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## **POLAND'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES**

(Jakub Zajączkowski, coord.)

*Katarzyna  
Kolodziejczyk*

Poland in the European Union.  
Ten Years of Membership

*Paula  
Marcinkowska*

European Neighbourhood Policy, A Polish Perspective

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German-Polish relations. Political and economic aspects

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## **NOTA EDITORIAL / EDITOR'S NOTE**

**Antonio Marquina<sup>1</sup>**

*Director de UNISCI*

The UNISCI Journal reaches the number 40, a milestone after 13 years of existence. Let me emphasize again that this journal, indexed in more than twenty databases, including Scopus, is the result of a meritorious effort of the UNISCI team. It has not received any financial or economic support by the Complutense University. And, in order to avoid any possible misinterpretation, it is not owned by the University.

This special issue is devoted to Poland's foreign and security policy. It also includes an interesting article by Professor Rohan Gunaratna on global terrorism and its prospects in 2016.

The journal wishes to thank in a very special way to the Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University, for all the contributions to this issue which try to explain the main aspects of the Polish European policies. It will be instrumental for improving our understanding- in Europe and outside of Europe- of the new foreign and security policies of Poland, an increasingly important State in the European Union, with well-defined interests.

This issue, coordinated by professor Jakub Zajączkowski, Chairman of the Scientific Board of the Institute of International Relations, thus presents several studies that clarify the policies and priorities of Poland within the European Union, its perspective on the European neighborhood policy, the new orientations in relation to States historically problematic, such as Germany and Russia, and, in particular, its relations with Ukraine

To these central articles, two other studies are added, the first one tries to clarify the main orientations of Poland's foreign and security policies, and the second, a very novel study, shows the evolution of international relations studies in Poland, their historic conditionality and the increasing autonomy of these studies. Thus, the reader now has a fairly comprehensive view of Poland's foreign and security policy and can understand the potential of this State in Europe and its future projection.

Finally, the article by professor Rohan Gunaratna explains the transformation of ISIS, the dynamics of its expansion and the future trajectory of the threat. He considers that ISIS has sustained itself so far due mostly to inaction or ineffective response, but it will be naïve to believe that groups like ISIS can overthrow the existing world order.

Let me again give my thanks to professor Jakub Zajączkowski for their support in the preparation of this issue and to the Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University,

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and its professors who have contributed to enriching our knowledge on key aspects of the Poland's foreign policy and security, an increasingly important State in Europe.





## POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. TEN YEARS OF MEMBERSHIP

Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk<sup>2</sup>  
University of Warsaw

### Abstract:

Twelve years have passed since the Polish entry into the European Union. For Poland the date of 1 May 2004 is the culmination of a transformation process launched at the end of the Cold War in 1989. One of the priorities of Polish foreign policy, the expansion of the political, economic and cultural relations with Western Europe and the United States has been met. This approach has been described as 'the return to Europe'. Membership in the European Union changed the Polish economy and the new politics opened up new opportunities for businesses and citizens. The aim of the article is to analyze the balance of the Polish membership in the European Union in the economic, financial, political and social dimensions.

**Abstract:** Poland, European Union, economic adjustments, exports and imports, financial flows, Polish presidency of the EU, Eastern Partnership, economic and social benefits.

### Resumen:

*Doce años han pasado desde la entrada de Polonia en la Unión Europea. Para Polonia, la fecha del 1 de mayo de 2004 supone la culminación de un proceso de transformación impulsado al final de la guerra fría en 1989. Una de las prioridades de la política exterior de Polonia que era la ampliación de las relaciones políticas, económicas y culturales con Europa Occidental y los Estados Unidos se ha llevado a cabo. Esta orientación ha sido descrita como "la vuelta a Europa". La pertenencia a la Unión Europea cambió la economía de Polonia y la nueva política abrió nuevas oportunidades para las empresas y los ciudadanos. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar las ventajas e inconvenientes de la pertenencia de Polonia a la Unión Europea en sus aspectos económicos, financieros, políticos y sociales.*

**Palabras clave:** *Polonia, Unión Europea, ajustes económicos, exportaciones e importaciones, flujos financieros, Presidencia polaca de la UE, Asociación Oriental, beneficios económicos y sociales.*

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## 1. Introduction

On 1 May 2014, Poland became a member of the European Union (EU), concluding the long process of striving to join this organisation. These efforts had been initiated by the international transformations of the ‘Autumn of Nations’ that resulted in an essential redefinition of Polish foreign policy, manifested in a purely pro-Western orientation and striving towards integration with Western European institutions. Formed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September 1989, the first non-Communist government set expanding political, economic and cultural relations with Western Europe and the United States as one of the priorities for Polish foreign policy. This approach was referred to as ‘the return to Europe’.<sup>3</sup>

Poland established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) in September 1988, and in the following year, on 19 September, it signed the first agreement with the EEC on trade and economic partnership. This agreement was important for the country’s systemic transformation and the crumbling trade exchange within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Even though the conclusion of the association agreement between Poland and the European Community (EC) on 16 December 1991 did not provide Poland with any guarantee of future membership, it constituted the foundation for the further development of relations with the EC because it established an institutional and legal framework for long-term economic, political, social, and cultural cooperation.

The Polish application for membership to the European Union was launched on 8 April 1994. Having obtained a positive assessment from the European Commission, Poland was invited to the accession negotiations at the European Council meeting held in Luxembourg on 12–13 December 1997. The negotiations were concluded on 13 December 2002, and the Accession Treaty was signed on 13 April 2003. Once the ratification procedure was completed, Poland joined the EU on 1 May 2004 with nine other countries.

More than a decade has passed since then, and Poles quickly got accustomed to EU membership. Polish enterprises have entered into competition with companies from other countries in the single market, employees from Poland seek employment in other EU Member States, students benefit from EU scholarships, and common ordinary Poles cross borders as fully-fledged members of the Schengen area. The fears of losing sovereignty, of Polish land being purchased away by foreigners or of a demise of Polish agriculture have not realised. Instead, after slightly more than a decade, Poland made a significant leap forward and is now the leader of economic growth in the EU. The symbolical crowning achievement so far was the appointment of Donald Tusk to the office of President of the European Council in the tenth year after accession.

Of course, the outcome of Poland’s membership in the EU includes some costs, but overall they have become beneficial for Poland because the adjustments to EU standards have supported the country’s modernisation. The aim of this article is to analyse the effects of Poland’s membership in the EU and to assess the costs and losses it has entailed. The underlying assumption, however, is that the decision to try and obtain EU membership was the best possible decision in terms of the Polish *raison d’état*. For the purpose of the analysis, the article has been divided into three parts. The first part concerns issues connected with the economic and financial dimension of Poland’s membership in the EU, followed by an assessment of political gains and losses resulting from membership. The main reason for this design is that the EU has an exceptionally well-developed policy concerning a broadly defined economic integration, in contrast to the Common Foreign and Security Policy

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
<sup>3</sup> Mazowiecki, Tadeusz: "Powrót do Europy. Przemówienie na forum Rady Europy w Strasburgu" (A Return to Europe. A Speech Held in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg), *Znak*, No. 416, Kraków (January 1990), pp. 3-9.

(CFSP). The third analysed area is social issues, a basic element in any comprehensive evaluation of Poland's membership.

## 2. Economic and Financial Aspects of Poland's Membership in the EU

Poland began its relations with the EU as a post-communist and backward country taking its first steps on the path of systemic transformation from a central planned economy to market economy. The accession to the EU, 15 years after the transformation process had been launched, provided some hope for faster economic growth, but, at the same time, gave rise to anxiety and concerns for the competition from companies in other EU Member States. Economists expected that benefits and tangible economic results appear after a relatively long period of time (around 20 to 25 years after accession). However, within a single decade, Poland has become the European leader in economic growth and during its EU membership has experienced always a positive economic growth.

**Table 1. Percentage Changes of Polish GDP Year over Year**



Source: Data from [www.euro-dane.com](http://www.euro-dane.com)

In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is the most popular measure of the overall size of the economy, with the value of EUR 413 billion, Poland holds the eighth place in the EU in terms of nominal GDP, after Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden (data available for 2014). Compared to the first five greater EU economies, the gap is immense and virtually impossible to overcome; for example, in 2014, Germany's GDP in current prices was EUR 2,904 billion (see Table 2). In terms of GDP at purchasing power parity per capita, an indicator used to assess the living standards, with the value of EUR 10,700, Poland holds only the 24<sup>th</sup> place, followed by Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. This figure is below the EU average, which in 2014 was EUR 27,300



(see Table 2). Nevertheless, the success of the Polish economy is huge because, after the country's accession to the EU, Polish GDP increased by almost a half (48.7%). GDP at purchasing power parity per capita in 2003 was 48.8 per cent of the EU average, and now it is 66.9 per cent,<sup>4</sup> which means that economic growth has sped up the process of eliminating development-related disparities.

**Table 2. GDP in Current Prices in 2003–04 and 2012–14**

	GDP					GDP per capita						
	(billion EUR)					(billion PPS)			(PPS, EU-28 = 100)			
	2003	2004	2012	2013	2014	2003	2012 (*)	2013	2003	2012 (*)	2013	2014
EU-28	10 490	11 016	13 426	13 520	13 921	10 490	13 426	13 520	100	100	100	27 300
Euro area (EA-19)	7 825	8 157	9 846	9 931	10 111	7 599	9 607	9 621	109	107	107	29 800
Belgium	282	298	388	395	402	271	350	351	123	120	119	36 000
Bulgaria	19	21	41	41	42	55	87	86	33	45	45	5 800
Czech Republic	88	96	161	157	155	169	229	230	77	82	82	14 700
Denmark	193	202	251	253	257	142	185	186	124	125	124	45 600
Germany	2 217	2 268	2 750	2 809	2 904	2 040	2 661	2 673	116	123	122	35 200
Estonia	9	10	18	19	20	15	25	26	52	71	73	14 800
Ireland	145	155	173	175	185	121	158	159	141	130	130	40 200
Greece	179	193	194	182	179	219	217	214	93	74	73	16 300
Spain	803	861	1 055	1 049	1 058	901	1 166	1 165	100	94	94	22 800
France	1 637	1 711	2 091	2 114	2 142	1 474	1 863	1 869	111	107	107	32 400
Croatia	31	33	44	44	43	51	69	69	56	61	61	10 200
Italy	1 391	1 449	1 615	1 609	1 616	1 376	1 608	1 595	112	101	99	26 600
Cyprus	13	14	19	18	18	14	21	20	94	93	89	20 500
Latvia	10	12	22	23	24	22	32	34	45	60	64	12 100
Lithuania	:	18	33	35	36	:	55	57	48	69	73	12 400
Luxembourg	26	28	44	45	:	23	37	37	240	264	257	:
Hungary	75	83	99	101	103	133	170	174	62	65	66	10 500
Malta	5	5	7	8	8	7	9	10	82	84	86	18 600
Netherlands	506	520	641	643	655	461	587	586	133	132	131	38 900
Austria	231	242	317	323	329	220	288	289	127	129	128	38 500
Poland	192	205	386	396	413	388	670	689	48	66	67	10 700
Portugal	146	152	168	169	173	175	211	217	78	76	79	16 600
Romania	53	61	134	144	150	142	281	289	31	53	55	7 500
Slovenia	26	28	36	36	37	35	44	45	83	82	82	18 100
Slovakia	30	35	72	74	75	63	106	108	55	74	75	13 900
Finland	152	158	200	202	204	127	166	164	114	115	113	37 400
Sweden	293	307	423	436	429	242	318	324	127	126	127	44 300
United Kingdom	1 720	1 850	2 041	2 017	2 222	1 568	1 810	1 852	123	107	109	34 400
Iceland	10	11	11	12	13	8	10	10	126	116	119	39 500
Norway	202	213	397	393	377	150	253	252	154	190	186	73 400
Switzerland	312	317	518	516	:	225	340	348	136	162	163	:
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	39	40	:
FYR of Macedonia	4	5	8	8	:	11	19	20	27	34	36	:
Albania	:	:	:	:	:	:	21	:	:	28	28	:
Serbia	19	20	32	34	33	:	70	70	:	37	37	:
Turkey	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	35	52	53	:
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	28	29	:
Japan	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	111	102	103	:
United States	10 176	9 868	12 580	12 626	13 112	9 704	12 289	12 662	157	148	150	41 100

(\*) Break in series.

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nama\_10\_gdp, nama\_10\_pc and tec00114)

Source: Eurostat: *Statistics Explained*, at [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat)

The source of the Polish economic success lies in the growth of the export sector, inflow of foreign direct investments, structural funds, as well as strong domestic demand and improved productivity. Polish exports, however, have become the real driving force behind economic development, which is consistent with the international approach to the notion of development, where trade plays the key role. Starting with 1989, Poland successfully

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014): *Poland's 10 years in European Union. Report*, Warsaw, p. 66, at [www.ms.gov.pl](http://www.ms.gov.pl). More on the Polish economy: Piątkowski, Marcin: "Poland's New Golden Age. Shifting from Europe's Periphery to Its Center", *Policy Research Working Papers* No. 6639, The World Bank (October 2013).



implemented the task of opening its economy to the world and perceived the EU countries as its natural trade partners. For Polish businesses, Poland's accession to the EU meant that they would be subject to the free movement of goods. Although the Association Agreement that paved the way to the accession, established a free trade area between Poland and the European Community, it excluded food and agricultural products, and these were the goods that experienced the most significant increase in the exports to the EU. In 2004–2014 Polish exports to the EU almost tripled, increasing from EUR 48.4 billion to 125.2 billion, a 4.3 per cent of total intra-EU exports (in 2004, it was 2.3 per cent) and put Poland in the eighth place among the leading exporters in intra-EU trade. For Polish exporters, the EU market is the main sales market and accounts for approximately 75 per cent of total Polish exports. Five years after accession to the EU, Poland recorded a trade surplus in trade exchange with other EU countries for the first time. It was a considerable success, given the fact that it had been experiencing a trade deficit since the conclusion of the Association Agreement. In 2004, the trade deficit with the EU was EUR 5.85 billion, but ten years later, the trade balance shifted to a surplus of EUR 11.07 billion.<sup>5</sup> Poland's exports to the EU market include electro-machinery products (37%), products of the chemical industry (14.2%), food and agricultural products (13.8%), and metallurgical products (11.4%).<sup>6</sup> Among these groups of commodities, as mentioned above, it was the food and agricultural products that have achieved a spectacular success. Since Poland became a member of the EU, the volume of exports of these goods to the EU increased more than fivefold, and the value rose from 16 billion euro to 22,7 billion euro. Poland became the leader in exports of rye, frozen fruit (strawberries), poultry, eggs, juice, fruit preserves, and tinned vegetables. Additionally, on 1 May 2004, Poland became one of the EU's leaders in exports of household appliances, furniture, products of the automotive industry, yachts and boats, TV sets and LCD displays and cosmetics.<sup>7</sup>

However, as regards the opportunity to enter the markets of non-EU countries provided by the EU's Common Commercial Policy and the EU agreements with third countries, Poland used this last one to a much lesser extent. Poland's exports in the EU's external trade increased from EUR 11.8 billion in 2004 to EUR 37.7 billion in 2014. However at present, exports to non-EU countries comprise around 25 per cent of total Polish exports. In the period under analysis, Poland's trade deficit with third countries was increasing as well, growing from EUR 5.92 to 13.51 billion.<sup>8</sup> These results, nevertheless, leave Polish exporters with opportunities to seek greater benefits in foreign markets; even more so as the EU presently has negotiated or is in the process of negotiation of the highest number of trade agreements in the world, ensuring mutual access to markets (for example, it has signed agreements with Mexico, Chile, Singapore, South Korea, the ACP countries, and Canada, and is currently negotiating one with the United States).

Contrary to the predictions of the opponents of Poland's accession to the EU, Poland's participation in the common market has not led to the demise of Polish entrepreneurship. Instead, Polish companies have skilfully taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the common market and quickly adjusted to the EU rules on technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Ten years after the accession, one in three (32%) of Polish small, medium and large enterprises engages in export activities. Most of them are active in industry, trade, transport, professional and service activity, and construction.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the development of Polish

<sup>5</sup> Eurostat: *Intra EU-27 trade, by Member States, total product*, data of 2.03.2015, at [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat)

<sup>6</sup> *Polska 2014. Raport o stanie handlu zagranicznego* (Poland 2014. A Report on the State of Foreign Trade), Ministry of Economy, Warszawa 2014, p. 43, at [www.mg.gov.pl](http://www.mg.gov.pl)

<sup>7</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014): *Poland's 10 years in...op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>8</sup> Eurostat: *Extra EU-27 trade, by Member States, total product*, data of 02.03.2015, at [www.ec.europaa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europaa.eu/eurostat)

<sup>9</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014): *Poland's 10 years in...op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.





business had a positive effect on the evolution of the services sector both in Poland and in the EU market. Many Polish companies provide services, which, in turn, contributed to structural changes of the Polish economy, leading to a situation typical of the developed market economies: increased significance of the service sector in employment and GDP generation at the expense of agriculture. At present, 57.6 per cent of workers in Poland are employed in the services sector (while 30.8% are employed in industry and 11% in agriculture), which generates 64 per cent of the Polish GDP.<sup>10</sup> Analysing statistical data, we notice, however, that Poland has taken advantage of the opportunities brought by the free movement of services that has been in force in the EU since 1 January 1993 only to a limited extent (compared to the trade in goods). The value of Polish exports in intra-EU trade is EUR 22.5 billion, which is only 2.7 per cent of total internal EU exchange; the value of imports is EUR 19.7 billion, that is 2.6 per cent. Poland's results in exports of services to the EU market is unfavourable compared to those of smaller economies (e.g.: Belgium 6.6%, Ireland 6.3%, Austria 37%) and absolutely incomparable to the results of the large economies (e.g.: Germany 112%, the UK 79.6%, Spain 75.7%).<sup>11</sup> Moreover, Poland has not yet taken advantage of the opportunities provided by the EU's trade agreements with third countries, to which Poland has been a party since its accession to the Union. These agreements remove trade barriers not only in the movement of goods but also in services, pursuant to Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Poland's share in the EU's overall international exchange of services is negligible. Its share in EU exports of services to third countries amounts to a mere EUR 7.7 billion, which constitutes only a 1.1 per cent share in total exports of services in the EU's exchange with third countries. In imports, the amount is EUR 5.3 billion, which is 1.0 per cent of total imports.<sup>12</sup> These figures should give Polish companies wider opportunities to search for markets, especially given the fact that an agreement with Canada, among others, and EPAs with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa) are expected to be ratified soon and perhaps trade negotiations with the United States will be completed as well.

Poland's accession to the EU undoubtedly attracted foreign direct investments (FDI). This is because EU membership increases the attractiveness of countries, makes them more credible to investors and guarantees observance of EU law. All this, combined with Poland's good economic results and political stability, has attracted foreign capital in substantial quantities. The figure is higher than those of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

**Table 3. Net FDI Inflow to Poland between 2003 and 2013**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Value (EUR billion)</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Value (EUR billion)</b>
2003	4.08	2009	9.34
2004	10.23	2010	10.50

<sup>10</sup> Data from: [www.rynekpracy.org.pl](http://www.rynekpracy.org.pl). In 1990, the agricultural sector employed 22% workers, and in 1995 the service sector employed 46% workers. This share is constantly growing.

<sup>11</sup> Eurostat: *Contribution to intra EU-28 trade in services, 2013*, data of 25.08.2014, at [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat)

<sup>12</sup> Eurostat: *Contribution to extra EU-28 trade in services, 2013*, data of 16.05.2014, at [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat)



2005	8.33	2011	14.89
2006	15.74	2012	4.76
2007	17.24	2013	2.20
2008	10.12	2014	no data

Source: Response of the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Economy to interpellation No. 21594 on FDI inflow to Poland, [www.orka2.sejm.gov.pl](http://www.orka2.sejm.gov.pl)

As shown in Table 3, the difference in FDI inflow between 2003 and 2004, when Poland became a member of the EU, is significant. Top FDI inflow was recorded in 2006 and 2007 as well as 2011, when they reached EUR 15.7 billion, 17.2 billion and 14.8 billion, respectively. The worse results in 2012 and 2013 were caused primarily by the economic crisis in the euro area, as its members are among the chief investors in Poland (90% of total commitments, of which Germany accounts for 17%, the Netherlands for 16%, France for 12%, and Luxembourg for 10%). Furthermore, capital in transit was withdrawn, special purpose entities were closed down and equity interest of foreign investors was withdrawn as well.<sup>13</sup> Still, in 2013 the aggregated value of FDI in Poland was EUR 160 billion, which means an almost fourfold growth compared to EUR 44 billion in 2004. Almost 32 per cent of commitments under FDI were the result of investments in industrial processing (manufacturing of metal products, food products, beverages, tobacco products, vehicles), 24 per cent in financial and insurance activity, and 14 per cent in retail and wholesale, repair of cars and motorcycles.<sup>14</sup> Without going into details of the impact of FDI on the Polish economy, we can generally state that they contributed to an increase in the production efficiency, to the general modernisation of the Polish economy and to an increase in exports since the share of entities with foreign capital in the value of Polish exports is approximately 60 per cent.<sup>15</sup>

When conducting an analysis of the economic and financial gains and losses related to Poland's membership in the EU, one cannot omit financial flows from the EU. In the 134 months of Poland's membership in the EU (as of 30 June 2015), Poland received a total amount of EUR 119.8 billion from the EU budget. In the same period, Poland contributed a total of EUR 37.6 billion to the EU budget and returned EUR 143 million of unspent funds. The balance is a surplus of EUR 82 billion.<sup>16</sup> Poland received from the EU Cohesion Policy, EUR 76.4 billion, from agricultural policy, 39 billion, and 4.4 billion from other transfers.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> National Bank of Poland (March 2015): *Polskie i zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w 2013 r. (Polish and Foreign Direct Investments in 2013)*, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup> GUS (April 2014): *Poland in the European Union 2004-2014*, p. 58, at: [www.stat.gov.pl](http://www.stat.gov.pl)

<sup>15</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014): *Poland's 10 years in...op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>16</sup> Ministry of Finance: *Transfery finansowe pomiędzy Polską a UE według stanu na dzień 30 czerwca 2015 r. (Financial Transfers between Poland and the EU as of 30 June 2015)*, [www.mf.gov.pl](http://www.mf.gov.pl)

<sup>17</sup> The 'other transfers' mean movements of capital related to EU programmes, including: Socrates, Erasmus, Youth, Leonardo da Vinci. Statistical data based on: Ministry of Finance: *Zestawienie transferów finansowych budżet UE-Polska (Financial Transfers between the EU Budget and Poland)*, at [www.mf.gov.pl](http://www.mf.gov.pl).

**Table 4. Funds Received from the European Union (in EUR) in the First 10 years of Membership**

	1.05.2004–31.12.2014
Funds from the EU budget	<b>109.6 billion</b>
Polish contribution to the EU budget	35 billion
Funds returned to the EU	143 million
BALANCE	74.3 billion

Source: Own compilation on the basis of data published by the Ministry of Finance for 2004–2014, at: [www.mf.gov.pl](http://www.mf.gov.pl)

Since Poland became a member of the European Union, the funds provided by the EU budget have been regularly increasing – from EUR 2.47 billion in 2004 to EUR 17.12 billion in 2014 – and have become an exceptionally important factor stimulating Poland’s economic growth. Poland has become the major net beneficiary of EU funds among the new Member States and since 2011, among all the Member States. The funds allocated to Poland for 2014–2020 (approx. EUR 119.5 billion) will allow it to maintain this position. The increasing amount of funding from the EU budget is, however, explained by a very high degree of absorption, which exceeds the EU average (60.8%) by 6 per cent and the average for Central and Eastern Europe (58.4%) by 8.4 per cent.<sup>18</sup> Poland skilfully took advantage of the opportunities provided by pre-accession programmes, quickly learning how to write applications, training administration staff and creating (in 2005) a separate ministry responsible for the use of funds provided by the EU (Ministry of Regional Development).<sup>19</sup> More than 170 000 projects have been executed under Cohesion Policy, which enabled the development of road infrastructure, environmental protection infrastructure as well as gas, electricity and energy infrastructure. Furthermore, support has been provided to enterprises, business environment institutions, universities and research and cultural centres, and the network of new e-services has been expanded.<sup>20</sup>

EU funds have also been provided to farmers and fishermen under the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy. Farmers, a group that used to be the most sceptical of Poland’s accession to the EU, are currently considered the greatest beneficiaries of the EU membership. Between May 2004 and the end of December 2014, Polish rural areas received EUR 39 billion, including 21.3 billion in direct subsidies and 15.6 billion for rural development. Thanks to EU funds and the policy of the Polish government, Polish agriculture has been thoroughly modernised. The real value of agricultural production increased by 50 per cent, and Polish farms generate production that according to global value (in current prices) places Polish farming on the 7<sup>th</sup> place in the EU, following France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands.<sup>21</sup> Poland has become an important

<sup>18</sup> Data from: *Poland’s 10 years in...op. cit.*, p. 146.

<sup>19</sup> Presently the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development

<sup>20</sup> More on the projects at [www.funduszeuropejskie.gov.pl](http://www.funduszeuropejskie.gov.pl) and in the report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Poland’s 10 years in European Union, op. cit.*, pp. 144-159.

<sup>21</sup> Poland is in the 1<sup>st</sup> place in terms of production of apples, triticale and black current; 2<sup>nd</sup> in terms of rye, champignons, potatoes and berries. 3<sup>rd</sup> place in the production of rape, sugar beets, butter, poultry meat. Data according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, at [www.minrol.gov.pl](http://www.minrol.gov.pl)





exporter of food and agricultural products; the value of these exports has increased fivefold, from EUR 4 billion in 2004 to 21.3 billion in 2014. A particularly important element of rural areas transformation are the structural changes that took place after Poland joined the EU. Compared with data from 2002, there was a 25 per cent decrease in the number of the smallest farms (0–5 ha of agricultural area) and a 34 per cent increase in the number of the largest farms (of 50 ha and more). The number of farms in the 20–50 ha group remained unchanged. Furthermore, between 2003 and 2013, the number of people employed in agriculture decreased by approximately 13.4 per cent.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, since the accession, the income of farmers has increased threefold, but there is still a visible income gap between farmers and other professional groups. Finally, the level of satisfaction among inhabitants of rural areas is rising, as is their acceptance of the EU – from a mere 39 per cent in 2004 to 71 per cent in 2014. Similar changes have taken place in the fishing sector, which has undergone a thorough restructuring since Poland's accession to the EU and has experienced an expansion of harbour infrastructure and the modernisation of fish processing. Although the changes were often painful and despite protests of workers employed in the fishing sector and the introduction of fishing quotas, the value of production increased by 190 per cent, and in 2012 the overall number of available jobs in the fishing industry was 12 per cent higher than in 2003.<sup>23</sup> To sum up, the transformations caused by different types of EU funds can be observed all over Poland, in small towns, large cities and villages alike, and they are a tangible proof of the positive changes resulting from Poland's membership in the EU.

### **3. Political Aspects of Poland's Membership in the EU**

When Poland became a full-fledged member of the European Union, Polish authorities were given opportunities to influence the integration processes taking place within this organisation. Poland became a co-host of Europe rather than its supplicant.<sup>24</sup> It received full rights allowing it to exert real influence for shaping the EU, its internal and external policy and the institutional system. The first years after accession (until November 2007) were not the most fortunate ones for Poland as regards the political dimension of the membership. When rightist groups rose to power in October 2005, Poland stubbornly defended the Nice voting system, without being supported by any other country or EU institution. By spreading slogans such as 'Nicea albo śmierć' ('Nice or death') or putting forward proposals of a 'square root model' for counting votes in the EU Council, Poland made a diplomatic mistake because the change of the double majority decision-making system had been a closed chapter ever since March 2004, when the then governing Centre-Left coalition had agreed to the content of the constitutional Treaty. Even though the departure from the Nice system is not beneficial to Poland, which could justify the position of the Polish rightist government, the fact that it remained obstinate and completely alone gave rise to considerable dislike for Poland in the EU institutions, the then President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pötering and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.<sup>25</sup> A similar fate awaited the Polish initiative put forward by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in January 2006,

<sup>22</sup> Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (April 2014): *Polski sektor rolno-żywnościowy i obszary wiejskie po 10 latach członkostwa w UE – przegląd najważniejszych zmian* (Polish Food and Agriculture Sector and Rural Areas after 10 Years of EU Membership – An Overview of the Major Changes), at [www.minrol.gov.pl](http://www.minrol.gov.pl)

<sup>23</sup> Data from: *Poland's 10 years in...op. cit.*, p. 185.

<sup>24</sup> Office of the Committee for European Integration (2009): *5 years of Poland in European Union*, Warszawa, p. 378.

<sup>25</sup> More to be found in: Kołodziejczyk Katarzyna (2010): "Poland's innovativeness and creativity in the European Union", in Bieleń, S. (ed.) (2010): *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Warszawa, pp. 145-155.



concerning the establishment of the European Energy Security Treaty by the countries of the EU and NATO. The proposal was aimed at developing a mechanism that would ensure that in the event of threats to energy security in any EU, the other countries would have to come to its aid, excluding armed intervention. The core of the pact would be the 'one for all, all for one' principle. However, also in this case the Polish proposal was rejected – both in the EU and NATO. It can be debated whether the proposal was reasonable or not, taking into consideration that it was presented after the interruptions in the supply of gas from Russia to EU countries through the territory of Ukraine, at the turn of 2005 and 2006; surely its biggest flaw was the manner in which it was proposed, namely with no prior diplomatic consultation in the EU or NATO and alongside a Commission proposal on energy policy presented in a Green Paper in March 2006. Naturally, no country could accept the way it was done, all the more so as the proposal concerned a very sensitive political issues embedded in energy security and in the relations with Russia.

The poor political experience in the first years after accession was an excellent lesson, and Poland was able to learn from it. The coalition of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People's Party (PSL) that governed Poland from November 2007 departed from the practice of the previous government and started creating or joining coalitions on various issues in the EU. The composition of these coalitions depended on the subject that was being negotiated. The 'alliances' of the so called 'friends of cohesion' during the negotiation of the multiannual financial frameworks 2007–2013 and 2014–2020 are an example of such a coalition. The group was composed of the countries that benefited the most from the EU's Cohesion Policy, that is the new Member States as well as Portugal, Greece and Spain (the latter also cooperated with the 'net contributors' group). Despite the large number of members and their diverging interests, Poland tried to use the group as an instrument of support for maintaining budgetary decisions as favourable as possible. This was particularly important during the negotiations on the EU's spending in 2014–2020, given the attempts of the net contributors to reduce it, also at the cost of Cohesion Policy; moreover, the negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of economic crisis and growing problems in the euro area. At that time, Poland became the leader of this group. It organised the group's meetings and strived to keep Spain within it following the 2012 Spanish elections, which led to a change in the ruling power. Surely Poland's activity in this regard, supported by many other EU countries achieved several objectives: EU budget cuts relatively low compared to the initial proposals, the adoption of the multiannual financial framework without a delay that could threaten timely payments for the Member States, and a positive result in the financial negotiations for Poland itself. In the last case, apart from having the backing of other countries, Poland had very strong assets, given its economic growth, even under economic crisis, and its high spending of EU funds.

Another example of a successful coalition initiated by Poland, this time with Sweden, was the Eastern Partnership, launched on 7 May 2009. Next to the efforts to join NATO and the EU, the Eastern Policy was one of the key priorities of Polish foreign policy. Poland's interest and involvement in the events taking place in the East had been an integral part of Polish foreign policy since 1989 (e.g.: the Rose Revolution in Georgia of 2003–2004, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of 2004–2005). At the same time, the goal behind Poland's activity in the EU was to make the other Member States interested in the matters concerning the eastern neighbourhood, similarly to France's policy towards the countries of the Mediterranean Basin or its former colonies. Poland strived to extend the EU's political and economic model to the post-Soviet countries and promoted deepened cooperation with them as well as gradual integration. Russia had a separate place in Polish eastern policy and a special status of 'strategic partner' in EU policy. Poland's efforts were focused, among others,



on its eastern neighbours, although due to the situation in Belarus it was Ukraine and Moldavia the countries that came to the foreground, with Poland supporting their pro-European ambitions and advocating association agreements with these countries. The second sphere of interest for Polish eastern policy included the countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.<sup>26</sup> The Polish/Swedish initiative received broad support despite the fact that in May 2004 the EU implemented the concept of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), covering the countries that the Eastern Partnership addressed later: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The reason was that the solution proposed by Poland and Sweden was very interesting; it was based on the assumption that the Eastern Partnership should be executed in accordance with the rules of the ENP but could expand to include the ENP's mechanisms and what it offered. The proposal included multilateral and bilateral cooperation – a step forward compared to the ENP, which excluded multilateral cooperation. The planned areas of common interest were: political and security issues, matters related to borders and the movement of people, economic and financial issues, as well as environmental and social issues. The key results of the Eastern Partnership are the association agreements concluded with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, but the ultimate assessment of the initiative cannot be very positive, given the situation in Ukraine. The EU's lack of interest in solving the conflict in Ukraine (except for the sanctions imposed on Russia) and its focus on its own economic problems (the Greek debt, illegal immigrants) have proven that, contrary to the Polish wishes, the main EU decision-making centres are not interested in the Eastern Policy.

The hallmark of Poland's membership in the EU in political terms so far is the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which Poland held in the second half of 2011. Poland used this semester to consolidate its position in the Union as a country with good knowledge of the mechanics behind the EU and able to seek a compromise and common solutions in difficult issues. This was especially difficult at the time of disagreements emerging among the EU Member States with regard to the deepening crisis in the euro area as well as the obviously decreasing support for the idea of European integration and when the revolutions in Arab countries started. The main achievements of the Polish Presidency include the efficient adoption of the 2012 EU budget, despite economic problems and strong opposition from the UK; the conclusion of the accession treaty with Croatia; reacting and taking initiatives with regard to the euro area debt crisis (the 'six-pack'); and the conclusion of negotiations on the association agreement with Ukraine. The failures, in turn, include the lack of a final declaration after the Eastern Partnership summit and the absence of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy at that summit, which showed that France did not support the Polish initiative; the lack of progress regarding the admission of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area due to the Dutch veto, and finally, the lack of arrangements concerning facilitation of shale gas extraction. Generally, however, the opinions about the Polish Presidency were very positive. Martin Schulz described it as 'one of the very best presidencies we have had', and the then President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso praised it saying: 'Poland demonstrated extraordinary capacity [during] probably the most difficult period since the European integration started'.<sup>27</sup>

Poland also used the time of the Presidency in the Council to accentuate more strongly its position towards the EU and the processes taking place in it. It promoted the idea of unity

<sup>26</sup> Kowal, P. (2014): "Sztuka przekonywania. Polska a polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej w latach 2004-2014" (The Art of Persuasion. Poland and EU's Eastern Policy in 2004-2014), in *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe* 2014/IV, p. 78.

<sup>27</sup> "Poland sees praise for EU presidency in turbulent time", *EUobserver*, 14 December 2011, at [www.euobserver.com](http://www.euobserver.com).



of the entire EU and the use of Union mechanisms rather than intergovernmental solutions as the latter make it easier for the EU's major actors to pursue their goals. In the opinion of German political scientists (Olaf Lang, Anna Quirin), the struggle for the EU's unity and preventing deeper divisions between the euro area and the other Member States is the key success of the Polish Presidency in the Council.<sup>28</sup> Thanks to Poland's efforts, the negotiations on the reform of the euro area are open to non-euro-area countries, despite France's opposition. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) gives non-euro-area Member States the right to participate in negotiations on Title III (Fiscal Compact) and IV (Economic Policy Coordination and Convergence). Thanks to this treaty, a vast majority of EU Member States (except for the UK and the Czech Republic) will cooperate towards fiscal discipline, and non-euro-area countries will be able to participate in euro summits devoted to proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, including the issue of stimulating competitiveness and employment as well as further stabilisation of public finance. Similarly, the first stage of supervision over the banking sector under the banking union comprising the euro area countries is open also to countries that have not joined the common currency area. Moreover, in line with Polish proposals, further comprehensive reform of the Economic and Monetary Union – concerning the banking, fiscal and economic union – will be incorporated into the institutional and legal framework of the EU.<sup>29</sup> With this, it has been ensured that the new solutions would be open to countries that remain outside the euro area.

Poland is also an active participant in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), mainly through the civilian missions and military operations conducted within its framework. Currently (as in September 2015) Poland takes part in the missions in Moldova and Ukraine, Iraq, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Kosovo as well as in the largest EU operation – in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the EU took over from NATO in December 2004. Thanks to these activities Poland was able to consolidate its image of a reliable EU member who implements its obligations resulting from the process of European integration. Poland's confidence grew with every year of membership, translated into bold presentations of its own initiatives. A good example of this is the Polish initiative aimed at establishing a mission in Georgia as well as the so called Chobielin initiative, which was, however, never implemented and which advocated the establishment of command structures independent of NATO to be used in the execution of EU operations, the appointment of a special deputy for military issues to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the creation of special stabilisation forces.<sup>30</sup> Since 2012, Poland has been engaged (alongside the countries of the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Group and the Baltic Countries) in activities for the strengthening of the CSDP, mainly through the development of a new European Security Strategy, the present one not having been modified since 2003. Correct definition of the threats to and problems for European security should translate into an increased sense of security in the EU.

The area that is essentially most problematic for Poland from both the political and the economic point of view is the EU's climate policy. It is not entirely consistent with Polish interests, and therefore Poland's activity in this field is rather defensive. The arrangements to which Poland consented in March 2007 concerning the EU's climate and energy goals (the 20-20-20 package, also known as the 3 x 20% package or the Triple Twenties) are yet another problem. It took too long for Poland to become truly aware of their consequences for its

<sup>28</sup> Kowalewski, I., Mehlhausen, T. and Sus, M.: *Poland's EU – Council Presidency under Evaluation: Navigating Europe through Stormy Waters*, December 2013, at [www.researchgate.net/publication](http://www.researchgate.net/publication), p. 23.

<sup>29</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014): *Poland's 10 years in...op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>30</sup> Madej, M.: "Wpływ udziału we Wspólnej Polityce Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony na polską politykę bezpieczeństwa" (Influence of the Participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy on Polish Security Policy), in Tereszkievicz, F. (ed.) (2013): *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Bilans dekady*, Warszawa, p. 261.





economic growth and finance, given that the share of coal in the production of electricity in Poland is around 84 per cent. The fact that Poland became aware of this too late is the reason for its current defensive activity towards the climate and energy policy. Although Polish interests in this respect diverged from those of the EU's key actors, Poland managed to take advantage of the economic crisis in attempting to redefine the Union's climate policy. Quite often other voices in the EU also raised the issue that reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and the Emission Trading Scheme contributed to a reduced competitiveness of the European industry, while the major 'polluters' – the United States and China – were rather reluctant to reduce their own CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Poland's efforts will perhaps draw more attention in debates on energy and climate in the EU to the need of maintaining competitiveness of the Member States' economies, raising the importance of industry as well as economic and resource diversification of the Member States.

#### **4. Social aspects of Poland's Membership of the EU**

The balance of social gains and losses resulting from Poland's membership in the EU is hard to establish because it will be different for the state as a whole and for individual citizens. Whether the social consequences of EU membership for them are overall positive or negative is mainly determined by their living standards. The most important social effect of Poland's accession to the EU, unquestioned, is that Poles have taken advantage of the opportunities brought by open borders and the free movement of people. According to Poles themselves, this is also one of the key benefits of accession (31% of respondents), closely followed by the availability of EU structural funds (30% of respondents). The most important consequence of open borders, in turn, is in their opinion the ability to seek employment and conduct business in the EU (17% of respondents compared to 11% opting for investments in infrastructure as the key benefit from EU funds).<sup>31</sup> A vast majority of the 'old' Member States established a transitional period that restricted the Poles' free access to the EU labour market. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden decided to open their markets right on 1 May 2004. The other countries opened their markets in:

- 2006 – Finland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece
- 2007 – The Netherlands, Luxembourg
- 2008 – France
- 2009 – Belgium, Denmark
- 2011 – Germany, Austria

As the free movement of workers has been extended also to the countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), Poles could start seeking employment in Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein as well. Switzerland, which is not an EEA member, is tied to the EU through a series of bilateral agreements that essentially extend the EEA's rules onto Switzerland as well. The country opened itself up to the Poles in 2011, but in May 2012 it introduced restrictions in the number of people employed, which it abolished again on 1 May 2014.

Poles took advantage of the new opportunities provided by the right to work in other EU countries in a higher proportion than had been expected. It is impossible to present accurate

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<sup>31</sup> *10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej (10 Years of Poland's Membership in the European Union)*, conclusions from a CBOS survey, Warszawa, no. 52/14 (April 2014), p. 13.



data on Polish migration after accession to the EU because of the differences between the methodologies applied in migration studies, between the individual Member States' population record systems and, finally, due to the very fact that migrations are fluid, that people can leave a country with the intent to stay abroad but after some time decide to come back. Moreover, statistical figures often do not take into account seasonal migration. Nonetheless, using data from various sources we can at least estimate the scale of the phenomenon. According to the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS), the number of Poles temporarily staying abroad<sup>32</sup> who migrated from Poland to other EU countries between 2004 and 2013 increased from 750,000 to 1.8 million.<sup>33</sup> The largest wave of migration took place between 2004 and 2008, when the number of migrants increased by almost 150 per cent. Without quoting the remaining available data, let us assume that Poles working in other EU countries constitute some 5 per cent of the Polish society. Poles seem to prefer the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, France and Norway as their destinations.

**Table 5. The Most Popular Destinations for Polish Migrants in the EU**

Country	Number of migrants at the end of 2004	Number of migrants at the end of 2014
The United Kingdom	150	642
Germany	383	560
Ireland	15	115
The Netherlands	23	113
Italy	59	96
France	30	63
Norway	no data	71
Belgium	13	49
Sweden	11	40

Source: Own compilation based on Table 1 in: *Szacunek emigracji z Polski na pobyt czasowy w latach 2004-201, op. cit., p.3*

Finally, Poles are also among the leading EU countries in terms of the number of its citizens living in another Member State; it holds the second place in this regard, after Romania, and is followed by Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> People who kept their permanent registered address in Poland although they reside abroad.

<sup>33</sup> Based on Table 1 in "Szacunek emigracji z Polski na pobyt czasowy w latach 2004-2013" (Estimations of Permanent and Temporary Emigration from Poland in 2004-2013), in *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004-2013* (Information on the Size and Directions of Temporary Emigration from Poland in 2004-2013), Central Statistical Office (GUS), Warszawa (October 2014), p. 3.

<sup>34</sup>C. Varga-Silva: *EU Migrants in other EU Countries: An Analysis of Bilateral Migrant Stocks*, Briefing, University of Oxford, [www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk](http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk), p. 5.



The above data may indicate two regularities: first, Poles have no inhibitions and, after years of political isolation from Western Europe, now take fully the advantages and opportunities provided by the single market. Migrants include well educated people, who often speak two foreign languages, are highly qualified and fare very well abroad, establishing their own businesses or taking up employment at foreign companies; second, despite the achievements of the Polish economy since the transformation, Poland's economic situation is still not satisfactory enough to encourage people to remain in the country, especially when the labour markets of 31 other European countries (the EEA and Switzerland) are open to Poles. The main driving force behind labour migration are economic motives, low wages, lack of available jobs, or difficulties in finding a job. An analysis of data on wages and labour costs in EU countries shows that the decreasing difference in economic development between Poland and the EU was not followed by a decrease in the difference between the wages of Poles and citizens of other EU Member States. In 2013, the average annual net wage of a single childless person in Poland was EUR 7429 (EUR 619 monthly), which was lower only in five other EU countries (Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria). Germans and the French earned three times more than Poles, while Danes and Brits earned four times more. Wages are highest in Norway (EUR 47,545) and Switzerland (EUR 59,357).<sup>35</sup> The labour cost per hour in Poland in 2004–2014 rose from EUR 4.5 to 8.4 and is at present considerably lower than in, for example: Denmark (EUR 40), Belgium (EUR 39), the Netherlands (EUR 34), Germany (EUR 31), Ireland (EUR 29), or the United Kingdom (EUR 22); it is also much below the EU average of EUR 24.6 and the euro area average of EUR 29.2.<sup>36</sup> The differences in wages will be lower if we take into account the price levels in those countries, but they are still, one of the key determinants of Polish migration, together with problems with finding a job.

The mobility of Polish workers contributed to the fall of unemployment in Poland, but with time the society started becoming increasingly aware of the threats related to the outflow of labour force, especially regarding the loss of qualified workers, young workers and women, who are more willing to have children abroad.<sup>37</sup> Given the problem of population ageing, this could become a serious burden for Polish public finance; and the situation is additionally exacerbated by non-measurable social costs related to the phenomenon of 'Euro-orphans' and breakdown of marriages.

Poland's fast economic growth and the Polish migration contributed to a decrease in the disparities between the earnings of Poles measured according to the Gini coefficient since the accession. During the decade of membership, in terms of socio-economic equality Poland came closer to the EU average of 30.5 (for the EU-28). The coefficient in Poland decreased from 35.6 in 2005 to 30.7 in 2013.<sup>38</sup> Despite concerns that had been voiced before the accession, the level of poverty has not raised either. On the contrary, there have been positive changes in this area: in 2005, as much as 45 per cent of the society was at risk of poverty or social exclusion, while in 2013 it was 25.8 per cent and currently it is only slightly above the EU average of 24.5 per cent.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Data from [www.forbes.pl](http://www.forbes.pl).

<sup>36</sup> Eurostat: *Labour costs per hour, 2004-2014, whole economy excluding agriculture and public administration*, data of 16.04.2014, [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat).

