

Grupo de Investigación UCM  
*Métodos de Inferencia Causal y Representación Científica*

Complutense Research Group  
*Methods of Causal Inference and Scientific Representation*

**Alan Hájek**  
(Australian National University, ANU)

## “Against Similarity Accounts of Counterfactuals”

Lunes, 24 de Junio de 2013, 17:00 hrs  
*Monday 24 June 2013, 17:00 hrs*

Seminario del Departamento de Lógica y  
Filosofía de la Ciencia.  
Facultad de Filosofía, Edificio “B”.  
Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

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Más Información /For further information:  
Mauricio Suárez (msuarez@filos.ucm.es)

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Alan Hájek (ANU): "Against Similarity Accounts of Counterfactuals"

Abstract: Widespread agreement among philosophers on a given topic is rare. However, it is enjoyed by similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly, they say that the counterfactual

*if p were the case, q would be the case*

is true if and only if at the nearest *p*-worlds, *q* is true.

I disagree with this account, for many reasons.