconsidered: history and current policy, Washington DC, Inst. for International Economics, pp. 2.

[14] See in Detail: Smith, Karen (2014): European Foreign Policy in a Changing World, third edition, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp. 44-66.

[15] Giumelli, Francesco (2013): How EU sanctions work: A new narrative, Chaillot Paper, Nº 129, pp. 7.

[16] Smith, Hazel (2002): European Union Foreign Policy. What it is and What it Does, Pluto Press, London, pp. 8.

[17] See in detail the official homepage of the European Commission about CFSP at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm .

[18] Smith, Michael (2013): Foreign policy and development in the post-Lisbon European Union, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26(3), pp. 519-535.

[19] The United Nation defines sanction, at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/.

The EU emphasizes in the document from 2004 that she abides by UN standards, but, at the same tame, the EU seeks to enforce independent sanctions against third countries. Since the 1990s the EU enforced sanctions became increasingly independent from the UN or the USA.[20] Consequently, sanction regimes became an elementary tool of the European foreign policy.[21] A recent example is the restrictive measures against Russia since July 2014.[22]

2.3.Sanction types of the EU

The EU listed the subjects and sorts of sanctions in the document *"Basic Principle"* (2004) and defines in detail in which cases the EU can enforce sanctions: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (hereafter abbreviated WMD), uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. The following list provides the current types of sanctions of the EU.[23] However, for this article only the sanction types i) to v) are relevant, like in Portela´s research approach of 2005, because those types are the most frequently imposed by the EU.

Table 1 Mark of various sanction types.

Mark	Sanction types which are relevant for this the analysis
i)	Arms embargo
ii)	Visa-Ban
iii)	Financial sanctions:
iv)	Entry sanctions
v)	Selective economic sanctions
Mark	**Sanction types which are not important for this analysis**
a)	Targed sanction against individuals
b)	Diplomatic sanctions or sanctions towards sport or cultural events
c)	Termination of development aid

Source: table based on the document Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), 10198/1/04, REV 1, PESC 450 07.06.2004.

2.4.EU sanctions between 2004-2015

The data was obtained directly from an exhaustive analysis of the EU document "*European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force*"[24] and are completed with the dataset of *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset* of the University Uppsala from *Department of Peace and Conflict Research* when the EU LUX-Dataset lacks some details needed in the research, in particular on context situations.[25] The chosen time frame spans from the release of the "Basic Principles" to the current sanction regime against the Russian Federation. Table 2 shows in alphabetical order the EU sanction between 2004 to march 2015. The table

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[20] Borzyskowski, Inken and Portela, Clara (2016): "Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations,the United States, and the EU", KFG Working Paper Series, No. 70, January 2016, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) "The Transformative Power of Europe", Freie Universität Berlin.

[21] Smith, Karen (2014), pp. 50f.

[22] See the note of the European Commission:" Leitfaden der Kommission für die Anwendung bestimmter Vorschriften der Verordnung"(EU) Nº 833/2014.

[23] See in detail the Journal of the European Commission: Governance and development, at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:r12524.

[24] See the document issued by the European Commission: Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU). (Version from 18.03.2015).

[25] The Uppsala University Conflict Database is available at http://www.pcr.uu.se.

illustrates which countries or targeted subjects are affected, the start of sanctions, the objective of sanctions and the conflict constellation.

Table 2. Targeted Countries are listed in alphabet order and Sanctions are categorized by start, context, objective, sort and region.