<sup>37</sup> In 2012, Polish women in the United Kingdom gave birth to the highest number of children among immigrant groups (21,156 births reported). "The Polish Paradox", *The Economist*, 14 December 2013, at [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com).

<sup>38</sup> Eurostat: *Gini coefficient of equalised disposable income*, data of 02.03.2015 r., at [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat).

<sup>39</sup> Eurostat: *People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex*, data of 07.07.2015, [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat).



The free crossing of borders and the Schengen area are also part of the social aspect of Poland's membership in the EU. The elimination of visas and passport control was especially important for Poland in the symbolical dimension, given that for years the majority of the Polish society had been virtually unable to obtain a passport. Poles were now able to feel as full EU citizens. Currently, seven years after accession to the Schengen area (21 December 2007), 'the elimination of border control' is the average Pole's first response to this question: 'What do you associate the EU with?' And the respondents consider a return to the situation existing before 2007 as inconceivable.

Finally, the assessment of the social aspects of membership ends with the opportunities that the EU has created in the field of science and education. Polish students and researchers benefit from EU and EEA education programmes, while Polish universities open up to foreign students and researchers. The most recognisable programme: Erasmus, has been expanding quicker than the EU. Since 2004, the number of Polish universities holding the Erasmus University Charter has almost doubled, rising from 187 to 324 at the end of 2012,<sup>40</sup> just as the number of Polish and foreign students and academics. Apart from gaining new professional experience and investments in education and training, participation in education programmes supports the elimination of stereotypes, learning about different cultures and a general rapprochement of societies and consequently states. The accession to the EU has also had a considerable influence on the educational structure of population in Poland. First by implementing the goals of the Lisbon Strategy and now of the Europa 2020 strategy, Poland managed to successfully promote higher education. In the decade between 2002 and 2012, the percentage of people with higher education increased from 10 to 25 per cent and is now slightly below the EU average of 29 per cent. It will rise even further in the near future due to the commitments resulting from the Europa 2020 strategy to increase the number of people aged 30–34 who have higher education to at least 40 per cent. In 2013, 32 per cent of Poles in this age group had higher education (secondary education : 34%, basic vocational education: 25%, junior high school or lower: 9%),<sup>41</sup> therefore there is still some room for reform.

## **5. Conclusion**

The results of the analysis of Poland's gains and losses resulting from the accession to the European Union presented in this article are clearly positive. After 1989, Poland had no alternative to the European Union, but the process of integration into the EU proved by all means to be beneficial. Economists believe that if Poland had not joined the EU, today it would be at the same level as Ukraine, whose GDP in 1990 was slightly higher than Poland's. Today, Poland's GDP is three times higher than Ukraine's.<sup>42</sup> The decade of EU membership was a time of increased economic growth and modernisation in virtually every sphere: legal, institutional, economic, political, social. We are catching up with the EU, currently reaching 2/3 of the average EU income and having started from 1/3. The structural funds have changed, among others: the Polish road infrastructure, agriculture, industry, the environment, as well as culture infrastructure. The balance of gains and losses resulting from EU membership in the Polish sector of food and agricultural products, which was most anxious about the possible negative impact of accession, is clearly positive as well, despite the fact that some provisions

<sup>40</sup> [www.erasmus.org.pl](http://www.erasmus.org.pl)

<sup>41</sup> Data from: Czarnik, Sz. Turek, K. (2014): *Aktywność zawodowa i wykształcenie Polaków* (Professional Activity and Education of Poles), Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, Warszawa, p. 62, at [www.bkl.parp.gov.pl](http://www.bkl.parp.gov.pl).

<sup>42</sup> *Dekadę po wejściu do UE jesteśmy dwa razy bogatsi* (A Decade after Accession We Are Two Times Richer), 30.04.2014, [www.wyborcza.pl](http://www.wyborcza.pl).





of the Common Agricultural Policy could have negative consequences for producers (e.g., production and fishing quotas).

Poland's accession to the European Union and the Schengen space had a considerable influence on the country's standing in the international political arena. It consolidated Poland's security, sovereignty and significance in international relations. As a new EU Member State, Poland has not weakened the EU; on the contrary, perhaps its actions even prevented a division of the EU and clearly contributed to maintaining EU-wide unity. Poland came to be known as a country that understands the European compromises but also one that can pursue its interests in accordance with the interests of the EU as a whole. This was confirmed by the President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz who stated that within the ten years of its membership in the European Union, Poland had achieved an impressive development; Poland's position has weight and relevance in the European Union, and Poland sets important elements for the further development and integration of the community; Polish MEPs bring a valuable contribution to the works of the Parliament, never losing sight of the common European interest; Poland has found its role in the European Union. He further concluded that this change pleased him in particular as a German president of an international parliament.<sup>43</sup>

This explicitly positive assessment of gains and losses from Poland's membership in the EU is also confirmed by polls and surveys, which showed that in March 2014 the support for EU membership among the Polish society was 89 per cent (with 7 per cent against and 4 per cent undecided). As regards the outcome of Poland's membership in the EU, 62 per cent of respondents consider it positive, 13 per cent negative and 20 per cent believe that the positive and negative effects were balanced out.<sup>44</sup> What is interesting, however, is that Polish respondents found it difficult to name the negative consequences of the EU membership and that almost half of the respondents were unable to list them.

Indeed, it is difficult to name them, but this does not mean that after ten years of EU membership Poles have grown complacent. Despite the growing GDP and decreasing disproportions in development levels, the living standard of the average Polish family is still far from Western European standards, and, in terms of wage gap, Poland is in one of the last places among the EU Member States. The large-scale migration of Poles to EU and EEA countries can be discussed in terms of negative demographic and economic consequences as well as in terms of positive effects of the membership that contributed to the decreasing unemployment in Poland.

Poles may feel some dissatisfaction in political terms, however. The government failed to maintain the EU's engagement in one aspect of foreign policy that is of key importance to Poland: the conflict in Ukraine. What is more, strategic talks on Ukraine (Poland considers itself Ukraine's advocate in the EU), i.e. on the Minsk agreement of February 2015, took place without representatives of Poland but instead with the presence of the leaders of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine. After ten years of membership, Poland is not part of the strict core of EU decision-making, but it has still managed to remain in the mainstream, mainly through the use of community mechanisms in the decision-making process. Poland aspires to be perceived as one of the leaders having the greatest impact on the decisions made in the EU; it is only a shame that Polish decision-makers identify this advance with joining the euro area.

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<sup>43</sup> Schulz, Martin (2014): *Skrępowany OLBRYM. Ostatnia szansa Europy* (A Tied-Up Giant. Europe's Last Chance), MUZA SA, Warszawa, p. 12 after: Fiszer, Józef: *Dziesięć lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Próba bilansu* (Ten Years of Poland's Membership of the EU. Towards an Assessment), at [www.kongreseuropeistyki.uw.edu.pl/aktualnosc](http://www.kongreseuropeistyki.uw.edu.pl/aktualnosc).

<sup>44</sup> *10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.



The main future challenge will be to maintain the present good trends in the economy. The coming decade could be more difficult than the previous one because the competitiveness of the Polish economy cannot be maintained relying on low labour costs. The Polish economic policy and the reforms that fuel it need to take into account the increasing importance of innovation because at present Poland ranks very low in international rankings of innovation. This will require reforms in the labour market, in research and development, taxes, the functioning of enterprises, education, as well as discipline on the Polish political stage. Drawing more benefits from the EU membership will also become more difficult because of the crisis that endures in the euro area as well as new threats to the EU's stability and security. The inflow of illegal immigrants, the threat of terrorism and the conflict in Ukraine are just some of many variables in the international environment to which Poland needs to skilfully react.



## EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, A POLISH PERSPECTIVE

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### **Abstract:**

Before the big-bang enlargement of the EU in 2004, the Union needed to define a coherent policy towards its new neighbours. The European Neighbourhood Policy was formulated when Poland became a member of the EU. Due to its close ties with the Eastern European countries, Poland tried to shape the EU foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries and became their advocate in Brussels. In 2009 it succeeded in establishing the Eastern Partnership as one of the dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

### **Resumen:**

*Antes de que tuviera lugar la gran ampliación de la UE en 2004, la Unión necesitaba definir una política coherente con respecto a sus vecinos. La Política de Vecindad Europea se formuló cuando Polonia se integró en la UE. Dadas sus estrechas relaciones con los estados de Europa del Este, Polonia trató de contribuir a la formulación de la política exterior de la UE hacia sus estados vecinos y ser su defensor en Bruselas. En 2009 consiguió la aprobación de la Asociación Oriental como una de las dimensiones de la Política Europea de Vecindad.*

**Palabras clave:** *Unión Europea, Polonia, política exterior, Política Europea de Vecindad, Asociación Oriental, estados vecinos, miembros de la UE, actor regional.*

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## **1. Introduction**

The EU enlargement in 2004 not only expanded the European integration process to ten new members, but also influenced the priorities and approaches of the EU foreign policy. Due to geographical, historical, economic, and cultural ties between Poland and the new EU eastern neighbours. Warsaw tried to shape the EU's foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries. The Europeanization of eastern issues became the core point of Polish advocacy in the Union<sup>2</sup>. Warsaw declared its wish to be the advocate of Eastern Europe in Brussels<sup>3</sup> and saw its EU membership as an incentive for the regional development. Despite the fact that Poland was not an EU member when the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was formulated, it made a significant contribution to the debate on the eastern dimension of the EU foreign policy.

The article does not focus on bilateral relations between the EU and/or Poland and its neighbours, but presents a comprehensive approach to the neighbouring countries. The author explains the European Neighbourhood Policy from the Polish perspective, stressing those aspects and dimensions that have been emphasized by Polish authorities through the whole period of its activities in Brussels. The main research question concerns the Polish impact on a real shaping of the EU eastern policy and enhancing relations between the Union and the Eastern European countries.

## **2. European Neighbourhood Policy: Assumptions:**

The European Neighborhood Policy and the enlargement process were launched simultaneously in 2004. Due to the forthcoming accession of ten countries, Brussels needed to elaborate a coherent policy towards its new neighbours. As it could not promise the membership in the EU, it wanted to be attractive enough for promoting deeper cooperation with non-member states.

In August 2012, as a response to the invitation from the General Affairs Council addressed to the High Representative and Commission to present a proposal of a new framework of relations with the neighbours, Javier Solana (High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy) with Christophen Patten (EU Commissioner), issued a letter entitled "Wider Europe". The aim of this initiative was to respond to the new challenges that the EU was facing: to prevent the creation of new dividing lines in Europe due to the big bang enlargement, and to find an adequate answer to the needs and threats emerging from the new neighbourhood. The effect of consultations between the EU institutions brought the formulation of the European Neighbourhood Policy with the main task of ensuring a „ring of friends" and privileged relations with the closest neighbours of the EU.<sup>4</sup> The ENP objective has been defined as "avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all."<sup>5</sup> It has been emphasized that the ENP is based on such values as: democracy, respect of human rights, and the rule of law. The European Neighbourhood Policy was designed covering 16 neighbouring countries. From East: Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan; and South: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,

<sup>2</sup> Pomorska, Karolina, "The Impact of Enlargement: Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy? Tracking Adaptation and Change in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 2 (2007), p. 25-51.

<sup>3</sup> Brussels is used here as a synonym for the European Union.

<sup>4</sup> Communication from the Commission, European Neighborhood Policy, Strategy Paper {SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels 12.05.2004.

<sup>5</sup> ENP website: [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm)



Syria and the Palestinian Authority. (Belarus, Libya and Syria do not fully participate in the structures of the ENP, due to its domestic situation and non-compliance with the core values promoted by the Union).<sup>6</sup>

The idea of the ENP assumes the use of different types of mechanisms on both the intergovernmental and supranational level - foreign policy and economic tools (with a major role of the European Commission in the latter case). All these instruments were tools for helping neighboring countries in their transformation processes and improve security, stability and prosperity in the region. This had to be achieved by allowing neighboring countries the use of a wider range of EU tools, without providing assurances on a future membership. "Everything but institutions" approach presented by the former President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, had clashed with the expectations of those neighbours that wanted to apply for the EU membership in the near or distant future. The reason is that the Union does not give them any long-term "awards" (such as membership in the accession process) for compliance with the EU rules and principles. Higher expectations of some of the eastern neighboring countries that were present since the launching of ENP, together with Polish advocacy for closer cooperation with the East European states, have been a starting point for a debate on the revision of the new policy that could take into consideration the need for creating separate regional dimensions of the EU policy.

### **3. Poland and the East**

Both, enlargement process and the new EU approach towards its neighbours have become a challenge for Polish foreign policy. After joining the EU, this challenge became a very demanding task, given the fact that Poland had been pursuing an active foreign policy with the countries of Eastern Europe that now were covered by the new European Neighbourhood Policy. This situation required the design of a new strategy establishing a link between EU's interests and the priorities of Polish foreign policy.<sup>7</sup>

Polish perspective on the ENP should derive from its eastern policy. The latest was rooted not only in the historical ties with the closest neighbours, but also linked to the concepts of reconciliation between Poland and the Eastern European countries, concepts and ideas developed by Polish intellectuals Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski in the Parisian journal "Kultura".<sup>8</sup> Notwithstanding, due to the multiplicity of countries in the post-Soviet area, Poland has separate policies for each of its neighbours. The strategic partner in the East is Ukraine. Important relations are with Belarus (though bilateral relations are limited), Russia, Moldova and South Caucasus states (their importance have grown in recent years in particular in the context of energy security).<sup>9</sup> These foreign policy priorities have influenced Polish activities in the context of the EU foreign policy. Although Poland has been very active in promoting the need for a consistent EU policy towards its eastern neighbours, Warsaw did not present a coherent vision of its strategy towards a new EU neighbourhood policy (there is not a single document on the Polish strategy towards the ENP). The obstacle could be seen in the coincidence with the accession preparations, as Poland, having an observer status before

<sup>6</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Marzęda-Młynarska, Katarzyna, "Strategia polityki zagranicznej Polski wobec Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa" in Pietraś, Marek; Stachurska-Szczesiak, Katarzyna; Misiągiewicz, Justyna (eds.) (2012), *Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej*, Lublin Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, p. 349.

<sup>8</sup> See: Pomianowski, Jerzy (2004): *Na wschód od zachodu. Jak być z Rosją?*, Warszawa, Rosner&Wspólnicy.

<sup>9</sup> Szeptycki, Andrzej, "A new phase of Polish messianism in the East?" in Bieleń, Stanisław (ed.) (2011): *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Warsaw, Difin, pp. 293-294.



joining the EU, couldn't formally influence the outcome of discussions on the European Neighbourhood Policy, but needed to adapt the new EU policy once it became a full member after the accession on the 1st of May 2004. Nevertheless, Poland since late 90s. has not been hiding its aspirations to build a new European policy towards Eastern Europe. For Poland, this region has been of particular interest due to geographical proximity, historical, economic and cultural ties. It has been also a strategic region taking into consideration security issues (including energy security and migration challenges).<sup>10</sup> When Polish border has become the external border of the EU, Warsaw's aspirations to influence the Union's foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries have gained in importance. Secure neighbourhood has been of interest of the whole European Union.<sup>11</sup> Poland, through its ties with the region wanted to be seen an advocate of Eastern Europe in Brussels. The threat of creating new dividing lines (just as the "iron curtain" in the cold war) in Europe after the 2004 EU enlargement, encouraged Poland to take more concrete steps in its commitment to the Union's eastern policy. The promotion of a secure neighbourhood in the EU has been in line with the Polish national security strategy, as well as a result of the two track approach in the Polish foreign policy after 1989, which presupposes maintaining good relations both with USSR and the communist republics in Europe (later Russia and the Eastern European countries). As a consequence of this policy, Poland has seen the EU policy towards its neighbours as a tool in helping to ensure a safe and stable Eastern Europe.<sup>12</sup>

#### **4. Polish Initiatives towards Eastern Neighbours**

When the ENP was in the process of consultation, Poland, as we said, was not yet a member of the EU, but it was invited to give its opinion only in the last phase of the policy formulation (but with no voting rights). Polish position regarding the European Neighbourhood Policy was directly linked to its foreign policy priorities. It means, on one hand, good relations with the Western neighbour (Germany), on the other, developing relations with the Eastern European countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and also Russia. Poland had the ambition to become a bridge between East and West.<sup>13</sup>

In this vein, Poland attempted to influence the EU policy towards the Eastern Europe in the Eastern Dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Poland's aspirations could be seen in 1998, when Bronisław Geremek, the foreign minister, in his speech inaugurating accession negotiations, expressed Polish willingness to contribute to shape the EU policy towards the eastern neighbours.<sup>14</sup> Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (Polish foreign affairs minister) in his speeches since 2001 also emphasized the fact, that Poland is developing "good-neighbourly relations with all its eastern neighbours" and underlined readiness to share Poland's experience of political transformation with its eastern partners.<sup>15</sup> This issue was then developed in a non-paper on the EU eastern policy prepared and presented by Poland in January 2003<sup>16</sup> (and expanded in May 2003 as a proposal titled "New

<sup>10</sup> Marzęda-Młynarska, Katarzyna, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 350-351.

<sup>11</sup> *A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy*, Brussels 12 XII 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Marzęda-Młynarska, Katarzyna, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 352-353.

<sup>13</sup> Nervi Christenses, Alessandra (2010): *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, Nomos, p. 116-117.

<sup>14</sup> Piskorska, Beata, "Partnerstwo Wschodnie 2011. Sukces czy porażka polskiej prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej" in Legucka, Agnieszka (ed.) (2012): *Polska prezydencja wobec wyzwań współczesnej Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa, Difin, p. 157-158.

<sup>15</sup> Nervi Christenses, Alessandra, *op. cit.*, p. 118-119.

<sup>16</sup> *Non-paper z polskimi propozycjami w sprawie przyszłego kształtu polityki rozszerzonej UE wobec nowych wschodnich sąsiadów*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, styczeń 2003, [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)





Neighbours, a framework for relations").<sup>17</sup> Poland's proposal reflected its vision regarding the EU policy towards the neighbouring countries. Warsaw agreed with the conclusion of the Copenhagen Council summit in December 2002, stating that the EU enlargement creates an opportunity to "upgrade" relations with eastern neighbours. Poland saw the need to diversify relations with neighbours depending on their aspirations in deepening cooperation with the EU, their progress with internal reforms and its alignment with the European norms and policies. According to the Polish proposal, it was advisable to create a coherent eastern dimension that will require a specific approach for each country. This integrated policy was to be based on three pillars: community (within Common Foreign and Security Policy), governmental (both on bilateral and multilateral level), and non-governmental.<sup>18</sup> It was assumed to be supplementary (and not competitive) to the already existing northern dimension<sup>19</sup> (it was seen as a blueprint for the Polish proposal). Moreover, according to Poland, future integration of Ukraine into the European structures lies in the interest of the whole EU. The project envisaged cooperation also with Belarus, Moldova and Russia to intensify political dialogue with these countries, and enhance people-to-people contacts. Poland also proposed extending EU programmes of assistance to the eastern neighbours in their transformation processes, and wished to contribute to the EU's eastern policy.<sup>20</sup>

Polish idea did not succeed at that time on the EU level, due to a couple of factors: law requirements embedded in the eastern policy, lack of Russia's presence in the project (Moscow was seen by most of the "old" EU members as a crucial partner in the east) and a not strong enough position of Poland in the EU.<sup>21</sup> Poland was not familiar with all the proceedings (particularly informal ones) applied in Brussels. Thus it did not know how to play "the Brussels game" and all its actions were taken through the formal channels.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, its proposal referred, among other suggestions, to the creation of a "European space of political and economic co-operation within the Wider Europe", and this particular recommendation could be seen in a first concept of new neighbourhood, proposed two months later by the European Commission which became the basis for the European Neighbourhood Policy.<sup>23</sup>

Just before the final version of the ENP was agreed, Poland did not express its clear position on the project. The ambiguity of the Polish attitude was linked to the changes made in the original proposal, which was directed only to Eastern Europe. During the negotiations on the content of the ENP, under pressure of Spain and France, its coverage was extended to the Mediterranean neighbours and Southern Caucasus states.<sup>24</sup> Polish delegation showed a clear disappointment regarding the whole policy, and issued an unilateral statement saying that "the ENP should not prejudice developing further long term relationship between

<sup>17</sup> Cieszkowski, Andrzej, "Polityka rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej wobec wschodnich sąsiadów – wkład Polski" in Wizińska, Barbara (2004): *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004*, Warszawa, Akademia Dyplomatyczna MSZ, p.105.

<sup>18</sup> *Non-paper z polskimi propozycjami...* op.cit.

<sup>19</sup> A joint policy between EU, Russia, Iceland and Norway - launched in 1999, renewed in 2006.

<sup>20</sup> *Non-paper z polskimi propozycjami...* op.cit.

<sup>21</sup> Kaczmarek, Marcin (2009): *Polska polityka wschodnia na tle polityki wschodniej Unii Europejskiej. Czyli Europa idzie na Wschód (po 2005 roku)*, Monitoring Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej, Warszawa, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych., p. 21.

<sup>22</sup> Pomorska, Karolina, „Poland. Learning to play Brussels game" in Wong, Reuben; Hill, Christopher (eds.) (2011), *National and European Foreign Policies. Towards Europeanization*, Routledge, p. 175.

<sup>23</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood. A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbours*, Brussels, 11.3.2003, COM (2003) 104 final.

<sup>24</sup> Szczerbiak, Aleks (2012): *Poland within the European Union. New awkward partner or new heart of Europe?*, London and New York, Routledge, p. 86.



European new neighbours and the EU".<sup>25</sup> When the document establishing the ENP was issued,<sup>26</sup> Poland did not express enthusiasm for the main policy assumptions, as the final concept of the ENP differ from the Polish proposals in the case of geographical content and the lack of a main goal: the membership perspective. The criticism was related mainly to the lack of diversification between regions (east and south), in the context of their differences as well as aspirations to the EU accession.<sup>27</sup> It should be noted here that the European Neighborhood Policy does not eliminate the possibility of the EU membership, but at the same time it does not promise a future enlargement. The exclusion of Turkey and the Western Balkans in the ENP confirms that.

Despite the fact that Poland was not fully satisfied with the final document establishing the ENP, it had to accept the new policy framework when joining the EU. At the same time, Warsaw's promotion of the eastern policy in Brussels strengthened the need of Europeanization of its foreign policy priorities. Poland's belief in the EU power in the region (notably when taking into account Poland's tense relations with Russia) has helped Warsaw in being more active in advocating a common approach to Eastern Europe. Through its involvement in the EU foreign policy, Poland wanted to strengthen its position within the Union and become one of the leaders in the process of formulating the eastern policy.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, since the beginning of its activities in the European structures, Poland has been engaged with shaping the eastern dimension of the EU foreign policy. Warsaw's attempts to be a leader in this policy have its roots in the Poland's historical and transformative experience and aspirations to be perceived as a regional power. Poland has been focusing on promoting democracy, security, stability and economic development in Eastern Europe. All this became the main goals of the ENP itself. To make it happen, it offered assistance in exporting its transformation experience to the neighbouring countries, preventing Russia's domination in the region, and also advocating the EU further enlargement to the east (mostly Ukraine).<sup>29</sup>

## **5. ENP - Polish Assumptions:**

We can emphasize two main assumptions of the Polish strategy regarding the European Neighbourhood Policy:

- There is too much diversity among neighbouring countries for developing relations within one common framework, the ENP;
- There is a crucial difference between eastern and southern neighbours, as they have different expectations and aspirations towards cooperation with the EU.<sup>30</sup>
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From the beginning, Polish involvement in the EU foreign policy meant an attempt to include in the agenda an "open doors" policy for the eastern partners.<sup>31</sup> Although this idea was not reflected in the final conception of the ENP, Poland has not given up trying to convince the

<sup>25</sup> European Neighbourhood Policy, draft Council conclusions, Statement by Polish delegation, Council of the European Union 10292/04, Brussels 10 June 2004, at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010292%202004%20ADD%201>.

<sup>26</sup> Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper {SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels 12.05.2004.

<sup>27</sup> Piskorska, Beata, "Partnerstwo Wschodnie 2011". *op. cit.*, p. 158-159.

<sup>28</sup> Szczerbiak, Aleks, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>30</sup> Marzęda-Młynarska, Katarzyna, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*





rest of Europe on the need to make a distinction between those who aspire to become an EU member (Eastern European countries), and those from North Africa and the Middle East (neighbours of Europe) who are not European countries and according to the EU law cannot apply for the EU membership.

Polish authorities have been supporting further enlargement of the Union to the east. It reflects the main goal of the eastern policy promoted by Poland, avoiding the creation of

division lines in Europe. Relations with particular neighbours were to be dependent on their progress in implementing reforms and aspirations concerning their cooperation with the EU. According to Poland, clear perspectives of membership for Ukraine and Moldova (countries most interested in their future accession to European structures) can only mobilize them towards closer relations with the European Union, and help the Union answer to their European integration aspirations. "Old member states" were, however, not willing to offer concrete accession perspectives to the eastern countries within the neighbourhood policy. Thus the concept of the ENP remained focused on the creation of a "ring of friends" with closer economic cooperation with the Union.<sup>32</sup> This kind of cooperation could be enhanced, but (so far) the EU cannot and does not want to offer any other long-term goal for its neighbours, "everything but institutions", nothing more.

After the biggest enlargement of the EU, all relations between Union and its eastern neighbours were conducted through the new European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels was, however, criticized for not being effective towards particular countries (such as Belarus or Ukraine) or territorial conflicts (ex. Transnistria). Warsaw saw the opportunity to fill the gap created by the ENP shortcomings, offering its experience in the transformation processes of the eastern countries, proposing new solutions in the face of the ineffectiveness of the EU actions towards its neighbouring region.<sup>33</sup>

Nevertheless, political changes in the neighbourhood had an impact on the changes of relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours and supported the Polish advocacy of Eastern Europe in Brussels. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine brought the belief in the pro-European direction of the country and its interest in deeper relations with the EU. However, as Dariusz Milczarek argues, "one could even have an impression that in fact most EU Member States principally intended to maintain correct relations with Moscow and that they were ready to even sacrifice democratization of Ukraine to that priority. (This was especially evident in the attitude assumed by France)."<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, at that time the EU was busy with its own institutional crisis and internal reforms, and was not ready to offer anything more than the ENP. Ukraine, as well as other eastern neighbours were treated in the same way as other (southern) neighbours of Europe, according to "one-size-fits-all policy", the main assumption of the ENP (which later was considered insufficient due to the asymmetry of interests and expectations between the EU and their neighbours).

Deeper relations with Ukraine, and its integration within the European structures has been a key objective of the "eastern policy" promoted by Polish authorities. Poland was the first country that officially recognized in 1991 the independence of Ukraine, and became an advocate of its interests in Brussels. Integration of Ukraine within the European structures was not only seen as important factor for the Polish security strategy, but also as a way of reducing Russia's zone of influence in the nearest neighbourhood.

<sup>32</sup> Cieszkowski, Andrzej, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-108.

<sup>33</sup> Pomorska, Katarzyna, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>34</sup> Milczarek, Dariusz: "Eastern Dimension of the European Union's Foreign Policy", *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 10/2006, p. 20.



The Orange Revolution open a window of opportunity for Polish activism in the EU foreign affairs. Polish President, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, succeeded to engage the High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana into negotiations in the post-election conflict. Poland played a role of mediator, and contributed to the adoption of the Action Plan towards Ukraine.<sup>35</sup> Hereby, it has become a crucial participant in the internal EU debate on the type of cooperation with the eastern partner. Nevertheless, diverse visions of Ukraine in Europe are in many cases derived from different perceptions of East Europe (with Russia as the main partner). Many countries do not see any possibilities to enhance cooperation with Kiev without the improvement of relations with Russia.<sup>36</sup> Besides, only Poland and Lithuania saw Ukraine's application to the EU as a priority. Western countries, such as France, were against further enlargement, others, like the UK, focused on Turkish application. As Aleks Szczerbiak noted "Poland was perhaps the most committed and enthusiastic pro-enlargement member state in the enlarged EU". For Poland, the ENP was not the framework for the inclusion of Ukraine's aspirations. Warsaw believed that managing to have it closer to the EU, the Union would have no other choice than to offer the status of member to Ukraine.<sup>37</sup>

Besides strengthening relations with Ukraine, Poland has been striving for improving relations with Belarus. Polish position on relations with Minsk is however unclear, as it officially disapproves Lukashenka's regime, but at the same time sees the need to maintain formal contacts with Belarusian authorities, and support pro-democratic opposition (twin-track policy). Poland is pursuing a more active EU policy towards regime change. The Union decided the implementation of various restrictions (ex. ban on visas), but still keeps Belarus away from the use of the majority of the tools and mechanisms available within the ENP.

Poland supports also the Moldova's EU aspirations and its internal transformation processes. According to Poland, a democratic and economically developed Moldova could contribute to the stability in the region and ensure a more secure neighbourhood for Poland and the European Union. Therefore, Poland supported all the initiatives that could lead to strengthening relations between Brussels and Chisinau, including peaceful settlement of the Transnistria conflict.<sup>38</sup>

The South Caucasus is however perceived by Poland mostly in terms of economics reasons and as an energy link (Nabucco gas pipeline). Poland strongly supported Georgia in its war with Russia in 2008 and advocates a stronger cooperation between Tbilisi and the EU within the Eastern Partnership. In spite of all, Polish interests regarding Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are different from the ones maintained with its closest neighbours. For Poland economic and humanitarian aid are the main priority in the South Caucasus case.<sup>39</sup>

What Poland has underestimated in its lobbying for the EU eastern policy, is the fact that Western countries have perceived Eastern Europe from the perspective of the global cooperation with Russia, as the main, and most influential partner in the region. Relations between the European Union and its eastern neighbours are based on competition with Russia for influence in the region. Despite this important fact, Moscow refused to participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy (relations EU-Russia are based on a "strategic partnership"),

<sup>35</sup> Nervi Christenses, Alessandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 124.

<sup>36</sup> More: Barburska, Olga: "Polska wobec europejskich aspiracji Ukrainy" in Borkowski, Jan (ed.) (2006), *Rola Polski w kształtowaniu polityki wschodniej Unii Europejskiej na przykładzie Ukrainy*, Warszawa, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

<sup>37</sup> Szczerbiak, Aleks, *op. cit.*, p. 88-91.

<sup>38</sup> Kosienkowski, Marcin: "Polska a Mołdawia i Naddniestrze", *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 10, no.1 (2012), pp. 1-4.

<sup>39</sup> Dudek, Adriana: "Partnerstwo Wschodnie i polski interes narodowy" in Nadolska, Jadwiga; Wojtaszczyk, Konstanty A. (eds.) (2010): *Polska prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa, ASPRA-JR, pp. 293-295.



it influences political decisions of the neighbouring countries.<sup>40</sup> Polish main goal in Brussels, when lobbying for the EU eastern policy, was thus to convince countries like France and Germany to develop relations with Russia in the EU framework, rather than at the bilateral level.<sup>41</sup> As a result of this involvement in the eastern neighborhood, the Polish bilateral relations with Moscow deteriorated, as the policies promoted by Poland clash with Russia's interests in the region.<sup>42</sup> Bilateral relations have been improved when the new government in Poland took office (2007). Easing of tensions between Warsaw and Moscow (in 2008, Poland withdrew its veto in the EU negotiations of the new agreement with Russia), helped Poland gain a reinforced position within the EU, when promoting a stronger eastern partnership.

## 6. The Eastern Partnership

The European Neighbourhood Policy was created as an instrument for the promotion of EU interests and values as well as to strengthen the position of the Union as an effective international actor.<sup>43</sup> Nonetheless, the adoption of the ENP in 2004 did not diminish the goals and interests of particular EU states, and is constantly criticized and even qualified as inefficient for the promotion of the EU influence in the neighbourhood. Different priorities and foreign policy directions have resulted in the creation of different subregional dimensions within the ENP.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is mainly a bilateral policy.<sup>44</sup> Different regional initiatives: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM, 2008), the Black Sea Strategy (BSS, 2008) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP, 2009) complement already existing bilateral tools of cooperation ensured by the ENP, such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (a new type of Association Agreements has already been signed with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) with the eastern countries, and Association Agreements with the North African and Middle East states; plus Action Plans or Association Agendas, and Country Reports.

The concept of Eastern Partnership has been partially an answer to the failure of the previous proposal: the eastern dimension of the CFSP, and at the same time a response to other regional dimensions within the foreign policy framework – as an added value to the Black Sea synergy<sup>45</sup> and Northern dimension, and a counterbalance to the Union for the Mediterranean.<sup>46</sup> Both, Black Sea Synergy<sup>47</sup> and Union for the Mediterranean<sup>48</sup> have been launched as a part of the ENP framework, although BSS is addressed not only to the Eastern

<sup>40</sup> In 2011, Vladimir Putin presented a new integration project for Euroasia, with the aim of creation Euroasian Union, based on the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Its establishment was to ensure a strong position of Russia in the Eastern Europe. More: Adomeit, Hannes, „Putin's Euroasian Union": Russia's integration project and policies on Post-Soviet space", *Neighbourhood policy paper*, CIES Kadir Has University and The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of the German Marshall Fund, no. 04, Istanbul&Bucharest July 2012.

<sup>41</sup> Szczerbiak, Aleks, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>42</sup> Longhurst, Kerry; Zaborowski, Marcin (2007): *The New Atlanticist. Poland's Foreign and Security Policy Priorities*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p. 61.

<sup>43</sup> Kapuśniak, Tomasz: "Unia Europejska wielu wymiarów – wprowadzenie" in Borkowski, Paweł J.; Dościał-Borysiak, Katarzyna; Kapuśniak, Tomasz (2009): *Wymiar południowy, północny i wschodni Unii Europejskiej: osiągnięcia, szanse, wyzwania*, Lublin-Łódź-Warszawa, Prace Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, p. 10.

<sup>44</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm)

<sup>45</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Black Sea Synergy. A New Regional Cooperation Initiative, Brussels 11. 04. 2007, COM(2007)160 final.

<sup>46</sup> Kaczmarek, Marcin, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

<sup>47</sup> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine.

<sup>48</sup> Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008, [http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ufm\\_paris\\_declaration1.pdf](http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ufm_paris_declaration1.pdf)



ENP countries in the Black Sea region, but also to Russia (strategic partnership) and Turkey (accession policy), states that are not part of the ENP framework. Due to the fact that BSS and EaP were both addressed to the eastern countries, initially there were concerns over a possible competition between two EU projects (although they have different aims: EaP: deeper integration with the EU; BSS: dealing with challenges emerging only from the Black Sea region).<sup>49</sup>

The biggest challenge Poland was facing when preparing the Eastern Partnership project was to gain acceptance and support from other EU members. It was not enthusiastically accepted by all EU countries. As a result, not all European leaders were present at the launching summit in Prague in 2009.<sup>50</sup> Initially, even the Commissioner responsible for external relations and the ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner was afraid of the duplication of existing structures (EaP vs. Black Sea Strategy). Equally cautious was Angela Merkel, who at the beginning was more engaged with the Black Sea Synergy project than interested in the Polish proposal.<sup>51</sup> Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 was a crucial factor in the awakening of the Western EU members. They realized the importance of releasing the region from the Russian influence. The war in Georgia had thus a direct impact on the support for the Eastern Partnership by the Western EU members (like France), that were not interested in deepening relations with the Post-soviet space. The tense situation in the Caucasus "forced" the EU countries to draft a concrete cooperation proposal for the eastern neighbours to bring them closer to the EU structures.<sup>52</sup>

The Eastern Partnership project was presented for the first time by the Polish foreign affairs minister, Radosław Sikorski, at the EU meeting of foreign ministers in April 2008 (shortly after the French proposal to create the Union for Mediterranean as a Southern dimension of the ENP). The proposal was previously carefully prepared and consulted with the EU institutions and member states. The concept was officially submitted, as a joint proposal of Poland and Sweden called "Eastern Partnership" at the European Council summit in June 2008. Its aim was to strengthen eastern dimension of the ENP.<sup>53</sup> The European Council concluded in March 2009 (2 months before the EaP project was launched) that "promoting stability, good governance and economic development in its eastern neighborhood is of strategic importance for the European Union. In line with the Commission communication of 3 December 2008, the European Council welcomes the establishment of an ambitious Eastern Partnership conclusions".<sup>54</sup>

The EaP was formally launched at the Prague summit on the 7th of May 2009. It has been addressed to 6 eastern partners (covered by the ENP): Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EaP differs from other ENP dimensions, as it put emphasis on the convergence with the EU rules and standards (Union for the Mediterranean

<sup>49</sup> Popielawska, Joanna, „W jakim towarzystwie? Partnerstwo Wschodnie na tle innych inicjatyw UE na wschodzie", *Analizy natolińskie*, no. 5(37) 2009, p. 19.

<sup>50</sup> Examples of European leaders, who did not participate in the Eastern Partnership launch summit in Prague: UK, Spanish and Italian prime ministers and French President.

<sup>51</sup> Kamińska, Joanna: "Rola Polski w budowaniu wschodniego wymiaru Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa: Partnerstwo Wschodnie" in Fiszler, Józef M., (ed.) (2012): *Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej. Geneza, doświadczenia, perspektywy*, Warszawa, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, pp. 279-280.

<sup>52</sup> Świeboda, Paweł; Sadowska, Maria, Wschodnie Partnerstwo – dobry początek, sukces dopiero będzie, [http://www.demoseuropa.eu/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=254%3Awschodnie-partnerstwo--dobry-poczatek-sukces-dopiero-bdzie&Itemid=95&lang=pl](http://www.demoseuropa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254%3Awschodnie-partnerstwo--dobry-poczatek-sukces-dopiero-bdzie&Itemid=95&lang=pl)

<sup>53</sup> Kapuśniak, Tomasz (2010): *The eastern dimension of the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy. Inclusion without membership?*, Warszawa, Centrum Europejskie Natolin, p. 90-91.

<sup>54</sup> Brussels European Council, 19/20 March 2009, Presidency Conclusions, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 29 April 2009, 7880/1/09 REV 1, at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/106809.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/106809.pdf)



focused on regional projects). The Partnership offers two levels of cooperation: bilateral and multilateral. The first one is based on concluding Association Agreements (already signed with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas and liberalizing the visa-regime, with the aim of establishing a visa-free system. Multilateral cooperation is focused on four thematic platforms:

1. Democracy, good governance, stability;
2. Economic integration together with convergence with other Union's policies;
3. Energy security;
4. People-to-people contacts.<sup>55</sup>

In addition this thematic cooperation, flagship initiatives have been launched to help eastern countries fulfill their bilateral goals. They relate to: border management, small and medium seized enterprises, natural and man-made disasters, energy efficiency, and promotion of good environmental governance.<sup>56</sup> Poland supports closer cooperation with the Eastern European states by promoting a democratic transformation as well as the integration with the EU market. Implementation of the *acquis communautaire* by the EaP countries is seen by Warsaw as a tool in creating good investment environment which plays an important role in the economic relations with the region.<sup>57</sup> Poland is looking for a flexible approach to visa liberalization process, supports stronger EU commitments to conflict prevention in the region, cultural cooperation and civil society movements (with special focus on Civil Society Forum as a platform of non-governmental organizations from partner countries and EU member states). It encourages promotion of the EU in neighbouring countries. These aims are being implemented not only by Polish government, but also by non-governmental organisations which are present in the neighbouring countries.<sup>58</sup> Poland strived also to increase financial aid to Eastern Europe, as it was underfinanced comparing to the instruments designed for the Southern neighbourhood. During negotiations on the EU financial framework for 2007-2013, member states adopted the financial rule which assumed distribution of two-thirds of available funds to the countries of North Africa and Middle East, and one third to the eastern partners.<sup>59</sup> Poland, as it previously did when the Eastern Partnership was launched, suggested equal opportunities for all the neighborhood countries, in the South and East and finally the EU decided to allocate additional EUR 600 million (EUR 350 million as new allocations, and EUR 250 million redistributed from regional cooperation) in the 2010-2013 financial framework to the eastern neighbours. Financial assistance to the EaP countries covered also additional resources, such as loans from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland – Eastern Partnership, at [http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign\\_policy/eastern\\_partnership/](http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/eastern_partnership/)

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Kaca, Elżbieta; Łada, Agnieszka, "Partnerstwo Wshodnie – polska perspektywa", *Biuletyn niemiecki*, No. 6, 13.05.2010, p. 10.

<sup>58</sup> Cieszkowski, Andrzej, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-111.

<sup>59</sup> Czerny, Inga, "Nowy problem w UE – finansowanie Partnerstwa Wschodniego", 20.02.2009, at [http://forsal.pl/artykuly/114817\\_nowy\\_problem\\_w\\_ue\\_finansowanie\\_partnerstwa\\_wschodniego.html](http://forsal.pl/artykuly/114817_nowy_problem_w_ue_finansowanie_partnerstwa_wschodniego.html)

<sup>60</sup> Kapuśniak, Tomasz (2010): "The eastern dimension...", *op. cit.*, p. 94.





## 7. Partners in the EU:

The European Union's foreign policy is characterized by diverse visions and interests of all 28 member countries. Therefore, effectiveness of the Polish strategy towards the ENP relies on finding partner countries within the EU, which have similar aims and interests.<sup>61</sup>

Before 2004 (EU enlargement and The Orange revolution in Ukraine), most of the EU activities towards the east were focused on relations with Russia. In the face of the new enlargement, Russia and the European Union needed to answer common challenges in shaping the post-Soviet space. After joining the EU and the creation of the ENP, Poland gained new partners in its efforts towards intensification of relations with eastern neighbours beyond *Russia first policy*. As we said, when the new neighbourhood policy was in the process of elaboration within the EU institutions, Poland with other Central and Eastern European countries were not part of the EU structures yet. Despite their different foreign policy cultures, they all shared the same goals (besides integration into the European structures), in particular developing good neighbourly relations.<sup>62</sup> Poland, therefore, made attempts to use the already existing frameworks of regional cooperation, such as the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary).<sup>63</sup> The V4 presented many "joint declarations" on cooperation with the Eastern European countries, nevertheless, regarding the ENP, the strongest voice of the Visegrad Four was seen in the August 2007 document presented to the Council "The Visegrad Group Contribution to the discussion on the strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy". The paper supported the Polish and Lithuanian response to the German "ENP Plus" proposal.<sup>64</sup> The core message of the V4 was that a clear differentiation between eastern and southern neighbours within the European Neighbourhood Policy was needed.<sup>65</sup> Besides Visegrad Group countries, the need to enhance cooperation with the Eastern Europe was also expressed by the Baltic states, mainly Lithuania (as stated above), but also Latvia and Estonia.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, the role of Scandinavian states in promoting EU eastern policy should not be underestimated. Thanks to the support of Sweden ("old" member of the Union, balancing the anti-russian perception of Polish foreign policy), the concept of the Eastern Partnership gained approval at the EU arena. However, the necessity to gain support from "old" member states in pursuing a more active policy towards Eastern Europe was inevitable. One of the first "old" countries which favored the eastern cooperation was Austria, which came with a proposal of common energy policy, that require dialogue with Ukraine and Belarus.<sup>67</sup> Germany, as one of the main players in Europe, with its strong economic position, and its willingness to be engaged in Eastern Europe, have become a crucial partner for Poland in pursuing the EU Eastern policy.<sup>68</sup> For many years, German

<sup>61</sup> Marzęda-Młynarska, Katarzyna, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

<sup>62</sup> Nervi Christenses, Alessandra, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>63</sup> Known also as "Visegrad Four" or "V4". It was formed in 1991 as a group of 3 countries: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary. In 1993, due to disintegration of Czechoslovakia, both successors – Czech Republic and Slovakia have become members of the V4.

<sup>64</sup> The aim of the German concept named "ENP-Plus" in 2007 was to create more attractive partnership to the neighbouring countries to ensure stable and secure EU neighbourhood.

<sup>65</sup> Dangerfield, Martin, "The Visegrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Pre-accession to Post-accession cooperation", *East European Politics & Societies*, Summer 2008, volume 22, no 3, p. 653.

<sup>66</sup> Walak, Marta, „Od Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa do Partnerstwa Wschodniego – nowy dyskurs w dyplomacji UE" in Legucka, Agnieszka (ed.) (2012): *Polska prezydencja wobec wyzwań współczesnej Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa, Difin, pp. 151.

<sup>67</sup> Walak, Marta, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

<sup>68</sup> Kempe, Inge, „The German Impact on the European Neighbourhood Policy" in Overhaus, Marco; Maull, Hanns W. ; Harnisch, Sebastian (eds.), *The New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union. Perspectives from the European Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova*, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, vol. 7, issue 19, Ask-Europa Stiftung, Trier, July 27, 2006, p. 26.



strategy towards the east was based on the "*Russia first policy*", which arised from personal relations between leaders of Germany and Russia, Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin, and later Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin. This had a direct impact on the controversial decision of Germany on the Nord Stream project with Russia, the pipeline construction under the Baltic sea, that was taken in spite of objections from Poland, and other "new" member states.<sup>69</sup>

Angela Merkel, as a new chancellor, has not shown the same fascination for Russia, as her predecessors, and emphasizes the need for a more effective European Neighbourhood Policy, which makes her a good partner for Polish efforts concerning the EU eastern policy. Chancellor Merkel has introduced a more "balanced" *Ostpolitik* to the hard "*Russia first policy*". Still its core element are good relations with Kremlin (though more pragmatic as before) but taking into account the security in the region, as well as the interests of the Eastern European countries. German proposal of the "ENP Plus" promoted during its presidency in the Council in 2007 confirms that. Later on, Germany supported the Polish-Sweden proposal of the Eastern Partnership to deepen cooperation with the eastern neighbours, but still avoid any type of declarations regarding the membership perspectives of these countries, as well as establishment of a visa-free area (although chancellor Merkel supported a visa facilitation regime).<sup>70</sup>

## **8. The Polish Presidency in the Council of the EU (2011). The Promotion of the Eastern Partnership**

The Eastern Partnership was promoted in and outside Union during the Polish presidency in the Council of the EU (July-December 2011). Poland argued that good relations with Russia and other countries from the region are in the interest of the whole EU, also in economic terms. The goals for the EaP during its presidency were focused on the finalization of Association Agreements and negotiations of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine and Moldova; enhanced cooperation on the visa liberalization process; discussion on new type of relations with Belarusian authorities, as well as bilateral cooperation between the EU and Russia.<sup>71</sup> Overall assesment of the Polish presidency should be positive, although Poland did not manage to succeed in all its goals (the biggest failure was the lack of progress in relations with Belarus). Political crisis in the Southern neighbourhood of the EU dominated the Brussel's agenda in this period of time, but Poland managed to draw attention to Eastern Europe in the times of political turbulences in the North Africa nad the Middle East. As a response to the Arab Spring in the Southern neighbourhood, as well as the tense situation in Belarus, Polish foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski initiated, the European Endowment for Democracy<sup>72</sup> as a tool allowing for a rapid response to the needs emerging from the neighbourhood (both South and East). The new tool was accepted by other EU countries in December 2011.

