

Grupo de Investigación UCM  
*Métodos de Inferencia Causal y Representación Científica*

Complutense Research Group  
*Methods of Causal Inference and Scientific Representation*

**Francesca Pero**  
(University of Florence)

**“Varieties of Misrepresentation and  
Isomorphism”**

Martes, 1 de abril de 2014, 15:00 hrs  
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Seminario del Departamento de Lógica y  
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Francesca Pero (University of Florence): "Varieties of Misrepresentation and Isomorphism"  
(joint work with Mauricio Suárez)

In this paper we examine Andreas Bartels' (2006) defence of the structural account of scientific representation and show that the theory of homomorphism he provides fails to account for misrepresentation. The reason for such failure, we argue, is twofold. First, according to the very theory provided by Bartels, homomorphism is not necessary for misrepresentation. Second, what Bartels is actually defending is epimorphism. Both epimorphism and homomorphism do not account for at least one of the three ways in which misrepresentation can occur, here identified with abstracting, lying and pretending. Given that misrepresentation is an intrinsic feature of representing in science, failure of accounting for it undermines the tenability of Bartels' approach. Given also that Bartels' is the last among the structural accounts whose tenability is still to be evaluated, showing its failure might definitely undermine the structuralist view of scientific representation tout court.