Target Country	Start	Conflict type	Objective for sanctions	Sanction type	Region
Afghanistan	2011	Support of Terrorism	Terrorism	i), iii), iv), v)	Other/Asia
Egypt	2011	Violation of human rights	Peace keeping and stabilization mission	v) a)	Southern Mediterranean
Belarus	2006 2012	Violation of democracy, Violation of human rights	Promotion of democracy and human rights Promotion of democracy	i), iii), v),	Eastern Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2011	Violation of democracy	Promotion of democracy	iii), iv)	Others/ Eastern Europe
Burma	2013	Other violations	Promotion of human rights	i), iv),	Other/Asia
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2005 2010	Violation of democracy; Violation of human rights.	Promotion of democracy And human rights	i), iii) v) a)	Other/Africa
Ivory Coast	2005 2010	Continuing conflict Violation of democracy	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission; Promotion of democracy	i), iii), iv) v),	Other/Africa
Eritrea	2010	Continuing conflict, Other violations	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), iii), iv), v), a)	Other/Africa
Guinea	2009 2010	Violation of democracy; Violation of democracy	Promotion of democracy Promotion of democracy	iii), iv), v)	Other/Africa
Guinea Bissau	2012	Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping	iii), iv), v), a)	Other/Africa
Iran	2011 2010 2012	WMD WMD Violation of human rights	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission Peacekeeping and stabilization mission Promotion of democracy and human rights	i), ii), iii), iv), v), a)	Other/Asia
Iraq	2003	Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), iii), iv), v), a), c)	Other/Asia
Yemen	2014	Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	iii), iv), a)	Southern Mediterranean
Lebanon	2005 2006	Continuing conflict Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), v)	Southern Mediterranean

Liberia	2008	Violation of democracy	Promotion of democracy	i), iii), iv), v), a)	Other/Africa
Libya	2004	Support of Terrorism Continuing conflict	Terrorism	i), ii), iii), iv), v), a)	Southern Mediterranean
	2011		Peacekeeping and stabilization mission		
Moldova	2010	Post-conflict	Promotion of human rights	ii), iv), a),	Eastern Europe
North Korea	2007	Others	Promotion of democracy and human rights Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), ii), iii), iv), v), a), b),	Other/Asia
	2013	WMD			
Russian Federation	2014	Continuing conflict	Peace keeping and stabilization mission	i), iv), v),	Others/ Eastern Europe
Zimbabwe	2004 2011	Violation of democracy Violation of democracy	Promotion of democracy Promotion of democracy	i), iii), iv), v), a)	Other/Africa
Somalia	2010	Continuing conflict	Peace keeping and stabilization mission	i), iii), iv), v), a)	Other/Africa
Sudan	2014	Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), iii) iv), v), a)	Other/Africa
South-Sudan	2014	Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), iii), iv), a)	Other/Africa
Syria	2005 2006 2012 2013	Support of Terrorism Support of Terrorism Continuing conflict Continuing conflict	Terrorism Terrorism Peacekeeping and stabilization mission Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	i), ii), iii), iv), v), a)	Southern Mediterranean
Tunisia	2011	Violation of Democracy	Promotion of democracy	iii), iv), a),	Southern Mediterranean
Ukraine (Separatists area /Crimea)	2014 2014 2014	Continuing conflict Continuing conflict Continuing conflict	Peacekeeping and stabilization mission; Peacekeeping and stabilization mission; Peacekeeping and stabilization mission	iii), iv), v), a)	Eastern Europe
Central African Republic	2013 2014	Violation of democracy Violation of democracy	Promotion of democracy Promotion of democracy	i), iii), v), a)	Other/Africa

Source: Table based on dataset of European Commission – Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU) (Version 18.03.2015) and database of the Uppsala University Conflict Database, available at http://www.pcr.uu.se.

In total, since the 1980s there have been more than 100 sanction regimes enforced or added or expanded. Between 2004-2015 the EU introduced more than 40 different sanctions against 27 states. The following analysis is going into detail to elaborate the individual points of sanctions.