## **9. Conclusion**

We can consider The European Neighbourhood Policy as the best instrument the EU could offer to its neighbours after the biggest enlargement in 2004. Hhowever it lacks proper tools

<sup>69</sup> Marcinkowska, Paula, „Republika Federalna Niemiec wobec wschodniego wymiaru Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa”, *Studia Politica Germanica* 2012/1 (1), p. 123.

<sup>70</sup> Gotkowska, Justyna: "Niemcy wobec Partnerstwa Wschodniego", *Komentarze OSW*, no. 37, 17.06.2010.

<sup>71</sup> Piskorska, Beata, „Partnerstwo Wschodnie 2011... op.cit., p. 171.

<sup>72</sup> European Endowment for Democracy <https://www.democracyendowment.eu/>



that could enable a solid response to the fast changing political environment, both in the south, as well as in the east.

The core of the ENP is the system of interdependence. The European Neighbourhood Policy is based on the "hub-and-spoke" model, which assumes correlation between its different dimensions (including cooperation between Brussels and partner countries), and common general objectives common for all neighbours.<sup>73</sup> Though the ENP is different from the enlargement policy, eastern neighbours are more willing to accept the EU rules (comparing to the countries from the North Africa and the Middle East) and some of them present membership aspirations. Cooperation with eastern neighbours, is nevertheless more challenging when observing the enlargement fatigue in the EU and the lack of accession perspectives offered to the close neighbours.

Definitely none of the "old" EU countries can understand better the eastern neighbours than its "new" members. Poland decided to take advantage of its potential in that task. The goal of the Polish diplomacy within the EU was to convince other members that neighbours have diverse interests towards the Union, therefore different types of cooperation should be implemented for the southern and eastern countries. The establishment of the Eastern Partnership has to be seen as a success for the Polish diplomacy, even if not all goals have been achieved. Poland managed to systematize EU relations with its eastern neighbours, as the general concept of the ENP was considered to be insufficient for developing closer relations with the east. Poland has succeeded in increasing its position in the decision-making process regarding eastern neighbours and raised the significance of Eastern Europe (particularly Ukraine) to the EU. It has also contributed to the change the perceptions on Russia among "old" member states, being more critical, and to perceive the region beyond the *Russia first policy*.<sup>74</sup> Polish diplomacy had also an impact on the evolution of thinking on Eastern Europe among the EU members. It managed to convince the Union to develop a more enhanced cooperation with this region, although the Ukrainian membership was not defined, one of the strategic goals of Polish activity within the EU foreign policy.

Germany remains the closest partner for Poland in pursuing its vision of the eastern policy, particularly since its *Ostpolitik* has not only been focused on Russia but also on Eastern European countries, covered by the ENP. Cooperation with France in Eastern Europe is of limited importance. In order to win the French vote for the new eastern policy, Warsaw supported the project of the Union for Mediterranean (proposed by France in 2008) as a "bargain" for approval of the EaP. The change in the French foreign policy could be seen after Nicolas Sarkozy became President. Since then, France has become active in relations with the Eastern European countries, (and not only with Russia).<sup>75</sup> This was however dictated almost entirely by political aspirations to co-shape the EU foreign policy and counterbalance the German dominance in this matter.

The consequences of the political events in the Southern neighborhood also have an impact on the effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership, as they affected the foreign policy preferences of particular member states and the whole Union.<sup>76</sup> The impact could be seen in the redistribution of financial aid towards the EU neighbours.

<sup>73</sup> Marcinkowska, Paula (2011): *Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa. Unia Europejska i jej sąsiedzi – wzajemne relacje i wyzwania*, Warszawa 2011, p. 9.

<sup>74</sup> Kaczmarowski, Marcin, *op. cit.*, p. 25-26.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 4-5.

<sup>76</sup> Starzyk-Sulejewska, Joanna, „Partnerstwo Wschodnie jako element stosunków zewnętrznych Unii Europejskiej" in Żóładowski, Cezary (ed.) (2012), *Polska Prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia w perspektywie politologicznej i medialnej*, Warszawa, Instytut Polityki Społecznej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.





The EU international relations in Eastern Europe are of special importance to the security of the continent. They have become complicated and dangerous due to the unstable situation in Ukraine. Poland should continue its efforts towards strengthening the cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbours. The emphasis should be put on Ukraine, as its interests with the country converge with those of the EU – trade, energy security, and, in particular, security. In the face of major challenges emerging from the eastern EU border, it seems to be crucial for the EU to offer a more enhanced cooperation to counterbalance the Russian dominance in the region.

Poland has been engaged in the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis. Radosław Sikorski, as minister of foreign affairs, participated, together with his German and French counterparts in the negotiations with the leaders of the Maidan protests in Ukraine in February 2014.<sup>77</sup> Although this peace deal was not implemented, Poland played a significant role in pursuing the Ukrainian case on the EU table.

The European Neighborhood Policy was not sufficient for dealing with the fast-changing political environment and sudden threats emerging from the neighborhood, such as the Arab Spring and Russian annexation of Crimea. Due to the lack of tools that the EU could use to respond to new challenges, the Union should decide on a comprehensive revision of its policy towards neighboring countries. The inclusion of the membership perspective in the ENP goals for countries that fulfill accession criteria is advisable as it could encourage eastern countries to more enhanced cooperation with the EU. Taking into account Polish ties with the eastern neighbours, its achievements in promoting the region in Brussels, and willingness to be perceived as a regional power, Poland, with the help of other partners in the EU, will continue to play a crucial role in strengthening relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours.

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<sup>77</sup> Easton, Adam: "Poland's crucial role as Yanukovich's rule crumbled", *BBC News*, 25 February 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26342882>





## GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

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### **Abstract:**

The aim of this article is to analyze the Polish-German relations in the last 25 years. The article will concentrate on the expectations declared in the early 1990s as well as on the results that were achieved. I argue that economic strength was successfully used by the German government to give German-Polish relations a new quality. Polish-German relations are an example of successful implementation of geo-economics strategy by the German government.

**Keywords:** Poland, Germany, geo-economy, European Union, NATO.

### **Resumen:**

*El objetivo de este artículo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre Polonia y Alemania en los últimos 25 años. El artículo se centra en la explicación de las expectativas declaradas a principios de los años noventa y los resultados obtenidos. El autor señala que el gobierno alemán utilizó con éxito su fortaleza económica dando a las relaciones bilaterales una nueva naturaleza. Las relaciones bilaterales constituyen un ejemplo del éxito de la puesta en práctica de una estrategia geo-económica por parte del gobierno alemán.*

**Palabras clave:** Polonia, Alemania, geo-economía, Unión Europea, OTAN.

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## 1. Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Empire in Central and Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany in 1990 opened a new chapter in Polish-German relations. During the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Poland were parts of different political alliances hostile to each other. Their relations were burdened by the historically grounded hostility and ideological competition.<sup>2</sup> In 1989/1990, the elites of Poland and the FRG, and then of the united Germany, decided to overcome the deficits of Polish-German relations and open a new chapter in bilateral relations. That was a historical decision. From the very beginning it was clear that it would be linked with the process of European integration, which was a priority of both governments.<sup>3</sup>

The aim of this article is to analyze the Polish-German relations in the last 25 years. Due to limited space it will concentrate on their beginnings and the expectations expressed in the early 1990s as well as on the achieved results. I argue that economic strength was successfully used by the German government to give German-Polish relations a new quality. Polish-German relations are an example of successful implementation of geoeconomic strategy by the German government.

The article has the following structure: First, I will discuss the character of power in the post-Cold War international system. Then I will discuss the national interests of both countries in the early 1990s. In the third part I will analyze the Polish-German community of interests. In the fourth part I will analyze the development of Polish-German economic relations, and finally I will look at the current state of Polish-German relations.

## 2. The Nature of Power in the post Cold War International System

During the Cold War world politics was dominated by the competition between two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. It was best described by the theory of political realism, which emphasized the role of anarchy in international relations and described the state as a dominant and rational actor in international relations pursuing its own national interests. The main goal of the state was security, mostly understood as military security.<sup>4</sup> With the changes in international relations that took place in the 1970s, the explanatory power of realism was falling more and more under criticism. The growing interdependences and the role of private actors exacerbated the criticism of realism. Neoliberalism, represented in particular by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, was an answer to the new dilemmas. But as Keohane commented in one of his publications, realism was a "good starting point for the analysis of cooperation and discord, since its taut logical structure and its pessimistic assumptions about individual and state behavior serve as barriers against wishful thinking",<sup>5</sup> to which he added: "ironically, my [...] theory, focused on the interaction

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<sup>2</sup>Bingen, Dieter: "Der lange Weg der „Normalisierung“. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen 1949-1990", in: Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter; Kerski, Basil (eds.) (2001): *Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1949-2000. Eine Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft?*, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, pp. 35-59.; Misala, Józef: "Die deutsch-polnischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen vor und nach der deutsche Einheit", *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, vol. 39, no. 1 (1994), p. 42-54.

<sup>3</sup> Bingen, Dieter (1998): *Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenauer bis Kohl 1949-1991*, Nomos, Baden-Baden.; Tomala, Mieczysław(2000): *Deutschland- von Polen gesehen. Zu den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1945-1990*, Schüren, Marburg. .

<sup>4</sup> Morgenthau, Hans (1948): *Politics Among Nations*, New York: Knopf.; Waltz, Kenneth (1979): *Theory of International Politics*, New York, McGraw Hill.

<sup>5</sup> Keohane, Robert O. (2005): *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, 2. ed., Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p. 245.



of states, may have given too much credit to the Realist anarchy paradigm that it sought to criticize".<sup>6</sup>

The end of the Cold War opened the quest for the right explanatory model that could properly explain the role of the state in international relations. Special attention should be given to the theory proposed by Edward Luttwak, who questioned the utility of military power but did not question the anarchical nature of international relations and the domination of national interest in state policy. He argued that states in the post-Cold War system used economic rather than military means to achieve national goals. With the absence of a military threat, economic goals (competitiveness of the economy and national wealth) were also described as a priority for the states. Luttwak argued in favor of cooperation between states and corporations. For him, military conflicts were uneconomic and thus unacceptable. He observed that competition between powers is substantially economical.<sup>7</sup> This observation proved to be right.<sup>8</sup> In the next two decades states concentrated on developing their economic potential and reduced their military spending. Luttwak had many followers and today his ideas are well developed. Economic strength is seen as both a goal and an instrument of state policy. Development of economic power was considered as a priority for the state.<sup>9</sup>

The unification of Germany in 1990 opened a discussion about the country's future foreign policy. Although Chancellor Helmut Kohl tried to convince other governments and public opinion that united Germany would stay faithful to the foreign policy principles of the FRG (close relations with the USA and France, good relations with neighboring states and engagement in the process of European integration),<sup>10</sup> doubts were not eliminated. Different concepts of foreign policy were discussed. The most popular were: the central power of Europe,<sup>11</sup> civilian power<sup>12</sup> and trade state.<sup>13</sup> Special attention was paid to the economic dimension of German foreign policy.<sup>14</sup> Already during the Cold War, the FRG was able to hide behind the US security umbrella and focus on achieving its economic goals. After World War II, the FRG was also reluctant to use military power as an instrument of foreign policy. After the reunification, a long discussion about "normality"<sup>15</sup> of the German foreign policy

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xvi.

<sup>7</sup> Luttwak Edward. N.: "From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce", in Tuathail, Gearóid Ó.; Dalby, Simon; Routledge, Paul (eds.) (1998): *The Geopolitics Reader*, Routledge, London, p. 125–130.

<sup>8</sup> Chung, Jae W. (2015): *Global Economic Disparity: A Dynamic Force in Geoeconomic Competition of Superpowers*, Lexington Books, Lanham.

<sup>9</sup> Savona, Paolo, Jean Carlo (ed.) (1995): *Geoeconomia - Il dominio dello spazio economico*, Franco Angeli, Milano.; Lorot, Pascal: "La géoéconomie, nouvelle grammaire des rivalités internationales", *Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales* 2000, p. 110-122.

<sup>10</sup> Haftendorn, Helga: "Maximen deutscher Außenpolitik- Von der Regierung Kohl über Schröder zu Merkel", in Meier-Walser, Reinhard; Wolf, Alexander (eds.) (2012): *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Anspruch, Realität, Perspektiven*, München: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, pp. 16.

<sup>11</sup> Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1994): *Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschland Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*, Berlin: Siedler Verlag.

<sup>12</sup> Maull, Hans W: "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 5 (1990), pp. 91–106.

<sup>13</sup> Staack, Michael (2000): *Handelsstaat Deutschland. Deutsche Außenpolitik in einem neuen internationalen System*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag.

<sup>14</sup> Schumann, Hartmut: "Wirtschaftliche Dimension der Außenpolitik", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, vol. 41, no. 2 (1994), pp. 146-161.

<sup>15</sup> Kessler, Sebastian; Schewe, Johann; Weber, Christian: "Normalität", in Link, Werner; Weber, Christian; Sauer, Frank (eds.) (2008): *Die Semantik der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik. Eine Analyse des außenpolitischen Vokabulars seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre*, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 126–134.



took place. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century attention shifted toward the concept of geo-economy. Germany was defined in literature as a geo-economic power.<sup>16</sup>

In this article I will follow the geo-economic approach, which is the most convenient explanatory model of the European affairs and German foreign policy in the post Cold War era.

### **3. The National Interests of Germany and Poland after 1990**

In February 1989, the Polish government started negotiations with the Solidarność (Solidarity) opposition (the Round Table Talks). They led to partially democratic elections held on June 4<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 1989, which ended with the victory of the opposition. A few months later, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was elected prime minister and Leszek Balcerowicz became minister of finance. Political and economic reforms followed. A "shock therapy" was implemented in economic affairs, and the foreign policy experienced its own shock as well, being re-oriented towards the West. The new key goals were accession to NATO and to the European Communities. It was clear to the new designers of the Polish foreign policy that Poland could achieve its goals only with German (and French) support.<sup>17</sup>

In early November 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Poland with the aim of reconstructing the Polish-German relations. The visit was full of symbolical gestures of historical importance, their peak being the holy mass held in Krzyżowa on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1989. Reconciliation was the declared the goal of both governments. However, the visit had a very practical dimension as well. Eleven bilateral agreements were signed and a joint declaration was issued.<sup>18</sup> Chancellor Kohl indicated during his talks with the Polish president that Germany wished to have equally good relations with Poland as with France.<sup>19</sup> During the 6<sup>th</sup> Poland-Germany Forum on February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1990, Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski argued in favor of the "Polish-German community of interests".<sup>20</sup>

Since the early 1990s, Polish-German relations have been determined by two expectations: first, they should achieve the quality of the French-German relations and second, a "Polish-German community of interests" should emerge.

In the late 1989 and the early 1990 unification of Germany was again a major topic in the international arena. Poland supported the unification and raised two arguments for it: first, Germans should enjoy the same right as other European nations to live in a free, democratic, united, and sovereign country; second, only a united Germany could support Poland in its plans to join the European Communities and NATO.

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<sup>16</sup> Kundnani, Hans: "Germany as a Geo-economic Power", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 3, (2011), p. 31–45.; Szabo, Stephen F. (2014): *Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics*, London, Bloomsbury Academic

<sup>17</sup> Kuźniar, Roman (2008): *Poland's Foreign Policy*, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, p. 64-65.

<sup>18</sup> Zięba, Ryszard (2010): *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie*, Wyd. 1. Warszawa, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> Bartoszewski, Władysław: "Angst vor der Großmacht? Deutschland und Polen nach dem Umbruch", *Internationale Politik*, vol. 55, no. 9 (2000), p. 10.

<sup>20</sup> Skubiszewski, Krzysztof: "Przemówienie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP prof. dr hab. Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego- wygłoszone podczas VI Forum Rzeczpospolita Polska- Republika Federalna Niemiec podczas przyjęcia w Hotelu Polonez", in Tomala, Mieczysław (eds.) (2006): *Polityka i dyplomacja polska wobec Niemiec Tom II 1971-1990. Wstęp, wybór i opracowanie dokumentów*, Warszawa, Dom Wydaw. Elipsa, pp. 659-662.; See: Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias (2001): *Deutschland und Polen - Eine Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft? Die Eliten-Perspektive*, Opladen, Springer VS, p. 17-24.





Germany and Poland confirmed the existing border between them in the treaty of November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1990.<sup>21</sup> As a way to support the development of friendly relations between them on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 1991 they signed the "Treaty of Good Neighborhood and Friendly Cooperation".<sup>22</sup> It provided a framework for Polish-German cooperation in the next decades. Special attention was paid to the European dimension of bilateral cooperation. Germany declared support for the Polish ambition to join the European Communities.<sup>23</sup> The treaty regulated also a wide range of issues and became the foundation of the current Polish-German relations.

In consequence of the treaty, Polish-German relations were institutionalized. A broad range of organizations and institutions emerged. The most important was the German-Polish Youth Office (Pol.: Polsko-Niemiecka Współpraca Młodzieży; Ger.: Deutsch-Polnisches Jugendwerk). Its goal is to finance projects aimed at children and youth. This idea was based on experiences of a similar German- French organization.

In the 1990s Germany took the central role in European politics. This was immediately noticed by Poland, which saw Germany as a country that practically determined the political and economic development in the EU.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, German politicians still saw Poland as a country being deep in the shadow of Russia. In time, the perspective of the German elites changed,<sup>25</sup> but the special sensitivity to Russian interests persisted.

The eastern enlargement of the European Communities did not enjoy support in all Western European countries. Especially French President François Mitterrand was skeptical. On the one hand, France was worried about possible dominance of Germany in Central Europe, but on the other hand, France wanted to strengthen its traditional ties with countries in this part of Europe. Polish elites did not want to be fully dependent on Germany in its European policy either. This mixture of interests led to the emergence of the Weimar Triangle in 1991. The consultation group composed of Germany, France and Poland was supposed to build mutual trust and work in favor of European integration.<sup>26</sup>

The German national interests in the new international reality were first officially defined in the White Book of 1994.<sup>27</sup> Germany saw itself as the biggest winner of the transformation in Central Europe.<sup>28</sup> It saw a chance to become one of the leaders and co-

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<sup>21</sup> *Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über die Bestätigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenze, vom 14.11.1990, at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/PolitischesArchiv/DokumenteUndVertraege/901114-VertDeuPL.Grenzen-pdf.pdf>.*

<sup>22</sup> *Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, vom 17.6.1991, at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/PolitischesArchiv/Dokumente und Vertraege/910617-VertDeuPLFreund-pdf.pdf>.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, Art.8(3).

<sup>24</sup> Bingen, Dieter: "Aspekte von Wandel und Kontinuität im polnischen politischen Denken über Deutschland von 1966 bis 1991" , in Bingen, Dieter; Więc, Janusz Józef (eds.) (1993): *Die Deutschlandpolitik Polens 1945-1991. Von der Status-quo-Orientierung bis zum Paradigmenwechsel*, Kraków, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, p. 174.

<sup>25</sup> Cichocki, Marek A.: "Polish-German Relations in the Light of Poland's Accession to the European Union", *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest*, no. 2 (2002), p. 170.

<sup>26</sup> Weber, Pierre-Frédéric: "Das 'Weimarer Dreieck' Vom Gründungsoptimismus zur neuen Sinnsuche", in Bingen, Dieter; Loew, Peter Oliver; Ruchniewicz, Krzysztof; Zybur, Marek (eds.) (2011): *Erwachsene Nachbarschaft: die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1991 bis 2011*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag, p. 77-91.

<sup>27</sup> *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Köln 1994.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.



designers of the new European order.<sup>29</sup> The White Book indicates five goals of the German foreign policy for the next decade. One of them was accession of Germany's eastern neighbors to Western European organizations.<sup>30</sup> The White Book of 1994 indicates three terms that should characterize the German foreign policy toward countries in Central and Eastern Europe: stability, cooperation and integration.<sup>31</sup> The German government saw no alternative to the eastern enlargement of the EU, and it considered itself the advocate of this process.<sup>32</sup> There was also a strong economic incentive to support it. The German industry hoped for new markets, investment opportunities and a source of cheap natural resources and semi-finished products.<sup>33</sup> The goal of the German policy was to replace the Yalta Order with a "Brussels Order".<sup>34</sup> Helmut Kohl was convinced that the eastern enlargement was in Germany's national interest.<sup>35</sup>

German interests coincided with the Polish ones. The aim of Polish foreign policy in the 1990s was to obtain membership in Western European institutions and NATO, keep USA engaged in European affairs, develop good relations with Poland's neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>36</sup> The accession to the European Union enjoyed the highest priority.<sup>37</sup> This was motivated by a combination of political and economic aspects of the Polish national interest. This goal was broadly supported by the political class and the Polish society.<sup>38</sup>

As former Polish ambassador in Berlin, Janusz Reiter, suggested, the issue of Polish accession to the European Union was closely connected with the question about the quality of the German-Polish relations. He drew the comparison with the situation of France. He expressed the view that for Poland and France alike the European policy was very close to German politics.<sup>39</sup> On the way to the EU, Germany was seen as a partner of "extraordinary importance".<sup>40</sup>

#### **4. The Polish-German Community of Interests and its Critique**

Poland and the European Economic Community had signed an agreement on trade and

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24-27.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>32</sup> Kinkel, Klaus: "Erklärung der Bundesregierung. Deutsche Präsidentschaft im Rat der Europäischen Union, abgegeben vor dem Deutschen Bundestag", in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (eds.) (1994): no. 63, Bonn, p. 594.

<sup>33</sup> Haftendorn, Helga: "Gulliver in der Mitte Europas. Internationale Verflechtung und nationale Handlungsmöglichkeiten", in Kaiser, Karl ; Maull, Hanns W. (eds.) (1997): *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Band 1: Grundlagen*, 3. Aufl., München, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, p. 142.

<sup>34</sup> Lippert Barbara: "Die EU-Erweiterungspolitik nach 1989 – Konzeption und Praxis der Regierung Kohl und Schröder", in: Schneider, Heinrich; Jopp, Mathias ; Schmalz Uwe (eds.) (2001): *Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik? Rahmenbedingungen-Problemfelder-Optionen*, Bonn, Europa Union Verl, p. 358.

<sup>35</sup> Lippert, Barbara: "Deutschlands spezielles Interesse", in: Franzmeyer, Fritz; Weise, Christian (eds.) (1996): *Polen und die Osterweiterung*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, p. 131.

<sup>36</sup> Skubiszewski, Krzysztof: "Racja stanu z perspektywy polskiej", *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992*, (1994), p. 38.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>39</sup> Reiter, Janusz: "Stosunki z Niemcami", *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1996*, Warszawa 1996, p. 109.; Weber, Pierre-Frédéric: "Frankreich, Deutschland und Polen im europäischen Einigungsprozess. Französische Rollen im Wandel der Zeit 1968-2008", in Hilz, Wolfram; Robert, Catherine (eds.) (2010): *Frankreich-Deutschland-Polen. Partnerschaften im Herzen Europas*, Bonn, ZEI Discussion Paper, p. 15.

<sup>40</sup> Skubiszewski, Krzysztof: "Deutschland: Anwalt Mitteleuropas. Eine polnische Sicht der deutschen Europa-Politik", *Internationale Politik*, vol.52, no. 2 (1997), p. 30.



commercial and economic cooperation on 19 September 1989.<sup>41</sup> It was a step toward trade liberalization, but it offered relatively small progress. Much more favorable for Poland was the decision of the European Commission of November 1989. This is why most provisions of the agreement from September 1989 didn't enter into force.<sup>42</sup> The political revolutions that took place in spring and summer of 1989 in Central and Eastern European countries inspired the EEC to take decisive steps. The Phare program was created in July 1989 and the Commission took the leading role, Poland was invited to the Generalized System of Preferences, and quantitative restrictions for imports from Poland were mostly eliminated. With these steps the trade liberalization between the EEC and Poland started.<sup>43</sup>

The next step was the association agreement between Poland and the European Communities from 1991, which clearly indicated that the association is only a step toward the integration of Poland with the European Communities.<sup>44</sup> The association agreement was signed on 16 December 1991 in Brussels.<sup>45</sup> As Polish Foreign Minister, Władysław Bartoszewski, indicated before the second official state visit of Helmut Kohl in Poland in 1995, in Poland's eyes Germany rose to the position of "strategic partner in all areas".<sup>46</sup> The goal of Polish and German politicians was to integrate the bilateral cooperation between the two countries stronger in European politics. Germany was keen to support Poland's accession to the European Union, and Chancellor Kohl even declared during his visit to Poland in 1995 that Poland should join the EU by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>47</sup> In December 1997 the European Council in Luxembourg decided to start accession negotiations with Poland. They ended on April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2003 as the Accession Treaty was signed. It is clear that the eastern enlargement of the EU would not be possible without German engagement in this process.

Although there were occasional conflicts, the quality of Polish-German relations in the 1990s is very positively assessed. The most notable conflict was over the interpretation of the common history. It was initiated by the declarations of the Bundestag (May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1998). The Polish Sejm answered with the declaration of July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1998. But at that time the elites of the two countries were determined to play these differences down. The 1990s were the "golden age" in Polish-German relations.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Polish People's Republic on trade and commercial and economic cooperation*, 19.9.1989, in: *Abl.* 1989, L 339, 22.11.1989, p. 2-52.

<sup>42</sup> Kawecka-Wyżykowska, Elżbieta; Synowiec, Ewa: "Droga Polski do Unii Europejskiej", in Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyżykowska/ Ewa Synowiec (eds.) (2004): *Unia Europejska T1*, Warszawa, Instytut Koniunktury i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego, p. 428.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Zięba, Ryszard (2010): *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie*, Wyd. 1. Warszawa, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, p. 104

<sup>45</sup> *Europa-Abkommen zur Gründung einer Assoziation zwischen den Europäischen Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Republik Polen andererseits - Protokoll Nr. 1 über die Bestimmungen für die Textilwaren - Protokoll Nr. 2 über die Bestimmungen für die unter den Vertrag über die Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl fallenden Erzeugnisse - Protokoll Nr. 3 über die Handelsbestimmungen für die landwirtschaftlichen Verarbeitungserzeugnisse - Protokoll Nr. 4 über die Ursprungsregeln für die Gewährung der Zollpräferenzen - Protokoll Nr. 5 enthält die Sonderbestimmungen für den Handel zwischen der Republik Polen einerseits und Spanien und Portugal andererseits - Protokoll Nr. 6 über Amtshilfe im Zollbereich - Schlussakte - Gemeinsame Erklärungen der Vertragsparteien*, in: *ABl.* 1993 L 348 vom 31.12.1993, p. 2-180.

<sup>46</sup> "Deutschland wichtiger strategischer Partner Polens", *FAZ*, 3 July 1995, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup> Kohl, Helmut: "Rede von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl anlässlich der Eröffnung der Deutsch-Polnischen Industrie- und Handelskammer am 7. Juli 1995 in Warschau", in *Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* (eds.) (1995): *Bulletin* Nr. 58, Bonn, p. 574.

<sup>48</sup> Kerski, Basil (2011): *Die Dynamik der Annäherung in den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen: Gegenwart und Geschichte einer Nachbarschaft*, Düsseldorf, düsseldorf university press, p. 240-265



But as the two main goals in the bilateral relations were achieved in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the relations entered a new phase. As a one of the best known experts in Polish-German relations, Dieter Bingen – Director of the German Institute of Polish Studies (Deutsches Polen-Institut) in Darmstadt – summarized, the successful closure of the Polish accession negotiations was also the end of the "paternalistic-clientelistic relation, the end of the role of Poland as a junior partner of Germany and junior position of Poland in the Weimar Triangle".<sup>49</sup> Differences between both governments came more into focus. The list was long: a new treaty for the EU (a Constitution for Europe), European-American relations, the energy relations with Russia (Nord Stream) and relations with Russia more generally, historical policy (Centre Against Expulsions).<sup>50</sup> Those were only the most important issues. The atmosphere in the Polish-German political relations deteriorated substantially. It seems that the focus on enlargement of the EU and NATO resulted in both governments leaving too many issues unresolved. It was high time for an unpleasant but frank discussion was needed.<sup>51</sup>

At the end of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the atmosphere in the mutual relations improved again. Opposition against German plans was unsuccessful. The Treaty of Lisbon became reality and the Nord Stream pipeline was built. Also German historical policy did not change. As the previous Polish ambassador said, after the "romantic" phase of Polish-German relations, there was a phase of "pragmatic cool-down", which in turn was followed by both countries going into the phase of "mature partnership".<sup>52</sup> The new strategy concentrated on strategic rapprochement with Germany. Beside the Polish-German issues, it was motivated by the rising position of Germany in the EU. The financial crisis and then the euro-crisis strengthened Germany. German financial power was needed to manage the euro-crisis. Some observers began seeing Germany as the European hegemon.<sup>53</sup> Although this thesis seems to exaggerate German power, it was needed for the Polish foreign policy to find an answer to the new international balance of power. Two declarations need to be mentioned in this context. The first one is the speech of the Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski in DGAP on November 28<sup>th</sup>, 2011. He argued in favor of Germany playing a more active role in the EU. He expressed the wish for Germany to help resolve problems in Europe. He ended his speech with the famous sentence "I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity".<sup>54</sup> The second important but also symbolic gesture was the proposal of Polish President, Bronisław Komorowski, during his speech in the German Bundestag on the 75 anniversary of the beginning of World War II, which concerned the need for "Polish-German responsibility partnership for the future of Europe".<sup>55</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Bingen, Dieter: "Einübung in erwachsene Partnerschaft. Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Polen", in: Bingen, Dieter; Loew, Peter Oliver; Ruchniewicz, Krzysztof; Zybur, Marek (eds.) (2011): *Erwachsene Nachbarschaft : die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1991 bis 2011*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, p. 35.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem.*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>51</sup> Ulatowski, Rafał: "Kryzys czy otwarta dyskusja? Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w XXI wieku", in Franzke, Jochen; Kindelberger, Kilian; Koszel, Bogdan Krämer, Raimund; Sakson, Andrzej (eds.) (2008): *The "third Generation". Essays and Articles about polish-german relations*, p. 40-49.

<sup>52</sup> Prawda, Marek: "Dialog-Gespräch mit Polens Botschafter in Deutschland, Marek Prawda, über des 20-jährige Jubiläum der Unterzeichnung des deutsch-polnischen Nachbarschaftsvertrags und die weitere Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern", *Dialog. Deutsch-Polnisches Magazin*, no. 95 (2011), p. 14-15.

<sup>53</sup> Hellmann, Gunther "Reflexive Sicherheitspolitik als antihegemoniales Rezept: Deutschlands Sicherheit und seine gewandelte Strategie", *APuZ*, vol. 69, no.37, (2013), p. 49-54.

<sup>54</sup> Sikorski, Radosław: *Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski reminds Berlin of its special responsibility in overcoming the European debt crisis*, DGAP, 2011, Available at: <https://dgap.org/en/node/20055>.

<sup>55</sup> *Rede von Polens Staatspräsident Bronislaw Komorowski bei der Gedenkfeier 75 Jahre Beginn Zweiter Weltkrieg" (Polnisch)*, at [https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/kw37\\_gedenkstunde\\_komorowski/297050](https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/kw37_gedenkstunde_komorowski/297050) (1.8.2015).





## 5. The Economic Aspects of Polish-German Relations

In the early 1990s German policy toward Poland was dominated by political interests. Economic cooperation played a secondary but positive role.<sup>56</sup> German industrial associations supported the eastern enlargement of the EU and close economic ties between Germany and Poland. They saw development of economic ties with Poland and other Central European countries as being in Germany's national interest.<sup>57</sup> Already in the 1990s, they argued that the German investment and trade exchange with this group of countries was of high value.<sup>58</sup> In the early 1990s Germany used its economic power to support Poland's transformation and integration with the EU.

The main problem for the development of the economic relations in the early 1990s was the issue of the Polish foreign debt. At the end of 1991 it reached USD 41 billion. Poland had been negotiating since the early 1980s with the Paris Club (sovereign creditors) and the London Club (private creditors/banks). In both cases the role of Germany was crucial. The share of state-owned Polish debt owned by Germany was 23.9% (USD 7.7 billion). The Deutsche Mark was also the second most important currency. The progress in the negotiations with the Paris Club was achieved already in February 1990, but the negotiations with the banks took longer and ended only in 1994. Poland signed a debt restructuring agreement with Germany on March 25<sup>th</sup>, 1992. This may come as a surprise because only the Polish-Italian and Polish-Spanish agreements were signed later. The Polish-German agreement was based on the assumption of a 50 per cent reduction (standard value) of the Polish debt. Banks were not ready to accept conditions such as this. They argued that states followed primary political goals and that they themselves had only an economic goal. Banks also worried that other countries in financial trouble might expect similar favorable treatment as well. In the first part of the negotiations banks were represented by the British Barclay Bank and then since September 1993 by Dresdner Bank. Dresdner Bank belonged to the supporters of favorable treatment of Poland. In consequence, the Heads of Terms was signed on 10 of March 1994 and the final agreement on 14 of September 1994 in Warsaw.<sup>59</sup>

The second important issue of Poland's economic relations with other countries was economic aid. This issue was very intensively discussed in Germany. The value of aid declared by countries of the G-24 for the period of 1990-1994 was USD 21.4 billion. But only USD 4.15 billion was non-returnable. The biggest part of the aid was earmarked for restructuring the Polish debt and export credits. Germany was the key donor.<sup>60</sup>

The third interesting issue is the interest of the authors of the Polish economic reforms in the German model of social market economy. The German economic system was an inspiration for the architects of the Polish reforms. This went so far that social market economy was acknowledged as the economic system of Poland in article 20 of the Polish constitution.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Lippert: Deutschlands spezielles op.cit., p. 133.

<sup>57</sup> "Positionspapier des Deutschen Industrie-und Handelstags zur EU-Osterweiterung/Agenda 2000, vorgelegt im Dezember 1997 in Bonn (Auszüge)", in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 53, no. 6 (1998), p. 71.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>59</sup> Górniewicz, Grzegorz (2002): *Zadłużenie zagraniczne. Polska a kraje rozwijające się*, Bydgoszcz Wydawn. Akademii Bydgoskiej im. Kazimierza Wielkiego.; Sulimierski, Bronisław (1995): "Problemy zadłużenia zagranicznego Polski i próby rozwiązań", *Polski Handel Zagraniczny*, p. 203-212.

<sup>60</sup> Ners, Krzysztof Janusz: "Pomoc zagraniczna dla transformacji w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Sześć lat doświadczeń", *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, vol. XLIX, no. 3-4, (1996), p. 66.

<sup>61</sup> Kleer, Jerzy: "Germany as a Reference Point in the Discussion about the Economic System in Poland", *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest*, no. 2 (2002), p. 196-199.



One of the most important dimensions of German-Polish economic cooperation is trade exchange. It has developed very dynamically since the early 1990s. Germany is the biggest trade partner of Poland. In 2013, 25.1% of Polish exports went to Germany and 21.7% of Polish imports came from Germany. These numbers prove German dominance in Polish foreign trade. But it is less than in the mid-1990s. The German market was the first goal for Polish exporters. In 1995, 26.6% of Polish imports came from Germany and 38.3% of Polish exports went to Germany. The diversification of Polish trade in the last 20 years made it possible to reduce this dependence.<sup>62</sup>

Poland belongs to the group of Germany's ten most important trade partners. In 2014 Poland was the eighth biggest trade partner of Germany. German statistical data show that Poland was the eighth biggest market for German exporters and the sixth most important source of imports.<sup>63</sup> As shown by the data presented in Table 1, 2014 was the best year for Polish-German trade.<sup>64</sup>

**Table 1. Trade between the Republic of Poland and Germany in million EUR**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Balance</i>
2004	17397.159	17909.105	511.946
2005	20024.030	20141.953	117.923
2006	24201.737	23869.733	-332.004
2007	28947.846	26370.121	-2577.725
2008	31834.2	28609.7	-3224.5
2009	24053.2	25685.7	1632.5
2010	29362.4	31427.0	2064.6
2011	34042.1	35664.3	1622.2
2012	32835.8	36057.1	3221.3
2013	34005.7	38887.5	4881.8
2014	36350.2	42594.5	6244.3

Source: Diverse GUS yearbooks and GUS data cited in: *Polsko-niemiecka współpraca handlowa w 2009-2014*,

[http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka\\_zagraniczna/europa/stosunki\\_polsko\\_niemieckie/wspolpraca\\_gospodarcza/wymiana\\_handlowa;jsessionid=191E8B187FDF33A4BDC4455BD73A636F.cmsap2p](http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/europa/stosunki_polsko_niemieckie/wspolpraca_gospodarcza/wymiana_handlowa;jsessionid=191E8B187FDF33A4BDC4455BD73A636F.cmsap2p).

Polish-German trade experienced other important changes as well. First, its overall structure has changed: while the structure of German exports to Poland has remained stable in the last 25 years, the exports being dominated since the early 1990s by products with high added

<sup>62</sup> Central Statistical Office, *Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics of Poland*, Warsaw 2014, pp. 47.

<sup>63</sup> Statistisches Bundesamt, *Außenhandel Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2014*, Wiesbaden 2015.

<sup>64</sup> *Wymiana handlowa. Polsko-niemiecka współpraca handlowa w 2009-2014*, at [https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka\\_zagraniczna/europa/stosunki\\_polsko\\_niemieckie/wspolpraca\\_gospodarcza/wymiana\\_handlowa](https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/europa/stosunki_polsko_niemieckie/wspolpraca_gospodarcza/wymiana_handlowa)





value, machinery, cars, and chemical products, Polish exports have changed dramatically. In the early 1990s, they were dominated by agricultural products, textiles and commodities. Today their structure is very similar to that of German exports to Poland. Products of the automobile industry are the most important.<sup>65</sup> Second, it has been based on a new legal framework. Before May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004 it was trade between an EU Member State and a non-member. After Poland's accession the full potential of the bilateral trade may be explored thanks to favorable legal conditions.

**Table 2. German- Polish bilateral FDI. (In billion EUR at the end of the year)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>German FDI in Poland</i>	<i>Polish FDI in Germany</i>
2013	26.017	1.787
2012	25.410	1.774
2011	25.873	2.142
2010	23.400	1.787
2009	19.732	0.273
2008	19.013	0.273
2007	19.020	0.198
2006	15.442	0.200
2005	12.629	0.152
2004	9.983	0.217

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2015), *Foreign direct investment stock statistics, Special Statistical Publication 10*, Frankfurt am Main.; Deutsche Bundesbank (2011), *Foreign direct investment stock statistics, Special Statistical Publication 10*, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 14 and 49.; Deutsche Bundesbank (2008), *Foreign direct investment stock statistics, Special Statistical Publication 10*, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 14 and 49.

The second pillar of the Polish-German economic relations are investments, especially foreign direct investment (FDI). As shown in Table 2, German FDI grows gradually and in 2013 reached the level of over EUR 26 billion, which makes Germany the second biggest foreign investor in Poland, preceded only by the Netherlands. On the other hand, Polish FDI in Germany is a relatively new phenomenon. This comes as no surprise if we keep in mind Poland's poor economic situation in the early 1990s. It is only with economic stabilization in Poland, restructuring of enterprises and their first export success that they were able to invest abroad.<sup>66</sup> Germany is the top investor in Poland if we take into account the number of foreign

<sup>65</sup> Ulatowski, Rafał: *Die deutsch-polnischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der europäischen Perspektive, 1990-2007*, Marburg, Tectum, pp. 221-233.

<sup>66</sup> *Foreign Direct Investment in Poland in 2014 (EUR)*, at <http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/publikacje/ziben/ziben.html>



enterprises. At the end of 2013, there were 6,230 German enterprises in Poland.<sup>67</sup> Germany is (according to NBP data) the fifth biggest recipient of Polish FDI. What is also important is that NBP data shows a much lower value of Polish FDI than the data of the Bundesbank, that is only EUR 933.8 million.<sup>68</sup>

## **6. Contemporary Situation of Polish-German Political Relations**

In early 2015 it was possible to indicate four areas where Poland and Germany had different interests. The first one is monetary policy. As an euro area member Germany is interested in rescuing the common currency. Poland, in turn, is interested in keeping the euro area open to other EU Member States. The second one is energy policy. Germany is a front runner in the promotion of renewable energy sources, and German energy policy is closely connected to environmental policy. Poland, on the other hand, is much more concerned about security of supply and the economic dimension of energy supply. This is the reason for its support for an energy system based on domestic coal reserves. The third one was security policy. The Polish preference for NATO and permanent presence of NATO troops in Poland did not enjoy German support. The fourth difference is the countries' perceptions of the conflict in the east of Ukraine. In the beginning of the conflict the idea of sanctions did not enjoy much support in Germany, while for Poland Ukrainian sovereignty plays a crucial role.<sup>69</sup> Later in 2015 one additional issue was added. The readiness of Germany, declared by the German chancellor, to take in refugees accelerated the wave of immigration, which by far exceeded the expectations of the German government. The migration crisis has dominated the European policy in 2015. The German government tries to impose quotas on the other EU Member States, which are not kindly accepted by Poland and the other Visegrad Group members.<sup>70</sup>

In 2015 Poland saw a change of the president and of the parliamentary majority. This provides a good opportunity to summarize the current state of Polish-German relations. Berlin was the second capital visited by the new president, Andrzej Duda, and the new foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, has already visited Germany as well. In this part of the article I will concentrate on these two visits.

President Andrzej Duda visited Germany on 28 August 2015. He met with President Joachim Gauck, Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Dietmar Woidke, plenipotentiary of the German government for the relations with Poland. Before the visit, President Duda declared: "I simply like Germany". He also appreciated the German policy toward Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis and the German approach toward its own history.<sup>71</sup> During the press conference after the joint meeting with President Gauck, the Polish president declared that he was going to build "strategic and best possible relations with Germany". The current security situation in Europe was discussed. He argued in favor of the development of possibilities of learning the Polish language for Poles living in Germany and the German language for Germans living in Poland. Another important part of the discussion was the role of civil societies in the development of the bilateral relations. He indicated that in this area changes and improvements were needed. He prized cooperation in

<sup>67</sup> Central Statistical Office, *Działalność Gospodarcza Podmiotów z kapitałem Zagranicznym w 2013 r. Economic Activity of Entities with foreign capital in 2013*, Warsaw 2014, p. 52

<sup>68</sup> *Polskie inwestycje bezpośrednie za granicą - 2014 (EUR)*, at <http://www.nbp.pl/home.aspx?f=/publikacje/pib/pib.html>

<sup>69</sup> Cichocki, Marek A.; Osica, Olaf: "Neue deutsch-polnische Agenda. Wie können aus unterschiedlichen Grundlagen gemeinsamer Interessen werden?", *Dialog. Deutsch-Polnisches Magazin*, no. 111 (2015), p. 51-53.

<sup>70</sup> Kałan, Dariusz (2015): *Migration Crisis Unites Visegrad Group*, Warszawa, PISM Bulletin.

<sup>71</sup> Schuller, Konrad: "Ein erklärter Deutschland-Freund", *FAZ*, 27 August 2015.



areas such as youth exchange. The conclusion of the visit was that the last 25 years were a great success in Polish-German relations and that the two countries should develop a strategy for the next 25 years.<sup>72</sup> President Gauck also appreciated the current state of Polish-German relations. He emphasized the two great successes of both countries: Poland's accession to NATO and to the EU. He talked about "a great reservoir of mutual respect and trust" between two countries.<sup>73</sup> But he also pointed out some differences between the two countries. These were: immigration policy (the refugee issue), the policy towards Ukraine and the future role of NATO. These topics were also discussed between President Duda and Chancellor Merkel.<sup>74</sup>

The second visit was paid by Witold Waszczykowski, Poland's new foreign minister, on 28 November 2015. He met with his German counterpart – Frank-Walter Steinmeier. They discussed the key and most controversial issues of the current situation in the EU: the migration crisis and the situation in Ukraine. The issue of immigrants and refugees is what particularly divides the two governments. Minister Waszczykowski declared in Berlin that the key goal of the EU should be to ensure security of the EU's borders. He pointed out that the relocation mechanism, agreed upon by the EU in September 2015 would not solve the problem.<sup>75</sup> The mechanism prescribes quotas for Member States. Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary voted against it. Finland abstained from the vote, and Poland accepted the plan, although the government had previously opposed it.<sup>76</sup> Migration was also the main topic of the interview given by Minister Waszczykowski to the German press. He indicated that NATO still had no troops in the new Member States and blamed this situation on Germany. He argued that Germany was taking Russian interests more seriously than the security interest of Central European countries.<sup>77</sup> This allegation concerns energy policy as well. As indicated earlier, in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century Poland and Germany argued about the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. In June 2015, Gazprom, Wintershall, E.on, Shell, OMV, and Engie agreed on the construction of Nord Stream II. Although Chancellor Merkel sees this project as a commercial activity, the countries of Central and Southern Europe interpret it as a threat to their energy security and economic interests or as an asymmetric approach to the EU policies regarding Russia.<sup>78</sup>

## 7. Conclusions

Polish-German relations developed favorably in the last 25 years. The two countries had the same strategic goals in the early 1990s. EU and NATO enlargement were at the top of the priority list of both countries. Of course, this does not mean that there were no diverging

<sup>72</sup> *Prezydent Andrzej Duda z pierwszą wizytą w Berlinie*, 28 August 2015, at <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/art,3,w-piatek-prezydent-duda-z-pierwsza-wizyta-w-berlinie.html>.

<sup>73</sup> *Federal President Joachim Gauck at a luncheon on the occasion of the first official visit of Polish President Andrzej Duda at Schloss Bellevue*, 28 August 2015, at [http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2015/08/150828-Antritt-Polen-Duda-englisch.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2015/08/150828-Antritt-Polen-Duda-englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile).

<sup>74</sup> von Marschall, Christoph: *Polens Präsident trifft Merkel und Gauck Andrzej Duda - der schwierige Gast*, 28 August 2015, at <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/polens-praesident-trifft-merkel-und-gauck-andrzej-duda-der-schwierige-gast/12250422.html>.

<sup>75</sup> *W Berlinie o współpracy polsko-niemieckiej*, 27 November 2015, at [http://berlin.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/w\\_berlinie\\_o\\_wspolpracy\\_polsko\\_niemieckiej](http://berlin.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/w_berlinie_o_wspolpracy_polsko_niemieckiej).

<sup>76</sup> *Migrant crisis: EU ministers approve disputed quota plan*, 22 September 2015, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34329825>.

<sup>77</sup> *Wo bleibt die Solidarität Deutschlands?*, 14 December 2015, at <http://www.fr-online.de/politik/polen-wo-bleibt-die-solidaritaet-deutschlands-,1472596,32924668.html>.

<sup>78</sup> *Pipeline-Projekt Nordstream 2: Heftiger Streit zwischen Merkel und Renzi auf EU-Gipfel*, 18 December 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/merkel-und-renzi-streit-ueber-nordstream-ausbau-a-1068611.html>.



interests, but governments of the two countries focused on the priorities and played the divergences down. They came to the spotlight more strongly only once the EU enlargement negotiations were closed. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century Poland and Germany went into a phase of intensive discussion. The differences were big and included the most important elements of bilateral relations but also European and transatlantic relations. Then the Polish government decided to reduce tensions. The speech delivered by Minister Sikorski showed the priority that Polish government gave to the relations with Germany. But in current Polish-German relations divergences are once again present. The key topic is migration policy. German behavior is criticized not only in Poland but also in many other EU Member States.

In the current Polish-German relations, the most important issues discussed do not have a strictly bilateral character. Common interests and differences concern issues of European or international policy. In this sense they are very similar to French-German relations, which confirms the success of the design of the Polish-German relations since the early 1990s.

In the last 25 years Germany has successfully used economic means to achieve political and economic goals in its relations with Poland. On the one hand, it was the power of attractiveness. The German model of social market economy is highly appreciated in Poland. German economic power was also sufficient to convince the other Member States to agree to the eastern enlargement. Germany developed intensive economic relations with Poland. Today they constitute a solid background for the economic and political cooperation between the two countries.

For the last 25 years, Polish-German relations have experienced a great deal of change. During the accession negotiations Poland was highly dependent on Germany. The accession changed this structural weakness of Polish foreign policy, creating new opportunities for the designers of the Polish foreign policy.

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## POLAND-UKRAINE RELATIONS

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### **Abstract:**

Poland and Ukraine are the two biggest and most populated countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Because of their size, neighbourhood and position in the region the two countries have often been compared to France and Germany. Both countries are deeply interested in their mutual cooperation. Such situation stems from five factors: direct neighbourhood, common (albeit difficult) history, attractiveness of the Polish labour market for the Ukrainians, membership of Poland in the Western structures, and last but not least, the Russian threat. Despite complimentary interests, both countries have difficulty to effectively develop their mutual relations and turn them into a real "strategic partnership". These problems are due to the internal political and economic situation in Ukraine, limits imposed by the membership of Poland in the EU, Russian policy aiming at keeping Ukraine within its zone of influence and, finally, the EU reluctance to effectively engage in Ukraine.

**Keywords:** Poland, Ukraine, political relations, economic relations, social relations, NATO, European Union.

### **Resumen:**

*Polonia y Ucrania son los estados más grandes y más poblados de Europa Central y Oriental. Dado su tamaño, su vecindad y su situación en la región, los dos estados frecuentemente han sido comparados a Francia y Alemania. Ambos estados están profundamente interesados en la cooperación mutua. Esta situación deriva de cinco factores: vecindad geográfica, historia común- aunque difícil-, atracción del mercado de trabajo en Polonia para los ucranianos y la amenaza rusa. A pesar de tener intereses complementarios tienen dificultades en el desarrollo de forma efectiva de sus relaciones mutuas para llegar a conseguir una asociación estratégica real. Estos problemas se deben a la situación política y económica de Ucrania, las limitaciones impuestas a la pertenencia de Polonia a la Unión Europea, la política rusa intentando mantener a Ucrania en su zona de influencia y, finalmente, las reticencias de la Unión Europea en comprometerse con Ucrania.*

**Palabras clave:** Polonia, Ucrania, relaciones políticas, relaciones económicas, relaciones sociales, OTAN, Unión Europea.

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## 1. Introduction

Poland and Ukraine are the two biggest and most populated countries of Central and Eastern Europe – the large part of the European continent, which lies between the Russian Federation on one side and Western Europe (in particularly Germany) on the other. Poland has an area of 312,685 km<sup>2</sup> and 38,5 million inhabitants<sup>2</sup>, Ukraine respectively – 603,550 km<sup>2</sup> and 44,4 million people<sup>3</sup>. Both countries share a border of 535 km<sup>4</sup>, which goes through the Eastern part of the Carpathian Mountains and later along the Bug River. Both Polish, Ukrainian, as well as the Russian, largely spoken in South-Eastern Ukraine, belong to the Slavic group of languages. Because of their size, neighbourhood and position in the region the two countries have often been compared to France and Germany, which had played a leading role in the unification of Western Europe after the Second World War.

Despite the above mentioned similarities, since the end of the communist system in 1989 – 1991, Poland and Ukraine have developed their foreign and security policies in different ways. Poland has realized a successful transformation, which led to its integration with NATO and EU, while Ukraine has remained a weak and unstable country on the peripheries of the Western system, which made it prone to the Russian aggression in 2014 – 2015.

These differences have a considerable impact on the mutual relations between the two states.

**Table 1. Poland and Ukraine - principal differences**

	Poland	Ukraine
History before 1989-1991	Part of the external Soviet empire Limited opresiveness of the regime	Part of Soviet Union Strong opresiveness of the regime
Politics	Internal reforms Pro-Western foreign policy	State-building "Multi-vector" foreign policy
Economy	"Shock therapy" (Balcerowicz plan) Foreign privatisation	"Shock without therapy" Oligarchization
Society	Nation-state Limited regional differences	Nation <i>in statu nascendi</i> Strong regional differences
International environment	NATO/EU accession Weak Russian pressure	No EU/NATO membership perspective Strong Russian pressure (war in Donbas)

<sup>2</sup> *The World Factbook: Poland*, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html>.

<sup>3</sup> *The World Factbook: Ukraine*, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Dmochowska Halina (ed.) (2014): *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2014*, Warsaw, Central Statistical Office, p. 25.





Table 2. Poland and Ukraine - principal economic indicators (1991 – 2014)

Poland			Ukraine		
	1991	2014		1991	2014
GDP per capita (current USD)	2193	13648	GDP per capita (current USD)	1489	3082
GDP growth (%)	-7,0	1,7	GDP growth (%)	-8,4	-6,8
Polish zloty to USD	2,42*	3,1	Ukrainian hryvna to USD	1,76**	22

\* in 1995, \*\* in 1996.

Source: [worldbank.org](http://worldbank.org); [www.nbp.pl](http://www.nbp.pl); [www.bank.gov.ua](http://www.bank.gov.ua).

## 2. Difficult Historical Heritage

At the end of the 10<sup>th</sup> century Poland and the Kyiv Rus', first Ukrainian<sup>5</sup> proto-state, adopted Christianity as the state religion, the former becoming progressively a catholic, and the latter – an orthodox country. Their mutual relations were not very different from the situation all over the continent at the time, switching from wars to royal intermarriage and vice-versa<sup>6</sup>. In 11<sup>th</sup> – 12<sup>th</sup> century both countries entered the period of feudal fragmentation.

In early 13<sup>th</sup> century Rus' was destroyed by the Mongol-Tatar invasion. Since that time it stopped to be an independent international actor and the Ukrainian lands fell under the domination of its neighbours – the Golden Horde, Poland and Lithuania (united since the end of 14<sup>th</sup> century by a personal union), Hungary, Turkey, and finally Russia. The Polish-Ukrainian relations became since that time highly asymmetrical. They were no more interstate relations, but relations between a state (an empire according to some historians<sup>7</sup>) and its province, and one of its ethnic groups, with a vaguely defined identity.

Until the 17<sup>th</sup> century these relations were relatively peaceful. Most of the Ukrainian lands were under the Lithuanian rule and benefited from a large degree of freedom, in particular in the field of religion. In 1569, however, Poland and Lithuania merged into a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Upon the common, Ukraine came under the Polish rule. Polish aristocrats were highly interested in the Ukrainian blacksoils, hoping to expand the production of grain, latter exported via the Baltic Sea to Western Europe. The civil and religious power considered detrimental the position of the orthodox church in Ukraine.

<sup>5</sup> For simplification I will use the adjectif "Ukrainian" and not "Ruthenian", even if the terms "Ukraine", "Ukrainian" were popularized only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>6</sup> On the history of the countries see for example Davies Norman (2005): *God's Playground. A History of Poland*, volume I *The Origins to 1795*, volume II *1795 to the Present*, Revised Edition, New York, Columbia University Press; Subtelny Orest (2009): *Ukraine. A History*, Fourth Edition, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.

<sup>7</sup> Nowak Andrzej: "Between imperial temptation and anti-imperial function in Eastern European politics: Poland from the eighteenth to twenty-first century", in Matsuzato Kimitaka (ed.) (2004): *Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised?*, Sapporo, Japanese Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, pp. 247 – 253; Nowak Andrzej, Szporluk Roman: "Was Poland an Empire?", *Ab Imperio*, vol. 1 (2007), pp. 23 – 42.



Moreover the latter gained a potential ally, the Grand Principality of Moscow (later the Russian empire), also orthodox, which aimed at uniting all the Eastern Slavs under its rule.

The attempts to unite the orthodox living within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with the Holy See proved to be futile. The union of Brest (1596) establishing the "uniate" catholic church of byzantine rite (the Greek Catholic church) proved to be largely unsuccessful. Most of the orthodox population did not accept the new faith, while the Commonwealth was not transformed into a three-part Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian state, as it had been planned<sup>8</sup>.

In the mid 17<sup>th</sup> century the tensions considerably rose. The semi-military movement of the Cossacks<sup>9</sup>, which exerted political dominance over the Ukrainian lands, claimed more autonomy from the Commonwealth. The dispute turned into a military conflict known as the Khmelnytsky uprising. The Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky proved to be unable neither to gain independence from the Commonwealth, nor to establish a viable state. After few years of war he was forced to seek protection from the Russian tsar. The Pereiaslav union (1654)<sup>10</sup> led to the progressive incorporation of the Eastern part of the Cossack "state" with the Russia, while the rest of Ukrainian lands remained under the control of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Cossack autonomy within Russia was definitively abolished. The partitions of the Commonwealth (1772 – 1795) led to the incorporation of most of Ukrainian lands to the Russian empire. Only the most Western part went to Austria.

Even if Poland was not any more an independent country, the relations between the Polish and Ukrainian communities remained conflictual and asymmetrical. The already existing religious differences were doubled by an economic and social conflict. In Russia Poles remained a nation of aristocrats, although their position progressively weakened under the Russian rule. Ukrainians were mainly peasants, as most of their elites underwent a process of Polonization or Russification. According to the French historian Daniel Beauvois, the Polish-Ukrainian relations were not very different from a colonial scheme, Poles being the colonizers and Ukrainians, the colonized<sup>11</sup>. In Austria, especially since its transformation into the Austro-Hungary (1867) the situation was relatively different. The Habsburgs gave a large freedom to the different ethnic groups (contrast with the Romanovs who aimed at russifying the empire, in particular the Ukrainians). It could even be said that Austro-Hungary bet on the Polish-Ukrainian difference according to the old principle *divide et impera*. In consequence the Ukrainian lands under Austro-Hungarian rule, in particular the Eastern Halychyna with Lviv as its capital became the cradle of the Ukrainian national movement, but also of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict<sup>12</sup>.

The First World War and its end led to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. In that context, both Poles and Ukrainians hoped to create

<sup>8</sup> See for example Bercken van der, Peter (ed.) (1998): *Four Hundred Years Union of Brest (1596-1996): A Critical Re-evaluation : Acta of the Congress Held at Hernen Castle, the Netherlands, in March 1996*, Eastern Christian Studies, volume 1, Leuven, Peeters.

<sup>9</sup> Longworth Philip (1970): *The Cossacks. Five Centuries of Turbulent Life on the Russian Steps*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

<sup>10</sup> Basarab John (1982): *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study*, Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.

<sup>11</sup> Beauvois Daniel (1991): *The noble, the serf, and the revizor: the Polish nobility between Tsarist imperialism and the Ukrainian masses (1831-1863)*, Reading, Harwood Academic Publishers.

<sup>12</sup> Himka John-Paul (1999): *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press; Magocsi Paul Robert (2002): *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.



independent states. The former were successful thanks to an active diplomacy in Western Europe and the internal strength of the new country, dubbed the "Second Republic" (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth being the first one). The latter were unable to realize their aims because of the internal divisions and lack of external support. Both nations clashed over Lviv and the Western Ukrainian lands, which finally went to Poland (1918). Two years later Poland signed an alliance treaty with the ephemeral Ukrainian People's Republic against the Bolshevik threat. With the help of the Ukrainian ally it was able to stop the expansion of the communist Russia, but not to save Ukraine. The Polish-Soviet Riga peace treaty (1921) confirmed that most of the Ukrainian lands will become part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, while the Eastern Halychyna and Volhynia (North-Western part of today's Ukraine, before 1918 part of the Russian empire) would go to Poland<sup>13</sup>.

Therefore during the interwar period, Poland was an independent state, while the Ukrainians did not have such an opportunity, which led to a growing frustration among their population, which was majority in South-Eastern Poland. The Ukrainians accounted for some 14% of the population of the newly created state. Poland was unable to develop a coherent policy towards that (and other minorities) balancing between an ethnic and a civic concept of the nation<sup>14</sup>. The Ukrainians were first seduced by the Soviet Union, which recognized the existence of the Ukrainian nation and allowed its cultural development<sup>15</sup>. However at the end of the twenties the Soviet authorities opted for a Russification and adopted radical measures against the Ukrainians living in the USSR. The Ukrainians turned towards extreme right, hoping in particular for the help of Germany against the Polish state. The conflict escalated – the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929, opted for terrorism as the principal instrument, Polish state responded by the persecution of Ukrainian minority. It should be stressed however that till 1939 the situation of the latter in Poland was much better than in the Soviet Union when few million people perished during the artificially orchestrated Great Hunger (Holodomor)<sup>16</sup>.

After the beginning of the Second World War the South-Eastern part of Poland fell under the control of the Soviets (1939) and later the Germans (1941). The two powers eliminated the local elites and launched the campaigns of ethnic cleansing (deportation of Poles by the Soviets, genocide of the Jews by the Germans). As the war approached its end, each country hoped that Volhynia, Eastern Halychyna and the neighbouring areas would become part of its own state. One of the fractions of the OUN created by Stepan Bandera and its Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) launched a campaign against the Poles living in the disputed areas to prove their Ukrainian character. Poles responded militarily in self-defence. Up to 100 thousand Poles and 10 – 20 thousand Ukrainians perished in the conflict in 1943 – 1944, with Volhynia being the witness of an ethnic cleansing of the Polish minority<sup>17</sup>.

This conflict had little influence on the fate of Eastern Halychyna and Volhynia, which were attached to the Soviet Ukraine by the decision of "Big Three" (United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain). Only small territories inhabited by the Ukrainians remained within the

<sup>13</sup> Davies Norman (2003): *White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 and The Miracle on the Vistula*, London, Pimlico.

<sup>14</sup> Budurowycz Bohdan: "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921–1939", *Canadian Slavonic Papers: Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, vol. 25, n° 4 (1983), pp. 473 – 500.

<sup>15</sup> See Rudnytsky Ivan L. (1987): *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, pp. 463 – 476.

<sup>16</sup> Conquest Robert (1986): *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<sup>17</sup> Snyder Timothy: "To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All": The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 25, n° 4 (1999), pp. 86 – 120; idem: "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943", *Past and Present*, n° 179 (2003), pp. 197 – 234.



new boundaries of Poland. Upon the agreement between the Soviet and Polish authorities most of these people were "repatriated" to the USSR, while the Poles from the Soviet Ukraine came to Poland. Some of the Ukrainians however refused to leave their native lands. Their presence was perceived as a threat to the communist regime. In 1947 on the pretext of eliminating the remains of UPA in Poland, during the "Vistula" operation some 146 thousand Ukrainians and Lemkos (highlanders from Carpatian Mountains close to Ukrainians) were deported to former German territories attached to Poland by the "Big Three" (Silesia, Pomerania, Warmia and Masuria) and dispersed to facilitate their assimilation<sup>18</sup>. The Ukrainian minority was persecuted by the communists till the end of the eighties.

Poland and Ukraine have been largely able to overcome their historical differences or at least to limit their impact on their day-to-day relations. This is a major achievement which made their mutual relations from those between the Western Balkan countries or even between Hungary and its neighbours, who benefitted from the Trianon treaty in 1919<sup>19</sup>.

Such situation is largely due to the people who sought alternatives for the foreign policy of the communist Poland before 1989 and who implemented their ideas after the end of the Yalta order. The Paris-based Polish-émigré literary-political magazine "Kultura", edited by Jerzy Giedroyc, argued that Poland should accept its new, postwar border and establish good relations with Ukraine and other Eastern neighbours (Belarus, Lithuania) in order to stop the Russian expansionism. "Kultura" established contacts with the Ukrainian intellectuals based in Western Europe, such as Bohdan Osadchuk. These ideas were implemented by the new authorities of an independent Poland after the 1989 political transformation, propelled by the anti-communist "Solidarity" movement. History was not to be an obstacle to cooperation with Ukraine. Already in 1990 the Polish Senate (upper house of the parliament) condemned the operation "Vistula". The post-communist nomenclature in power in Ukraine since 1991 easily accepted this approach. They did not really care about historical issues. In 1997 the presidents of Poland and Ukraine adopted a joint declaration on concord and reconciliation, calling to both countries to "remember the past, but to think about the future". Ukraine however has never formally asked for forgiveness for the Volhynia tragedy, which still divides the two countries. In 2013 the Polish Sejm adopted a resolution to commemorate that issue, depicting the Ukrainian underground's anti-Polish action as conducted in the spirit of ethnic cleansing and showing signs of genocide. However history is not a fundamental obstacle for a "strategic partnership" between Poland and Ukraine.

### **3. Mutual Political Attraction**

Poland was the first country in the world to recognize the statehood of Ukraine after the independence referendum on 1 December 1991. Already in 1992 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation, which in particular confirmed the existing border. In March 1994 Poland and Ukraine adopted a declaration on the principles of their mutual relations, which recognized their strategic importance for the two countries. In fact under the presidency of Lech Wałęsa (1990 – 1995) and Leonid Kravchuk (1991 – 1994) the bilateral relations were not however a top priority. Poland during that time focused on strengthening the relations with the West, while Ukraine launched a difficult process of state-building. The situation did change under Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995 – 2005) and Leonid Kuchma (1994 – 2005). Poland secured its access to the Western institutions and organizations,

<sup>18</sup> Snyder Timothy (2012): *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, New York, Basic Books, p. 328 – 329.

<sup>19</sup> See idem (2003): *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569-1999*, New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 2 – 3.





Ukraine stopped to be perceived as a *Saisonstaat*. Both countries could focus on the bilateral relations: historical reconciliation, economic projects, cooperation with EU and NATO<sup>20</sup>. Poland was also a valuable partner for Ukraine, as its relations with the West deteriorated after 2000. Since that time, the term "strategic partnership" was frequently used to describe the bilateral relations<sup>21</sup>. After the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" (2004) which brought to power pro-Western, democratic forces, the relations between the two countries were further strengthened. The presidencies of Lech Kaczyński (2005 – 2010) and Victor Yushchenko however showed the limits of that cooperation. Ukraine remained a weak, unstable country between EU/NATO and Russia; Poland was unable to effectively help it<sup>22</sup>. Under Bronisław Komorowski (2010 – 2015) and Victor Yanukovich (2010 – 2014) both countries focused on the association of Ukraine with the EU. This process was however hampered by the growing authoritarianism of the Ukrainian regime and its rapprochement with Russia. In November 2013, under the pressure of Russia, the Ukrainian regime refused to sign the association agreement with the EU. This decision sparked massive protests in Ukraine, which led to the toppling of Yanukovich. The new authorities signed the association agreement with the EU (2014), however the Ukrainian "revolution of dignity" (known also as the "Euromaidan") provoked Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has become a major challenge for both new Ukrainian authorities and Poland, in particular the new heads of states, Petro Poroshenko (elected in 2014) and Andrzej Duda (elected in 2015).

Both countries are interested in mutual cooperation for different reasons. In the case of Poland there are five main reasons<sup>23</sup>:

First, history. If Poland perceives the common past mainly through the bloody period of 1943 – 1944, it remembers that for centuries the Ukrainian lands belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In a certain way Ukraine is for Poles what Algeria was for the French or India for the British: lost Arcadia, where the geographical names remind the splendid past of the Commonwealth or the microhistory of several Polish families, which came to Warsaw, Cracow, Gdańsk from what has become Ukraine<sup>24</sup>.

Second, the stability of the neighbourhood. Poland wants its Ukrainian neighbour to be a stable, prosperous, democratic and "European" (not only in geographical sense) state. This would protect Poland against such threats as a civil war on the other side of the border, development of organized crime or arrival of waves of refugees from Ukraine. The improvement of situation in Ukraine would also limit the migration pressure on Poland and open new perspectives for Polish exporters and investors present in Ukraine. For several years, NGOs financed by the Polish state and Western sponsors have been working on the democracy promotion and civil society building in Ukraine, such as the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI. Since 2013 the state grants for such organizations are channelled mainly by the Solidarity Fund PL – Polish equivalent of the European Endowment for Democracy. After the "revolution of dignity" Poland has been committed in supporting the

<sup>20</sup> Wolczuk Roman: "Ukrainian-Polish Relations Between 1991 and 1998: From the Declarative to the Substantive", *European Security*, vol. 9, n° 1 (2000), pp.127 – 156.

<sup>21</sup> Pavliuk Oleksandr: "The Ukrainian-Polish Strategic Partnership and Central European Geopolitics", in Spillman Kurt R., Wenger Andreas, Müller Derek (ed.) (1999): *Between Russia and the West. Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine*, Bern, Peter Lang, pp. 185 – 211; Zięba Ryszard: "The "Strategic Partnership" between Poland and Ukraine", *Polish Foreign Affairs Digest*, vol. 2, n° 3 (4) (2002), pp. 195 – 226.

<sup>22</sup> Szeptycki Andrzej: "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: From the Success of the "Orange Revolution" to Russia-first Policy", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, vol. 19, n° 3 (2010), pp. 55 – 25.

<sup>23</sup> See idem: "A new phase of the Polish messianism in the East", in: Bieleń Stanisław (ed.) (2011): *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Warsaw, Difin, pp. 294 – 300.

<sup>24</sup> See Korek Janusz (ed.) (2007): *From Sovietology to Postcoloniality: Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective*, Stockholm, Södertörns högskola.



reform of the local self-government in Ukraine, which is both necessary to modernize the state, but also politically difficult, because of the separatist tendencies supported by Russia.

Third, progressive integration and eventually (in a long-time perspective) accession of Ukraine to EU and NATO. Poland is fully aware it does not have political and economic instruments to successfully support the transformation of Ukraine by its own. That is why it opts for the integration of Ukraine in the Western institutions and organizations, both to modernize the former and to move the border of the West more to the East.

Forth, the relations with Russia. Polish political elites fear the revival of the Russian imperialism and keep in mind two recommendations formulated respectively by Ignacy Daszyński, one of the fathers of Polish independence in 1918, and Zbigniew Brzeziński: "There will be no independent Poland without independent Ukraine" and "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire"<sup>25</sup>. Therefore Polish policy aims at strengthening Ukraine, but also at weakening Russia<sup>26</sup>. The historical memory plays an important role in this context again. Poles have always fought for their freedom against their oppressive neighbours (or at least they think so) - this concerns in particular tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union. That is why Poles tend to support those who fight against Russia in the North Caucasus (Chechnya), South Caucasus (Georgia) or in Eastern Europe. Polish leaders born in the fifties took part in the fight against the Soviet domination and often refer to the heritage of "Solidarity". Their children, who were born at the end of the communist period or after its end, could not fight for their independence - that's why they often become active within the Polish civil society or decide to help the Eastern neighbours, to bring there the flame of freedom. In consequence Polish society and political elites actively supported both the "Orange Revolution" in Autumn 2004, when Ukrainians went out to the street to protest against the falsified presidential elections, and in 2013/2014 during the "Revolution of dignity".

Fifth, the international position of Poland. Poland wants to be the leading country in the EU Eastern policy, and in particular the "advocate" of Ukraine in the Western institutions and organizations. Such a position stems from the importance of Ukraine for Poland, but also from a will to strengthen the position of Poland on the international arena (in particular in the European Union). In consequence Poland considers it should be consulted on the Ukrainian issues. Such position has been reinforced by the "Orange Revolution". As it has been already mentioned the then president Aleksander Kwaśniewski had built up close contacts with his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kuchma. After the beginning of the political crisis in Ukraine, he managed to convince on one hand the Ukrainian president to launch the negotiations with the opposition and, on the other, the EU to support these talks. The "round table" in Kyiv led to a peaceful solution of the crisis with pro-Western Victor Yushchenko becoming the new head of state<sup>27</sup>. Once again Polish minister of foreign affairs Radosław Sikorski was (together with his German and French counterpart) one of the three EU envoys who unsuccessfully tried to find a compromise between Yanukovich and the Ukrainian opposition during the bloodiest days of the "Euromaidan" in February 2014.

Ukraine is interested in cooperation with Poland because of a considerable soft power the latter has in Ukraine. During the communist period, Polish culture was relatively well known in the Soviet Union and Poland (although a part of the communist bloc) was perceived

<sup>25</sup> Brzezinski Zbigniew: "The Premature Partnership", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, n° 2 (1994), p. 80.

<sup>26</sup> See also Pełczyńska-Nałęcz Katarzyna: *How far do the borders of the West extend? Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010*, Point of View n° 15, Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies, pp. 52 – 58.

<sup>27</sup> On the Polish engagement in the "Orange Revolution" see for example Goldman Minton F.: "Polish-Russian Relations and the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections", *East European Quarterly*, vol. XL, n° 4 (2006), pp. 409 – 428.





as more Western, more European, than the USSR – therefore more attractive. This positive image of Poland was reinforced by the political transformation after 1989. It has become an example of success for both Ukrainian elites and population, which they would like to follow (or at least they claim so). It has become a part of the Western institutions and organizations, in particular the European Union, which, according to the official declarations, Ukraine wants to join. Polish experience is particularly important in this context, as it could be instructive for Ukraine<sup>28</sup>. The successful transformation of Poland, buoyant economy and accession to EU has made the country an attractive labour market for the Ukrainian emigrants. Both countries are direct neighbours and share similar languages and cultures, which facilitates the emigration. The large presence of the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland has direct political implications. From the point of view of the Ukrainian authorities the most difficult issue is probably the existence of the EU Schengen visa regime, which Poland is to respect and which considerably limits the access of the Ukrainian citizens to Polish (and in a larger way EU) labour market. Finally, Ukraine needs Poland as an "advocate" in the Western institutions and organizations, in particular in the EU. The Ukrainian authorities are aware of the fact that, for geopolitical reasons, they can always count on the Polish support despite internal problems.

Even if the interests of the two states are complimentary their mutual approach is slightly different. Poland, being a member of the EU, perceives Ukraine as its most important and/or most promising non-EU neighbour. At the same time it often was deceived by its fallacious hopes. Ukraine has a more positive image of Poland, however it treats the Polish partner with less singularity. Ukraine reasons and argues in terms of geopolitical blocks (EU on one side, Russia or the Eurasian Union on the other). In this context it perceives Poland as one of the important members of the EU, albeit not the leading one (like Germany).

#### 4. Limited Economic Opportunities

Economic cooperation between Poland and Ukraine does not meet the expectations formulated at the political level, the only notable exception being the growing presence of the Ukrainian labour immigrants in Poland. Such situation is due mainly to similarities between the post-communist economies, their relatively small size, as well as the difficult condition of the Ukrainian economy. Because of the crisis which has touched Ukraine, the devaluation of hryvna and war in the East of the country, only in 2013 – 2014 Ukraine fell down from the 8<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> position as an import partner of Poland.

**Table 3. Trade between Poland and Ukraine – selected indicators (2014)**

	Exports from Poland	Exports from Ukraine	Balance
Polish data (million US dollars)	4,2	2,2	2
Part of total export of Poland/Ukraine (in %)	1,8	4,9	-
Part of total import of Ukraine/Poland (in %)	5,6	1	-

<sup>28</sup> Adamczyk Artur, Zajączkowski Kamil (ed.) (2012): *Poland in the European Union: Adjustment and Modernisation. Lessons for Ukraine*, Warsaw – Lviv, Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw – Faculty of International Relations, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv.



Ukraine among importers from/exporters to Poland	14 <sup>th</sup>	21 <sup>th</sup>	-
Poland among exporters to/importers from Ukraine	5	5	-
<i>Ukrainian data (million US dollars)</i>	<i>3,1</i>	<i>2,6</i>	<i>0,5</i>

Source: [www.stat.gov.pl](http://www.stat.gov.pl), [www.ukrstat.gov.ua](http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua).

**Table 4. FDI flow between Poland and Ukraine – selected indicators (end of 2013)**

	FDI from Poland	FDI from Ukraine	Balance
Polish data (million US dollars)	354	-84	270
Part of total FDI from Poland/Ukraine (in %)	1,2	0,9	-
Part of total FDI in Poland/Ukraine (in %)	1,5	n.a.	-
Ukraine among places of investment/investors in Poland	13	n.a.	-
Poland among investors/places of investment from Ukraine	13	4	-
<i>Ukrainian data (million US dollars)</i>	<i>845</i>	<i>56</i>	<i>789</i>

Source: [www.stat.gov.pl](http://www.stat.gov.pl), [www.ukrstat.gov.ua](http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua).

The economic cooperation is more important for Ukraine, Poland being the fifth trade partner, but also the fourth place of Ukrainian foreign investments. Poland exports to Ukraine mainly electromechanical, chemical and mineral products, while it imports metallurgical, agro-alimentary and mineral products. It has also a positive balance both in trade and in foreign direct investments.

Ukraine is potentially an interesting, but also difficult place, for Polish investors. Geographical closeness, cultural and linguistic ties, low labour costs, growing needs of the Ukrainian population, which often cannot be satisfied by the local entrepreneurs, Western (EU) know-how push the Polish business to invest in Ukraine. Leading Polish companies like the bank PKO BP and the insurance company PZU SA are present in Ukraine (via respectively Kredobank and PZU Ukraine), as well as several industrial and agro-alimentary producers. They encounter however several problems, such as corruption, unlawful "raiding" of companies, lack of transparency and variability of legislation, the weakness of the Ukrainian judiciary system, poor infrastructure, delays in repayment (or non-repayment) of VAT, slow implementation of the WTO and EU standards, in particular the maintaining of



several non-tariff barriers<sup>29</sup>. These issues should be one of the priorities of bilateral cooperation, however they have often mistreated by both Polish and Ukrainian authorities. In 2005 the government of Yulia Tymoshenko decided to abolish all the privileges in the special economic zones established in the previous years. This decision, which was officially motivated by the necessity to ensure equal treatment for all the economic actors and conform to WTO standards touched some 70 Polish companies, which conducted their businesses in the above mentioned zones<sup>30</sup>. It is to be hoped that such problems will be eliminated with the progressive implementation of the association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union.

**Table 5. Poland and Ukraine: The gas sector (2014, in billion cubic meters)**

	production	total imports	imports from Russia	consumption
Poland	3,7	10,6	8,9	14,3
Ukraine	16,7	17,5	12,9	34,2

Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015*, London, BP.

Poland and Ukraine have sought to develop their cooperation – for political, economic and strategic reasons. In the last case, the principal area of cooperation would be the energy sector, as the countries have been considerably dependent on the gas and oil import from the Russian Federation, which has been perceived as a threat for the two countries, in particular in the context of two Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis (2006, 2009), and later the undeclared war between the two countries. These attempts brought however only limited results.

After the "Orange Revolution" the Ukrainian oligarchic group Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD) became a major investor in Poland. Its engagement in Poland was at least to some extent politically motivated, as ISD owners Vitaliy Hayduk and Serhiy Taruta closely linked to President Yushchenko. In 2005 ISD bought Częstochowa Steelworks in 2005, and two years later acquired a majority stake in the Gdańsk shipyard, the historical birthplace of "Solidarity". The second transaction proved to be misfortunate. The transaction was made in a hurry, skipping the competitive selection procedure. In the beginning of 2008, the European Commission estimated that the shipyard had benefited from a considerable unlawful public aid and it demanded that the shipyard either return the money obtained in breach of EU rules or cut its production capacity. Under the circumstances, a restructuring plan was drawn up for the shipyard, providing for the liquidation of two out of the yard's three slipways and a major loan from the state.

The main energy-related project was Odessa–Brody–Płock pipeline to carry Caspian Sea oil along a route bypassing Russia: from the Black Sea to Poland and, potentially, further on to Western Europe. It was to become an element of broader platform for energy cooperation among countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and, potentially, Central Asia, which was to limit their energy dependence on Russia. The project

<sup>29</sup> See Schwab Klaus (ed.) (2014): *The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012*, World Economic Forum, Geneva 2011, p. 25.

<sup>30</sup> Szeptycki Andrzej: "Poland's Relations with Ukraine", *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* (2006), p. 144.



had a declarative support of both governments, as well as of the European Commission. The Ukrainian portion of the pipeline (Odessa–Brody) was constructed in 2002, but it was not continued to Poland. Undoubtedly Ukraine was its more vocal advocate, seeing in the project a means to increase its energy security. In Poland certain doubts emerged as to the venture's economic viability. According to some commentators, Caspian Sea oil would be more expensive than Russian because of transport costs, and its parameters would not suit the requirements of Polish refineries. Besides, no private investor could be found to finance the pipeline extension<sup>31</sup>.

A positive experience was the Euro 2012 football championship hosted together by Poland and Ukraine. The idea was launched in 2003 by Ukraine with the aim of developing the ties between the two countries and strengthening their position in Europe. If the latter aim was only partially realized, because of the internal situation in Ukraine under the Yanukovich regime, Euro 2012 brought some considerable economic benefits: partial modernization and development of infrastructure (albeit not as successful as expected), promotion of Poland in Ukraine outside their borders etc. ( see Table 6).

**Table 6. Economic Effects of the Euro 2012**

	Poland	Ukraine
Investment (2007 – 2012, in billion euros)	19,8	10,4
<i>in % of GDP</i>	5,2	9
Employment effect (in thousands)	20 – 30	69
<i>in % of labour force</i>	0,11 – 0,17	0,31
Average tourist expenditures (in euros)	800	800
Total tourist spending (in million euros)	400 – 560	400
<i>% of GDP</i>	0,11 – 0,16	0,32
Overall long-term GDP increase	1.4-2.7%	n.a.

Source: Niessner Brigit, Bittner Petr, Zablotsky Maryan: *Euro Championship 2012*, CEE Special Report, 23 May 2012, at <https://www.erstegroup.com/en/Downloads/cd690892-bfde-4738-ba5e-f12053f767ed.pdf>.

## **5. Growing People-to-People Contacts**

Long-time common history and direct neighbourhood have contributed to the existence of social ties between the two countries. Despite the policies of the communist regimes, the Ukrainian minority still lives in Poland, while the Polish one in Ukraine. According to the official censuses conducted in the two countries, there were 144 thousand Poles in Ukraine

<sup>31</sup> Szeptycki: "Polish-Ukrainian Relations", op.cit.



(0,3% of the population) (2001)<sup>32</sup> and 51 thousand Ukrainians in Poland (0,1%) (2011)<sup>33</sup>. In both cases the representatives of the two communities would claim that these numbers had been understated. Because of their little number, as well as dispersion of the Ukrainian in Poland due to the operation "Vistula", the two groups are neither a major actor, nor a major problem in the bilateral relations. The situation is slightly different on the local level – in the borderland region, in particular in Przemyśl (Poland) and Lviv (Ukraine) there are some tensions between the two communities. Because of historical resentments, local population negatively assess the growing activities of the Polish (or Ukrainian) minority, while the latter claims its rights are not being fully respected. The ethnic relations are closely interrelated with the religious ones, as Poles are Roman Catholics, while Ukrainians are Greek Catholics or Orthodox. In 2007 the Republic of Poland introduced the Pole's Card – a special document which can be issued to people living in the former USSR and which confirms their belonging to the Polish nation. The Card gives the holder certain rights such as free access to the public education system; however it does not entitle him/her to settle in Poland. The documents have gained in popularity in Ukraine, even if the Polish origins of certain holders of the Card seem questionable.

Since the nineties, Poland has become an important labour market for the Ukrainians. After the fall of the communism, both Polish and Ukrainian citizens would engage into the border trade to make a living, however with the growing economic differences between Poland and Ukraine, the former has witnessed a growing number of the Ukrainian immigrants coming to Poland. Ukrainian women work most often as cleaners and nannies, Ukrainian men as workers in horticulture and construction sector. However there are more and more "white collars" from Ukraine in Poland. In 2011, for the first time, a Ukrainian immigrant ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the European Parliament. The number of Ukrainian citizens living (working) in Poland is difficult to assess, as many of these people periodically come and go back. In 2011 it was estimated by some experts at around 156 thousand<sup>34</sup>. Economic situation used to be the main reason which pushed Ukrainian to emigrate to Poland. According to a poll conducted in 2010 – 2012 some 64% of the Ukrainian immigrants came to Poland to work there, 13% to accompany their family members, and 4% to study<sup>35</sup>. In 2014 the private transfers from Poland to Ukraine (made mainly by the Ukrainian workers staying in Poland) were estimated at 40 million US dollars<sup>36</sup>, however this number may be underestimated.

This situation has considerably changed since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in November 2013. More and more Ukrainians are coming to Poland – not only to work there

<sup>32</sup> *About number and composition population of Ukraine by data All-Ukrainian population census '2001 data*, at <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/>. On the ethnic situation in Ukraine see for example Bugajski Janusz: "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine", in Wolchik Sharon L., Zvighyanich Volodymyr (ed.) (2002): *Ukraine: The Search for National Identity*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 165 – 181.

<sup>33</sup> *Wybrane tablice dotyczące przynależności narodowo-etnicznej, języka i wyznania - NSP 2011*, at <http://stat.gov.pl/spisy-powszechnie/nsp-2011/nsp-2011-wyniki/>.

<sup>34</sup> *Migration facts Ukraine*, April 2013, at [http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/fact\\_sheets/Factsheet%20Ukraine.pdf](http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/fact_sheets/Factsheet%20Ukraine.pdf). On migration from Ukraine see also Cipko Serge: "Contemporary Migration from Ukraine", in Rios R.R. (ed.) (2006): *Migration Perspectives: Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Planning and Managing Labour Migration*, International Organization for Migration, Vienna

<sup>35</sup> Lesińska Magdalena, Thibos Cameron: *Corridor Report on Poland: the case of Ukrainian and Russian immigrants*, Interfact, n° 2 (2015), at [http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34601/Interact\\_KF\\_2015\\_02.pdf](http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34601/Interact_KF_2015_02.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Приватні грошові перекази, at <http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=73840>. See also Kaczmaryk Paweł: *Money for Nothing? Ukrainian Immigrants in Poland and their Remitting Behaviors*, Discussion Paper, n° 7666 (2013), Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labour, at <http://ftp.iza.org/dp7666.pdf>.



(see Table 7)<sup>37</sup>. Ukrainians are the biggest group among the foreign students in Poland; in the year 2013/2014 they were 15 thousand, in 2014/2015, more than 20 thousand. They come to Poland not only because of the current situation in Ukraine, but also because the quality of education is better and its costs are not much higher if one takes into account corruption-related charges. Poland has funded a special "Polish Erasmus for Ukrainians" program for some 550 students from all-over Ukraine, in particular from the Eastern territories touched by the war with Russia. Ukrainian citizens, in particular those from the Crimean Peninsula, annexed by Russia, and from the Donbas, seek also asylum in Poland. In the last two years most of their demands however have been rejected, Polish authorities arguing that these people can easily benefit from the protection of their home country as IDPs, so their demands for asylum are considered groundless. Growing presence of the Ukrainians in Poland together with a large coverage of the 2013 – 2015 events in Ukraine has largely contributed to a better visibility of the Ukrainian community in Poland. If a few years ago the immigrants were unnoticeable, now they dispose of their own NGOs (different from those run by the members of the "traditional" Ukrainian minority), which lobby the interests of the Ukrainians and Ukraine in Poland.

**Table 7. Ukrainian citizens in Poland**

	2013	2014	2015
Visas issued (in thousands)	708	833	434*
Foreigners (mainly Ukrainians) crossing the border (in millions) <sup>***</sup>	14,4	15,7	8,1*
Asylum seekers (asylum granted)	46 (2)	2318 (0)	1665**

\* January – June, \*\*\* with the exception of local border traffic, \*\* January – August

Source: [www.strazgraniczna.pl](http://www.strazgraniczna.pl), [www.udsc.gov.pl](http://www.udsc.gov.pl), [www.kijow.msz.gov.pl](http://www.kijow.msz.gov.pl).

The biggest obstacle to the people-to-people contacts is the EU Schengen visa regime, as well as the situation on the border. In the nineties both Polish and Ukrainian citizens could cross the border without visa. This situation changed because of the approaching perspective of Poland's accession to the EU. In 2003 Poland introduced free visas for the Ukrainians, in return Poles retained the right to travel to Ukraine without a visa. Later on, in 2007 Poland joined the Schengen zone, which further complicated the situation. Since that time Ukraine had to pay for the visas to Poland/Schengen zone (except for those covered by the 2007 EU – Ukraine agreement on the liberalization of visa regime). The visas were also more difficult to obtain. Both Poland and Ukraine hope that the latter will obtain a visa-free regime from the EU as stipulated by the EU Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation adopted in 2010. The accession of Poland to the Schengen zone considerably limited the movement of the Ukrainians to Poland, especially during the first years. It should be noted that most of the Ukrainian citizens come to Poland legally, which constitutes a major difference in comparison

<sup>37</sup> Adamczyk Anita: "Ukrainian immigration to Poland during the political crisis in Ukraine", *Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne*, n° 3 (2014), pp. 29 – 44, at <https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/jspui/bitstream/10593/12661/1/ssp-2014-3-029-044.pdf>.





with the immigrants coming to the EU from North Africa and the Middle East. Most of them are intended to find (at least officially) a legal job, as this is one of the conditions to get an employment visa. They are also easily integrated into the Polish society. Till now Poland does not have to deal with the immigration-related problems existing in the Western European countries.

Ukrainians are in general positively perceived in Poland, as well as Poles in Ukraine. This means that a major change has occurred in Poland. If in 1993 only 12% of the people polled expressed positive feelings towards the Ukrainians, in 2015 this figure rose to 36%<sup>38</sup>. In Ukraine, Poland is also perceived as the "best friend"<sup>39</sup>. It cannot be excluded, however, in particular in the context of the 2015 immigration crisis, that the attitude of Poles towards the Ukrainians will worsen and *vice versa*.

**Table 8. Poland and Ukraine – mutual perceptions**

	Ukrainians on Poland	Poles on Ukraine
Neighbour	41	26
National traditions	23	16
History and politics	9	26
East versus West	14	11

Source: Fomina Joanna, Konieczna-Sałamatin Joanna, Kucharczyk Jacek, Wenerski Łukasz (2013): *Polska – Ukraina. Polacy – Ukraińcy. Spojrzenie przez granicę*, Warszawa, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, p. 49.

## **6. Military Weakness**

After the collapse of communist bloc, Poland quickly opted to be part of the Euro-Atlantic block of western countries, wanting to leave the "grey zone" between the unstable post-Soviet space and the prosperous West, and fearing the possibility of the revival of Russian expansionist policy. Already in 1993 it got rid of Russian (formerly Soviet) troops which had been stationed in its territory. The perspective of the NATO enlargement towards the East was at first unwelcomed by the member states – this was due in particular to the strong objection from Russia. In 1994 the Alliance launched the *Partnership for Peace*, which Poland joined in the same year. The NATO countries attitude, in particular the US, towards the Central European countries' aspirations changed around 1995. In 1997 Poland, together with the Czech Republic and Hungary was invited to join NATO. In 1999 it became a member of the Alliance. As member of NATO, Poland is covered by article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The cooperation with NATO within the *Partnership for Peace* program and later the accession to the Alliance led to the adoption by Poland of the NATO/Western politico-military standards in the field of security and defense. Through various trainings, exercises, maneuvers, and later military operations, Polish armies has become familiarized with NATO, its values,

<sup>38</sup> *Attitude to Other Nationalities*, at [http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2015/014\\_15.pdf](http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2015/014_15.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> *Who is Our Friend in the EU?*, 26 June 2014, at <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1156.html>.



organization and style of work. The major NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan, were however costly in terms of money and casualties and therefore socially unpopular<sup>40</sup>.