3. Method, categorizing and hypotheses

This part describes the methodical-analytical approach. It explains in detail the method and where and why it differs from Portela´s approach. For those readers who just would like to read the empirical results may skip this part. Each sector has to be analyzed separately, to prove the correlation between the conflict type and the objective of sanctions with the geographic location. The analysis concentrates only on the sanctions regimes of the EU. Sanctions by other international organizations or States Covenants are not included in this analysis. Various sanctions may overlap or be charged at the same time against a target country. That is why the number of sanctions type is higher than the number of target countries. Data for this study were retrospectively collected from the EU document "European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force". However, further decisions on the collection of new sanctions by the Council are treated as new sanction types and listed in the table, but extensions of sanctions are treated as part of the sanctions levied. The article distinguishes between "Regulation Council" and a "Council Decision" given the fact that both greatly differ. Furthermore, this analysis includes only sanctions collected from 1 January 2004 even if they remained by 01.01.2004; Sanctions episodes are grouped in periods of five years such as Portela´s research results of the period 1987-2003 and authors research results of the period 2004-2015. If the sanctions to 1 January 2004 led to a new Council Decision and the EU adopted against the target country new sanctions, it is also listed in the analysis.[26] If another sanction was imposed with a new objective to the same target country, it is included as an independent sanction in the analysis. It was decided that the best method to adopt for this investigation was to compare the frequencies of sanctions. However, due to the small number of events, the analysis refrains from using analytical statistical methods. Further, the number of potential states in the category Others has changed since Portela published her article in 2005. Few countries of Eastern Europe are now considered as Others (Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo) and other recently emerged new states, such as South Sudan. That is why the work here refers to the current United Nations list of recognized states and not on Portela´s number of states from 2004. Thus, the analysis divided the geographic zones for types into three: Eastern Europe, Southern Mediterranean and others as rest of the world. The first two zones are part of the European Neighborhood Program (hereafter abbreviated ENP). The Mediterranean neighboring countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. The EU neighborhood states with third countries from the Eastern Partnership program are the six former Soviet republics Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In addition, Portela has numbered among its study to Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslav states and the states of the former Warsaw Pact. In the period from 2004, only Bosnia and Herzegovina has been sanctioned as the only state of the former Yugoslavia and is recorded under Others, as well as the Russian Federation.

The analysis is divided into five parts:
A)   Conflict type in the target country
B)   Objective of sanctions in the target country
C)   Geographic location of the target country
D)   Correlation between conflict type and its geographic location
E)   Correlation between the objective of sanctions and its geographic location

Hence, the categorization and the methical approach is the same as in Portela´s research of

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[26] The sanctions against Iraq from 2003 were also included in this analysis and associated with the period of 2004-2015; this case has been not recorded in Portela´s study.

2005, with some additions.[27] This enables us to compare her analysis of the sanction period 1987-2004 with this sanction period of 2005-2015. The data sets of both periods are shown in the same table for the purpose a comparison.

3.1.A) Conflict type in target countries

The EU has to define the conflict type to decide which kind of sanction has to be enforced. Sanctions are imposed by the EU in regions, where a relevant conflict for the EU or UN exists. The EU orientates its sanction policy to the official UN-Charta: „We are committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way to maintain and restore international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and of our common foreign and security policy."[28] Buzan[29] divides the EU sanctions into two big dimensions, a military and a political one, whereas Francesco Giumelli[30] classifies two other dimensions, with human rights promotion and post-conflict institutional consolidation. This article uses Buzan´s approach, but with Portela´s definition. She defines military threats as directly security-related and violation of EU standards as indirectly security-related. Those conflict types are divided into two dimensions:

> 1 Directly security-related contexts comprise: ongoing conflict, alleged support of terrorism and in post-conflict situations and non-proliferation of WMD.
> 2 Indirectly security-related objectives encompass: such as obstruction of Democracy and of Human Rights (hereafter abbreviated DHR) or others.

The last point links to Manners concept that the EU is not a Military Power but a Normative Power.[31] Thus, its foreign policy and politics has to belong to normative rules. In consequence, the EU refers its sanction policy to the universal and European values and pursues it as a tool to discipline target states. Portela works with the following hypotheses: *"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions in situations that are indirectly relevant to security."*

3.2.B) Objective of sanctions in target countries.

With each sanction, the EU wants to accomplish some goals. Therefore, to understand the EU objectives it is necessary to explain the self-conception in foreign policy. In 2002 the EU defined its own role quite clearly: "According to art.11 of the Treaty on European Union, the objectives of CFSP are: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (...), to promote international co-operation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and

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[27] As an example the different number of states in the Eastern Partnership can be mentioned. Further, in this article the conflict type WMD is added, because in Portela´s research period it was not included.

[28] EU Document: "Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)", 10198/1/04, REV 1, PESC 450 07.06.2004.

[29] Buzan, Barry (1991): People, States and Fear, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 19f.

[30] Giumelli, Francesco (2013): "How EU sanctions work: A new narrative", Chaillot Paper, Nº 129, pp. 12f.

[31] Manners, Ian: "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.4, Nº2 (2002), pp. 235-258.

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."[32]

Kreutz[33] defines three core areas of EU objectives:
1. Respect of the international or universal rights;
2. The territorial security of the EU (it includes peacekeeping and stabilization missions);
3. Values and norms like democracy, human rights or freedom.

By contrast, it explains why sanctions are enforced and which objectives are linked to it.

Portela sorts following points to direct and indirectly security-related objectives:
1. Directly security-related objectives comprise: i) fight against terrorism; ii) preservation of regional peace and stability; iii) support an ongoing peace process and vi) non-proliferation of WMD.
2. Indirectly security-related objectives encompass: i) promotion of democracy, and ii) promotion of Human Rights (hereafter abbreviated DHR).

The second hypothesis is the following: *"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions to promote objectives indirectly relevant to security"*.

3.3.C) Geographic location of target countries

The geographic location is relevant, because the EU does not always impose sanctions where point A) would appropriate deem it. There are many conflicts worldwide, where EU values or principles are violated or do not exist.[34] Therefore, the EU selects where to pursue sanctions and where not. However, the EU became a relevant global actor[35], on the other hand the EU focuses mostly regional, like the quotation in ESS from 2003 emphasize: "Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on its borders are well-governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe."[36]

In conclusion, the EU differentiates between the countries in its regional vicinity and far away ones. Portela[37] raises a vital question when it comes to sanctions: "Does the EU behave differently in a regional context than globally and, if so, in what way? In other words, how `regional´ and how `global´ is the EU as an international actor?". In 2003 the EU lays the foundation for the ENP in the Commission Communication on the New European Neighbourhood.[38] In 2008, within the ENP structures, the EU established the Union for the

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[32] EU Document: Council of the European Union, "Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", 15579/03, Brussels, 3 December 2003.

[33] Kreutz, Joachim (2005): "Hard measures from a soft power? Sanctions policy of the European Union", Bonn, Bonn International Center for Conversion, p. 13.

[34] Borzyskowski, Inken and Portela, Clara (2016): "Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations,the United States, and the EU", KFG Working Paper Series, No. 70, January 2016, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) "The Transformative Power of Europe", Freie Universität Berlin, pp.5-8.

[35] Fröhlich, Stefan (2014): Die Europäische Union als globaler Akteur. Eine Einführung, second edition, Berlin, Springer, pp. 201-271.

[36] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12.12.2003, p. 8.

[37] Portela, Clara (2005): Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?, Politique euro-péenne, Nr. 17 (3), 89.

[38] "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors". Brussels, 11.3.2003 COM (2003) 104 final.

Mediterranean and in 2009 followed the Eastern Partnership. For this reason, Portela arranges the target countries of EU sanctions in three spheres of interest:
1.   Eastern European Neighbor states / Eastern Europe.
2.   South Southern Mediterranean states/Southern Mediterranean
3.   Remaining countries/others

Therefore, Portela envisages the following third hypothesis: *"The closer a region is to the EU, the higher the frequency of EU sanctions regimes."*

3.4.D) and E) correlation between the points A) with C) and B) with C)

The last part of the analysis explores two correlations: The correlation between the geographic vicinity with conflict types and with subjects of sanctions.

D) Portela´s study shows that the direct security-related context is the most important one in Eastern Europe, instead faraway countries are sanctioned because of the violation of EU values and principles.

E) Portela´s study explores that the EU sorted mostly neighboring countries to the sphere of directly security-related objectives, whereas States of the category Others are arranged to the sphere of indirect security-related objectives.
Both last working hypotheses, D) and E), are listed at the end of this part and are created by the author, but took Portela´s interplayed hypotheses into account.

- Conflict type in target countries
"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions in situations that are indirectly relevant to security."
- Subject of sanction in target countries
"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions to promote objectives indirectly relevant to security."
- Geographic location of target countries
 "The closer a region is to the EU, the higher the frequency of EU sanctions regimes."
- Geographic location and conflict type
"The closer a target is located to the EU, the more the directly security-related context is recorded."
- Geographic location and subject of sanctions
"The further a target is located to the EU, the more it relates to the indirectly security-related object type."