The independent Ukraine successfully managed to take control of most of the formerly Soviet military arsenal located in its territory; however it had to give up to Russia the nuclear weapons (1994) and share with it the Black Sea Fleet, which was stationed in the Ukrainian Crimea till 2017 (later till at least 2042). Ukraine has never criticised NATO as Russia has done, although it did not welcome the perspective of its Eastern enlargement in the nineties, fearing to be isolated. After adopting a quasi-neutral ("non-block") status in 1990, in the year 2002 Ukraine declared its will to join the Alliance. The perspective of its accession to NATO became more tangible under the pro-Western Yushchenko. In 2008 the North Atlantic Council declared that in the future Ukraine and Georgia would join the Alliance, however it did not offer to the two countries the Membership Action Plan, which would substance to this declaration. After Yanukovych came to power Ukraine once again adopted a non-block status, which took the question of its accession of the agenda. Ukraine was unable to join NATO because of the unwillingness of several Western European member states, strong opposition from Russia, as well as the negative attitude of the majority of the Ukrainian population, largely fuelled by Soviet and Russian propaganda<sup>41</sup>.

Poland was a fervent supporter of the NATO enlargement policy, in particular to Ukraine. Such policy steamed from four reasons. First, it believed that the accession towards NATO would contribute to democratization, modernization and stabilization of Ukraine. In this way it would enhance security in the neighborhood of Poland. Second, the enlargement of NATO was perceived as an element of the enlargement of the European structures. As all the new EU member states had entered NATO, it was assumed that these two processes were somehow interrelated. Third, Poland feared Russia and its expansionist policy. It expected Ukraine's accession to NATO would weaken Russia in the region, while strengthening the security of Poland. Forth the membership of Ukraine in NATO was to contribute to the development of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, especially in the defense area, as Poland was already a member of the Alliance.

Both countries engaged into military cooperation, which aimed in particular at assisting the Ukrainian armed forces' adjustment to NATO standards. A Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion (POLUKRBAT) was formed and in 2000 it joined NATO's force in Kosovo (KFOR). In 2008 Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania decided to create a multinational unit. In 2014 they returned to this idea, establishing a common brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). The unit will be used in accordance with the international law with UN, NATO and EU missions. It has not become fully operational yet.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 – first the annexation of Crimea, and later the "hybrid war" in the Donbas-, clearly showed both the fallacy of the Ukrainian security policy since 1991 and the limits of the Polish-Ukrainian "strategic partnership". Because of its lower military potential, strong penetration of the security sector by Russia and especially the lack of allies, Ukraine was unable to successfully defend its territory. The new pro-Western authorities have declared the will to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, however such solution seems unrealistic; NATO could hardly accept as a new member a country which is in state of war with a great power like Russia. Besides the collective defense

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<sup>40</sup> Jeffrey Simon (2004): *Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-military Relations*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

<sup>41</sup> On Ukraine – NATO relations see for example Deugd (de) Nienke (2007): *Ukraine and NATO. The Policy and Practise of Co-operating with the Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, Harmonie Papers, Groningen, Centre for European Security Studies.



organizations generally work like "insurance policies" – you need to take precautions before falling into troubles.

At the military level, Poland could do little to help Ukraine in the context of a war with Russia. A direct military engagement has not been envisaged by the Polish political elites both because of limited Polish military capabilities, unwillingness to enter in military conflict with Russia and incompatibility of such action with Polish membership in NATO. Ukraine has hoped it could receive weapons from NATO countries, in particular Poland. The latter has offered to sell military equipment to Ukraine (instead of delivering it for free as the Ukrainians wanted), but this proposal has not been materialized. Therefore, at least officially, Poland does not deliver weapons to Ukraine; but it cannot be excluded however that such aid is being furnished secretly. What is certain is that Polish and Ukrainian non-governmental organizations based in Poland have been supplying non-lethal equipment such as clothes, night-vision goggles etc. to the Ukrainian army and paramilitary units.

**Table 9. Poland, Ukraine and Russia - military potential (2013)**

	Poland	Ukraine	Russia
Military expenditures (million US dollars)	9,4	4,4	84,8
Military forces (in thousands)	99	130	845

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, at [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org); *Military Balance* (2014), London, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

## **7. The European Context**

If the lack of membership in NATO has been one of the crucial factors which allowed foreign aggression against Ukraine, the lack of membership perspective in the European Union has largely contributed to the failure of the political and economic reforms in the last 24 years.

Since the very beginning of the nineties, Poland aimed at joining the European Communities (since 1993 the European Union). In 1991 both partners signed the association agreement bringing Poland closer to the Communities, although did not provide any guarantees concerning its future status. As the association agreement entered in force in 1994, Poland presented its application for membership in the European Union. Despite internal problems (budget, institutional reform) the EU decided to launch the accession talks with the first group of candidates in 1998. The negotiations were concluded successfully in 2002; and two years later, Poland joined the EU. The accession and the membership period constituted a powerful stimulus for Polish transformation, at least for three reasons. First, the EU legislation Poland had to adopt was a ready-to-use model of a European free-market economy. Second, the perspective of membership was an important reason to implement Poland's obligations towards the European Union. Third, Poland considerably benefitted from the EU financial help, in particular after the accession, receiving some 88 billion euros in 2007 – 2013 and (according to the plans) 108 billion euros in 2014 – 2020.

Ukraine has also declared since the early nineties that it wanted to join the EU. However its demands have never been treated seriously by the EU. Such situation steamed both from unstable situation in Ukraine and the unwillingness of the European Union to extend its future borders to the post-Soviet space (with the exception of the Baltic countries). Despite the fact



that Ukraine is a European state and fulfils the criteria required for being a candidate, the EU member states have never recognize its membership perspective. Such situation has been a handicap for the reforms in that country, both on political and financial level. In 2007 – 2013 Ukraine received from the EU only one billion euros of economic help. If a part of the Ukrainian political elites is sceptical on the EU integration, the majority of the population want the integration in the Union. The "Euromaidan" unanimously confirmed that EU has a considerable *soft power* in Ukraine. After the fall of Yanukovych both partners have signed the association agreement, EU has also increased the economic help to Ukraine. However its stance on the membership has not changed.

Poland has always advocated a close cooperation between Ukraine and EU, hoping this would contribute to the modernization of Ukraine and stabilization of Poland's eastern neighbourhood. It was one of the countries which successfully convinced the EU to engage into the resolution of the political crisis in Ukraine during the "Orange Revolution". During the Yushchenko presidency, Poland focused on three issues. It steadfastly advocated the EU's further enlargement and, eventually, admission of Ukraine. Poland also sought a strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy's eastern dimension, as well as the increase of funding for the eastern neighbors under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Finally, Poland wanted the EU's visa regime to be liberalized for Ukrainian citizens. This effort brought about partial results. The European Parliament recognized more than once the possibility of Ukraine's accession. Both documents were drawn up with active participation of Polish MEPs. However the European Council or the Council of the EU has never recognized Ukraine as "candidate" or "potential candidate" to the EU. In 2009 on the initiative of Poland and Sweden, the EU adopted a new initiative addressed towards the six post-Soviet neighbors (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). The Eastern Partnership was not an alternative to the membership, focusing only on concrete issues such as political association, establishment of free trade area, visa liberalization and energy cooperation<sup>42</sup>. The proposals represented a success for Poland interested in tightening up the Union's collaboration with its eastern neighbors, but their importance was less substantial for Ukraine, which had been offered such arrangements earlier.

Indeed the negotiations of the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU, which had to establish in particular the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the two partners, were launched in 2007. It was a difficult process for both technical and political reasons. The concept of the DCFTA involves not only the mutual opening of the markets, but also the adoption by the partner country of the majority of the EU *acquis communautaire*. As it does not include the membership perspective Ukraine was tempted by a "cherry-picking approach", which was rejected by the EU. The association agreement became the main issue in Polish-Ukrainian relations during the Yanukovych presidency, Poland trying consistently to push forward despite the degradation of democratic standards in Ukraine and subsequently, the worsening of EU – Ukraine relations. In 2011 the EU postponed the signature of the association agreement because of the imprisonment of the former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. In 2012, as Poland and Ukraine hosted the European football championship, some EU countries called for the boycott of the Ukrainian part of the event. Poland however remained loyal to its Ukrainian partner. The president Bronisław Komorowski was the only EU leader who went to Kyiv to watch the Euro final match in the company of Yanukovych and the president of Belarus Olexandr Lukachenka. In 2013 despite Polish please Ukraine decided not to sign the agreement with the EU, which ultimately led to the fall of Yanukovych.

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<sup>42</sup> Korosteleva Elena (2014): *Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours?*, London, Routledge.



After the "Euromaidan" and the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Poland, together with the countries of Northern Europe (Sweden, the Baltic states), successfully lobbied a progressive, albeit limited, introduction of EU sanctions against Russia. The decision on that issue adopted against the political will and economic interests of several member states was certainly a success for the Polish diplomacy. However it should be noted that this success was possible mainly because of the persistence of Russia and Russia-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine. After the annexation of Crimea, the EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes – mainly on the members of the pro-Russian administration of Crimea, as well as separatist leaders. The turning point was the shooting of the Malaysian airliner travelling from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur over Eastern Ukraine by the pro-Russian separatists in July 2014, which forced the European Union to introduce targeted economic sanctions against the Russian Federation<sup>43</sup>.

Despite an active policy within the EU, Poland has been excluded from the international talks on the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. If in February 2014 Poland was one of the countries engaged in talks for the peaceful solution of the "Euromaidan" crisis, since spring 2014 it has been absent from the table of negotiations. Neither the already forgotten "Geneva format" (Ukraine, Russia, US, EU), nor the "Normandy" (Ukraine, Russia, Germany, France) and "Minsk format" (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, "Donetsk" and "Lugansk" People's Republics) include Poland. Such situation stems from two facts: First, the international position of Poland remains weak comparing to the actors currently engaged in the resolution of the conflict. Second, the "strategic partnership" between Poland and Ukraine is a handicap for the former as the Russian Federation prefers to deal with the mediators who have a more balanced approach towards the two sides of the conflict. Ukraine seems to be aware of that fact, as it cannot expect a Western aid, it needs to deal with Russia, on Russian conditions, therefore without Poland.

## **8. Conclusions**

Poland and Ukraine are deeply interested in mutual cooperation. Such situation stems from five factors: direct neighbourhood, common, albeit difficult history, attractiveness of the Polish labour market, membership of Poland in the Western institutions and organizations (in particular in the EU), and last but not least, the Russian threat, which shapes the geopolitical landscape of the whole region.

Despite complementary interests, both countries have some important difficulties to effectively develop their mutual relations and turn them into a real "strategic partnership"; the best example being the economic cooperation. One could argue that such situation is due to their relatively limited potential; however such explanation does not seem to be valid. There are examples of small countries which are able to effectively cooperate and one can mention the Benelux or the Baltic states. The problem lies somewhere else.

There are four main factors that impede the development of the Polish-Ukrainian relations: First, the internal situation in Ukraine: political instability, lack of reforms, a mere declarative will to join the EU for a long period of time and unwillingness to engage into a real historical dialogue with Poland. Second, the membership of Poland in the European Union: belonging to the Union gives Poland a certain influence on EU foreign policy and reinforces Polish *soft power* in Ukraine; however it also imposes certain limits, for example in the case of the EU visa policy. Third, the policy of Russia, which consistently tries to keep

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<sup>43</sup> Szeptycki Andrzej: "The European Union in the Mirror of the Ukrainian Crisis (2013 – 2014)", *Stosunki Międzynarodowe. International Relations*, vol. 51, n° 1 (2015), pp. 107 – 125.



Ukraine within its zone of influence using political, economic and (since 2014) military means. The Russian Federation is openly clear against the association of Ukraine with the EU, in particularly against the establishment of the DCFTA. It also aims at weakening Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, being aware of the anti-Russian character of the Polish eastern policy. Forth, the lack of a EU solid and viable design towards Ukraine (despite the strength of the pro-European sentiment in Ukraine).

To put it briefly, despite their mutual interest, Poland and Ukraine belong to two different geopolitical areas in Europe, one being member of NATO and EU, and the other one being in their periphery. Such situation has complicated significantly the bilateral relations and makes it almost impossible to transform them into a "strategic partnership", as it was the case between France and Germany.





## POLAND AND RUSSIA AT THE TURN OF XXI CENTURY. BETWEEN A LIBERAL ILLUSION AND IMPERIAL REALISM<sup>1</sup>

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### **Abstract:**

In this article the author examines how Poland and Russia perceive international relations and the objectives of foreign policy using specific research approaches. Later, the article tries to illustrate the incompatibility of the ways these two countries perceive the world. In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to refer to concepts explaining these two approaches. In this regard, the author takes advantage of selected currents of structural and offensive realism, the concept of interdependence, institutionalism and liberal theory, which in the context of identification of preferences and perceptions were complemented by research reflections originating in constructivism.

**Keywords:** Poland, Russia, realism, liberal theory, interdependence, institutionalism, perceptions, constructivism.

### **Resumen:**

*La autora de este artículo examina cómo Polonia y Rusia perciben las relaciones internacionales y los objetivos de la política exterior utilizando diversas aproximaciones de investigación. Posteriormente el artículo trata de ilustrar sobre la incompatibilidad con la que los dos países perciben el mundo. A este fin se exponen las concepciones que subyacen en las dos aproximaciones, recurriendo a los planteamientos del realismo estructural y ofensivo, el concepto de interdependencia, el institucionalismo y la teoría liberal, complementados con algunas reflexiones propias del constructivismo.*

**Palabras clave:** *Polonia, Rusia, realismo, teoría liberal, institucionalismo, interdependencia, percepciones, constructivismo.*

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*Many problems in our relations arise from failure to understand the other side, from ascribing false motivations.<sup>3</sup>*

## 1. Introduction

The analysis conducted in the article constitutes an attempt to answer the following question: Are states having different theoretical paradigms that shape their perception of international relations capable of lasting agreement? The author shall operationalise the two main theoretical proposals in international relations – the liberal and the realist one – on the example of two countries – Poland and Russia. Given the purpose of the analysis, two assumptions had to be made, and both shall be justified in the course of the article. The first one is that in the execution of its foreign policy, Poland (Polish decision-makers) refers to the perception of the world in line with the liberal paradigm; the second one is that Russia (the Russian decision-makers) sees and explains the world from the angle of realism. These assumptions lead us to the fundamental question: Is the regular fluctuation between short periods of relative agreement and long periods of conflict between Poland and Russia the result of completely different interpretation of the same phenomena, events and processes? The analysis presented below shall seek to provide an answer to that question.

The article is divided into four main parts. The first part contains a brief analysis of how a state perceives international relations from the liberal and from the realist perspective. Three criteria that will be taken into account are: the characteristics of international relations and the behaviour of states, the attitude towards institutions as cooperation forums, and identification of interest. The second and third parts are devoted to the analysis of Polish and Russian perception of the world in accordance with the said criteria. In the fourth part, on the example of the perception of Ukraine by these two countries and the optimal architecture from their points of view, the author examines the extent to which the goals and visions of the two countries, referring to entirely different perceptions of the same phenomena, clash with each other.

The starting point for the analysis is Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004, as it brought about a fundamental change in all the aspects of the functioning of the state, especially in foreign policy.<sup>4</sup>

Accession to the European Union was expected not only to allow Poland neutralise the difference in potential in its relations with Russia but also give it the opportunity to affect and

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<sup>3</sup> Address of the Chairman of the State Duma's International Committee Konstatin Kosachev at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm on 27 May 2010, *Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Sejmu*, No. 165, No. 3785/VI kad., 27.05.2010, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Membership of the EU was perceived as an element that changed the perception of Poland's potential by both foreign partners and Poland itself. It seems that it was of particular significance for the relations with Russia as it created an illusion that Russia's domination in terms of the asymmetry of potentials between Poland and Russia would be quickly neutralised. In other words, strengthened by membership in the European Union, Poland was to become a stronger partner in Russia's eyes. This optimistic view has been shared by consecutive Polish ministers of foreign affairs and prime ministers since 2002, that is since the negotiations of Poland's Treaty of Accession were concluded. Membership in the EU gave rise to the conviction that it would make it possible to realise more complex interests in the East, that it would include Polish interests in the framework of the emerging concept of relations between the EU and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as well as the other former members of the Soviet Union (as per information of Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz on Polish foreign policy in 2002, available at [https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka\\_zagraniczna/priorytety\\_polityki\\_zagr\\_2012\\_2016/expose2/expose\\_2002/](https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2012_2016/expose2/expose_2002/)).



co-develop the Eastern policy of the entire community.<sup>5</sup> Thus the breakthrough of 2004 gave Poland the chance to realise its interests regarding its eastern neighbours by including them in cooperation with the European Union and, consequently, expanding the sphere of development, security and predictability to Poland's immediate neighbours.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. Analytical Premises

The analytical model used in this article is eclectic in nature.<sup>7</sup> Today, none of the main currents in international relations theory, neither the realist nor the liberal one, is homogeneous or consistent any longer and, even more importantly, they both lost their capability to provide a comprehensive and universal explication of the increasingly complex reality (provided they had had it in the first place). The new currents and approaches that keep emerging prove once again that this complexity exceeds and perhaps even renders impossible any comprehensive and universalising attempts at constructing models, at explaining the causality of phenomena and processes and at synthesising. Constant development of the main theoretical paradigms and debates between their supporters proves that this work is infinite because reality is infinitely dynamic. Considering this cognitive impotence, recently there have been some calls for a dialogue between the approaches and for attempts to integrate them, which would make it possible to take advantage of synergy, and this, in turn, could bring us closer to a holistic perception of international relations and the laws governing them.

The second foundation of the analytical model, beside eclecticism, will be a trans-paradigmatic approach in examining the international reality. Its explanatory value is proven by certain premises useful in both of the main theoretical research currents. One of these, which is key for this analysis, is the hypothesis of R. Jervis on the influence of information and views (perception) of decision-makers on the perception of reality and, consequently, on foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>

The analytical model is based on the analysis of the three elements that are crucial from the angle of the perception of the international reality: the characteristics of international relations and behaviour of states, the attitude to institutions as forums for cooperation, as well as identification of interests. The matrix thus created and enriched by constructivist thought is applied in the next part to Poland's liberal and Russia's realist perception of the world.

The liberal current in international relations theory is internally diverse and has a rich internal discourse.<sup>9</sup> For the purpose of this analysis, two approaches within the broad current

<sup>5</sup> It should be emphasised that because of the lack of unanimity in the perception of the Eastern policy among the EU Member States as well as due to the differences between their interests as regards, for example, the different directions of the EU's external activity under the European Neighbourhood Policy, this proved to be a much harder task than had been assumed.

<sup>6</sup> The fundamental weakness of such an approach, albeit one that the decision-makers failed to take into account, was the assumption that these states were somehow predestined to keep deepening their cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Cf.: Dębski, Sławomir: "Ewolucja doktryny polityki wschodniej Polski", in Gil, Andrzej., Kapuśniak, Tomasz (eds) (2009); *Polityka wschodnia Polski. Uwarunkowania, koncepcje, realizacja*, Lublin-Warszawa, p. 195.

<sup>7</sup> Sil, Rudra, Katzenstein, Peter.J.: "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions", *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (June 2010), pp. 411-431.

<sup>8</sup> Jervis, Robert: "Hypotheses on Misperception", *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No 3 (April 1968), p. 455.

<sup>9</sup> Haliżak, Edward: "Liberalna wizja porządku międzynarodowego", in Kuźniar, Roman (ed.) (2005): *Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku. Wizje – koncepcje – paradygmaty*, Warszawa; Lake, David.A.: "Why 'isms' Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 55, (June 2011), no. 2, pp.465-480; Milner Helen V. (1997): *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, New York, Princeton University Press; Keohane, Robert.O., Nye, Joseph.S. (2001): *Power and Interdependence*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, New York,



of liberal theories are of particular significance: the interdependence theory complemented by the international regime theory as well as liberal institutionalism.

A state that perceives the world from the angle of the liberal approach<sup>10</sup> primarily sits deep in a network of interdependences, which, on the one hand, is almost an endogenous attribute of that world, but on the other hand, if properly used, can be the source of the state power.<sup>11</sup> It is only natural that ideally symmetrical interdependences are rather rare in this complex reality; therefore, asymmetric relations – where one party remains more dependent on the other party – predominate. The state, however, does not struggle against an asymmetric interdependence; it accepts this situation and only tries to optimise the environment so that it can pursue its interests as effectively as possible. For the stronger party, an asymmetrical interdependence is the source of power; for the weaker party, it remains a challenge; but neither contests the other's positions and, consequently, neither strives to change the very nature of the relation of interdependence.<sup>12</sup> The relations between Poland and Russia are a good example of such an asymmetrical interdependence, where Poland, dependent on imports of oil and gas from Russia, is the weaker side.

So, what can a state do to neutralise this asymmetry? It can apply two mechanisms – institutions and/or regime. A state that perceives the world through the liberal paradigm 'believes' in the effectiveness of such mechanisms. Therefore, when attempting to deal with the aforementioned asymmetry in its relations with Russia, Poland was an active proponent of an energy regime within the European Union in the form of the Energy Union. What is more, we can assume that the Eastern Partnership is also a kind of variation of such a regime. By creating rules, including primarily the commitment to maintain broadly defined solidarity, an international regime would strengthen Poland's position as a country dependent on imports of resources. This is because regimes make the behaviour of states more predictable and thus "reduce the sensitivity of states".<sup>13</sup>

International institutions are the second mechanism that gives the state a chance to realise its interests according to the liberal perception of reality. It is, of course, a broader term than international organisations. By offering a forum for cooperation institutions are to become the instrument for realising state interests. Obviously, not all institutions of international cooperation offer such possibilities, and their usefulness depends not only on the institution itself but also on the position the given state enjoys therein. Therefore, we can consider the striving to gain more influence in an institution, with this influence not resulting directly from how the state is perceived by the other members or from its potential, to be an example of state activity aimed at optimising the environment. It can take the form of contribution to the conceptualisation of the institution's or organisation's directions of activity, participation in its decision-making bodies or acts of solidarity in undertaking joint action towards third parties. It needs to be noted, however, that this inclination of states to

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Longman; Ruggie, John.Gerard (2002): *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, New York, Routledge.

<sup>10</sup> Especially from the angle of interdependence theory, cf.: Keohane, Robert.O., Nye, Joseph.S. (1987): *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*, Boston.

<sup>11</sup> Keohane, Robert O., Nye, Joseph S. (1989): *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*, Boston, Little Brown.

<sup>12</sup> Even though asymmetry of interdependence is an obvious phenomenon, it is not always properly identified. What seems to be an inadequate example of asymmetry of interdependence is the relation between Russia and the European Union, where the EU (or actually a part of it) depends on the supply of Russian gas and thus would be identified as the weaker party. Cf.: Kozub-Karkut, Magdalena: "Liberalizm: charakterystyka teorii w świetle założeń A. Moravcsika", in Fijałkowski, Łukasz, Stadtmuller, Elżbieta (eds)(2015): *Normy, wartości i instytucje we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Warszawa, p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Czuputowicz, Jacek (2007): *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa, p. 219.



cooperate results from an assumption that is fundamental for the liberal perception of the world: that peace and cooperation are the key to development.

This virtual predestination of the state to cooperation and positive rivalry stems from a number of factors, but a detailed analysis in this respect would not be relevant to the purpose of this article. Taking into account the initial research premises, one of them is, however, worth drawing attention to: the ascribing of considerable, possibly decisive, influence on the choices made by states and on the identification of interests to individuals and social groups (bottom-up).<sup>14</sup> Through their influence on decision-makers social groups (using various channels) 'force' the state to redefine its interests so that it is consistent with social (their) preferences. Therefore, a decision-maker that directly stems from such a group or is under its strong influence makes choices aimed at avoiding conflicts and situations that would raise the sense of threat (rational actor model); in other words, the decision-maker makes rational choices, which translates into rational and therefore cooperative behaviour of states. Thus the way liberals perceive the mechanism of identifying preferences and transforming them into state interests leads to what we might call the opening of a 'black box'. Incidentally, it is also worth noting that direct influence of social groups and individuals on the identification of preferences and goals of the state means that a change of the political provenance of the decision-makers leads to a change in these preferences.<sup>15</sup> What lies at the source of the process of emergence of state interests is the identification of preferences by the individuals that have the decisive influence on state policy, the values, convictions and experiences they carry.

The world perceived from the angle of the realist approach<sup>16</sup> is a space of interests subject to constant rivalry, where every state strives to maximise its power<sup>17</sup> (defined relatively by offensive realists) and thus achieve domination. The principles of offensive realism constitute a particularly useful instrument in studying the major powers' foreign policies.<sup>18</sup> Maximisation of power, and consequently relative domination over others, guarantees optimal realisation of interests and survival. Major powers such as Russia are predestined or condemned to perceiving the goals of foreign policy in these terms because in the anarchical international environment this is the only path to security and survival.<sup>19</sup> For example, Russia will therefore perceive its potential through the comparison with the potentials of its main rivals, mainly the United States, and will be striving to maximise its power through all the means and activities available to it; if possible, it will also do so at the expense of the rival.

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<sup>14</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew: "Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization*, vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), p. 517.

<sup>15</sup> The source and ways of identifying preferences were also the subject of interest of constructivists, who placed them in the broad context of experiences of individuals and of cultural influences. Cf.: Wendt, Alexander(2008): *Spoleczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa.

<sup>16</sup> Just as the liberal approach, the realist approach in international relations has a strong tendency to internal discourse. The conceptualisation of new approaches became especially dynamic with the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* in 1979 (Waltz, Kenneth (1979): *Theory of International Politics*, New York, McGraw Hill).

<sup>17</sup> Maximisation of power as the dominant goal of foreign policy is an element of one of the two currents of realism introduced to theoretical discourse by Jack Snyder. In 1991, in the book *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* he proposed the concepts of offensive and defensive realism. (Snyder, Jack (1991): *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Ithaca).

<sup>18</sup> Zajączkowski, Jakub: "Strategie morskie Indii, Chin i USA w regionie Oceanu Indyjskiego: analiza w kategoriach realizmu ofensywnego", in *Stosunki Międzynarodowe–International Relations*, No. 2, Vol. 51 (2015), pp. 37-70, p. 40.

<sup>19</sup> Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, Norton.





The international environment including a 'realist' state is anarchical, but this does not mean that it is chaotic.<sup>20</sup> The fact that it lacks any semblance of an effective global decision-making centre or sanction mechanisms to be applied if the recognised and functioning rules are violated does not imply disorder. Such a world and its 'organisation' are based to a greater extent on rivalry, especially in the area of security, and on allowing the escalation of conflicts of interests. This rivalry puts it in the state of a kind of homeostasis, makes it a system that is relatively balanced internally. Thus the activities in such a system are not coincidental, and the fact that in the world of realists there is no place for a 'government over governments' makes it highly flexible and adaptable.<sup>21</sup>

This dynamic balance results in the imperative of resorting to self-help<sup>22</sup> or specifically understood 'lone wolf' behaviour. This is not only due to the fact that the environment is anarchical but also because states can never be sure of the intentions and motives of other states. Assuming that the others perceive the world in the same way and pursue similar goals (maximisation of power), states need to act mainly out of self-interest.<sup>23</sup>

Given all the above, institutions of cooperation seem a rather unconvincing instrument to a state that perceives the world in realist terms, or even – to quote J. Mearsheimer – an instrument that gives false promises. As a matter of fact, within institutions states behave in the same way as they do outside them – they try to maximise their own benefits regardless of the position of others and achieve their own goals, especially towards the other partners. Under this approach, an institution is an agreement concluded in bad faith because all parties declare different goals than the ones they actually want to achieve. In such circumstances, the lack of effective governance mechanisms in institutions of international cooperation is the consequence of the states' deeply hidden dislike of these mechanisms as they would limit the states' freedom in pursuing their particular interests within the institutions. Of course, this does not mean that there is no possibility of cooperation within institutions; it is, however, a signal that the weight they are given should be adequate to their significance and that they should be treated only as a complementary channel providing the opportunity to exercise a state's advantage over weaker actors. For gains can be relative or absolute; in the opinion of realists the situation is optimal when both relative and absolute gains can be achieved, although relative gains remain more important and are always dependent on the gains or losses of the rival – just as it is the case with realist perception of power.<sup>24</sup>

From the point of view of stability, the optimum arrangement for a state that perceives the world from the angle of offensive realism is multipolarity as it ensures relatively equal division of influence between major powers.<sup>25</sup> Fulfilling the ambitions of the major powers through distribution of influence reduces, in a way, the risk of conflict and stabilises the international system. In this situation, each of the major powers builds its power on the foundation of its sphere of influence.<sup>26</sup> At the core of this category lays the unchallenged

<sup>20</sup> Łoś-Nowak, Teresa: "Paradygmat realistyczny – projekcje porządku międzynarodowego w XXI wieku", in Kuźniar, Roman (2005): *Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku. Wizje-koncepcje-paradygmaty*, Warszawa.

<sup>21</sup> Mearsheimer, John J.: "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, p. 10.

<sup>22</sup> Waltz, Kenneth (2008): *Realism and International Politics*, Abingdon, Routledge.

<sup>23</sup> Mearsheimer, *op. cit.* p. 11.

<sup>24</sup> Powell, Robert L.: "Absolute and relative gains in international relation theory", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320.

<sup>25</sup> Morgenthau, Hans (1978): *Politics Among Nations. The Nations. The struggle for Power and Peace*, New York.

<sup>26</sup> Bryła, Jolanta (2002): *Strefy wpływów w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne na przykładzie supermocarstw*, Poznań.





domination of a single power and the lack of agreement, including active opposition against any attempts to disturb or weaken its domination in this area. The 'inviolability' of the sphere of influence is the result of it being perceived not only in terms of security but also in terms of prestige.

The behaviour of a state in the realist world derives from the influence of the entire system.<sup>27</sup> The identification of interests and objectives in foreign policy is determined by the impact of external factors as the ones the state's policy and position depends on. What remains crucial to defining state interests and goals is the structure of the system as well as the state's position in it, and while identifying its goals and interests the state is guided by its perception of the international environment, especially its key rivals and their subjectively perceived potential. These factors make it possible to understand the motives behind the activity of states. According to this approach, neither the characteristics of the political system nor the internal situation are really important because they perform similar tasks.<sup>28</sup> In a situation where it is the system that determines a state's choices, the primary goal is to optimise this system in such a way as to facilitate the successful execution of the other goals. In contrast to the liberal world, however, this activity takes the form of a solitary rivalry with the aim of increasing one's own power, without any delusions of abnegative cooperation within institutions or regimes. For the sake of accuracy, it also needs to be noted that internal variables, such as personalities of decision-makers, remain important for a state's foreign policy as they determine how the state reacts and takes advantage of its place in the system.<sup>29</sup>

Given limited information about the motives and capabilities of the other actors, the world seen from the angle of the realist paradigm is in a sense marked by rivalry. The assumption that others share a similar inclination to striving to improve their position makes states more willing to engage in risky behaviour, including revisionist activity, if only it will increase their power, also at the expense of others. The arsenal of activities states consider acceptable and effective still includes those that are directly related to the material potential, especially military power; thus they still include, for example, blackmail, bleeding out or war.<sup>30</sup>

### **3. The Polish Perception of the World**

From the Polish point of view, the world is based on interdependencies and cooperation founded on a community of values. Poland is clearly anxious about 'rationally understood

<sup>27</sup> In accordance with the principles of structural realism. Cf.: Waltz, Kenneth (1979): *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

<sup>28</sup> Halizak, Edward and Czaputowicz, Jacek (2014) (eds): *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*, Warszawa, Rambler.

<sup>29</sup> This new approach constitutes the contribution of neoclassical realism to discourse within the realist theories. Neoclassical realists pointed out that alongside the still important external variables, internal variables, such as the decision-makers' perception of the state's place in the system or power in international relation, also influence state policy. Cf.: Byman, Daniel.L., Pollack, Kenneth .M (2001): "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 107–46; Rose Gideon (1998), "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 144–72.

<sup>30</sup> John Mearsheimer wrote: '[...] what strategies do states pursue to gain power or to maintain It when another great power threatens to upset the balance of power? Blackmail and the war are the main strategies that states employ to acquire power, and balancing and back-passing are the principal strategies that great power use to maintain the distribution of power when facing a dangerous rival. With balancing the threatened state accepts the burden of deterring its adversary and commits substantial resource to achieving that goal. With the back-passing, the endangered great power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state'; Mearsheimer, John (2001): *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, Norton, Introduction.



national interests', which means that the axiological approach is the basis in the process of identifying preferences.<sup>31</sup> It is in these terms that Poland perceives the institutions of cooperation that it considers the most important – the European Union and NATO – as well as the broadly understood West; it is also this approach that it applies in its policy towards its Eastern neighbours. It seems that the so called Eastern policy<sup>32</sup> is an excellent example of the importance of values in Poland's perception and understanding of international relations because it is affected by lasting discourse between the two fundamental historiosophic approaches – the pragmatic (realist) one and the romantic (prometheist) one.<sup>33</sup> Very generally speaking, the pragmatic approach can be described as accepting our Eastern partners as they are – and vice versa of course – and basing the relations with them mainly on economic interests, while avoiding a *iunctim* between cooperation and reforms towards democracy and towards Western values. The romantic vision, in turn, is based on the imperative of democracy and internal reforms in the countries beyond Poland's eastern border; especially in Ukraine. These processes should facilitate their deeper integration with the West, which, in turn, would turn them into a belt of independent and stable states forming a safety buffer against Russia's 'revisionist' policy.<sup>34</sup>

As previously mentioned, the Polish vision of the state of international relations has a cooperative nature. Polish decision-makers acknowledge that the world is clearly heading towards multipolarity where the West will only be one of the elements and the centre will shift towards the Pacific. A strategic challenge that remains for Poland is to find its place in this new balance of power so as not to be condemned to marginalisation and limited to regional interactions.<sup>35</sup> This was the viewpoint of the previous Polish minister of foreign affairs, Grzegorz Schetyna, but it also needs to be noted that given the recent government change in Poland, there have been indications that the region of Central Europe will become

<sup>31</sup> Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Barbara Tuge-Erecińska spoke along these lines at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 27 April 2006. *Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 34; at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/B5?Open>.

<sup>32</sup> The Eastern policy is usually understood as the policy towards Poland's Eastern neighbours. It should be noted that in terms of methodology this term is incorrect because there is no clear division in Polish foreign policy into other directions, e.g. Northern, Southern or Western. The notion, however, has been adopted by means of *usus* in Polish academic discourse with regard to Poland's policy towards its Eastern neighbours.

<sup>33</sup> The discourse between realists and prometheists has been taking place virtually since Poland regained independence after World War I. It became particularly intense after 1989, although the 1990s were a period of clear domination of the prometheist approach. The scale of polarisation and emotions involved was spectacularly shown during a debate held in the weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* that had begun with the article by B. Sienkiewicz titled "Pochwała minimalizmu" (A Praise to Minimalism), where the author presented arguments for a pragmatic policy towards Poland's eastern neighbours. The subsequent articles in the debate: Sienkiewicz, B.: "Pochwała minimalizmu", *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24-31 December 2000; Sienkiewicz, B.: "Szkodliwe marzycielstwo" (Harmful dreaming), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 21 January 2001; Maziarski, W.: "Szkodliwe poglądy" (Harmful views), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 February 2001; Sienkiewicz, B.: "Podejmijmy poważny spór" (Let's start a serious debate), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 February 2001; Berdychowska, B.: "Giedroyc nadal aktualny" (Giedroyc still relevant), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 March 2001; Miłosz, Cz.: "Przeciw minimalizmowi" (Against minimalism), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 March 2001; Olszański, T.A.: "Po pierwsze: interes państwa" (The state interest comes first), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 18 March 2001; Pomianowski, J.: "Wszystkie błędy zostały już popełnione" (All the errors have already been made), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 25 March 2001.

<sup>34</sup> Nowak, Andrzej.: "Polityka wschodnia Polski: historyczne inspiracje i współczesne dylematy"; Unger, Leopold.: "Polityka wschodnia Polski w wizji paryskiej „Kultury”", in Gil, Andrzej., Kapuśniak, Tomasz (eds) (2009): *Polityka Wschodnia Polski Uwarunkowania Koncepcje Realizacja*, Warszawa-Lublin.

<sup>35</sup> In Polish politics, this vision is described as globalisation of the Polish foreign policy, which should be based on four pillars: multidimensional dialogue with non-European partners, influencing European policy towards non-European countries, cooperation with non-European regional organisations, and working towards a consensus among Polish political, local government, scientific, and business circles on the global priorities of Polish foreign policy.



the most important arena of Polish activity, including as an alliance of states within the framework of the European Union.<sup>36</sup>

Poland puts special weight on the cooperative aspect of its own activity in the international arena; it is convinced that institutions guarantee stability and space for dialogue even in the most difficult of situations. One could get the impression that this specific unquestioning trust in the effectiveness of such solutions applies not only to multilateral cooperation but to bilateral relations as well. Relations with Russia are a special example, as they have never been particularly close and warm and as they involve an entire network of various institutions of Polish–Russian cooperation.<sup>37</sup> In the decision-makers' opinion, this complex infrastructure was justified by the fact that focusing on institutionalisation on many levels of the relations between Poland and Russia resulted from the conviction that while the moods in the relations change, institutions last; that mood was fragile and institutions provided opportunities for communication, even in the most difficult circumstances.<sup>38</sup>

This belief in the effectiveness of policy implemented through institutions of multilateral cooperation is especially prominent in the way Poland strives to achieve its priorities in foreign policy – primarily through international organisations. Since 1989, the priorities of Polish foreign policy have remained unchanged. These are security and development, and the effective way to achieve them has always been through institutions of international cooperation. Consequently, in 1992 NATO became the instrument for ensuring security, and even today it remains the foundation of Poland's security; Minister of Foreign Affairs Grzegorz Schetyna even called it the most important instrument.<sup>39</sup> The European Union has remained the forum for cooperation that provides development opportunities. Since 1989, Poland has been perceiving the EU as an opportunity to pursue its interests with regard to the other EU members, but at the same time membership of the EU was also meant to improve Poland's position towards third countries, especially those with whom the relation of interdependence is clearly asymmetrical, such as Russia.

Due to the significance of the European Union as an instrument for realising foreign policy, one of the fundamental foreign policy goals (perhaps even the most important one) of all Polish governments without exception has been to secure Poland's position in the EU and constantly consolidate it.<sup>40</sup> A strong position in the EU, complemented by an alliance with Germany, was expected to strengthen Poland's relative position in bilateral relations outside

<sup>36</sup> Although the new minister of foreign affairs has not yet presented any information on the directions of Polish foreign policy, in her expose of 18 November 2015 Prime Minister Beata Szydło stressed that the government 'shall strive to empower not only our policy but also the policy of the entire region to which we belong'; at <https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/policy-statement-by-prime-minister-beata-szydlo-stenographic-record.html>.

<sup>37</sup> Bilateral institutional infrastructure comprises the Polish–Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation (established in 2004), the Committee for Polish–Russian Cooperation Strategy (2002), the Polish–Russian Group for Difficult Issues (2002), the Forum for Polish–Russian Dialogue (2001).

<sup>38</sup> A statement made by Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 4 April 2013. Chancellery of the Sejm, Office of the Sejm Committees, full record of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (No. 73), 4 April 2013; at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy7.nsf/0/65378854C6F54EA5C1257B4E004B1622/%24File/0169407.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Grzegorz Schetyna at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 22 April 2015. Chancellery of the Sejm, Office of the Sejm Committees, full record of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 22 April 2015, p. 3; at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy7.nsf/0/5EAB382551C0B3DBC1257E360048A2F1/%24File/0449207.pdf>.

<sup>40</sup> However, the declarations made by Prime Minister Beata Szydło on empowerment and caring for a strong position of Poland in the European Union as well as the undisguised scepticism of the leader of the governing party, Jarosław Kaczyński, about the European Union, could indicate changes in this well-established approach towards the EU. It would seem that the procedure of monitoring the rule of law in Poland launched by the European Commission on 14 January 2014 and statements made by top politicians on the EU's actions towards Poland herald a change in the mood of the dialogue between Poland and the EU.



the EU, including relations with Russia and the East in general. This was the basic programme of the Polish foreign policy that Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski presented in 2009, referring in it to the 'Piast vision' of foreign policy as opposed to the 'Jagiellonian vision'.<sup>41</sup> It is also worth pointing out that until the dissolution of the USSR, Russia's position on Poland's accession to NATO was explicitly negative as it would mean chipping away at the Eastern Bloc and Russia's sphere of influence of the Cold War era. At the same time, this was an excellent opportunity to try and obtain concession for Russia from NATO. The Polish belief in the effectiveness of the EU's activity and the impact of membership on relative improvement of Poland's international position is especially visible in crisis situations, such as when Russia imposed an embargo on Polish goods.<sup>42</sup> At that time, Poland's view was that the main activity in this matter is between Warsaw and the Union and then between the European Commission and Moscow, that it was the Commission that should represent us in this dispute with Russia, defending our opinion that the restrictions were groundless.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, Poland remains a loyal member of the European Union and follows its guidelines where EU solidarity is necessary.<sup>44</sup>

While development as the main priority of Polish foreign policy has been pursued under EU membership, security has been approached mainly from the angle of institutional cooperation within NATO. During the Cold War security had been guaranteed by another institution, the Warsaw Pact, and a year after its dissolution in 1991 Poland declared that obtaining membership of NATO was its strategic goal for the 1990s.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> In the tradition of thought on Eastern policy, after Poland's accession to the EU the Jagiellonian vision is associated with the Law and Justice (PiS) party. Generally speaking, it remains close to the prometheist vision. Pursuant to the principles of these approaches, it is the strategic vision of a community of interests between Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as well as Latvia and Estonia that should be the foundation of Poland's policy towards all its Eastern neighbours. This concept refers to the period of the First Polish Republic of the 17<sup>th</sup> century ruled by the Jagiellonian dynasty – the age in Poland's history when at the height of its territorial extent the country encompassed present-day Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Prussia (as a vassal), as well as parts of present-day Estonia and Lithuania. The Jagiellonian vision was anti-Russian because the proposed alliance of the said countries was to constitute a barrier to Russian imperialism. The Piast vision referred to earlier periods in Polish history – between the 10<sup>th</sup> and the 14<sup>th</sup> centuries – and emphasises integration and enhanced cooperation with the West as well as focusing on improving Poland's prestige in this respect. The concept was presented in the newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* by Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski; cf.: Sikorski, Radosław: "1 września – lekcja historii", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 sierpnia 2009.

<sup>42</sup> In November 2005, Russia introduced bans on imports of certain products from plants and animals claiming that Polish exporters were forging certificates of origin. In the following year, Ukraine joined Russia in this respect by introducing a ban on imports of meat and meat products on 26 March 2006 and justifying this move with smuggling and the lack of veterinary certificates in the transport of these products from Poland to Ukraine. Cf.: Krzyżanowski, Julian T.: "Polski handel zagraniczny produktami rolno-spożywczymi ze wschodem (Europa wschodnia, kraje bliskiego i dalekiego wschodu) – bariery dla eksportu", at [http://www.wne.sggw.pl/czasopisma/pdf/PRS\\_2006\\_T15\\_s293.pdf](http://www.wne.sggw.pl/czasopisma/pdf/PRS_2006_T15_s293.pdf)

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Katarzyna Pelczyńska-Nałęcz for the Polish Press Agency, among other on Polish-Russian relations, 7 August 2014, at [https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/msz\\_w\\_mediach/wywiad\\_ambasador\\_katarzyny\\_pelczynskiej\\_nalecz\\_dla\\_pap\\_m\\_in\\_o\\_stosunkach\\_polsko\\_rosyjskich\\_7\\_sierpnia\\_2014\\_r\\_printMode=true](https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/msz_w_mediach/wywiad_ambasador_katarzyny_pelczynskiej_nalecz_dla_pap_m_in_o_stosunkach_polsko_rosyjskich_7_sierpnia_2014_r_printMode=true).

<sup>44</sup> The informal agreement within the EU made in the first half of 2014 to suspend any and all regular meetings between the EU Member States and Russia that did not directly concern the resolution of the Ukraine crisis is a good example of this. Under the agreement Poland suspended its participation in the meetings of the Committee for Polish-Russian Cooperation Strategy because it decided that there was no justification to hold regular talks with Russia at that time. The Committee had been established in 2002 as a forum for annual meetings chaired by the Polish and Russian ministers of foreign affairs with the aim of discussing the key issues in bilateral relations.