4.Analysis

Hereinafter, the analysis explores the five hypotheses for the period 2005-2015. The analysis contains five parts:
A)   Conflict types in target countries
B)   Subject of sanctions in target countries
C)   Geographic location of target countries
D)   Correlation of geographic location with conflict types
E)   Correlation of geographic location with subject of sanctions.

The data set and results of the period 2005-2015 are integrated in one table with Portela´s results of the period 1987-2004. Some cases will be explored in more detail in each subpart.

4.1.A) Conflict type in target countries

Hypothesis 1: *"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions in situations that are indirectly relevant to security."*

Table 3 shows the conflict type and the argument used by the EU for imposing sanctions in a target country. Overall, between 2005-2015 47 conflicts occurred. As part of directly security-related conflicts are sorted long-running conflicts, support of terrorism, proliferation of WMD and post-conflicts. Violation of democracy and others (human rights) are sorted to EU values.

Table 3. List and classification of conflict types, sorted in five year intervals.

	Results of Portelas analysis				Own research			Total
	1987-1991	1992-1997	1998-2003	1987-2003	2004-2009	2010-2015	2004-2015	
Continuing conflict	1	1	1	3	5	13	18	21
Alleged support of terrorism	2	0	1	3	3	1	4	7
proliferation of MDW	0	0	0	0	2	4	6	6
Post-conflict situation	0	5	2	7		1	1	8
Directly security related	3	6	4	13	10	19	29	42
Violation of democracy	1	3	0	4	3	6	9	13
Other violations	1	0	3	4	4	5	9	13
Indirectly security related	2	3	3	8	7	11	18	26
Total	5	9	7	21	17	30	47	68

Source: Table based on dataset of European Commission – Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU) (Version 18.03.2015) and Clara Portela: "Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?", *Politique Européenne*, Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005), p 83.

In the part of directly security-related objectives 29 cases recorded, but in indirectly security-related objectives only18 cases are included. Between 2004-2009 the table illustrates ten conflicts, whereas between 2010-2015 the total number has nearly doubled reaching 19. The long-running conflicts are sanctioned18 times. Thus, the EU imposed the same amount of sanctions because of indirectly security-related objectives. For the supporting terrorism the EU imposed sanctions four times. The most surprising aspect of the data is that between 1987-2004 no sanctions have been imposed for the proliferation of WMD, but between 2004-2015 the EU imposed sanctions six times: North Korea and Iran have been sanctioned in various ways. Interestingly, the post-conflict is named only in one case, the sanctions against Moldavia. The violation of democracy and human rights are recorded eight times. Thus, the first hypothesis is falsified: The EU imposes sanctions more often against third countries because of directly security-related objectives.

4.2.B) Objective of sanctions in target countries

Table 4 provides for the period 2004-2015 44 various objectives of sanctions. Taken together, most of the EU sanctions were linked to direct security related objectives, in total 25, and, in particular, objectives of peacekeeping and stabilization missions,19. Before 2010, the EU imposed sanctions only four times to fight the support of terrorism. Support of Peacekeeping was mentioned only once. In the field of indirectly security related objectives, the table presents 19 cases. Most of them are related to promotion of democracy with 13 cases; those cases coincide with the Arab revolutions in North Africa. Support for HR was recorded 6 times, mostly in far away countries. What is interesting in this data is that the number of sanctions increased after 2010: between 2004-2009 the data shows 12 cases, whereas between 2010-2015 it increased rapidly to 32 cases. A comparison with the data set from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict vom Department of Peace and Conflict Research shows that most sanctions have been imposed because of internal conflicts with the local citizens. Taken together, these results suggest that there is an association between the Arab revolutions in North Africa[39] as well as the regional conflict in Eastern Ukraine[40]. Therefore, the hypothesis is disproved: The EU sorts more target countries to the field of directly security related objectives; in fact three times more.

Table 4 List and classification of sanction objectives, sorted in five year intervals.

	Results of Portelas analysis				Own research			Total
	1987-1991	1992-1997	1998-2003	1987-2003	2004-2009	2010-2015	2004-2015	
Peace keeping and stabilization missions	1	5	1	7	3	17	20	27
Terrorism	2	0	1	3	3	1	4	7
Support of Peace Process	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	3
Directly security related	3	6	2	11	6	19	25	36
Promotion of democracy	3	1	3	7	4	9	13	20
Support of HR	1	3	3	7	2	4	6	13
Indirectly security related	4	4	6	14	6	13	19	33
Total	7	10	8	25	12	32	44	69

Source: Table based on dataset of European Commission – Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU) (Version 18.03.2015) and Clara Portela: "Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?", *Politique Européenne,* Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005), p 83.

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[39] Börzel, Tanja and van Hüllen, Vera: "One voice, one message, but conflicting goals: cohesiveness and consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 21, Nº 7 (2014), pp. 1033-1049.
[40] Haukkala, Hiski (2015): "From cooperative to contested Europe? The conflict in Ukraine as a culmination of a long-term crisis in EU–Russia relations", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 23, Nº1, pp. 25-40.

4.3. C) Geographic location of target countries

Hypothesis 3: *"The closer a region is to the EU, the higher the frequency of EU sanctions regimes."*

The following Table 5 shows the division of sanctions per countries/regions and indicates the percentage chance of imposing a sanction. The geographical classification is based on the states of the Eastern Partnership (Eastern Europe), the partner states of the Union for the Mediterranean (Southern Mediterranean neighboring countries) and the rest of the world (Others).

Table 1 Geographic distribution of targets of EU autonomous sanctions by proximity to EU

Regions	Eastern Europe		Southern Mediterranean		Others		Total
Period	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003
Frequency of targeted states	8	3	2	6	7	19	**45**
Number of possible targets	35	6	8	10	133	149	**193**
Percentage of possible target in percentage	23	50	25	60	< 5	13	**22,8**

Source: Table based on dataset of European Commission – Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU) (Version 18.03.2015) and Clara Portela: "Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?", *Politique Européenne*, Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005)

In the period 2005-2015 the EU has levied 27 sanctions against target countries. In the category Eastern Europe were assigned only three countries: Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine or concretely the Ukrainian Eastern Provinces around Donetsk and Luhansk. Three of possible six countries were targed. This corresponds to a frequency of 50 percent. From the Southern Mediterranean States were six sanctioned, which is exactly 60 percent. Of the remaining 149 countries, the EU imposed against 19 countries sanctions, which corresponds to a probability of about 13 percent. Thus, in absolute numbers the EU imposed more sanctions against faraway states. Together these results provide important insights that the probability is higher that a neighboring state is sanctioned. Hence, it can be summed up that a country is often sanctioned by the EU when it is in geographic vicinity. Consequently, the working third hypothesis is verified.

4.4. D) Geographic distribution of targets and objectives of EU sanctions

Hypothesis 4: *"The closer a target is located to the EU, the more the directly security-related context is recorded."*

Table 6 illustrates the interplay of the geographic location and the conflict situation. It includes Portela´s results, marked in grey color. Overall, 65 conflict situations are located, 21 from Portela´s research and 44 of the current study. The table provides the various constellations of conflict situations for both periods separately as well as both periods together. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that the direct security related conflicts are measured 25 times, whereas the indirect security related conflicts are 19 times recorded. However, the total sum of direct security related conflicts is in the category others with 12 cases the highest one, but concerning to probability it is the lowest. More often the EU imposed sanctions against countries in her geographic vicinity, also when the absolute number is higher in the category Others. This is evident in the case of the category Eastern

European States (four times) and in particular Sothern Mediterranean countries (nine times). Portela presents in her research 13 cases to direct security related context and eight to indirect. The single most striking observation to emerge from the data comparison was that the sanction regimes doubled in a shorter time. Particularly, the Southern Mediterranean region

Table 2: Geographic distribution of targets and objectives of EU sanctions, sorted between the periods 1987-2003 and 2004-2015.