<sup>45</sup> It was entered in the Principles of Polish Security Policy and in the Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland adopted on 2 November 1992. Of course, it is the expansion of own defensive capability that remains the foundation in this regard, but mainly as contribution to the security of NATO, which remains the key multilateral instrument of the Polish security policy in the political and military aspect. For more see:





For Poland, institutions of international cooperation are the most effective mechanism of pursuing own interests and preventing conflicts and instability in international relations. In situations of political or economic crises Poland stresses the need to streamline the functioning of the institutions responsible for the areas affected by crisis. The three main priorities in the Polish foreign policy strategy after 2012 concern cooperation within institutions – the European Union, NATO and the Visegrad Group, the latter perceived as an example of regional cooperation. It is also telling that Poland believes institutions to be the primary effective mechanisms of crisis prevention or resolution rather than the system (the international environment) understood as unorganised activity of states. Thus in Poland's opinion, the economic crisis that engulfed the world in 2008 should have been a stimulus for reforms of the existing institutions of cooperation (the IMF, the World Bank, the G20), and the Lisbon Treaty was to be used as an instrument for improving the effectiveness of the decision-making processes in the European Union, given their apparent ineffectiveness.<sup>46</sup>

Next to interdependence and the importance of multilateral cooperation, the third crucial element of the Polish perception of the world are international regimes as mechanisms that organise the relations between states and thus give Poland a bigger chance to improve its position and mitigate the risks resulting from asymmetric interdependencies. In the analysed direction of foreign policy, we can observe confirmation of these preferences in Poland's particular engagement in two directions: towards the conceptual development of European Union's Eastern Policy and the European Union's energy security.<sup>47</sup> Both elements were on the list of priorities of the Polish Presidency in the EU in 2011,<sup>48</sup> and Poland in fact worked on them during that period.<sup>49</sup> They remain among the key issues of Polish Eastern policy within the framework of the asymmetric interdependence with Russia as Poland is strongly dependent on Russian resources.<sup>50</sup> The solutions proposed by Poland include energy solidarity to mitigate the risks resulting from possible supply disruptions, joint purchase of gas (which would eliminate the differences between the prices of gas offered to the individual Member States in accordance with the *divide et impera* principle) as well as the obligation to present gas purchase contracts to the EU before they are signed.<sup>51</sup> Poland associates them not only

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Tabor, Marek: "Polska w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim", in Parzymies, Stanisław; Popiuk-Rysińska, Irena (eds)(2002): *Polska w organizacjach międzynarodowych*, Warszawa, p. 14.

<sup>46</sup> *Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2012-2016* (Priorities of Polish foreign policy 2012-2016), Warszawa, March 2012, pp. 4-5.

<sup>47</sup> It took the form of a proposal presented in April 2014 by Prime Minister Donald Tusk: "Mapa drogowa na rzecz Unii Energetycznej dla Europy. Non-paper adresujący wyzwania zależności energetycznej UE", at <https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/fc25e49c-a646-4b8a-bc7d-5336dac99670:JCR>.

<sup>48</sup> Energy security was included in the second of the three main thematic areas of the presidency: 'Secure Europe', and the Eastern Partnership in the third one: 'Europe benefiting from openness'; "Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 1 July 2011 – 31 December 2011", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 5-9, at [https://www.bmbf.gv.at/schulen/euint/rp/polen\\_20863.pdf?4dzi3h](https://www.bmbf.gv.at/schulen/euint/rp/polen_20863.pdf?4dzi3h).

<sup>49</sup> "Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Final Report: preparations, achievements, conclusions submitted by the Government Plenipotentiary for the Preparation of Governmental Administrative Agencies to Poland's Presidency of the Council of the European Union". Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 17 April 2012, at: [http://www.mf.gov.pl/en/documents/764034/1137013/Report\\_Polish\\_presidency.pdf](http://www.mf.gov.pl/en/documents/764034/1137013/Report_Polish_presidency.pdf).

<sup>50</sup> Poland is dependent on imports of resources from Russia; Russia covers more than 90 % of Poland's oil needs and more than 70 % of its gas needs. The dependence on Russian gas will decrease significantly (by almost 30 %) due to LNG imports from Qatar thanks to the opening of the LNG import terminal in Świnoujście in autumn 2015. "Strategia Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne i Środowisko perspektywa do 2020 roku" (Energy Security and Environment Strategy – 2020 Perspective), Warszawa 2014, at [http://www.kigeit.org.pl/FTP/PRCIP/Literatura/008\\_3\\_Strategia\\_Bezpieczenstwo\\_Energetyczne\\_i\\_Srodowisko\\_2020.pdf](http://www.kigeit.org.pl/FTP/PRCIP/Literatura/008_3_Strategia_Bezpieczenstwo_Energetyczne_i_Srodowisko_2020.pdf), accessed on: 17 January 2016.

<sup>51</sup> Some of the Polish proposals were adopted, but the idea of joint gas purchase was not. The package concerning the Energy Union was published by the European Commission in February 2015. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee,



with its own energy security and a chance to decrease the interdependence asymmetry caused by the need to import resources from Russia but also with its place on the geopolitical map of Europe.<sup>52</sup> It seems that from the point of view of Polish interests, the idea to include energy security in the list of subjects of intra-EU debates as well as the fact that Polish (although not solely Polish) activities in this regard were successful to a certain extent could reinforce the belief that using a regime as a mechanism facilitating the realisation of state interests is an effective solution.

Furthermore, in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, Poland showed clear determination to become a participant in the debate on the European Union's Eastern policy and its development. Poland prepared its first concrete proposal already in 2003, even before it became a member of the European Union.<sup>53</sup> After 2004 it remained an active proponent of definitive development of the Eastern dimension of EU policy as a separate dimension of EU's external activity.<sup>54</sup> Poland's efforts eventually resulted in an institutional success – the Eastern Partnership.<sup>55</sup> The key interest that the Eastern Partnership has made achievable for Poland is the establishment of a stable and predictable zone at the EU's eastern border.<sup>56</sup>

From the angle of the liberal approach and in reference to the model proposed in the first part of the article, the most essential issue is the identification of preferences and, consequently, the goals of state foreign policy. Also in this case Poland seems to confirm that the liberal vision of international relations is the key to Poland's perception of the world and its place in it. The identification of goals and directions of Polish foreign policy shows a noticeable correlation with political provenance of the governing elites. While between 1989 and 2004 there was a certain consensus as regards the main priorities of foreign policy and membership of NATO and the European Union remained the most important objectives, we need to remember that this period saw the systemic transformation of Poland and the emergence of the party system and that all consecutive governments were coalitions, which meant that no single party could push through its own vision of foreign policy without consulting (negotiating) it with the other members of the coalition. The situation changed considerably after 2004, when two dominant visions of foreign policy, represented by the two dominant political parties of that period – Law and Justice<sup>57</sup> and the Civic Platform – clashed

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the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank of 25 February 2015 on A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate.

<sup>52</sup> Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016, Warszawa, March 2012, pp. 4-5, 10, at <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/d31571cf-d24f-4479-af09-e9a46cc85cf6:JCR>.

<sup>53</sup> "Non-paper z polskimi propozycjami ws. kształtu polityki rozszerzonej UE wobec nowych wschodnich sąsiadów, Polityka rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej wobec nowych sąsiadów (Non-paper with Polish proposals on a future shape of the policy of the enlarged EU towards its Eastern neighbours), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Warszawa, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 2003, pp. 93–107.

<sup>54</sup> The Polish position and initiatives in this regard is discussed in: Kowal, Paweł.: "Kluczowe elementy stanowiska Polski wobec polityki wschodniej Unii europejskiej", at <http://www.lazarski.pl/pl/pobierz/1009/>

<sup>55</sup> A detailed discussion of the origins, principles and effects of the initiative can be found in another article included in this publication.

<sup>56</sup> A secure Europe in a better world – European security strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 7; at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> For more on this issue see: Dudek Adriana: "Partnerstwo wschodnie i polski interes narodowy", in Nadolska, Jadwiga, Wojtaszczyk, Konstanty A. (eds) (2010): *Prezydencja Polski w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa.

<sup>57</sup> Law and Justice is first and foremost a Eurosceptic party. Their anxiety about deepening European integration results from the imperative of protecting the plenitude of sovereignty and concerns that the EU would become dominated by the strongest actors (primarily Germany). The party is a proponent of the concept of a Europe of Homelands and is clearly unfriendly towards Germany, which it perceives as a source of threat to Poland's territorial integrity and economic sovereignty. Law and Justice is also unfriendly towards Russia and advocates the Jagiellonian vision of foreign policy; this is also why it strongly supports Ukraine's independence, development and deepening ties with the European Union. In the party's viewpoint, the United States remain Poland's traditionally most important partner and Poland should remain its loyal ally. Furthermore, the party puts





with each other. The influence of the political provenance of the governing coalition's dominant member was most prominent after the elections of 2005, won by Law and Justice, and in 2007, when the Civic Platform received the most support in early elections to the Sejm. Following the latter, there was noticeable improvement in the relations with Russia, which withdrew its embargo on Polish meat<sup>58</sup> that it had imposed in November 2005 (immediately after Law and Justice had assumed power); the cooperation within the EU deepened as well, and a significant rapprochement with Germany could be observed. The latter direction, which led to the emergence of a lasting Polish–German alliance in the EU, was especially conducive to improving Poland's position in the integrated Europe, but the Law and Justice government formed after the 2015 elections – the first non-coalition government – will not continue with it.

#### **4. The Russian Perception of the World**

A world consistent with Russia's interests and aspirations is a world where the most powerful states play the dominant role. The relation between these top powers is based upon rivalry resulting from conflicting interests, upon maximisation of power.<sup>59</sup> The United States and China remain Russia's key rivals, and its main objectives are to weaken the influence of United States (NATO) and undermine the US's role as the sole global superpower.<sup>60</sup>

The world based on domination by a single power – the United States – is becoming a thing of the past; new trends, like the relative weakening of the West, the shift of the centre of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region and the emergence of new major powers, imply a change in the present *status quo* in the direction optimal for Russia. Therefore, Russia attempts to strengthen these trends and take advantage of them, also in its closest neighbourhood. Some examples of such attempts to overcome the *status quo* include the war with Georgia in 2008 as well as the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia in 2009. These actions were a manifestation of Russia's determination to exercise dominance in the areas that it treats as its sphere of influence and at the same time a display of its position as major power. The use of force against Georgia can be considered a sign of outright realist perception of the

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strong emphasis on regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in the Visegrad Group area (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). For more see: Smolar, Aleksander (2006): "Polityka zagraniczna Prawa i Sprawiedliwości – próba rzeczywistości", in *Ciągłość i zmiana w polskiej polityce zagranicznej*, Warszawa, Fundacja im. S. Batorego, pp. 57-73.

<sup>58</sup> Russia imposed the embargo on Polish dairy and meat products in November 2005, justifying it with the accusation that Polish exporters were falsifying certificates of origin. The efforts Poland undertook at that time to deal with the situation and mitigate the conflict were received with noticeable reluctance in Russia. Poland managed to raise the problem to the European level when it used its veto right in the vote on the mandate to conduct negotiations between the EU and Russia on a new framework agreement given the expiry of the earlier partnership and cooperation agreement. Despite explicit declarations by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who held Presidency in the Council at that time, that the problem was a European and not a bilateral one, Russia did not withdraw the embargo until 2007, right after the elections won by the Civic Platform. Cf.: Cichocki, Bartosz., Świeżak, Paweł.(2008): "Co Polska może na wschodzie?" *Raport BBN, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe*, No. 7-8, 2008, pp. 65-82; Słowikowski, Michał.(2007): "Stosunki unijno-rosyjskie w okresie niemieckiej prezydencji. Stagnacja zamiast przełomu?", *Analizy natolińskie*, Vol. 6 No. 19.

<sup>59</sup> Russia uses all the means available to it to make its activity aimed at a multipolar world effective. The Eurasian Economic Union is a good example of this as on the one hand, it undermines or outright rejects US domination, and on the other hand, makes it easier for Russia to play its intended role of a bridge between Europe and Asia. Cf.: Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra, Fischer, Ewa., "Eurazjatycka Unia Gospodarcza – więcej polityki, mniej gospodarki", *Komentarze OSW*, No. 157, 20 January 2015, Warszawa, at [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/komentarze\\_157\\_0.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/komentarze_157_0.pdf).

<sup>60</sup> Kuczyński, Grzegorz. (2009): "Strategia Rosji wobec zachodu", *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe*, No. 9-10. 2009, pp. 155-171.



struggle for inviolability of Russian domination in the post-Soviet space. Another example of this is the annexation of Crimea and the events in Ukraine in 2014.<sup>61</sup>

Transforming Russia into one of the main global powers in a multipolar world was named as Russia's national interest in the latest National Security Strategy<sup>62</sup> and in the Russian Federation's foreign policy strategy of 2013. This world is characterised by contradictions and conflicts between states' national interests. Of course, this approach is not new to Russian policy because Russia has never ceased perceiving itself as a superpower and an empire. However, after a period of self-identification and search for a new identity,<sup>63</sup> according to Russian Decision makers only by the end of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the conditions were right to transform the Russian Federation into one of the key powers in terms of technological progress, quality of life, and influence on global affairs.<sup>64</sup>

Russian imperialism involves Russia's perception of itself as an empire and does not carry explicitly pejorative meanings. In the opinion of other countries, typical Russian expansionism has become its attribute,<sup>65</sup> evidenced by both the aforementioned war in Georgia of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.<sup>66</sup> For Russia, in turn, it remains a sign of trying to maintain inviolability of its sphere of influence as well as the eternal struggle to deter threats, which in Russian history have always come from the outside.<sup>67</sup> This is why Russia shows considerable mistrust towards its neighbours and even greater mistrust towards its partners from Europe. To Russia, the interests and motives of each of them seem unclear, which increases the degree of unpredictability of the developments in its immediate and broader neighbourhood. This is also why it exhibits a typical self-help behaviour and unilateral activity; its priority is strategic self-reliance as the only way to consolidate its position of an independent pole in a multipolar world.<sup>68</sup>

In a multipolar world where the key role is played by the major powers their respective spheres of influence are the attributes of their positions; for Russia this sphere covers the entire area of the former Russian Federation. Russia has been stressing this in every strategic document addressing the issues of security or foreign policy, including the latest foreign policy strategy of 2013.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, beside the activity conducted on the global scale, which is to involve primarily participation in the shaping of a new global order, Russia identifies

<sup>61</sup> Mearsheimer, John (2014): "Why Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2014), pp. 77-89.

<sup>62</sup> The strategy was signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 31 December 2015. For its main principles see: <http://csis.org/publication/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>.

<sup>63</sup> For more see: Bieleń, Stanisław, and Góralski, Witold M., (eds) (1999): *Nowa tożsamość Niemiec i Rosji w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Warszawa, SCHOLAR; Czarnocki, Andrzej., Topolski, Ireneusz. (eds) (2006): *Federacja Rosyjska w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Lublin, Wydawnictwo UMCS; Bryc, Agnieszka. (2005): *Cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Toruń, Wyd. Adam Marszałek.

<sup>64</sup> National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitrij Medvedev of 12 May 2009. For English translation, see for example: <http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>.

<sup>65</sup> Bryc, Agnieszka.: "Wpływ geopolityki na tożsamość międzynarodową Polski i Rosji", in Bieleń Stanisław, Skrzypek, Andrzej (eds) (2012): *Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich*, Warszawa, p. 27.

<sup>66</sup> It is also worth mentioning the petition the Russian Federation filed in the UN for extending the Russian territory in the Arctic by 1.2 million square kilometres. Most probably the reasons behind this concern obtaining rights to oil and gas deposits as well as the ability to control sea traffic between the Pacific and the Atlantic.

<sup>67</sup> Russian historians claim that the country's neighbours are sources of potential threats because whenever Russian statehood was threatened, the threat always came from the outside, from aggressive empires. Bryc, A.: "Wpływ geopolityki...", *op.cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>68</sup> Lukianow, Fiodor(2008): "Rosja w globalnej awanturze", *Nowa Europa Wschodnia*, No. 2, 2008, p. 19.

<sup>69</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Approved by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, 12 February 2013, at [http://archive.mid.ru//brp\\_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D](http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D).



regional priorities and focuses particularly strongly on the post-Soviet area, especially the Commonwealth of Independent States, which it understands as the Russian sphere of influence.<sup>70</sup> The importance of the sphere of influence in Russian foreign policy is proven by Russia's reactions to the attempts to infringe on its 'monopoly' in this region by the plans to extend the NATO's influence on the region's states as well as some attempts to consolidate economic ties (and in fact political as well) through new cooperation concepts (association agreements between the EU and Ukraine or Georgia).

The Russian sphere of influence encompasses the post-Soviet area, where Russia will not allow anyone to oust it from the position of the dominant power. Russia has been emphasising this virtually since the establishment of the Russian Federation although initially its vehement objection to the plans to expand the EU and NATO into this area was only verbal. The situation changed in 2008, when Russia decided to turn to using the argument of force. This way it definitively ended the period of Western strategy consisting in planned and gradual 'taming of the geopolitical legacy of the Soviet Union',<sup>71</sup> and launched a struggle aimed at protecting the inviolability of its sphere of influence using measures that the West had not considered until then; the aforementioned war with Georgia of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 are good examples of this. Russia declared that it would not allow rapprochement between the two countries and the West within the frameworks of NATO and the European Union. Russia treats Georgia and Ukraine as constituents of the Russian sphere of influence in a special way – without Ukraine it would no longer be an Eurasian empire<sup>72</sup> that is predestined to the role of a bridge between Europe and Asia and to a special status in the region and in the relations between major powers in general.<sup>73</sup>

To increase its influence and ties with the countries of the area, Russia not only resorts to traditional bilateral mechanisms but also takes advantage of institutional solutions in order to expand and consolidate its influence in every aspect under the guise economic cooperation. One of such instruments is the Eurasian Economic Union,<sup>74</sup> which is an attempt to unite Ruthenian lands, strengthen the Russian state and halt the economic expansion of the European Union and China; the ties between the members of the CIS and of the Russian Federation need to be arranged so as to ensure lasting political and economic influence of Russia at least throughout the former Soviet Union.<sup>75</sup> Although the concept of the Eurasian Economic Union refers to economic mechanisms leading to the deepening of the interdependencies between individual economies, in fact it facilitates the growth of Russia's political domination in the region. The consolidation of Russia and its power has a directly proportional impact on the support enjoyed by decision-makers – in this case, President Vladimir Putin as the initiator and promoter of the idea.<sup>76</sup>

Military factors still remain Russia's key material foundation of increasing power, and economic, legal or scientific factors only play a secondary role,<sup>77</sup> but in the latest foreign policy concept reference can already be found to soft power instruments, which Russia has

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<sup>70</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, *op.cit.*

<sup>71</sup> Łukianow, Feodor., *op.cit.*, p. 22.

<sup>72</sup> For more on this issue see: Paradowski, R. (2003): *Eurazjatyckie imperium Rosji. Studium idei*, Warszawa.

<sup>73</sup> Brzeziński, Zbigniew (1998): *Wielka szachownica* (The Grand Chessboard), Warszawa, Elipsa, p. 49.

<sup>74</sup> For more on this issue see: Евразийская интЕграция: экономика, право, политика Международный научно-аналитический журнал, No. 1, 2015.

<sup>75</sup> Massaka, Iwona.: "Possible benefits of the creation the Eurasian Union", pp. 52-61, in Евразийская интЕграция..., *op.cit.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>77</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, *op.cit.*



been employing for some time especially with regard to the 'near abroad'.<sup>78</sup> Perceiving military potential as the foundation of power affects the choice of instruments applied in foreign policy, which still include blackmail, threats and war. A good example of this are Russia's reactions to plans of deploying elements of the missile defence system in Central European countries, when Russia threatened to not only withdraw from armament control agreements such as the CFE (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) and the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) but also deploy Iskander missile complexes in Kaliningrad.<sup>79</sup> Russia has been taking advantage of such instruments on many occasions, especially when essential decisions on association agreements initialled or signed within the framework of the Eastern Partnership were made.

In line with the realist perception of the world – especially its offensive variety – Russia engages in rivalry with the main global powers. The purpose of this rivalry is more than a simple change of the existing *status quo* with the dominant position of a single power; it is much rather to weaken it as much as possible. Thus, out of necessity, Russia pursues a revisionist strategy, seeking to increase its own power at the expense of others,<sup>80</sup> and specifically by weakening the influence of the United States. In the opinion of Russia, NATO remains an instrument of the United States; weakening NATO is therefore a permanent element of Russian activity towards the US.<sup>81</sup>

In the 'National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020' of May 2009, NATO was deemed a rising threat to international security. At the same time, it was emphasised that Russia would not accept NATO's attempts at moving military infrastructure to Russia's borders.<sup>82</sup> The Strategy also noted that there was an increasing common sense of threat among states due to changes in the international environment and that a qualitatively new geopolitical situation was emerging. The trend it highlighted was the need to focus on solutions on the regional level, without interference from the outside. Combined with the opinion that NATO is one of the factors that cause exacerbation of threats to international security, this gives Russia a very special mission – that of the power responsible for the situation in the region. This basically means that Russia's activity in the post-Soviet area is to be perceived as ensuring peace and security in that region and, as a result, throughout the world. Russia emphasises that there can be no global order without Russia as one of the key

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<sup>78</sup> Włodkowska-Bagan, Agata.: "Soft power w polityce zagranicznej Rosji wobec państw 'bliskiej zagranicy'", *Kwartalnik Naukowy OAP UW "e-Politikon"*, No. 3, 2012, at <http://oapuw.pl/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wlodkowska-Bagan-A.-Soft-Power-w-polityce-zagranicznej.pdf>.

<sup>79</sup> Russia reacted by threats also to the possibility of Denmark joining the NATO missile defence system. In March 2015, Russian Ambassador in Copenhagen Mikhail Vanin warned Denmark that if this happened, Danish ships could become targets for Russian nuclear missiles.

<sup>80</sup> Zajączkowski, J., *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>81</sup> Russian elites deeply long for a return of the time when the Warsaw Pact was in force and when the Soviet Union and the United States were the only global powers. Echoes of such reflections can be found in statements by Russian politicians of virtually every level of administration. For example, in his speech delivered during a visit to Warsaw, State Duma Member Leonid Kalashnikov commented on NATO remarking that Warsaw had once been the site of the signing of another alliance, one that no longer existed, and that Russia was also worried that NATO, called a defensive pact in Poland and the West, grew to become twice the size it used to be. He further stressed that such issues should be discussed in the forum of the NATO–Russia Council. The speech was delivered at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 27 May 2010, which was attended by a delegation of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, *Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Sejmu*, No. 165, No. 3785/VI kad., 27 May 2010, p. 43.

<sup>82</sup> As it was put: since the unreasonable nature of the existing global and regional architecture oriented at NATO gives rise to an increasing threat to ensuring international security, what shall remain the determining factor for the relations with NATO is Russia's disapproval of the plans to move NATO's military infrastructure towards its borders and attempts at giving the Alliance global functions, contrary to the standards of international law. Cf.: National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, *op. cit.*





powers, but it prefers working alone, co-developing the order but also taking responsibility for security on both the regional and the global levels.<sup>83</sup>

Weakening the United States and NATO remains one of the major objectives of Russian policy for two fundamental reasons: first, it would lead to a relative strengthening of Russia itself and increase its influence on the global scale; and second, it would give Russia the opportunity to gain absolute dominance in its sphere of influence since the weakened United States would not want to become involved in that region. Russia's actions in various fields are subordinated to this particular goal, also those actions that are seemingly unrelated to it. A good example of this is the contract that accompanied the annexation of Crimea.<sup>84</sup> The contract, worth USD 400 billion and concerning exports of gas to the PRC for 30 years, was signed by the Russian Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in Shanghai on 21 May 2014 and is an element of a specific Russian–Chinese alliance *par excellence*. It should be noted that the economic dimension is neither the sole nor the main element of this alliance; it is primarily about creating a counterbalance to the United States and NATO as well as about strengthening Russia.<sup>85</sup> This activity is not strategic, because Russian and Chinese interests are on a collision course (albeit the pace is constantly accelerated). In the meantime, however, when a new system is emerging and when powers are vying for increasing their power, every instance of weakening the United States could mean more power for Russia.

As one of the major powers, Russia identifies its objectives and interests from the angle of its place in the international system and in relation to the potential of the main rival. As already mentioned, Russia has a single fundamental interest – to achieve the position of one of the strongest powers. Therefore, the choice of instruments and methods is determined by the actions of Russia's rivals, its potential in the given moment and the possibilities of optimising the state of the international environment. Another element of the system is the European Union, which Russia perceives not as a community but a concert of powers, where Germany, France and Italy are the major actors. In practice, Russia applies a strategy of selective partnership towards the European Union by establishing bilateral dialogues with the strongest Member States while ignoring the EU as a whole and its less important members, such as Poland. The reason behind this strategy is the desire to weaken the EU's coherence as well as to make it more difficult for the EU to develop a single concept of a policy towards the East or communitisation of energy security.<sup>86</sup> Instead of the EU's common policy towards the East, Russia proposed its own concept of the Greater Europe.<sup>87</sup>

## **5. A clash (Conflict) of Worlds**

The above necessarily brief analysis of the perceptions of the state of international relations and foreign policy by Poland and Russia leads us to the conclusion that the two countries represent completely different approaches. The Polish perception is close to the liberal

<sup>83</sup> Kaczmarek, Marcin.: "Rosyjski rewizjonizm wobec Zachodu", *Prace OSW*, No.33 (December 2009), p. 18 ff.

<sup>84</sup> This eventually became a fact on 18 March 2014, when Russian President V. Putin signed an agreement with the president of the Crimean parliament, the prime minister of Crimea and the mayor of Sevastopol that made the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol constituents of the Russian Federation.

<sup>85</sup> It is worth noting, however, that it is in fact China that benefits the most from it. For more see: Grochmalski, Piotr: "Afroeurazja Centralna – nowa, geopolityczna przestrzeń chronicznej niestabilności", in Marszałek-Kawa, Joanna., Wawrzyński, Patryk (eds)(2014): *Prawo i polityka na wschód od Europy*, Toruń, pp. 396-446.

<sup>86</sup> Kuczyński, Grzegorz (2009): "Strategia Rosji wobec Zachodu", in *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe*, No. 9-10, 2009, pp. 155-171, 163.

<sup>87</sup> Menkiszak, Marek.: "Wielka Europa. Putinowska wizja (dez)integracji europejskiej", *Prace OSW*, No. 46 (October 2013), Warszawa.





current, taking into account its various varieties, while Russia remains a pragmatic realist with clearly offensive inclinations. Is it therefore possible for countries that ascribe entirely different meanings to the same notions to establish dialogue or are they somehow naturally condemned to a cool-to-lukewarm atmosphere in mutual relations that can never end in a lasting agreement? More broadly, and this merits deeper reflection in a separate analysis: If the size and potential of a state determine its perception of the world and of international relations, does this mean that only major powers are capable of understanding each other, even if this takes place in the circumstances of rivalry, which they consider natural for them?

### 5.1. Ukraine

Poland and Russia perceive the countries that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 in diametrically different ways, which affects not only into the policies pursued by these two states but also the relations between them. Two countries of the post-Soviet area in particular play a special role in the disagreements between Poland and Russia, and these are Georgia<sup>88</sup> and Ukraine. In this article, we will focus only on the latter due to the gravity of the situation there.

In Russia, Ukraine still evokes memories of the great Russian empire, and Russia has never come to terms with its fall.<sup>89</sup> It was very hard for Russia to recognise Ukraine's independence in the first place, which was aptly proven by how it was delaying the signing of an agreement on the relations between the two countries until 1997. For Poland, Ukraine's sovereignty has always been an opportunity and as such it was welcomed with enthusiasm, and so Poland was the first country to recognise its independence. Because of reminiscences related to the aforementioned Jagiellonian era and historiosophic tradition of prometheist thought, Ukraine was considered the cornerstone of the Polish Eastern policy concept. A democratic and stable Ukraine included in the European Union's 'common neighbourhood' and tied to the broadly defined West would be the fulfilment of Poland's missionary ambitions in the East and would ensure stability at Poland's eastern border. The main objectives of the Polish Eastern policy are democratisation, stabilisation and integration of Ukraine with Europe, as close as possible. Poland declares that no matters in Polish–Russian relations could prevent it from pursuing a policy aimed at achieving this goal, which is a strategic goal not only for Poland.<sup>90</sup>

Ukraine is therefore the stage of rivalry between Poland and Russia, between two different visions of Ukraine and its place in the European international community. This rivalry is, however, not a fight for the sphere of influence but a veritable clash of 'civilisations', because Poland would like to have Ukraine in the Western value system, while Russia wants it in its own cultural, civilisational and political sphere.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Polish diplomacy became actively involved in the war in Georgia of 2008. The position of Polish President Lech Kaczyński was very explicit and proactive from the very beginning; he condemned Russia's actions towards Georgia in a joint declaration with the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, he paid a visit to Tbilisi (alongside the presidents of Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia as well as the Latvian prime minister), which was followed by a joint statement calling for a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. He also highlighted the need to develop a NATO membership plan for Georgia, which he deemed the fundamental guarantee of eliminating aggressive behaviour in the region.

<sup>89</sup> Broda, Marian.: "Mocarstwowy imperatyw i imperialno-autorytarne fatum współczesnej Rosji?", in Bieleń, Stanisław, Skrzypek, Andrzej (eds)(2015): *Rosja. Rozważania imperiologiczne*, Warszawa, pp. 19-38.

<sup>90</sup> Statement by Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm held on 13 March 2014. Chancellery of the Sejm, Office of the Sejm Committees, full record of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 13 March 2014, at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy7.nsf/0/FEF5C316D1584AF1C1257CA1004F773E/%24File/0305707.pdf>.

<sup>91</sup> Some scholars perceive the relations between Poland and Russia in terms of rivalry for the sphere of influence; such interpretations can be found in academic literature on the subject. Cf.: Bryc, Agnieszka.: "Wpływ



It should be noted that Poland is well aware that in light of the Russian strategy its pro-Ukrainian position is interpreted as anti-Russian. Thus, it is aware that the perceptions of the two countries are entirely different. But still it contests the Russian approach, declaring that from the Polish perspective there is nothing more important for Russia than casting aside its imperialist sentiments as harmful, while noting at the same time that this is the Polish logic and that the Russian perception is entirely different.<sup>92</sup> In this context, the question that arises is whether beside the axiological element of this approach there is a pragmatic one as well and whether agreement is possible without it.

In these circumstances, any kind of Polish involvement in Ukraine aimed at including it in the Western sphere of influence will be perceived by Russia as interfering with the Russian sphere of influence.<sup>93</sup> This happened both during the Orange Revolution and in 2014. Poland's involvement in the events of 2014 in Ukraine not only worsened the atmosphere in state-level relations between Poland and Russia but also had a negative impact on how the two nations perceive each other.<sup>94</sup> As a public opinion survey report noted, Russians perceive Poland as a country that is not independent in its strategic choices and foreign policy, one that submits to Western influence and is on the opposing side to Russia in the new Cold War.<sup>95</sup> Poland, as Russians see it, has not become a partner to Russia and Russians and has in fact never been one, but after the events in Ukraine it is becoming less and less an actor in international relations and increasingly just a pawn in the game played by major powers. This is supposedly confirmed by Polish efforts to include Ukraine-related issues in interregional and international discourse.

Given Russia's position, the issue of Ukraine's (and Georgia's) rapprochement with NATO is also bound to give rise to conflicts. Russia has always considered Poland the driving force behind the idea and explained its motives pragmatically as striving to no longer be a border country.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, Russia stressed that the opinion of Ukraine itself on this issue was not clear, which led it to the conclusion that dragging Ukraine into NATO could destabilise both Ukraine and its immediate neighbourhood. The war in Georgia was

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geopolityki na tożsamość międzynarodową Polski i Rosji", in Bieliń, Stanisław., Skrzypek, Andrzej (eds)(2012): *Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich*, Warszawa, p. 44.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibidem*, Statement by Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm held on 13 March 2014.

<sup>93</sup> We should not forget the internal function of foreign policy that is visible in Russia. It is a factor that has immense influence on the levels of support for President V. Putin and consolidation of his power. According to a survey conducted by the Yuri Levada Analytical Centre, only 48 % of Russia's citizens had a positive opinion of V. Putin in 2012, but in May 2014 this was already 85.9 %, which was largely due to his decisions on the annexation of Crimea. Cf.: Zamarajewa, AAleksandra.: "Lease or chaos : the metaphor of "disintegration" in the symbolic politics of Russia", in Massaka, Iwona (ed.) (2012): *Symbol in politics*, Torun, p. 232.

<sup>94</sup> Public opinion surveys conducted in the two countries in 2013 recorded clear separation of the perception of states from the perception of nations. 47 % of Poles considered Russia rather hostile towards Poland, and 22 % perceived it as definitely hostile, but 48 % considered Russians rather friendly, and only 6 % believed them to be definitely hostile towards Poland. Cf.: "Polska-Rosja. Diagnoza społeczna 2013, Raport z badań opinii publicznej w Polsce i Rosji", Warszawa 2013, at

[http://www.cprdip.pl/assets/media/Wydawnictwa/Raporty/Polska\\_Rosja\\_Diagnoza\\_spoleczna\\_2013.pdf](http://www.cprdip.pl/assets/media/Wydawnictwa/Raporty/Polska_Rosja_Diagnoza_spoleczna_2013.pdf). The events in Ukraine caused mutual perception to deteriorate, in terms of both states and nations. In a 2014 survey, already 41 % considered Russia definitely hostile to Poland (which is an increase of 21 percentage points compared to 2013), while 42 % perceived Russians as rather friendly to Poland (a decrease of 6 percentage points) and 22 % as definitely hostile to Poland (an increase of 16 percentage points). Cf.: "Polska-Rosja Diagnoza Społeczna 2015", *op.cit.*

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>96</sup> Statement by Chairman of the State Duma's International Committee Konstatin Kosachev at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm held on 27 May 2010, which was attended by a delegation from the International Committee, *Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Sejmu*, No.165, No. 3785/VI kad., 27 May 2010, p. 46.



interpreted in a similar manner.<sup>97</sup> From the Russian point of view, NATO does not constitute a direct threat to Russia, but it becomes one when it attempts to assume responsibility for various issues beyond its own borders.<sup>98</sup>

The place of Eastern Europe in Polish and Russian visions is fundamentally different.<sup>99</sup> Poland strives after integrating its eastern neighbours as much as possible and especially after Ukrainian cooperation with Western cooperation institutions. Russia, in turn, perceives this process as an infringement on its sphere of influence because it wants to keep the countries of this region in deep dependence in all possible fields. This is the context in which Russia evaluates the association agreements between the European Union and the countries of the Eastern Partnership, and this is why Russia attempts to block them or discourage the parties from signing them. The association agreement between the EU and Ukraine is a very good example of this. In September 2015, by making threats that it would escalate the war in Donbas and increase economic sanctions, Russia coerced Ukraine into postponing the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,<sup>100</sup> and immediately after the agreement entered into force at the beginning of 2016, it introduced sanctions against Ukraine.<sup>101</sup> Russia's actions against Ukraine should be interpreted as reactions to violation of its sphere of influence, using threats as a tool. Their effectiveness – the postponing of the free trade agreement's entry into force – proves to Russia that such methods are the way to go and that as a third country it can have considerable influence on decisions concerning Ukraine, with the consent of the European Union.

It seems that presently Russian policy is aimed at deescalating the conflict in Ukraine, reintegrating Donbas on Russian conditions, which, combined with the lack of consensus regarding the necessary internal reforms among Ukrainian political elites, will result in a slow-down or suspension of reforms and oligarchic revenge in the form of groupings linked to Kolomoyskyi and Yulia Tymoshenko, which will cause Ukraine to float and will make a systemic reconstruction and improvement of the state impossible.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Chairman of the State Duma's International Committee Konstatin Kosachev commented that he was certain that had the West not been sending Georgia the false message to 'come and join NATO', there would have been no conflict in South Ossetia; this was significant in terms of stabilisation of the situation in the Caucasus because in the end a war broke out there. He further stated that the fact that NATO was at some point interested in having Georgia join it was not a stabilising element but in fact a destabilising one. Statement by Chairman of the State Duma's International Committee, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>98</sup> Statement by Chairman of the State Duma's International Committee, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

<sup>99</sup> Balcer, Adam (2015): *Na wschodzie bez zmian? Polska polityka wschodnia, stan obecny i perspektywy*, Wrocław-Wojnowice, p. 13.

<sup>100</sup> The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is an element of the association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine ratified on 16 September 2015 by the European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Negotiations were held trilaterally – between ministers from Ukraine and Russia as well as representatives of the European Union. The free trade agreement provides for the establishment of a free trade area and Ukraine adopting approximately 60 % of EU law (in the area of energy, technical, sanitary, phytosanitary, and customs provisions and those concerning to protection of intellectual property).

<sup>101</sup> On 1 January 2016, Russia put Ukraine on the list of countries subject to sanctions in response to the entry into force of the free trade agreement and to Ukraine joining the anti-Russian sanctions in summer 2015. As part of the sanctions against Ukraine, Russia suspended the free trade agreement between the two countries, which means a return to regular tariffs within the WTO. Russia's gesture is primarily symbolical because given the decreasing share of the Russian market in Ukrainian food exports, this will have no considerable impact on the Ukrainian economy.

<sup>102</sup> The opinion of one of the most renowned Polish think tanks focusing on Poland's eastern neighbours – the Centre for Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, OSW). Statement by OSW Deputy Director Adam Eberhardt at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 2 December 2015. Chancellery of the Sejm, Office of the Sejm Committees, full record of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (No. 3) of 2 December 2015, at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy8.nsf/0/2C28A925FC945DDCC1257F14005017DD/%24File/0005408.pdf>.



## 5.2. European Security Architecture

Another area where fundamental differences of interests exist is the vision of the security architecture, which remains closely related to the issues presented above and as such can complement them. Since the issue has been extensively analysed and discussed elsewhere, here the author shall present only a brief outline.

For the pragmatic Russia, which perceives the world in realist terms, military potential remains the key element of the measure and maximisation of power, while international institutions that function in the area of security and bear the trappings of an alliance are an instrument that allows it to fulfil the most important objective. Until 1991, the Warsaw Pact had been such an instrument; it guaranteed the position and dependence of its member countries and 'disciplined' the Soviet sphere of influence through the Brezhnev Doctrine (until 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev abolished it). Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 Russia has had no alliance-type institution that would perform similar functions, while its greatest rival, the United States, still 'have' NATO. This is why almost from the very beginning of the 1990s Russia advocated the need to limit the role of NATO and instead turn the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) into the main institution coordinating security-related issues in Europe.<sup>103</sup>

In Russia's eyes NATO and its involvement in areas outside its competence remains a source of destabilisation, especially when this activity concerns the Russian sphere of influence. Russia stresses that it will never join NATO because it is a 'different phenomenon in the area of security' and as such it advocates the need to create a new security system.

For Poland, NATO remains the key instrument for ensuring security, but Poland also emphasises that its most important goal within the NATO is to strengthen the Alliance's eastern flank and that in order to achieve this, it is necessary to fully implement the Readiness Action Plan.<sup>104</sup> Poland tried to obtain support for increasing NATO presence at the eastern flank, especially given Russia's policy towards Ukraine in 2014. Before the Newport Summit,<sup>105</sup> a meeting was held in Warsaw in July 2014 between Polish President Bronisław Komorowski and the presidents of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Estonia), the the Visegrad Group (apart from Poland – the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) as well as Bulgaria and Romania. The parties agreed that it was necessary to strengthen NATO's eastern flank. The second most important instrument of security next to NATO is cooperation with the United States, followed by deepening cooperation in this area within the EU and the OSCE.

Poland will be the host of the coming NATO summit scheduled to be held in Warsaw in July 2016. It will not involve any breakthrough, but as the host Poland will want to obtain support for its position that it is necessary to strengthen NATO's eastern flank,<sup>106</sup> induce the allies to make a decision on the possibility of stationing allied troops and erecting allied bases

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<sup>103</sup> The concept was first presented by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev in 1994. For more see: Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Katarzyna (2010): *Dokąd sięgają granice zachodu? Rosyjsko-polskie konflikty strategiczne 1990-2010*, Warszawa, OSW, p. 12.

<sup>104</sup> The minister referred to the agreements made at the NATO Summit in Newport of 4–5 September 2014, where the Readiness Action Plan was adopted, which meant increasing NATO presence in the countries accepted to the organisation in 1999.

<sup>105</sup> Koziej, Stanisław, Pietrzak, Paweł (2014): "Szczyt NATO w Walii: uwarunkowania, rezultaty, wnioski dla Polski", *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe*, 2014/III, pp. 11-29.

<sup>106</sup> This would take place through implementation of the principles adopted earlier and concerning the Response Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, that is the so called Spearhead Force, Integration Units, and the Multinational Corps Northeast.





in Poland as well as to implement the decisions made at the Newport Summit.<sup>107</sup> It seems, however, that no considerable changes will take place regarding the most important issues discussed in this article; cooperation will remain based on the NATO–Russia Council, and NATO’s presence in this region of Europe will not be increased to any significant degree.

## **6. Conclusion**

The complexity and changeability of the contemporary world makes it very hard to explain it using a single specific research approach. This is illustrated to a certain extent by the relations between Poland and Russia, characterised by the fact that they have a European context and that they influence entities that are not directly part to these relations. The aforementioned volatile and turbulent nature of these relations as well the scale of complexity are the source of one of the main proposals for future directions of research: the need to undertake efforts to combine different approaches and methods.

This analysis is an example of a positive reply to this request. Rejecting the clear intellectual cognitive helplessness of a single approach, it draws upon Katzenstein’s and Sil’s analytic eclecticism. Its explanatory potential is invaluable as it makes it possible to use research categories and notions hailing from different approaches and traditions in order to create the optimal and holistic (from the point of view of the research subject) analytical model. In this case the subject were the relations between Poland and Russia, and therefore the principles of the analytical model described in the introduction have taken into account the eclectic approach of the creators of this concept.

The analysis presented in this article is not an examination of cause and effect and is not aimed at providing a historical description of the relations between Poland and Russia for the simple reason that there is ample academic literature available that discusses the subject in static narration. The idea behind the research was to examine how Poland and Russia perceive international relations and the objectives of foreign policy using specific research approaches, followed by an attempt to illustrate the incompatibility of the ways these two countries perceive the world. In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to refer to concepts explaining these two approaches. Therefore, when the analytical model was developed, the author took advantage of selected currents of structural and offensive realism, the concept of interdependence, institutionalism and liberal theory, which in the context of identification of preferences and perceptions were complemented by research reflections originating in constructivism.

The model created and operationalised in the article and based on the principles of eclecticism made it possible to identify rudimentary differences between Poland and Russia in their perception of international relations as well as the behaviour of states and the nature of foreign policy. The analysis has led to the conclusion that the two countries perceive the international reality and the mechanisms that govern it in an entirely different way. They describe it using different terms, and even when they apply similar cognitive categories, these carry entirely different meanings, making it impossible for the other party to decode them. This in turn suggests that the chronically bad condition of Polish–Russian relations is not the result of the lack of will to improve it or of intentional attempts to undermine it but much

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<sup>107</sup> Statement by Minister of Defence A. Macierewicz at the meeting of the National Defence Committee of the Sejm on 25 November 2015. Chancellery of the Sejm, Office of the Sejm Committees, full record of the meeting of the National Defence Committee (No. 2), 25 November 2015, at <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy8.nsf/0/803C0C9871A75558C1257F0D004FDA91/%24File/0004308.pdf>.





rather of the fact that the two parties perceive and explain reality in a different way. We are therefore dealing with a kind of objectively existing determinants that largely hinder dialogue and compromise. The two countries are neither rivals nor enemies, they function on entirely different levels of international activity that have very little in common. As a country whose perception of its partners' behaviour is dominated by values and belief in the effectiveness of multilateral forms of cooperation, Poland will be unable to pragmatically interpret Russia's behaviour. The Russian Federation, in turn, which resorts to the categories of power, strength and spheres of influence and which sees only the other major powers as its partners, will not engage in dialogue with Poland, which is driven by axiology rather than state interest, and which Russia simply does not understand.

Such an assessment of the impact of divergent perceptions has grave implications for mutual relations and possibilities of cooperation. More broadly, however, it affects the entire continent since from the European perspective the relations between Poland and Russia remain a constituent of broadly defined EU–Russia relations. Due to its tradition and location, Poland could be playing the role of a 'translator', facilitating communication between the West and Russia. It even declared the desire to play such a role, believing that its experiences and knowledge of Russia made it naturally predestined to do so. But if Poland ever truly had such an advantage in knowledge and experience, the time when it could have used it is long gone, and it has managed to play the role of middleman only to a very limited extent.

Finally, we should come back to the question posed in the introduction: Are countries that perceive international relations in a different way, following a different logic and driven by different motivations in fact able to develop mutual relations based on understanding and dialogue? The answers provided by the analysis conducted in this paper are not optimistic. It seems that in such circumstances developing positive relations is a considerable challenge to both parties, which makes it extremely important for the two states to have the will to understand how the other partner perceives the world and to explain one's own perception. This is, however, unlikely given the dramatic difference in potential in the analysed case.





## POLAND'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: MAIN DIRECTIONS

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### **Abstract:**

This article tries to present the main areas of Polish foreign and security policy. Poland's membership in the EU and in NATO was the strongest determinant of its position in international relations, and the guiding light of its foreign policy. Poland's work in the EU was focused in particular on EU policy towards its eastern neighbours, common energy policy and security issues, while in NATO, Poland has always been a proponent of the open doors policy and has maintained close relationship with the US, supporting many of its policies and initiatives.

**Keywords:** Poland, European Union Security and Defence, NATO, Poland's bilateral relations.

### **Resumen:**

*El artículo presenta las principales áreas de la política exterior y de seguridad de Polonia, siendo su pertenencia a la Unión Europea y la OTAN los principales determinantes de su posición en las relaciones internacionales y el foco que ilumina su política exterior. La política y actividades en la Unión Europea se han centrado en particular en la política hacia sus vecinos del Este, mientras que en La OTAN, Polonia ha sido un defensor continuamente de la política de puertas abiertas y ha mantenido una relación muy estrecha con los Estados Unidos, apoyando sus políticas e iniciativas.*

**Palabras clave:** *Polonia, Seguridad y Defensa de la Unión Europea, OTAN, Relaciones bilaterales de Polonia.*

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## 1. Internal and External Aspects<sup>2</sup>

Starting in 1989, Poland successfully transformed its political system from an undemocratic regime into a democracy. The principles of democratic order, the rule of law, respect for human rights and solidarity became the foundations of the state. Poland became a member of the Council of Europe (1991), the World Trade Organization (1995), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1996). The crowning accomplishment of Polish foreign policy was the country's accession to NATO in 1999 and to the European Union in 2004, followed by joining the Schengen Area in 2007<sup>3</sup>.