Countries/ Regions	Eastern Europe		Southern Mediterranean		Others		All Countries		
Conflict type	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2015
Continuing conflict	2	3	0	6	1	8	3	17	**20**
Alleged support of terrorism	0	0	3	3	0	1	3	4	**7**
Proliferation of MDW	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	**3**
Post-conflict situation	6	1	0	0	1	0	7	1	**8**
Directly security related	**8**	**4**	**3**	**9**	**2**	**12**	**13**	**25**	**38**
Violation of democracy	0	1	0	1	4	11	4	13	**17**
Other violations	2	1	0	1	2	4	4	6	**10**
Indirectly security related	**2**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**6**	**15**	**8**	**19**	**27**
Total	**10**	**6**	**3**	**11**	**8**	**27**	**21**	**44**	**65**

Source: Table based on dataset of European Commission – Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU) (Version 18.03.2015) and Clara Portela: "Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?"*, Politique Européenne*, Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005).

has been the most affected one.

Overall, the category Others has increased in both categories. Thus, summarized for both periods, the result is clear: 38 Total conflict situations were as direct and 27 as indirect security related context identified. Therefore, Portela´s statement is still valid and the fourth hypothesis can be verified.

4.5.E) Geographic distribution of targets and conflict type

Hypothesis 5: *"The further a target is located to the EU, the more it relates to the indirectly security-related object type."*

Table 7 illustrates the interplay of the geographic location and the objective of sanctions. It includes Portela´s results, marked in grey color. Overall, there are 68 various objectives, 25 from Portela´s research and 43 from the current study. The table shows the various possible constellation of objectives between 1987-2003 and 2004-2015, as well as for both periods together (1987-2015). The most obvious finding to emerge from the analysis is that the direct security related conflicts are measured 25 times, whereas the indirect security related conflicts are recorded 19 times. For the period 2004-2015, the table provides the direct security related cases occurred 26 times, whereas the indirect security related cases are mentioned only 17 times.

This results are different from Portela´s in a number of respects. While Portela explored eleven cases for the direct security related objectives it doubled in the period between 2004-2015 26 times On the other hand, indirectly security related cases increased only from 14 to 17. The geographical location shows clearly that in particular countries sorted to direct security related cases by the EU when they are in geographical proximity. However, it is interesting to note that even if the absolute number of the category Others is mostly recorded, the probability to be sanctioned is for EU's neighboring countries still significantly higher. The converse can be seen in the table: countries of the category Others are more often sorted to indirect security related issue. Thus, from the absolute 17 cases from the period 2004-2015 13 are sorted to the category Others, which is with three cases higher than in Portela´s research; in her study, there were only ten cases presented.

Thus, the last fifth hypothesis can be verified: If a country is not in geographical proximity to the EU (category Others), the probability is higher to be sorted to the indirect security related category.

Table 3: Geographic distribution of targets and conflict type, sorted between the periods 1987-2003 and 2004-2015.

Countries/ Regions	Eastern Europe		Southern Mediterranean		Others		All Countries		
Objective of sanctions	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2003	2004-2015	1987-2015
Peace keeping and stabilization missions	6	3	0	6	0	12	6	21	**27**
Terrorism	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	**6**
Support of Peace Process	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	**4**
Directly security related	**8**	**3**	**3**	**9**	**0**	**14**	**11**	**26**	**37**
Promotion of democracy	1	1	0	1	5	9	6	11	**17**
Support of HR	3	2	0	0	5	4	8	6	**14**
Indirectly security Related	**4**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**10**	**13**	**14**	**17**	**31**
Total	**12**	**6**	**3**	**10**	**10**	**27**	**25**	**43**	**68**

Source: Table based on dataset of European Commission – Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU) (Version 18.03.2015) and Clara Portela: "Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?"*, Politique Européenne*, Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005).

5.Conclusion

This article analyzed the reasons for the correlation between the EU sanction policy and its geographic vicinity. The analysis approach is based on Portela´s research.[41] Thus, in order to ensure a better comparison this analysis used the same methodic, categories and wordings as in Portela´s research, with some additions. In each subchapter of the analysis 4.1-4.5 a hypothesis has been drafted which derived from Portela´s work. Hereinafter, the hypotheses are listed in verified and non-verified, before the article returns to discuss the research question.