Poland's membership in the EU and in NATO was the strongest determinant of its position in international relations, and the guiding light of its foreign policy. Under the 1997 constitution, the objectives of Poland's foreign policy were to safeguard the sovereignty of the state, its security and the integrity of its territory. NATO was the best choice for Poland to develop the security policy in cooperation with the United States. The EU, on the other hand, provided the means and opportunities for a rapid general development of the country. Thanks to EU funds and policies, alongside to the new opportunities in communications, infrastructure, trade, education, and other areas, the modernization of the country took place. In the first decade of Poland's membership in the EU, the country's GDP increased from PLN 884 billion to PLN 1600 billion, and Poland reached the level of over 60% of the EU's level of economic development<sup>4</sup>. Investment capital rushed in, amounting to over PLN 405 billion in the period 2004–2013. Export of goods and services to the West tripled, what resulted generating a surplus of approx. PLN 100 billion (€ 28.8 billion) in 2014.<sup>5</sup> While it was certainly possible to make better use of EU funds, the above-cited numbers – alongside the steady economic growth<sup>6</sup> – meant that Poland was considered a leader among the 'new' EU member states. Nevertheless, it didn't enter the Eurozone.

In the same period, the public debt increased significantly, from PLN 431,4 billion in 2004 to PLN 780 billion in 2015. Compared to other European countries, Poland is also lagging behind in terms of compensation for work. Average monthly earnings went up from EUR 530 in 2004 to over EUR 1000 euro in March 2014 in the business sector. However, average earnings in Poland (in USD) amount to just over 32% of that of Germany, 31% of France, 26% of United Kingdom and 41% of Spain (134% of that of Hungary)<sup>7</sup>. This has created a powerful social frustration, powering economic migration on a drastic scale. In 2004–2014, almost 1.8 million Poles left the country. Given the country's birth rate of 9,97<sup>8</sup>, this has exacerbated the demographic problems. Poland also continues to struggle with certain

<sup>2</sup> This text is not an exhaustive presentation of Poland's foreign policy. Rather, it offers a general overview of its main areas and issues. Poland is a mid-sized Central European country bordered by large neighbours. As such, it focuses on pursuing its interests mainly within Europe. Because it has undergone a successful democratic transformation, and because it has been incorporated into European and trans-Atlantic political and organizational structures, it firmly belongs to the conceptual West. Its foreign policy is predictable. The conservative government of Law and Justice is not going to change the fundamental objectives and directions of Polish foreign policy. It will however likely change the style in which politics is conducted and shift emphasis towards issues that are not currently at the foreign policy forefront.

<sup>3</sup> On the process of reorientation of Poland's Foreign Policy see: Kuźniar, Roman (2009): *Poland's Foreign Policy after 1989*, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

<sup>4</sup> *Rzeczpospolita*, 9 May 2014.

<sup>5</sup> According to the Polish Ministry's of Foreign Affairs Note on The Economic and Social Effects of the Polish Membership in European Union, in connection with the eleventh anniversary of accession and Polish accession to the EU, at <https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/26c005f4-b73e-4402-bb32-8b10c1b42a4c:JCR> (data dostępu: 24 stycznia 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Poland is the only EU member state that has recorded economic growth year-on-year every year after 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Data of 5 May 2015, at <http://www.bankier.pl>

<sup>8</sup> Birth/1.000 population.



challenges. In the Global Innovation Index 2009-2010, Poland ranks poorly at 47, despite its economy being ranked at a much better position (20).

While euroscepticism is on the rise in Europe (largely due to the financial crisis of 2008), Poland and the Polish society have remained greatly enthusiastic towards the EU, becoming one of Germany's strongest allies in its efforts towards reform and further integration. Support for Poland's membership in the EU is at the level of 72%<sup>9</sup>.

As a member of NATO and the EU, Poland was located at their borders, a strong determinant of its foreign policy. With regard to the neighbouring countries of Ukraine and Belarus, Poland's policy objective was to foster democratization and the promotion of improved relations with Western institutions. Relations with Russia continued to present the greatest challenge. This was due to two reasons: firstly, problems rooted in the period before 1989, when Poland was part of the Eastern block controlled by the USSR and Poland's reorientation, and, secondly, the different visions for the future of post-Soviet states. While Russia pursued a future in which these countries were in its sphere of influence, Poland made efforts to bring them as close as possible to the West.

In the 1990s, the pursuit of foreign policy objectives in Poland was facilitated by a consensus worked out by all the political parties on the integration into the Western institutions and normalization of relations with Poland's neighbours to the east. After the EU accession, gradually differences began to emerge between the most influential political parties: Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). Both of these parties agreed that membership in NATO and the EU provided the foundation of security and development of the country, and both were in favour of strengthening relations with the United States. However, they differed in their approaches to the manner in which foreign policy should be implemented, and which issues should prevail. The Law and Justice administration in 2007-2008 and later after 2015 was and is eurosceptical, distrustful towards Germany, and with very limited initiatives in the relations with Russia. On the other hand, policy making of the Civic Platform's administration in 2008-2015 was strongly pro-European.

Institutionally, foreign policy in Poland is the responsibility of the government, headed by the prime minister. Foreign policy is coordinated by the foreign minister, but the president also has the right to become involved. As a representative of the state in its external relations, the president is expected to cooperate in this area with the prime minister and the foreign minister.

Formally, a document entitled *Foundations of Poland's foreign policy*, approved by the government at the request of the foreign minister, forms the basis of Poland's foreign policy. The *Foundations...* serves as guidelines for the government departments as they develop their own foreign cooperation plans. Every year, the foreign minister presents a report to the Parliament (entitled *Information on foreign policy*), outlining the key policy objectives<sup>10</sup>.

## **2. Poland in the European Union**

Poland's accession to the EU triggered a fundamental reorganization of the country's foreign

<sup>9</sup> "European Youth in 2014", Eurobarometer, p.11.

<sup>10</sup> In March 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted the *Priorities of Polish foreign policy*, the first long-term strategy paper on foreign policy (including European policy) since 1989. This key document guides the Polish diplomacy in its operations. Its purpose is to coordinate the work of the administration with regard to external relations. Moreover, it presents to the general public the vision and key objectives for Polish foreign policy up to 2016.





policy. A full mobilization for the foreign service and multiple adaptation of ministry structures were necessary to meet the challenges resulting from the membership<sup>11</sup>.

The first years in the EU made it evident that Poland had no clear vision of the future of the Union. It took time for the country to gain experience and develop a constructive approach to policy within Europe. The EU membership in itself was a huge adjustment for Poland, which was not immediately ready to discuss further stages of European integration. There was a concern that the EU might become dominated by the largest member states<sup>12</sup>. The Polish government supported a vision of a European Union of sovereign member states rather than a federation of states.

This approach was reflected in the country's position during the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe<sup>13</sup> and of the Lisbon Treaty thereafter. Polish leaders in general, and President Lech Kaczyński in particular, were reluctant to accept the Lisbon Treaty, expressing hesitation as to whether it was at all necessary. Poland opposed the efforts to boost the powers of European institutions, including the proposal to appoint a president of the European Council and to uphold the principle of 'one state – one commissioner' for the European Commission. It also protested against the changes in the decision-making system unfavourable for small and medium-sized countries (where a decision would require a majority of 55% countries and 65% of their population). It pursued the strengthening of cooperation on European Security and Defence Policy and an expansion of the solidarity clause to also cover energy security.

Poland only ratified the Lisbon Treaty after the second Irish referendum, on 10 October 2009<sup>14</sup>. As a result, it was viewed as a country for which European cooperation is not a priority. This image was further reinforced by Poland's support for an involvement in the war in Iraq, criticized by countries such as Germany and France. The prevalent view in Poland, however, was that Polish security interests require close cooperation with the United States, including ventures as controversial as the war in Iraq, due to a variety of reasons (including the belief that EU's defence capacity is insufficient).

The government formed by the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), which was in power for two terms of office in 2008-2015, endeavoured to shift the perception of Poland within the EU. When the new foreign minister Radosław Sikorski presented his first foreign policy report to the Sejm on 7 May 2008, he declared that his first priority would be to make Poland 'strong with the strength of European Union's solidarity', and he went on to speak at length about the EU, saying for example: "The European Union is not the dangerous "them", Europe and the Union is just "us"<sup>15</sup>. In his address to the Sejm on 29 April 2012, he said that Poland supports an EU where the member states are forever sovereign and maintain the right to leave the Union, as well as the right to determine the powers transferred to the community. He argued in favour of a 'smart federation', which would be a 'way towards a greater power, built together, and not towards a loss of identity'<sup>16</sup>. Polish foreign policy continued in this spirit for the next seven years, to the

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11 The government proposed the bill on the coordination of matters related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union relatively late, in December 2008. The main change resulting from the bill was the merging of the Committee for European Integration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

12 *International Herald Tribune*, 14 August 2007.

13 Poland participated in the negotiations since 2003.

14 The constitutional treaty was rejected in the referendums in France and in the Netherlands.

15 *Information by the Foreign Minister on foreign policy of the Republic of Poland in 2008*, at [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)

16 *Information by the Foreign Minister on the guidelines of Polish foreign policy in 2012*, presented to the Sejm on 29 April 2012, at [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).



dissatisfaction of the Law and Justice party (in parliamentary opposition)<sup>17</sup>. It resulted in the appointment of Donald Tusk to serve as the President of the European Council in August 2014.

Poland's work in the EU was focused in particular on EU policy towards its eastern neighbours, common energy policy and security issues. Poland's most important initiative, put forward jointly with Sweden, was the Eastern Partnership, approved on 19 June 2008 by the European Council. Its objective was to bring about closer cooperation between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus (on the condition that the latter chooses to begin the process of democratization). The objective of the Eastern Partnership was to develop a mechanism for permanent institutional cooperation in the following areas: politics, security, economy, social issues, financial issues, environmental issues, borders, and the movement of persons<sup>18</sup>. The project was formally launched at a special Eastern Partnership summit in the spring of 2009. Foreign minister Radosław Sikorski made it clear that the goal of the Eastern Partnership was to help the participating countries meet the criteria for EU membership. He announced that it was going to be 'a Polish brand in the EU and a priority of the Polish presidency in 2011'<sup>19</sup>.

Poland systematically supported the development of the Eastern Partnership. It launched numerous initiatives, such as the establishment of a 'group of friends' of the Partnership, organization of the September 2011 summit, and founding the Public Administration Academy of the Eastern Partnership in Warsaw. Poland has also provided bilateral counsel services, used primarily by Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, and made efforts to ensure that Eastern Partnership issues are included in the scope of powers of a EU commissioner<sup>20</sup>.

The Eastern Partnership was also used to develop diplomatic cooperation with Sweden and Germany (from which the project had garnered strong support). Bi- and trilateral visits in Eastern Partnership countries were held relatively often. Additionally, Poland started a parallel project: the European Endowment for Democracy, first proposed by Radosław Sikorski in January 2011, and then launched during Poland's EU presidency. The fund was designed to support organizations and individuals in EU's eastern and southern neighbouring states working in the area of advancing democracy<sup>21</sup>. Poland has been one of the largest contributors to the fund, providing EUR 5 million by 2015.

Polish diplomacy was also hard at work on the issue of energy solidarity. This is due to the country's strong dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. In 2006, approx. 91.5% of imported natural gas came from countries situated east of Poland, including 68.2% from the Russian Federation. There were several aspects of Poland's energy policy. Firstly, Poland supported the development of a common energy policy for the entire EU. Secondly, it

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<sup>17</sup> Law and Justice argued that a tighter political union would weaken the states and thus the entire European Union, and also cause the 'reign of the more powerful'. See: *Transcript of the eleventh sitting of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, 29 March 2012, Warsaw 2012.

<sup>18</sup> The project gained popularity in the European Union after the war between Russia and Georgia, and after the 'gas crisis' between Russia and Ukraine. These events demonstrated to the European Union that there was a need for action that would encourage democratization and stabilization in the states neighbouring it to the east. See also: *Eastern Partnership: Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council*, COM(2008) 823, 3 December 2008.

<sup>19</sup> Lecture by Radosław Sikorski in the European Policy Center, 26 May 2008, at <http://www.epc.eu>

<sup>20</sup> Eventually, this responsibility was given to the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle; see also: Ochmann, C.: "Przyszłość Partnerstwa Wschodniego z niemieckiej perspektywy", *Biuletyn niemiecki* No 6, 13 May 2010.

<sup>21</sup> See also: *Biuletyn PISM* No 93, 7 October 2011.



endeavoured to discourage Germany and Russia from building the North European pipeline. Thirdly, it focused on seeking out alternative energy sources and ensuring reliable supplies<sup>22</sup>.

Poland and Ukraine pay the highest prices for the Russian natural gas in all of Europe. Therefore, Poland was interested in the potential development of a common energy supply system and pursued a broader energy solidarity clause for the EU. Poland's position was that the clause should become applicable when one member state loses access to natural gas. It argued that developing a common energy market helps to diminish the risk of potential blackmail of Eastern European countries by Russia and thus of the entire EU becoming entangled. Once the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014, the matter took on an extra urgency for Poland. Poland took decisive steps towards developing the energy union, with a vision far exceeding the EU. The following elements were proposed: development of energy infrastructure between EU member states and their neighbours; solidarity mechanisms in case of a supply crisis; using the bargaining power of the entire EU in negotiations with suppliers; using domestic energy sources; diversification of supply sources; working to strengthen the energy security of the states neighbouring the EU. Most of these elements were incorporated into the energy union strategy presented by the European Commission on 25 February 2015. However, the strategy contains no hard language on joint (shared) natural gas purchases in the future.

Due to its history and geopolitical location, Poland's foreign policy has always been strongly focused on security issues. The question of the EU's ability to guarantee security, along with its defence potential, has been at the forefront of concern for every government. National security strategy documents adopted in 2007 and 2014 both supported the development of a European security policy.<sup>23</sup> In the Lisbon Treaty, Poland was a proponent of the provision demanding solidarity in defence matters (188c). It also supported the advancement of the security and defence policy proposed by France during its presidency in 2008, and on numerous occasions advocated a revision and redevelopment of the security and defence policy of the EU.

The events of 2015 undermined the image of Poland as a pro-European country that observes the principle of solidarity in the face of EU-wide challenges. Two factors were instrumental in this process:

Firstly, Polish authorities were sceptical towards the unconditional welcome extended towards the masses of refugees and migrants (in particular by Germany). In defence of its position, Poland mentioned the increased immigration for Ukraine. According to Eurostat data, Poland absorbed the second-largest number of Ukrainian immigrants (after Great Britain): an estimated 355,4 thousand people in 2014<sup>24</sup>. At the end of 2015, it was estimated that over 800,000 immigrants had found work in Poland. Security and cultural factors were also invoked. Pressured and criticized by the EU, which argued that Poland was violating the solidarity principle, the country eventually agreed to accept 7,000 refugees, while continuing to uphold its opposition towards fixed mandatory quotas for redistribution of the incoming refugees.

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<sup>22</sup> Poland has cooperated in this respect with Qatar and the United States. In 2016, facilities for handling imported natural gas were launched in Świnoujście. PKN Orlen, a Polish investor, also acquired the refinery Możejki Nafta, but in July 2007 Russia cut off its oil supply along the Friendship Pipeline.

<sup>23</sup> *National security strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej)*, Warsaw 2007; *National security strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej)*, Warsaw 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Eurostat report 2014.



Secondly, after eight years of coalition government of the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party, the parliamentary election held on 25 October 2015 brought the conservative Law and Justice into power. In the electoral campaign, the party had focused on changes in Poland's internal affairs. Once in power, it adopted new laws designed to circumnavigate the constitutional order. The changes heavily affected the functioning of the Constitutional Court and the National Broadcasting Council (the body in charge of the public media), which led to protests across the country. International institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) took an interest in the developments.

The European Commission decided to launch the EU's Rule of Law Mechanism in order to assess the situation in Poland<sup>25</sup>. Moreover, on 19 January 2016 the European Parliament held a debate on the situation in Poland, attended by the new Prime Minister Beata Szydło. She argued that the changes in Poland are in line and fully compliant with European law and that they constitute an internal matter of Poland<sup>26</sup>.

In response to the tensions between Poland and the EU institutions, on 23 January 2016 foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski published an article "*What Union does Poland want?*". The article posits that Poland remains open to dialogue within the EU and promises that it will be an active and responsible member of the EU. Yet it also argues against a supranational, federalized Europe, and advocates the right of individual countries to take decisions that directly concern their own citizens<sup>27</sup>.

### **3. Polish Security Policy**

Before the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the 2014-onwards conflict in Ukraine, Poland's security situation was considered to be much better than in any other period of its history. There were no border disputes; relations with all neighbours were good; the risk of possible aggression against Poland was also considered minimal. Since 2014, Poland has focused on strengthening its security policy. Poland's security budget is 1.8% GDP, one of the highest proportions in Europe. There was a plan to raise this figure to 2% starting in 2016, but the new Law and Justice administration has put these plans on hold. The main pillars of Poland's security policy are as follows: NATO, the EU, cooperation with the United States, participation in regional and global organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Visegrád Group and the United Nations<sup>28</sup>.

NATO and the guarantees of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remain at the core of 'hard security' policy. The NATO membership gave Poland access to the largest and stronger military organization in the West (mainly thanks to the participation of the United States)<sup>29</sup>. Poland has been an active member of the alliance, continually engaging in its various efforts to adapt to the changing circumstances. It participated in the NATO operation in Kosovo

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<sup>25</sup> *College Orientation Debate on Recent Developments in Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions&Answers*, European Commission Fact Sheet, Brussels, 13 January 2016.

<sup>26</sup> *Poland: MEPs Debate Rule of Law Issues with Prime Minister Szydło*, European Parliament Press Release, 19 January 2016; Full statement at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160114IPR09899/Poland-MEPs-debate-rule-of-law-issues-with-Prime-Minister-Szyd%C5%82o>.

<sup>27</sup> The article was published in a number of papers including *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Corriere della Sera* and *Die Presse* dated 23 January 2016.

<sup>28</sup> *National security strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej)*, Warsaw 2014.

<sup>29</sup> M. Madej, "Polska w systemie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego" (in:) S. Bieleń, *Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Warsaw 2007, p. 41.





(from 1999 onwards), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2004), Macedonia (2001-2003) and Pakistan (2005-2006). It was also involved in the operation in Afghanistan launched in 2001 under Article 5 of the Treaty in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. Since January 2015, Polish military personnel have provided training as part of Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Periodically, Poland has also been involved in the anti-terrorist maritime operation Active Endeavour and Baltic Air Policy, the objective of which is to monitor the air space above Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

On the other hand, Poland did not participate in the NATO operation in Libya in 2011. Polish authorities have argued that there are insufficient grounds for NATO involvement in North Africa and said it was necessary to find a balance between reinforcing NATO's defence potential and undertaking missions beyond its territorial reach<sup>30</sup>.

As for the future development of NATO, Poland has always been a proponent of the open doors policy. It supported the membership of the Balkan countries and promoted the NATO aspirations of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After the challenging and expensive operation in Afghanistan, Poland has advocated for a balanced approach to external operations and defence capacities (having made similar entreaties at the NATO summits in Lisbon in 2010 and in Chicago in May 2012)<sup>31</sup>.

With the military operations in Ukraine, the unprecedented incidents involving Russian airplanes over the Baltic Sea, and the increasingly hostile rhetoric between Russia and NATO, security has become the chief preoccupation of Polish authorities. There have been suggestions of requesting permanent NATO detachments in Poland. They met with opposition from Germany and France, and with scepticism from the United States. Poland has therefore pursued a formula in which NATO troops would be stationed in the country on a rotating basis. At the NATO summit in Newport on 4-5 September 2014, Poland's proposal garnered support from the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria. Poland has also been actively investigating new avenues for increasing NATO's defence capacity eastwards. It argued in favour of conducting the allied forces' drills in Poland and the Baltic states, and of locating new logistics centres and emergency warehousing facilities in these territories. Poland was a proponent of reforming the NATO Response Force, including the establishment of the high-readiness 'spearhead force' and strengthening the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, staffed mainly by personnel from Poland, Germany and Denmark. Discussions on these issues will continue at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016.

The United States was Poland's key partner for bilateral cooperation on security matters. Because of American support when it was seeking NATO membership<sup>32</sup>, Poland in turn supported various American initiatives, e.g. the military intervention in Iraq in 2003-2008, and was an active member of the anti-terrorist coalition. Even as the political parties in power change, Polish authorities have continued to maintain close ties with the United States and have sought American involvement in modernizing the Polish armies. There was observable anxiety in the beginnings of Barack Obama's administration when it seemed that the United States was losing its interest in Europe.

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<sup>30</sup> After the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, attempts were made to rationalize the approach to deploying Polish military units. In light of the casualties among Polish soldiers in Afghanistan, the public opinion was opposed to participation in the intervention in Libya. See the remarks by President Bronisław Komorowski on 17 March 2011, news archive at [www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl)

<sup>31</sup> For more information see the interview with the advisor to the President of the Republic of Poland Roman Kuźniar, *Polityka* dated 16 May 2012; see also: P. Pietrzak, „Szczyt NATO w Chicago – determinanty, oczekiwania i rezultaty”, *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe* (kwartalnik BBN) 2012, No 22.

<sup>32</sup> Winid Bogusław: "Security Issues in Polish-American Relations", in Kuźniar Roman (ed.): *Poland's Security Policy 1989-2000*, Warsaw 2001, p. 171-193.





Despite the deal between Poland and the United States (signed during the presidency of George W. Bush on 20 August 2008) to base interceptor missiles in Poland as part of the American anti-missile shield, Barack Obama was reluctant to proceed with this plan.<sup>33</sup> Instead, he modified the project to cover the entire NATO. The new concept (referred to as the European Phased Adaptive Approach) envisaged four stages of anti-missile defence, including the new generation SM-3 defences against short- and medium-range missiles, to be placed on the ground by approx. 2018.<sup>34</sup> Polish authorities have expressed interest in joining the program. A protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America on deployment on Polish territory of anti-ballistic missile interceptors, drafted in Warsaw on 20 August 2008, was signed on 3 July 2010<sup>35</sup>.

Poland also arranged for American military personnel to provide training locally. Under the above-mentioned Protocol, from November 2012 onwards a detachment of American troops has been based in 32nd Air Base in Poland to contribute to training programs and drills.

Cooperation grew even tighter when the war in Ukraine started. During his visit to Poland in June 2014, President Barack Obama invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and said he had come to Warsaw 'on behalf of the United States, on behalf of the NATO Alliance - to reaffirm our unwavering commitment to Poland's security', adding that 'Poland will never stand alone'<sup>36</sup>. Polish authorities had expected and welcomed words to this effect.

On 17 April 2014, Polish defence minister, Tomasz Siemoniak, and American Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, launched a joint solidarity and partnership roadmap. The roadmap proposes permanent presence of American detachments (on a rotating basis) in Poland, more training programs and drills and increased cooperation across all branches of the military. Moreover, at President Barack Obama's request, the American Congress approved additional funding of up to a billion USD for joint projects. Due to the conflict across Poland's eastern border, the scale of consultations and joint training exercises has been unprecedented.

As a great supporter of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, Poland was engaged in the work of the European Defence Agency and missions (both civilian and military) of the EU. It was involved in the establishment of EU rapid deployment battlegroups, and itself participated in the international battlegroup (with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia) in 2007, in the Weimar Battlegroup with Germany and France in 2013 and the Visegrád Battlegroup with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in 2016.

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33 Górka-Winter Beata: "Porozumienia Polski i Stanów Zjednoczonych w sprawie obrony przeciwrakietowej – zakres współpracy i perspektywy realizacji", *Biuletyn*, 22 August 2008.

34 See also: Górka-Winter, Beata: "Program obrony przeciwrakietowej – nowe założenia administracji Baracka Obamy", *Biuletyn PISM*, No 52 (584), 10 September 2009.

35 In 2010, Strategic Dialogue and Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group continued to hold meetings (it had been established on the basis of the August 2008 Declaration on Strategic Cooperation). Strategic dialogue was also renewed in connection with the visit to the United States of foreign minister Radosław Sikorski with an official delegation in May 2010.

36 Remarks by President Obama at 25th Anniversary of Freedom Day, Warsaw, 4 June 2014, at [http://photos.state.gov/libraries/poland/788/pdfs/PresidSpeechAmended\\_PL.pdf](http://photos.state.gov/libraries/poland/788/pdfs/PresidSpeechAmended_PL.pdf), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/04/remarks-president-obama-25th-anniversary-freedom-day>.



Recently, Poland has also participated in military EU missions in Chad and the Central African Republic, a training mission Mali, and in operation Althea, i.e. the EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>37</sup>.

Poland has no direct political or economic interests in Africa, but it has acted on the belief that standing in solidarity with the EU member states gives it a moral right to ask for greater involvement of the EU in promoting security, stability and the rule of law to the east of the Polish border, should such a need arise<sup>38</sup>. Poland was disappointed with the EU's lukewarm response to the war in Ukraine in terms of security policy, and thus it has increased its efforts to have NATO bases established in its territory.

#### **4. Bilateral Relations with EU Member States**

Poland has maintained good bilateral relations with all EU member states. Germany, Poland's largest neighbour<sup>39</sup> and biggest trading partner<sup>40</sup> has been particularly important in this respect. Re-orientation of the Polish foreign policy post-1989, Poland's support for the reunification of Germany and Germany's support in the 1990s of Poland's effort to develop good relationship with Western institutions provided a good foundation for political and economic cooperation. Given the two countries' complicated history, the process of reconciliation was particularly noteworthy. It was rendered possible by the fact that both countries embraced democracy, human rights and a pro-European attitude as cornerstones of their policy.

Dialogue between Warsaw and Berlin and their cooperation within the EU was reinforced by the mechanism of Polish-German Intergovernmental Consultations. Bilateral relations further flourished during the financial crisis in Europe after 2008, as Polish-German dialogue played a significant role in drafting EU-wide reform plans. Poland's enthusiasm towards reforms provided a counterweight to Germany's poorly-received attitude, while Germany provided support in budgetary matters.

Germany was also an important ally in promoting democracy in Ukraine and Belarus, and in shaping the policy of EU sanctions towards Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In the recent years, foreign ministers of Poland and Germany have travelled together to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and issued joint statements. In February 2014, along with the French foreign minister, they held mediation in Ukraine that helped end the violence in Maidan in Kiev. On 26 November 2014, Radosław Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle issued a declaration in support of 'a European future for Ukraine'<sup>41</sup>. However, in the following months critical opinions were voiced in Poland - to the effect that Germany made an unsatisfactory

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<sup>37</sup> Poland decided against participating in the NATO operation against Libya in 2011, despite the suggestions from France that it should become involved. Following the costly operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was a time of a more moderate approach of the Polish administration towards Polish participation in missions abroad. There were also considerations with regard to the need to invest in Poland's defence potential.

<sup>38</sup> *Information presented by the Ministry of National Defence with regard to the framework and preparation of the mission of the Polish Military Contingent in Chad*, presentation by Stanisław Komorowski, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of National Defence, before the National Defence Committee of the Sejm, 10 January 2008, Biuletyn No 151/VI.

<sup>39</sup> The following two legal acts in particular outline the legal basis for the relations between the two countries: (1) the treaty acknowledging the existing border dated 14 November 1990, (2) the treaty on neighbourly policies and friendly cooperation dated 17 June 1991.

<sup>40</sup> See also an interesting analysis in: M.A. Orenstein, "Sixth Market to Watch: Poland", *Foreign Affairs* January/February 2014.

<sup>41</sup> See also the joint declaration by foreign ministers of Poland and Germany with regard to Ukraine dated 26 November 2013, news archive at [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)



effort in trying to ensure that Poland would have a seat at the table during the negotiations on Ukraine's future, held in Berlin in August 2014 and later in Minsk.

On many issues, the positions of Poland and Germany differed<sup>42</sup>. Poland was very critical towards the construction of the pipeline between Russia and Germany (Nordstream I) and the plans to follow up with Nordstream II. It cited the high costs of the investment and its negative environmental impact, and argued that it violated the principle of energy solidarity<sup>43</sup>. These investments were directly contrary to Poland's interest as a transit state and made it easy for Russia to blackmail Eastern European states (primarily Ukraine). Germany in turn was critical towards the (eventually dismissed) plans to build an American anti-missile system in Poland<sup>44</sup>, and towards Poland's efforts to ensure the location of NATO bases in its territory. Germany's unfavourable views on these two issues were perceived in Poland as obstinate unwillingness to recognize Poland's and Europe's fundamental security needs, and provided fuel for anti-German sentiments among political conservatives.

The influx of refugees and migrants that increased in 2015 also drove a wedge between the two countries. Poland's resistance to the idea of assigned quotas of refugees and migrants was perceived by Germany as a violation of solidarity.

History continues to be a stumbling block in Poland's relations with Germany. One of the most serious issues in the recent years has been the claims for compensation put forward by German compatriots' (local) associations. The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights dated 7 October 2008 on the inadmissibility of the application of Preußische Treuhand against Poland on the grounds of expropriation of property of Germans expelled from Poland after World War II was an important factor in this regard. The Court held that the application against Poland was inadmissible because the borders were re-drawn and expulsions took place on the basis of decisions of the superpowers at the time<sup>45</sup>. This was fully in line with the official positions of both the Poland and the German government<sup>46</sup>. Negotiations pertaining to historical issues were conducted mainly in 2007-2015 by Władysław Bartoszewski, serving as Plenipotentiary of the President of the Council of Ministers for International Dialogue. Matters discussed during the negotiations included the artefacts stolen by Germans, claims with regard to the Prussian Library<sup>47</sup> and the plans for the design and construction of the Centre Against Expulsions championed by the Federation of Expellees headed by Erika Steinbach. Concerns were voiced by the Polish government about a potential revisionist turn in German historical policy in connection with these issues<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> Wóycicki, Kazimierz, Czachur, Waldemar: "Challenges for Poland's Policy Towards Germany", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, Vol. 18, No.1, p. 25-42.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, *Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung* dated 6 September 2008.

<sup>44</sup> The article authored by minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and published in *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* on 4 February 2009 was received with astonishment in Poland. The article urged the United States not to place elements of the anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic, in the interest of disarmament.

<sup>45</sup> The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.

<sup>46</sup> See: Barcz Jan and Frowein Jochen A.: Expert opinion on claims related to World War II directed by German entities against Poland, drafted at the request of the governments of Germany and Poland, 2 November 2004, at <http://www.pol-niem.pl/docs/47/ekspertyza.doc>; Barcz Jan: "Long Shadow of History: On the Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 7 October 2008", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, Vol. 18, No.1, p. 43-60.

<sup>47</sup> The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated in the publication of a report on the war losses in Poland in 1939-1945 (*Sprawozdanie w przedmiocie strat i szkód wojennych Polski w latach 1939-1945*), published together with the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation. It was a reprint of a report originally published in 1947; the new report was sent to diplomatic outposts in Warsaw, libraries and relevant research institutions.

<sup>48</sup> M. Cichocki: "Widoczny znak – cudze zobowiązanie", *Rzeczpospolita* dated 5 February 2008, P. Semka, "Widoczny znak – mamy prawo do obaw", *Rzeczpospolita* dated 7 February 2008.



Poland was also interested in developing bilateral relations with France. However, due to France's reserved attitude towards a variety of Polish movements (Poland's pursuit of EU membership, its involvement in the war in Iraq on the side of the United States, attempts at EU reform, attempts at adopting a EU constitution), bilateral relations were rather guarded<sup>49</sup>. When a declaration on Polish-French strategic partnership was signed on 28 May 2008, its content was not very solid.

Poland and France stood together with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy, advocating its further development. They also shared a vision for a Europe with greater security and defence capacity. For many years, Poland found it difficult to interest France in the problems of EU's eastern neighbours, given its vested interest in developing a neighbourhood policy to the south and in encouraging Poland's involvement in Africa. The latter efforts were generally successful, with the exception of the intervention in Libya in 2011. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced a new opening in Polish-French relations after François Hollande was elected President on 6 May 2012. The new president declared his support for Poland's initiatives in the EU and offered his assistance in budget negotiations<sup>50</sup>. An aspect to be emphasized is the support for sanctions against Ukraine once the violence broke out on the Maidan in 2013, and against Russia after the annexation of Crimea.

Apart from their bilateral relations, Poland, Germany and France maintained moderate activity levels within the framework of the Weimar Triangle. Poland in particular pursued these relations, which is perceived as potentially advantageous to its position in Europe. The formula of Weimar Triangle +, with representatives of Ukraine and Russia, also had Poland's support. Meetings at ministerial level took place practically every year. The last Weimar Triangle summit was held at the invitation of President Bronisław Komorowski in Warsaw in 2010, and it was attended by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Topics under discussion within the Weimar Triangle included the Common Security and Defence Policy and the Eastern Partnership.

In seeking to meet its political and economic objectives in the EU, Poland has naturally turned towards the Central and Eastern European states that joined the EU at the same time in 2004. Because of their shared history, including their time in the Eastern block during the Cold War, this seemed like a promising solution. Poland arranged regular bilateral meetings with the countries in the region. Additionally, it formed the Visegrád Group together with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary<sup>51</sup>, which facilitated close cooperation and mutual support. The potential impact of the Visegrád Group grew after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, because under the Treaty it became vital to find allies in order to be successful in promoting new initiatives within the EU. Consultations on EU matters were held on a regular basis. Poland made use of this forum mainly to promote the notion of energy solidarity and Eastern Partnership issues. It also sought the Group's support on the climate package in 2009 and on issuing a joint statement to uphold EU spending on cohesion policy in the 2014–2020 perspective.

In view of the conflict in Ukraine, there were difficulties in effectively implementing the Visegrád Group formula as the states within the group differed in their reactions to Russia's policy and actions. Slovakia and Hungary, both strongly dependent on Russian natural gas, feared that excessive sanctions could be detrimental for their countries. In

<sup>49</sup> Szeptycki Andrzej: "Poland's Policy Regarding France", *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* 2008, Warsaw, p. 119-122.

<sup>50</sup> Parzymies Stanisław: "François Hollande. Nowy architekt polityki zagranicznej Francji", *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 2012, No 2, p.55-78.

<sup>51</sup> Between 1991 and 1993, the name was 'the Visegrád Triangle'.



September, after a meeting with Vladimir Putin, the Czech president Miloš Zeman actually argued in favour of lifting the sanctions against Russia.

## **5. Poland's Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours**

Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus continue to present an important challenge for Polish foreign policy. Poland's objectives in this respect include: establishing a good relationship with Russia where both parties are treated as equal partners; further development of the relationship between Ukraine and the EU and NATO; and democratization in Belarus. Poland has also supported the Western leanings of Georgia and Moldova. As a country that has itself experienced a successful political transformation, it offered support for reforms, guided by the belief that stable rule of law in the neighbouring countries ensures Poland's security and contributes to a peaceful Europe<sup>52</sup>.

Relations with Russia (the successor of the USSR) became problematic when Poland attempted a westward shift in its policy post-1989. Russia opposed the expansion of the EU and NATO to include Poland. Its vision for the post-Soviet countries was different and relied on their very close relations with Moscow. Given the disparity of interests, relations between the two countries were rather poor.

There were several attempts at overcoming the historical problems; for instance, a body called Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters was formed<sup>53</sup>. Yet bilateral dialogue was much less advanced compared to similar discussions with Germany. Poland argued that Russia's cooperation was unsatisfactory in matters such as the investigation of Soviet crimes against Poles during World War II (mainly the crimes committed in Katyn, where in 1941 Polish civilian intellectuals and military officials fell victims to mass murders). Russia in turn criticized Poland's alleged disrespect towards the memory of the soldiers who died in the fight against the German oppressors.

Russia also had an unfavourable view of Poland's efforts in the area of security, in particular the invitation to the USA to place parts of the anti-missile defence system on Polish soil, or having NATO forces stationed within the country. Poland's involvement in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and in the subsequent years triggered sanctions: in 2005, Russia imposed sanctions to Poland, affecting Polish plant- and animal-based food products and, in retaliation, Poland vetoed the negotiations between the EU and Russia on a new treaty on mutual cooperation.

Donald Tusk's government endeavoured to improve the atmosphere. On 8 February 2008, Donald Tusk made the first official visit to Moscow in many years. It proceeded smoothly. Permanent mechanisms for cooperation were either established or re-established. They included a committee for Polish-Russian cooperation strategy, a Polish-Russian intergovernmental committee for economic cooperation, a forum for civic dialogue and a forum of regions.

The war between Russia and Georgia was an obstacle to friendly relations. Polish President Lech Kaczyński was particularly vocal in his criticism of it. The Polish foreign ministry issued an official statement saying that the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity by foreign military forces was unacceptable and criticizing the fact that Russia recognized South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence.

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<sup>52</sup> *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki zagranicznej 2012-2016*, p. 17.

<sup>53</sup> The Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters was formed in 2002 but became operational in 2008.





Nonetheless, the subsequent years brought several important meetings and agreements<sup>54</sup>. Vladimir Putin was present during the commemoration of the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the beginning of World War II in Westerplatte<sup>55</sup> in Poland on 1 September 2009, and on 7 April 2010 together with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk he participated in the commemoration of the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Katyn massacre. Moreover, on 26 November 2010, the Russian Duma adopted a resolution 'On the tragedy in Katyn and its victims', condemning the crime and assigning responsibility for it to Joseph Stalin and other Russian leaders.

Relations deteriorated again when the Polish airplane TU-154, carrying aboard the Polish president Lech Kaczyński along with a large entourage, crashed on 10 April 2010 near Smolensk. The plane was carrying the official Polish delegation travelling to commemorate the anniversary of the massacre in Katyn. There were 96 victims in the crash, including the President, his wife, and many key members of the government and public administration. Poland and Russia disagreed as to the reasons for the crash. Additionally, Russia was reluctant to hand over the wreckage of the airplane. The last official high-level Polish-Russian meeting in the recent years was when President Bronisław Komorowski and President Dmitry Medvedev met to honour the victims of the crash on its first anniversary, on 11 April 2011 in Smolensk and in Katyn.

The brief revival in mutual relations could not bridge the objectively contrary interests of the two states. This was particularly evident during the conflict in Ukraine. In the first phase of the crisis, Prime Minister Donald Tusk was a vocal proponent of imposing and maintaining sanctions against Russia. Relations practically dissipated and hostile rhetoric intensified. The Polish government decided to withdraw from its plans to celebrate 2015 as the year of Russia in Poland. Polish economy was affected by the Russian embargo on meat, dairy, fruit and vegetables originating in the EU (in February and August 2014) and by the ban on re-exporting plant-based products. In view of the continuing war in Ukraine, there appears to be no prospect of significant improvement in official Polish-Russian relations.

Ukraine holds an exceptional place in Polish foreign policy. Good neighbourly relations and the establishment of a special partnership between the two countries are two constant policy objectives. This view was reflected e.g. in the appointment of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and of the Republic of Poland in Kiev on 12 January 1993<sup>56</sup> and the adoption of the Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the Republic and Poland and Ukraine on the Principles for Shaping the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership on 21 March 1994<sup>57</sup>. In this case, historical issues (in particular the interpretation of the massacres

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54 For instance, an agreement on local transborder traffic with Kaliningrad Oblast was adopted; it entered into force on 27 July 2012.

55 Vladimir Putin gave a speech in Westerplatte on 1 September, and an article authored by him was published in a major Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*. The article discussed the interpretation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and other key events of World War II. The Polish interpretation of these historical events was presented by President Lech Kaczyński in another major daily *Rzeczpospolita*, also on 1 September, and by foreign minister Radosław Sikorski in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 29 August. While noting its certain relativist elements, minister Radosław Sikorski argued that Vladimir Putin's narration 'offered a platform for further discussion'. The Polish government had an overall positive view of the fact that the Russian Prime Minister was present during the commemoration. See also: "Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych z 23 września 2009 r.", No 2751/VI kad.

56 "Protokół o utworzeniu Komitetu Konsultacyjnego prezydentów Ukrainy i Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej," in: *Zbiór Dokumentów* No 1, 1993.

57 "Deklaracja ministrów spraw zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy o zasadach kształtowania polsko-ukraińskiego partnerstwa, Warszawa, 21 marca 1994 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów* No 1, 1994.



in Volhynia and the perception of certain historical Ukrainian national heroes) were no obstacle to constructive development of mutual relations<sup>58</sup>.

Close cooperation with Poland was intended to consolidate Ukrainian independence and democracy, and then to support the pro-Western orientation in its politics. Ukraine's independence was perceived as a 'factor that encourages the consolidation of Poland's independence'<sup>59</sup>. The intention was also that an independent Ukraine should be a democratic country that respects human rights (i.e. that its policies should conform to Western standards). In treaties and joint declarations, these values were unfailingly included among the foundations of the relations<sup>60</sup>. Polish politicians frequently stressed the importance of democracy and human rights in relations with Ukraine.

Polish authorities reacted strongly to violations of democratic principles during presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski played an important role in dispelling the crises during the Orange Revolution, making a strong contribution to the attainment of an accord between the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition<sup>61</sup>. He held talks with most European leaders to facilitate an understanding of the events in Ukraine and in support of democracy<sup>62</sup>. At first, the West remained aloof, fearing a deterioration of relations with Russia (which clearly demonstrated its preference for Viktor Yanukovich's victory)<sup>63</sup>.

Polish diplomacy also worked towards securing NATO membership for Ukraine. During the 2009 NATO summit in Bucharest, Poland argued in favour of a MAP (Membership Action Plan) for Ukraine and Georgia. However, Germany and France were thoroughly opposed to this idea, fearing Russia's reaction. Poland's efforts to ensure the MAPs proved unsuccessful, but the work of the Polish diplomacy – and the personal involvement of President Lech Kaczyński – resulted in the inclusion of a declaration of future membership of Ukraine and Georgia in the final documents of the summit. Poland pressed NATO to uphold its 'open doors' policy and continued to cooperate with Ukraine with regard to security and defence.

Poland had high hopes for the Eastern Partnership project, and Ukraine and Moldova had expressed a strong interest in the benefits it offered. However, in view of Ukraine's internal problems (after Viktor Yanukovich became president in February 2010) it became increasingly difficult to promote democracy and close ties with Europe. Despite numerous assurances made to President Bronisław Komorowski at bilateral meetings, President Viktor Yanukovich refused – to some extent due to the strong pressure from Russia – to sign an EU association agreement in Vilnius on 21 November 2013.

As the crisis in Ukraine progressed, mass demonstrations began on Kiev's Maidan, and violence was used against the demonstrators, Polish diplomacy was once again spurred into action. Aware that it has insufficient measures to respond on its own, Poland worked to secure

<sup>58</sup> Brzeziński, Ian J.: "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, p.26-37.

<sup>59</sup> See "Wspólna deklaracja Prezydentów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy, Warszawa, 25 czerwca 1996", *Zbiór Dokumentów* No. 2, 1996.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*, and also: "Wspólne oświadczenie Prezydentów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy o porozumieniu i pojednaniu, Kijów, 21 maja 1997 r" *Zbiór Dokumentów* No. 2, 1997 and others.

<sup>61</sup> Also involved was Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. In the end, the international group of mediators also included Javier Solana, the EU's representative for CFSP, and OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubis. The Russian Federation was represented by Duma chairman Borys Gryzlov.

<sup>62</sup> Ash, Timothy Garton, Snyder, Timothy: "The Orange Revolution," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 52, No. 7, 28 April 2005.

<sup>63</sup> See commentary by Ash, Timothy Garton in *The Guardian*, 2 December 2004.



a united European response, and to ensure that the EU would constructively engage in the mediations between the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition and Maidan. The involvement of Prime Minister Donald Tusk and foreign minister Radosław Sikorski in early 2014 reinforced the image of Poland as a leader of EU's eastern policy<sup>64</sup>.

Overall, the reaction of the EU towards the escalation of the crisis was slow and indecisive. The EU was unprepared for the escalation of Russia's confrontational attitude towards Ukraine that led to the annexation<sup>65</sup> and to military engagement in the east of Ukraine. Polish government officially condemned Russia for signing the treaty incorporating the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation<sup>66</sup>. The crisis in Ukraine revealed the weakness of Polish-Russian relations. While the Polish authorities communicated with all the parties to the crisis in Ukraine and with their European partners, they were unable to engage at all with their Russian counterparts. Poland was therefore not welcome at the negotiations on ending the Ukrainian conflict.

In view of the progressing conflict in Ukraine, Poland's policy was to support its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to promote the development of its relationship with the EU. President Bronisław Komorowski signed the bill to ratify the UE-Ukraine association agreement on 17 December 2014. Poland also offered technical assistance and advisory services with regard to local government reform, anti-corruption measures and finance.

While promoting the democratic reforms it had itself undergone, Poland remained aware of its limitations, such as insufficient funding available for this purpose. Poland was also unable to overcome the disinterest of certain elites in the countries to its east with regard to building a closer relationship with Western institutions. This was particularly true with regard to Belarus, governed since 1994 by President Alexander Lukashenko. Despite the numerous diplomatic initiatives and despite the support provided to the civic society in Belarus, Polish involvement there must be considered unsuccessful. However, since democracy beyond its eastern borders is considered vital to Poland's overall security, this involvement will continue. The efforts in this regard are encouraged by the presence of Polish ethnic minorities both in Ukraine and in Belarus. The rights of these ethnic Poles would be best protected in democracies<sup>67</sup>.