1. Conflict type in target countries
"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions in situations that are indirectly relevant to security."
2. Subject of sanction in target countries
"The EU has increasingly imposed sanctions to promote objectives indirectly relevant to security."
3. Geographic location of target countries

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[41] Portela, Clara "Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?", *Politique Européenne*, Vol. 3, Nº 17 (2005), p. 83.

"The closer a region is to the EU, the higher the frequency of EU sanctions regimes."
    4.   Geographic location and conflict type
"The closer a target is located to the EU, the more the directly security-related context is recorded."
    5.   Geographic location and subject of sanctions
"The further a target is located to the EU, the more it relates to the indirectly security-related object type."

The results of this research show that three of the five hypotheses can be verified and two falsified. This result is comparable to that explored by Portela. Therefore, returning to the research question posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state the geographic vicinity is still an important factor for the EU when it comes to sanctions. However, the absolute number of EU sanction against faraway states nearly trebled (1987-2003: seven cases; 2004-2015: 19 cases), simultaneously the probability increased that neighbor states of the EU are sanctioned (see chapter 4.3.). Herein exists a significant positive correlation between conflict type and the objective: Countries in European vicinity are significantly often dedicated to direct security related issues (see chapter 4.1.). The correlation is interesting because it increased since the Arabic revolutions begun.

However, there are a number of important differences between the current research and Portela´s analysis. The findings of the current study, according to the division of conflict types, do not support the previous research: In Portela´s research there have been from seven of 13 cases assigned to the category post-conflict in Eastern Europe, whereas in the current study from 25 cases 17 were counted to the category continuing conflict. Furthermore, the objectives therefore are also often in the field of direct security related field (see chapter 4.2.). Thus, the implication is then that the countries of the category Others are more often associated with indirect security related issues (see Chapter 4.5.). 17 cases between 2004-2014 are assigned to the category Others, which is with three cases higher than in Portela´s research; she sorted 10 countries in this category (see chapter 4.5.).

Further, it should be mentioned that the component of the violation of EU values in the direct security related category also plays a significant role; the EU mentions the violation for most of the cases, also when they are direct security related. Thus, the question "where and why (objective) the EU imposed sanction between 2004-2015 and exits further a correlation to its geographic vicinity" is clearly to be answered: There is still a correlation between A) the conflict in the destination country, B) the objective of sanctions and C) the geographical proximity. The EU levied maxim from the document ESS is valid: „Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important."[42]

Furthermore, the geographic location overlaps with the ENP area as well as most of the target countries have been before a colony of an European State. The present study confirms previous findings and contributes additional evidence that suggests that the EU sanction policy became an integral part of the European foreign policy, in regional as well as in global view. It significantly increased since the EU stated its sanction policy in the key-document "Basic Principles" (compare chapter 4.3.). Summarized, the focus of imposed EU sanction regimes are still in geographic vicinity, but at the same time the international sanction against far away states significantly increased, in particular according to defending EU and international rights. Portela emphases the normative character of EU sanctions outside the immediate vicinity: *"(…) EU unilateral sanctions [are] to promote 'flagship' objectives*

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[42] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12.12.2003, p. 8.

of European foreign policy: human rights and democracy."[43] Karen Smith[44] stresses the defending of international human rights might be a conclusion of the EU to defend also the security of the EU or at least the international rules. Overall, this study strengthens the idea that the EU expended its sanctions against far away countries. Further, the study of the PSIG showed, that the use of sanctions is a foreign instrument to punish governments or states, but it has to be used more dedicate: *"Closer coordination between sanctions and other policy instruments could be beneficial, including closer synchronisation with mediation efforts, referrals to legal tribunals and more creative use of assistance to member states and sectors negatively affected by sanctions. A more strategic use of the threat of sanctions could also be useful."[45]* Consequently, the EU might use sanction in future as a foreign instrument to shape the international relations. Probably, sanction regimes of the EU would be more effective if they are combined with other policies and stronger international cooperation with third states or organizations. Otherwise, sanctions could lose its deterrent. Finally, the EU sanction policy remains to be a relevant research field. Another possible area of future research would be to investigate if the European sanction policy leads to a more coherent common European foreign policy in context of Europeanization.

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