## **6. Beyond Europe**

Poland's involvement in its relations with non-European countries was limited. Given its medium size and capacity, Poland's diplomatic focus was on European, eastern, and trans-Atlantic policy.

Beyond Europe, Poland sought mainly to boost its international trade, 80% of which takes place within the EU. China has been Poland's biggest trading partner outside the EU, but the relationship is marked by a large deficit. President Bronisław Komorowski's visit to China resulted in a strategic partnership declaration, which elevated the relations between the

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<sup>64</sup> For example, *Le Soir* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* dated 25 February 2014; see also the annual report of the European Council on Foreign Relations in which Poland is named a leader of EU foreign policy, *European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014*.

<sup>65</sup> For an interesting analysis see: Speck, Ulrich: *Has the EU Failed Ukraine?* 21 February 2014, at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=54600>.

<sup>66</sup> Statement on the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation dated 18 March 2014, at [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)

<sup>67</sup> Bieńczyk-Missala, Agnieszka (2006): "Human Rights in Polish Foreign Policy after 1989", Warsaw, Polish Institute of International Affairs, p. 181-190.



two countries to a new level in the subsequent years<sup>68</sup>. Poland endeavoured to encourage business with China by promoting Chinese cooperation with other Central and Eastern European states.

For the first time in 25 years, the Chinese prime minister visited Poland in March 2012. On that occasion, a meeting was organized in Warsaw with prime ministers and deputy prime ministers of 16 Central and Eastern European states<sup>69</sup>. These efforts continued in October 2012, when Poland organized a forum on cooperation between China and the Visegrád Group. This led to a strong boost in the number of contracts and joint business ventures. The new Polish President Andrzej Duda continued to work along similar lines, paying a 4-day visit to China in November 2015.

Poland's military involvement in the Middle East did not translate into a stronger economic presence in the region. Nonetheless, Poland pursued opportunities there, with a focus on alternative energy supply sources. This led to an agreement signed in June 2009 between Qatargas and the Polish energy operator PGNiG for the supply of liquefied natural gas, which is now being delivered into the new facility in Świnoujście.

Poland made certain endeavours to promote relations with India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia and Turkey. In the recent years, Polish leaders have also visited several African and Latin American countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Peru and Chile).

Finally, countries outside Europe have received a large proportion of Polish developmental aid, offered as part of the work carried out by the UN, the OSCE and the EU to eradicate poverty worldwide. Aid from Poland has flowed mainly towards North and East Africa, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the Palestinian Autonomy.

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<sup>68</sup> Polish-Russian relations are the eighth case of what China refers to as a strategic partnership in the EU.

<sup>69</sup> The talks had their practically-oriented counterpart (generating direct networking opportunities) in the form of another event held on the same day: Economic Forum Poland – Central Europe – China, attended e.g. by businesspeople from China, Poland and other countries in the region.







## POLISH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES AND POST-HISTORIOGRAPHY, DISCIPLINARY DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR

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### **Abstract:**

The purpose of this article is to present the methodological and institutional development of international studies in Poland, which were formed under the influence of the unique historical experience resulting from Poland's geographical location between Germany and Russia. This unfavourable geopolitical location was overcome after the Cold War, when Poland joined Western institutions: NATO and the European Union. The integration with the West provided a qualitatively new impetus for the development of international studies and especially the issues of security and European integration; moreover, entirely new possibilities of academic cooperation opened up in the field of international relations studies. The article focuses on the following issues: first, the historical tradition of international relations studies in Poland until the end of the Cold War; and second, the process of autonomisation of international studies in Poland as a discipline of social sciences after the fall of communism.

**Keywords:** Poland, international studies, transformation of international studies, Polish authors.

### **Resumen:**

*El artículo presenta el desarrollo metodológico e institucional de los estudios internacionales en Polonia, que se desarrollaron en función de la influencia de su situación geográfica entre Alemania y Rusia y una experiencia histórica única. Esta situación se superó con el final de la guerra fría, cuando Polonia se integró en la OTAN y en la Unión Europea. La integración en Occidente produjo un impacto cualitativo en el desarrollo de los estudios internacionales en particular en asuntos como la integración y la seguridad europea, a lo que se añadieron importantes posibilidades de cooperación académica en el campo de las relaciones internacionales. El artículo se entra en los siguientes puntos: la tradición histórica de los estudios internacionales en Polonia hasta el final de la guerra fría; y el proceso de creciente autonomía de estos estudios tras el fin de la guerra fría.*

**Palabras clave:** *Polonia, estudios internacionales, la transformación de los estudios internacionales, autores polacos.*

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## 1. History of International Studies in Poland

According to the American scholar Brian C. Schmidt, the history and historiography of a given discipline, in this case international studies, are indispensable in understanding the specificity of its development, identity and research scope.<sup>2</sup> In Western international studies it is assumed that the tradition of this discipline goes back to Ancient Greek thought (Thucydides) and the achievements of such scholars as: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, Kant, and Morgenthau, to name some of the most important ones. The problem is, however, that they represent the Western tradition, which aspires to the status of universal thought. Researchers of international relations from cultures other than the Western one contest the model of international studies based only on the historical experience and tradition of the West, and some scholars in the West understand and support this.<sup>3</sup> In his statements and publications, Amitav Acharya, former president of the International Studies Association, puts forward the proposal that local tradition be taken into account when devising research principles, based on the idea of pluralist universalism that relates to everyone and everything but also recognises diversity among researchers.<sup>4</sup>

Bearing the above in mind and considering the requirements of historical contextualisation, we believe that the thought and studies of international relations in Poland were shaped by the traditions of the following disciplines: the political thought related to reflection on the nature and essence of peace, the law of nations, political geography, and political science.

The tradition of Polish political thought on international relations, in particular on war and peace, goes back to the first half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, when two professors of canon law at the newly established Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Stanisław of Skarbimierz and Paweł Włodkowic, published their works on this subject. These two were pioneers in promoting the concept of peaceful coexistence of Christian and pagan nations, arguing at the same time that it is possible to conduct a just war. Stanisław of Skarbimierz argued that Christian countries had a duty to fight for peace while retaining the right to self-defence. Given the times he lived in, his proposals of the right to independence and sovereignty of non-Christian nations were extremely bold, and he believed that the Pope and Christians in general were not allowed to conquer non-Christian lands and overthrow their rulers.<sup>5</sup> Paweł Włodkowic promoted similar views, with the exception, however, that he did so in the international arena: at the Council of Constance in 1415 and during lectures at Italian universities. Quoting the principles of the law of nations of that time, he claimed that Christian and pagan countries had the very same rights.<sup>6</sup>

In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski became well-known all over Europe as he wrote in his work *De Republica Emendanda Libri Quinque* published in Latin in 1551 that war was a crime, a notion that was officially recognised in international law only in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Stanisław Leszczyński, former king of Poland and a relative (by

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<sup>2</sup> Schmidt, Brian C. (2010): "On the History and Historiography of International Relations", in W Carlsnaes, W. T. Risse T Simmons I B. (eds) (2010): *Handbook of International Relations*, Sage, London, p.3-23.

<sup>3</sup> Tickner, Ann., Weaver, Ole, (eds) (2012): *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, London, Routledge.

<sup>4</sup> Acharya, Amitav (2014): "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 58, p. 647-659.

<sup>5</sup> Ehrlich, Ludwik (1955): *Polski wykład prawa wojny XV wieku* (A Polish lecture on the law of war in the 15<sup>th</sup> c.), Warszawa.

<sup>6</sup> See Winiawdii, Bolesław (1935): "Victoria at Włodkowic", *Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des Sciences at des lettres*, Kraków; Belch, Stanislas (1965): *Paulus Vladimiri and his Doctrine Concerning International Law and Politics*, The Hague.



marriage) of King Louis XVI of France, became famous in Europe for his ideas of ensuring peace across the continent through an eternal alliance of such countries as England, Genoa, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Sweden, Venice, France. This alliance was to be based on such principles as collective self-defence, settling conflicts by peaceful means, France abandoning territorial expansion.<sup>7</sup>

In the 1970s, the rich Polish tradition of peace studies was discussed by Joachim Kondziela, member of the International Peace Research Association and professor at the Catholic University of Lublin. At that time, this university was the only catholic one in the Communist bloc, and its staff enjoyed a relative freedom to conduct research in social sciences. In 1974, Professor Kondziela published a paper titled “Badania nad pokojem. Teoria i jej zastosowanie” (Peace studies. Theory and application), summing up the results of studies conducted at German, Austrian and American universities (Yale University). Taking into account the political context, the paper stood out thanks to its intellectual honesty and a scientific approach – instead of an ideological one – to studying peace. What is even more important, however, is that it placed peace studies within the framework of international studies. He observed that it was insufficient to simply show peace as the only reasonable and truly beneficial goal for mankind. It was much more important, according to him, to study the means leading to this goal and if the existing means are found insufficient – to plan and develop them. Such a diagnosis, he wrote further, required taking interest in international politics.<sup>8</sup>

This monograph, published more than four decades ago, contains highly interesting reflection on the perception of peace, and they remain current even now. Kondziela asked how to overcome the definition dilemma with regard to the goal of peace studies. In answer to this question he claimed that it was necessary to focus on the analysis of those processes and states in international relations that were a manifestation of the lack of peace. This is why he believed that peace studies should be understood as a theologically oriented discipline of knowledge dealing with the study of means of avoiding negative goals rather than a discipline aimed at achieving positive goals.<sup>9</sup>

The second important source of inspiration for international relations studies in Poland was the study and teaching of the law of nations. Towards the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, a private school for tradesmen called the Athenaeum was established in Danzig (Gdańsk), a member of the Hanseatic League, and it taught students the law of the sea.<sup>10</sup> The law of nations, in turn, was first taught as an academic subject at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, in 1748.<sup>11</sup> In 1780, the first paper on the law of nations in Polish was published at the University of Lviv and that year is perceived as the beginning of the academic discipline of the law of nations (international law) in Poland.<sup>12</sup>

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, studies of international relations were developing quickly, and for a brief period the University of Warsaw was the most important centre of this discipline thanks to the efforts of Professor Antoni Białecki, who published a paper titled *Prawidłowość*

<sup>7</sup> Ehrlich, Ludwik (1958): *Prawo międzynarodowe* (International law), Warszawa, PWN, p. 60-61.

<sup>8</sup> Kondziela, Joachim (1974): *Badania nad pokojem. Teoria i jej zastosowanie*, Warszawa, ODiSS, p. 13-14.

<sup>9</sup> *Idem*, p. 56.

<sup>10</sup> Kocot, Kazimierz (1965): *Nauka prawa narodów w Ateneum Gdańskim (1580-1793)* (Teaching the law of nations in the Gdansk Athenaeum), Wrocław.

<sup>11</sup> Lachs, Manfred (1987): *The Teacher in International Law. Teachings and Teaching*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

<sup>12</sup> Kolasa, J.(1951): *Pierwsze systemy prawa narodów w języku polskim z 1780 r.* (First systems of the law of nations in Polish). Presented at the meeting of the faculty of social sciences on 3 February 1949, published in Wrocław by Wrocławskie Towarzystwo Naukowe.



*stosunków międzynarodowych* in 1874. It was the first work in Polish academic literature that contained the term ‘international relations’ (*stosunki międzynarodowe*) already in the title. It contains interesting observations on the origins of international relations, which the author sees in the necessity of states and people to meet their needs. According to Białecki, people’s activity contributed to the development of international relations because their life and needs are not limited to the state; regardless of the state, people develop material and spiritual needs that bound them together.<sup>13</sup>

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and right up until World War II, the most important centre of the development of international law and international studies in Poland was Lviv (presently in Ukraine). The importance of that research centre was truly great as it is there that the first international law textbooks in Polish were written. One of the particularly eminent scholars connected with this academic centre was Ludwig Ehrlich (1889–1968), a graduate of the universities in Berlin and Oxford. He was a world-class international lawyer, specialising in treaty law and publishing papers in the United Kingdom and in the United States.<sup>14</sup>

Professor Ludwig Ehrlich created the Polish school of international law because his students developed the discipline further after World War II and up until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was a great achievement when in 1930 the Diplomatic School was established at the Faculty of Law of University of Lviv, as it should be perceived as the first university programme of education in international relations.<sup>15</sup>

It should also be noted that two especially eminent figures were among the graduates of the faculty of Law in Lviv: Raphael Lemkin, the father of the concept of genocide in international law,<sup>16</sup> and the eminent international lawyer H. Lauterpacht.<sup>17</sup>

Geography is the scientific discipline that had a unique impact on the way of thinking and approach to the study of international relations in Poland and especially its foreign policy. The key role in this regard was played by the views of two great Polish geographers of the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries: Waław Nałkowski and Eugeniusz Romer. Before World War I, Nałkowski formulated an original geopolitical conception, according to which the main aspect of Poland’s geographical location in Europe was transitionality, meaning its location on the East–West axis, which in effect makes Poland a country:

- 1) constituting an open door from Western Europe to Eastern Europe;
- 2) where culture and its features gradually transition from Western European to Eastern European.<sup>18</sup>

He argued that this transitional nature of Poland’s geographical location entailed a constant threat to the existence of the state and nation.<sup>19</sup> It was this manifestation of geopolitical

<sup>13</sup> Białecki, Antoni (1874): *Prawidłowość stosunków międzynarodowych* (The Rules of International Relations), Warszawa.

<sup>14</sup> Ehrlich, Ludwik (1914): *Poland, Prussia and Culture, Oxford Pamphlets*, Oxford, Oxford University Press; *Idem* (1918): "The War and Political Theory", *California Law Review*, Vol. 6, no 6, pp. 418-442; *Idem*, *The War and Political Theory, California Law Review*, 1918, vol. 7, No. 1, p. 33-57.

<sup>15</sup> Redzik, Adam (2006): "Lwowska szkoła dyplomatyczna. Zarys historii Studium Dyplomatycznego przy Wydziale Prawa Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie 1930-1939" (The Lviv school of diplomacy. An outline of the history of the Diplomatic School at the Faculty of Law, Jan Kazimierz University in Lviv), *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, No. 5, p. 127-149.

<sup>16</sup> Bieńczyk-Missala, Agnieszka, Dębski, Sławomir, Lemkin, Rafał (2010): *A Hero of Humankind*, Warsaw, the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>17</sup> Lauterpacht Elihu (2010): *The life of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>18</sup> Jędrzejczyk, Dobiesław (1999): *Mysł geograficzna Waław Nałkowskiego*, Warszawa, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, UW.



fatalism that shaped fears of German and Russian domination, the two countries constantly posing a threat to Polish security.

One of Nałkowski's more prominent antagonists was Eugeniusz Romer (1871–1954), who believed that the North–South axis, that is the narrower part of the European continent between the Baltic and the Black Sea, was much more significant for Poland's situation in Europe. Due to favourable geographic conditions in this area, communication and international cooperation are easy there. This geographical view also justified Poland's active role in the region of Central Europe.<sup>20</sup>

These two concepts: the first referred to as the transition concept and the other one as the bridge concept, dominated the discussion about Poland's place in Europe up until the present times. It needs to be stressed, however, that it is the first concept that has remained the pivot of discussions on Polish foreign policy. The problem of arranging the relations with Poland's two powerful neighbours, Russia and Germany, remains the most important political challenge and gives rise to intense research disputes, where some opt for developing the relations with Germany (the Western option) and some – albeit a minority – believe that the relations with Russia are the priority. It is an important element of the scientific discourse within the framework of international studies in Poland, and because of this element the discourse is dominated by political realism based on the assumption that Poland should maintain a balance between Germany and Russia due to its geographical location.<sup>21</sup>

The discipline that contributed the most to the development of international studies in Poland is political science. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Polish universities started establishing institutes and faculties of political science. For example, in 1911, the School of Political Science was established at the Jagiellonian University, and the Faculty of Law and Political Science was set up at the University of Warsaw. Another important event in this context was the establishment of the Warsaw Academy of Political Science in 1938.

The rising importance of political science in the study of international relations was linked to the establishment of the International Studies Conference (French: *La Conférence des Heures Etudes Internationales*) under the auspices of the League of Nations. The task of the Conference was to support interdisciplinary research of international relations and develop education programmes in this discipline. To achieve that, international conferences were held in a 1–2 years cycle.<sup>22</sup>

Scholars from Poland actively participated in the workings of this forum, especially international lawyers, who saw this as an opportunity to study the achievements of political science in the West and its role in international studies. The most prominent ones among them were the aforementioned eminent international lawyer Ludwik Ehrlich, as well as others such as Bogdan Winiarski, Waław Komarnicki and Antoni Deryng.<sup>23</sup> As far as the last one is

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<sup>19</sup> Solarz, Marcin Wojciech (2014): "The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Polish Political Geography", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 19, p. 719-739.

<sup>20</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>21</sup> See Krasinski, Valerian (1855): *Is the Power of Russia to be Reduced Or Increased by the Present War? The Polish Question and Pan Slavism*, London, Chapman and Hall; Kukiel, M., Czartoryski, A. (1955): *Poland and the European Unity*, Princeton, Princeton University Press; Bromke, A. (1967): *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press; Bocheński, Adolf (2009): *Między Niemcami, a Rosją* (Between Germany and Russia), Krakow, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.

<sup>22</sup> See (1937): *The International Studies Conference. Origins. Functions, Organization*, Paris; Fox, W. (1949): "Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience", *World Politics*, No. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Komarnicki, Waław (1939): *The Study and Teaching of International Relations*; Deryng, Antoni (1939): *Methods of Scientific Research and Methods of University Teaching Used for the Subject of International Relations*; Winiarski, Bohdan (1939): *International Politics as a Science of Inter Relations*, in Zimmern, Sir





concerned, in his research he addressed the problem of multidisciplinary of international studies. His definition of international relations (included in an article published in French in 1936) is cited by Hans Morgenthau: 'The Science of International Relations has primarily a descriptive character. It is somewhat in the order of the contemporary history of nations, covering all fields: economics, trade, exchange, movement of production, of goods, of currency, as well as politics and culture (...) The factor uniting the problems which form the science of international relations is their international character, that is to say, the tie which is created among all domains of social life when that life transgresses the limits of one single nation and influences the relations among nations'.<sup>24</sup>

When World War II ended and Poland's borders were changed, the Lviv School ceased to exist because the professors moved to other universities throughout Poland. Ludwik Ehrlich, for example, moved to the School of Political Science at the Jagiellonian University, where in 1947 he published the fundamental and pioneering paper titled: 'Wstęp do nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych' (Introduction to the science of international relations), which can be considered a breakthrough in Polish international studies because it was the first work to attempt to define the scope and methods of research of this academic discipline. Its structure was as follows:

Chapter I – on the science of international relations

Chapter II – on the development of the science of international relations

Chapter III – on the branches of the science of international relations

Chapter IV – on the method and synthesis

Furthermore, according to the definition of the discipline proposed by L. Ehrlich, the science of international relations addressed the broadest aspect of people's coexistence, that is to say, the coexistence of nations.<sup>25</sup>

Ehrlich's work was not continued because the Soviet Union imposed the communist regime on Poland. In social sciences and the humanities, this entailed far-reaching ideologisation and departure from scientific methods of studying international relations. While no academic discipline of communism was actually introduced in Poland, political sciences (teaching and research alike) were still subject to strong ideological influence. The articles and monographs published in that period do not provide any new insight and instead constitute material proof of the methods used to study international relations in that period.<sup>26</sup> One praiseworthy example of this was the monograph by Remigiusz Bierzanek, a professor at the University of Warsaw, published in 1972 and titled 'Współczesne Stosunki Międzynarodowe' (Contemporary International Relations). Bierzanek was an eminent international lawyer; he translated the famous work by Hugo Grotius *De jure belli ac pacis*

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Alfred (ed.), *University Teaching of International Relations, A Record of the Eleventh Session of the International Studies Conference*, Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation.

<sup>24</sup> Morgenthau, Hans (1952): "Area Studies and the study of international relations", *International Social Science Bulletin*, No. 4, pp. 648.

<sup>25</sup> Ehrlich, Ludwig (1947): *Wstęp do nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych* (Introduction to the science of international relations), Kraków, p.1.

<sup>26</sup> Kukułka, Józef. (1978): *Wstęp do teorii stosunków międzynarodowych* (Introduction to the theory of international relations), Warszawa, PWN.



(On the Law of War and Peace) from Latin into Polish.<sup>27</sup> In his work of 1972, he wrote that the discipline of international studies had not emerged from the division of an already existing discipline but synthetically. He believed that many disciplines contributed to the development of research and didactics of international studies, such as international law, political history (especially diplomatic history), the study of international organisations, the science of the state, military doctrine, and political economics (especially foreign trade economics).<sup>28</sup>

Generally speaking, until 1989 international studies in Poland were limited to the ideological and political concept of scientific communism (although formally no such scientific discipline was created), which was based on the assumption that the process of social development was linear and that its ultimate goal was a communist system. Thus, social sciences played the role of social engineering serving this purpose, which led to extreme politicisation of social sciences, including political science. The research programme of that time named 'Marksistowska nauka o stosunkach międzynarodowych' (Marxist science of international relations) is a good example of that approach. The programme essentially criticised Western theoretical concepts for non-compliance with the dogmas of the official ideology and emphasised the achievements of Soviet science in building a new type of international relations in the form of a system of socialist countries led by the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup>

## **2. International Studies in the Period of Transformation after 1989**

After the fall of communism in Poland, a symbol of which were the democratic elections of 4 June 1989, Poland entered a period of systemic transformation, which also affected the sphere of social sciences and humanities. In contrast to the Czech Republic and East Germany, in Poland there was no decommunisation in this sphere, which meant that many professors at universities and research centres who had been active in the area of politics and ideology in the communist times kept conducting research and teaching. This fact had the greatest impact on the character of international studies in Poland and in the entire Central Europe, as pointed out by Western researchers such as Knud E. Jorgensen<sup>30</sup> and Thomas Volgy<sup>31</sup> as well as Peter Drulak from the Czech Republic.<sup>32</sup> Among Polish scholars in turn, a comprehensive evaluation of the state of international studies in Poland after the fall of communism was performed by Jacek Czaputowicz and Anna Wojciuk.<sup>33</sup> In 2015, the same pair of authors published a monograph titled 'Nauka o stosunkach międzynarodowych i studia europejskie Polsce' (The science of international relations and the European studies in Poland),<sup>34</sup> where they analysed the state of international studies and European studies on the basis of TRIP

<sup>27</sup> Bierzanek, Remigiusz (1957): *O prawie wojny i pokoju. Trzy księgi, w których znajdują wyjaśnienie prawo natury i prawo narodów, a także główne zasady prawa publicznego* (On the law of war and peace. Three volumes explaining the law of nature and the law of nations, as well as the main rules of public law), Warszawa, PWN.

<sup>28</sup> Bierzanek, Remigiusz (1972): *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe*, Warszawa, UW.

<sup>29</sup> Symonides, Janusz, Pałyga, Edward (1979): *Marksistowska nauka o stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Warszawa.

<sup>30</sup> Jorgensen, Knud (2004): "Toward a six Continents Social Science: International Relations", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, No.4. pp. 300-343; (2013): "Choosing Directions at Central and Eastern European Crossroads", *Przegląd Europejski*, No. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Volgy, Thomas (2013): "A Couple of Quick Reflections on Changes in the CEE Academic IR Community over the Last Decade", *Przegląd Europejski*, No. 1, pp. 27-28.

<sup>32</sup> Drulak, Peter, Konigova, Lucie, Karlas, Jan (2009): "Continuity and Change in the Discipline of IR in Central and Eastern Europe Forum", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, No. 2, pp. 168-173.

<sup>33</sup> Czaputowicz, Jacek, Wojciuk, Anna (2014): "IR Scholarship in Poland: the state of the discipline 25 years after the transition to democracy", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, advanced online publication, 28 November 2014, doi, 10.1057/jird.2014.21.

<sup>34</sup> Czaputowicz, Jacek, Ławniczak, Kamil (2015): *Nauka o stosunkach międzynarodowych i studia europejskie w Polsce* (The IR Scholarship and the European Studies in Poland), Warszawa, Scholar.



methodology (Teaching Research and International Policy). It is a very interesting study, but it uses quantitative and statistical methods, therefore the historical context of the changes and evolution of institutions are not sufficiently addressed in it; furthermore, a number of important facts and events were omitted as they had not been included in surveys. As a witness to the events and evolution of international studies in 1989, the author of the present article presents his own view, based on his own experience.

The inspiration for international studies in Poland after 1989 were the fundamental changes in the international environment and, even more importantly, the fundamental and historic turn in Polish foreign policy effected by the new governing political elites tracing their roots to the Solidarity. The new policy was referred to as 'all roads lead West' and was the manifestation of the desire to join Western institutions as quickly as possible in order to prevent the country from being drawn back into the post-Soviet or Russian sphere of influence. All this naturally created high demand for knowledge about Western institutions, security issues and European integration. As a result, new didactic and research programmes were launched, thus leading to the development of strong institutional thinking about foreign policy and perceiving the Polish *raison d'état* and the relations with the external world in these terms.

At the very beginning of the transformation process, in 1990, the Institute of International Relations at the University of Warsaw launched a programme of master's studies in international relations, and other Polish universities followed this example. It was a qualitative change because the new programme was meant to educate professionals in broadly understood international cooperation and differed considerably from the traditionally narrow and highly specialised didactic programmes for diplomats. Another important aspect of the programme was that teaching international relations in the form of five-year studies emerged from the apparatus of political sciences, which were pervaded with the tradition of ideological influence and dependence on political decision-makers. In accordance with UNESCO standards, in the communist period international relations were considered a constituent of political science (as its sub-discipline). Departure from the standard of political science in educating international relations experts was reflected in the multidisciplinary teaching programme, which, constantly improved since then, has become the most popular and recognisable study major at Polish universities.

In 1993, the Institute of International Relations and other similar academic centres in Central Europe received assistance from the American Professional School of International Affairs (APSIA). The assistance consisted of the transfer of knowledge related to creating syllabuses and programmes of international relations that were used at American universities. For this purpose, between 1992 and 1997, workshops and seminars were organised alternately in the United States and in various Central European countries with the aim to improve the professional teaching skills in international relations. Furthermore, numerous young academics from Central Europe had the opportunity to participate in traineeship programmes at leading American universities and discover the organisation of didactics and research themselves. The Institute of International Relations at the University of Warsaw was very actively engaged in the cooperation with APSIA, which also included the execution of joint research programmes that resulted in the joint publication (the first one of its kind in Poland) titled *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku* (National and international security towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century).<sup>35</sup> The individual chapters were

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<sup>35</sup> Bobrow, Davis, Halizak, Edward, Zięba, Ryszard (eds) (1997): *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, Warszawa, Scholar.



authored by researchers from Poland and the United States, including Davis Bobrow, Henry Nau, Bruce Russett, Richard Ullman, Charles Kupchan.

One of important results of the cooperation with APSIA was the establishment of the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA) in 1998. This international society publishes the “Journal of International Relations and Development”. The CEEISA’s significance for internationalisation of international studies in Poland has been immense, mainly thanks to workshops and seminars organised with the participation of researchers from Western Europe and the United States. The most important role, however, has been played by the annual CEEISA Conferences, organised by the countries of the region; Poland hosted them on three occasions (Warsaw – 2000, Wrocław – 2007, Cracow – 2012).

In 2013, a new scientific society was established in Europe under the name European International Studies Association (EISA), and several dozen Polish scholars became its members. In September 2013, the Institute of International Relations of the University of Warsaw organised the first EISA international conference: ‘One International Relations or Many? Multiple Worlds, Multiple Crises’.

The most important event, however, one that should be perceived as key for the development of international studies in Poland, was Poland’s accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004. This opened up the unique opportunity of becoming engaged in various forms of scientific cooperation within the EU and of accessing an important source of research funding. One of the examples of adaptation to education standards is the Bologna Process. Poland replaced the system of five-year master’s studies with the 3+2+3 system: bachelor’s studies, master’s studies and doctoral studies.

Yet another important impetus for the development of international studies in Poland was provided by the establishment of the Polish Association for International Studies in 2008, which should be perceived as an important sign that international studies were becoming a more autonomous research discipline and a sign of the emergence of an epistemic community of researchers sharing the common beliefs and assumptions on the subject of international studies. Starting with 2011, the Association held five national conventions focusing on the following issues:

2011 – The problem of multidisciplinary nature of international relations

2012 – The levels of analysis in international relations

2013 – The theory of realism in international studies. Principles and research applications

2014 – Norms, values and institutions in contemporary international relations

2015 – Liberalism and neo-liberalism in international studies

2016 – Analysis of state foreign policy

2017 – Area and Global Studies.

Since 2013, the Polish Association for International Studies has been a member of the World International Studies Committee (WISC). Its most important statutory goal is to work towards achieving the official status of scientific discipline for international studies. Under Polish law, once a field of knowledge is recognised as a scientific discipline, doctoral-level education can be conducted and doctoral titles can be granted in this field, which means Ph.D. in International Studies instead of Ph.D. in Political Science, as it is today.



There is a consensus among researchers of international relations in Poland as regards the perception of the discipline's research scope and its division into the following sub-disciplines:

- 1) Foreign policy analysis.
- 2) Security studies.
- 3) International law and institutions.
- 4) International political economy.
- 5) Area and global studies.
- 6) History of international relations.

The emancipation efforts of the Polish researchers of international relations is determined by the following circumstances.

First, according to UNESCO standards, international studies are placed within the framework of political science. In the Polish reality, this circumstance hinders the functioning of international studies because of the autarchic development of political science in isolation from global standards. It is also under considerable influence of researchers who had been shaped, in terms of ideology and methodology, by real socialism and who do not recognise the global achievements in this field.

Second, since 1990 Poland has experienced a dynamic increase in the number of students of international relations. According to J. Czaputowicz and A. Wojciuk, almost 28,000 people were studying this major in 2012 on the bachelor, master and doctoral levels at public and private universities.<sup>36</sup> This is much more than the number of students of political science. At the University of Warsaw, the number is three times higher.

Third, an important source of emancipation of international studies in Poland is the fact that the tradition of research in this discipline goes back to the times before World War II, when a significant group of Polish scholars participated in the work of the International Studies Conference. The researchers of international relations in Poland draw on this idea, following the example of their Western counterparts, who consider International Studies a discipline of science.<sup>37</sup>

In Poland, international relations studies are conducted by universities and the following research centres (think-tanks):

- Center for Social and Economic Research (<http://www.case-research.eu/pl/index>)
- Centre for International Relations (<http://csm.org.pl/>)
- Centre for Poland-Asia Studies (<http://www.polska-azja.pl>)
- Lech Wałęsa Institute Foundation (<http://www.ilw.org.pl>)
- demosEuropa Foundation (<http://www.demoseuropa.eu>)
- Czesław Mojsiewicz Foundation (<http://www.fundacjamojsiewicz.org.pl/>)

<sup>36</sup> Czaputowicz, Jacek, Wojciuk, Anna, *op.cit.*, p. 53-54.

<sup>37</sup> See Smith, Brian (1998): "Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42, p. 433-459; Long, David (2006): "Who Killed the International Studies Conference", *Review of International Studies*, No. 4, p. 603-622.





- Caismir Pulaski Foundation (<http://www.pulaski.pl/>)
- Stefan Batory Foundation (<http://www.batory.org.pl>)
- Institute of Public Affairs (<http://isp.org.pl>)
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- Foundation of International Studies (<http://www.fundacjasm.edu.pl/index.php>)
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- Institute of Geopolitics (<http://geopolityka.net/instytut-geopolityki/>)
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- Polish Society of International Studies (<http://www.ptsm.edu.pl>)
- Baltic Business Forum Association (<http://www.balticbusinessforum.eu/index.php>)
- CTA – Closer To Asia Association (<http://closertoasia.pl>)
- The Analysis Board of the Amicus Europae Foundation (<http://fae.pl/>)

As has been mentioned in the first part of this chapter, universities in Poland have a rich tradition of international relations studies. After 1989, they started creating departments, sections, chairs, institutes and faculties responsible for education in international relations. Presently, there are Faculties of Political Science and International Relations at the universities in Warsaw (since 1 September 2016), in Cracow (the Jagiellonian University), Łódź and Toruń; furthermore, at the University of Warsaw and the University of Wrocław there are Institutes of International Relations.

The Institute of International Relations at the University of Warsaw is the oldest academic institution of this kind in Poland; it was founded in 1976. At the onset of Poland's systemic transformation, in 1990, it had 14 staff members; now it is more than 60. It presently has approximately 1400 students, including 250 from abroad. The Institute's research profile is shaped by its sections: Strategic Studies, IR Political Economy, Law and International Relations, European integration, Non-European Area Studies, Contemporary India Research and Studies. Since 1980, the Institute of International Relations has been publishing the



journal *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, since 2015 issued as a quarterly. Detailed information on the Institute can be found at: [www.ism.uw.edu.pl](http://www.ism.uw.edu.pl).

The development and state of international studies in Poland is evidenced by the fact that more than a dozen academic journals are published by various research centres and universities. The most prominent among them are:

1. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*
2. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*
3. *Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego*
4. *Rocznik Strategiczny*
5. *Przegląd Europejski*.

Academic textbooks in the field of international relations also played an important role in the development of research and didactics in this field. Poland's situation in this respect was rather special because, in contrast to many countries, academics relied on their own skills, experience and knowledge instead of having American and British textbooks translated into Polish. Some examples of Polish publications used as textbooks include: Edward Halizak and Roman Kuźniar, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza. Struktura. Dynamika* (International relations. Genesis. Structure. Dynamics);<sup>38</sup> Erhard Cziomer and Lubomir Zyblikiewicz, *Zarys współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych* (An outline of contemporary international relations);<sup>39</sup> Marek Pietraś (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne* (International political relations).<sup>40</sup> The significance of these books for education in international relations was immense because of the modern content layout, with multidisciplinary approach to international issues.

Another important element that needs to be taken into account in the analysis of the state of international studies in Poland are the directions and areas of study. Due to the limited framework of this article, it is not possible to characterise all of them here in detail – hence some generalisations.

The theory and methodological status of 'international studies' is a research area in which Polish researchers of international relations became interested already in the 1970s. It was a period of learning (albeit to a limited extent) about the achievements of the Western science of international relations. This was also when the first publications were written, taking the form of descriptive articles on international relations theories. These were followed by the particularly important first doctoral theses analysing the individual theories and their authors. In the last decade, there was a qualitative turn in this direction of research – a shift from describing and classifying theories towards creating original and individual conceptualisations of theoretical and methodological knowledge, as exemplified by papers by Jacek Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja* (Theories of international relations. Critical analysis and systematisation)<sup>41</sup> and Andrzej Gałganek,

<sup>38</sup> Halizak, Edward, Kuźniar, Roman (eds)(2005): *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza. Struktura. Dynamika*, Warszawa, UW.

<sup>39</sup> Cziomer, Erhard, Zyblikiewicz, Lubomir (2007): *Zarys współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa, PWN.

<sup>40</sup> Pietraś, Marek (ed.)(2006): *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Lublin, UMCS.

<sup>41</sup> Czaputowicz, Jacek (2007): *Teoria stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja*, Warszawa, PWN.



*Historia stosunków międzynarodowych w dwóch tomach* (History of international relations in two volumes)<sup>42</sup>.

The next two areas of international studies in Poland were related to the exceptional need for knowledge and competences resulting from Poland's aspirations to obtain membership in the two leading Western institutions: the European Union and NATO.

After 1989, when the new, democratically elected authorities declared the desire for the country to join the European Union, at the same time they created legal and organisational conditions for the development of European studies, understood as area studies, studies of the European Union and of regional integration. Almost all Polish universities opened institutes (departments) of European studies, which launched bachelor's and master's studies. The dynamic development of education in European studies was supported by research of issues related to the EU. The achievements in this area are truly impressive; they represent a multitude of approaches and multidisciplinary. Among the many publications on this subject, the most influential ones were the monograph by Zbigniew Doliwa-Klepacki<sup>43</sup> and the academic textbook edited by Wojciech Jakubowski and Konstanty Adam Wojtaszczyk.<sup>44</sup>

Security issues are yet another priority area of research in Poland due to the logic of Poland's geopolitical location and membership in NATO, within which Poland tries to play an active role by cooperating with the United States.<sup>45</sup> The importance of these issues increased even more after Russia's conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine. The works that especially stand out in this area are those by Roman Kuźniar<sup>46</sup> and Katarzyna Żukrowska,<sup>47</sup> considered the most representative publications on security studies in Poland.

After 1989, Polish foreign policy issues became the subject of broad research characterised by a historical and descriptive approach as well as focusing on bilateral relations, for example: the relations between the United States and Poland, Poland and Germany, Poland and Russia. Research and theoretical analyses of the nature of contemporary foreign policy is relatively little developed, although works by Ryszard Stemplowski<sup>48</sup> and Adriana Dudek<sup>49</sup> are a praiseworthy exception to this rule.

Area studies are an important and characteristic area of international studies in Poland. They focus on non-European regions and take the point of view of international relations, but there is also a large group of researchers who approach them from the perspective of cultural studies. The most well-developed among area studies in terms of the number of publications

<sup>42</sup> Gałganek, Andrzej (2013): *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój. Tom 1 Idee; Tom 2 Rzeczy i praktyki* (History of international relations. Uneven and combined development. Volume 1: Ideas, Volume 2: Things and practice), Elipsa.

<sup>43</sup> Doliwa-Klepacki, Zbigniew (1999): *Integracja europejska* (European integration), Białystok, Temida 2.

<sup>44</sup> Wojtaszczyk, Konstanty Adam, Jakubowski, Wojciech (eds)(2012), *Europeistyka. Podręcznik akademicki* (European Studies. An academic textbook). Vol. 1-2, Warszawa, PWN.

<sup>45</sup> Madej, Marek (2013): "Security Studies in the Context of International Relations. Child. Cousin or Just Close Neighbour", *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, No. 2, pp. 223-241.

<sup>46</sup> Kuźniar, Roman (2006): *Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki* (Politics and power. Strategic studies – an outline), Warszawa, Scholar.

<sup>47</sup> Żukrowska, Katarzyna (2011): *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Przegląd stanu* (International security. A review of the situation), Warszawa, SGH.

<sup>48</sup> Stemplowski, Ryszard (2006): *Wprowadzenie do analizy polityki zagranicznej RP* (Introduction to the analysis of Poland's Foreign Policy), Warszawa, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych.

<sup>49</sup> Dudek, Adriana (2012): *System decyzyjny w polityce zagranicznej Polski okresu tranżycji (1989-1992). Mechanizmy, procedury i instytucje, praktyka* (The decision-making system in Poland's foreign policy in the period of transition 1989-1992. Mechanisms, procedures and institutions, practice), Wrocław, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.



and organisation in research centres and university departments are Latin American studies,<sup>50</sup> African studies<sup>51</sup> and Asia studies<sup>52</sup>.

### **3. Conclusion and Summary**

International studies in Poland have a rich tradition in the history of political and legal thought. The fatalism of Poland's geopolitical location gave special importance to issues such as security, independence and sovereignty in the discussion on the country's relations with the external world and on the optimal model of foreign policy towards Poland's neighbours and other European countries. As regards the experience of the last century, it is undeniable that the tradition of participating in the International Studies Conference of the inter-war period played an important and positive role as the Conference was an important source of inspiration for the conceptualisation of the research scope of international studies. The period of real socialism in Poland, until 1989, significantly slowed down the process of studying international relations because of their considerable ideological aspect. But starting with the 1970s, in the period of détente in the relations between the East and the West and the relative increase in international contacts, there appeared first publications and doctoral theses concerning the idea of international studies as it is now understood.

The last 25 years, that is the period since the beginning of the transformation in 1989, were a time of a quantitative and qualitative leap in the development of international studies in Poland. The period can be divided into two phases.

The first phase, between 1989 and 2004, was characterised by the creation of institutional foundations for research and education: faculties, institutes, departments, sections and chairs at universities, the establishment of new and reorganisation of existing research centres, opening up to cooperation with the West, and examining the achievements and state of research, launching education in this field.

The second phase, starting in 2004, when Poland joined the EU, and is still not over, has been characterised by qualitative changes as a result of increased funding owing to the availability of funds from the European Union. Journals published in accordance with Western standards started appearing, containing articles with theoretical ambitions. There has been a considerable increase in internationalisation of the international studies researchers' community. What is the most important, however, is that the recent years have seen the rise of a community of researchers sharing similar beliefs regarding the research scope of international studies and the development of pluralism in the area of epistemology, where realism is clearly dominating (a consequence of Poland's historical experience) over liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism – which, in turn, stems from the tradition of international law and the explicitly positive assessment of Poland's membership in NATO and the European Union.

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<sup>50</sup> Gawrycki, Marcin F. (2015): *Latynoamerykańskie koncepcje stosunków międzynarodowych* (Latin American concepts of international relations), Vol. I-VI, Warszawa, Museum of the Polish Peasant Movement.

<sup>51</sup> Lizak, Wiesław (2012): *Afrykańskie instytucje bezpieczeństwa* (African security institutions), Warszawa, Scholar.

<sup>52</sup> Halizak, Edward (1999): *Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku* (International relations in the region of Asia and the Pacific), Warszawa, Scholar; Zajączkowski, Jakub, Schottli, Jivanta, Thapa, Manish (2014): *India in the Contemporary World: Polity, Economy and International Relations*, London, Routledge.



## GLOBAL TERRORISM IN 2016

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### **Abstract:**

With the emergence and the growing clout of Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the terrorist threat confronting the international community has undergone a profound and dangerous transformation. At the same time Al Qaeda is still in the game – a bit diminished but lethal. Unfortunately however, governments – individually and collectively - continue to be ambivalent about the threat, leading to lackluster responses highlighted by lack of understanding of the threat, political will and coordination of operations against these groups.

**Keywords:** ISIS, Al Qaida, terrorism, threats, political coordination, response.

### **Resumen:**

*Con el surgir, crecimiento y creciente influencia de del Estado Islámico de Irak y la Gran Siria (ISIS), la amenaza terrorista a la que ha de hacer frente la comunidad internacional ha sufrido una profunda y peligrosa transformación. Al mismo tiempo Al Qaida todavía está en la escena, algo debilitada, pero letal. No obstante, los gobiernos, de forma individual y colectiva, desafortunadamente continúan siendo ambivalentes ante esta amenaza, dando paso a respuestas mediocres que demuestran la falta de comprensión de la amenaza, la falta de voluntad política y la ausencia de coordinación en las operaciones contra estos grupos.*

**Palabras clave:** ISIS, Al Qaida, terrorismo, amenazas, coordinación política, respuesta.

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## **1. Introduction**

The rise of ISIS in 2014 and its claim of the establishment of the Islamic State have introduced a threat of unprecedented magnitude to the international community. Even as the Al Qaeda remains significant despite having diminished in size, strength and influence, the threat from the group and its affiliates and supporters has begun to eclipse due to ISIS. With territorial control, huge resources, savviness in exploiting modern communication technology, especially the social media and brutality and barbarism, ISIS has presented a new version of extremism and terrorism to the world. Despite counter-offensives like aerial bombings and ground combat on multiple fronts, ISIS continues to survive and has been able to demonstrate its robust and lethal capabilities with attacks in many countries and to spread its influence worldwide.

ISIS (originally Islamic State of Iraq - ISI) evolved out of Abu Musab al Zarqawi-led Al Qaeda in Iraq. Though the initial objective of ISI was to create a Sunny enclave in Iraq to counter the growing dominance of the Shias and the Kurds, instability in the country together with disbanding of the Iraqi military and intelligence apparatus and dismantling of Ba'ath party and its affiliated governmental apparatus let the group to grow and expand. The post-Arab Spring chaos in many Middle Eastern countries specifically in Iraq's neighbourhood allowed the group to capture territory and establish its rule projecting it as the Islamic State – the Caliphate. As Al Qaeda's leadership of the jihadist movement began to wane especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden, many groups and individuals that Al Qaeda mentored with ideology, training and financing are now increasingly turning to ISIS and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for strategic leadership and inspiration.

## **2. ISIS's Strategy**

Today, ISIS has become a transnational phenomenon with an estimated 80,000 fighters including 30,000 Iraqis and Syrians and 20,000 foreigners combating in Iraq and Syria and hundreds of thousands of supporters worldwide. According to Western security and intelligence estimates ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq grew from 30,000 in 2014 to 50,000 in 2015 and likely to increase further in coming months as the group grabs more territory. ISIS strategy is to govern the areas it controls in Iraq and Syria and expand to other Muslim territories by accepting pledges of allegiance from local jihadist groups. Specifically ISIS seeks to control territory and administer the caliphate; expand the caliphate into other permissive areas; and exploit and destabilise areas not under its control. By demonstrating the establishment of the Islamic State, propagating the idea of a global caliphate and at the same time undermining competing groups and co-opting likeminded groups, ISIS is garnering more support and resources including manpower thereby the potential for future expansion. ISIS has also inspired individuals to carry out attacks in their home countries as it become increasingly challenging for foreign recruits to travel to Syria and Iraq. This nevertheless benefits the group in its quest for global expansion.

## **3. Dynamics of ISIS's Expansion**

ISIS grew in territories where states failed to govern. This has been mostly the case in Iraq and Syria. As the rulers got entrapped in state-building initiatives (Iraq) or dealing with the chaos induced by Arab Spring (Syria), ISIS was able to grab territory, amass wealth and armaments from all vulnerable sources including oil and natural gas production and distribution systems, financial institutions like banks and even the disbanding Iraqi army. The



group also aims to establish more satellites of the Caliphate known as wilayats (governorates or provinces) in other permissive areas across the world. For example, in Afghanistan, poor governance, lax security and fractionalisation of the Taliban after Mullah Omar's death allowed ISIS to grow, where it refers to itself as Wilayat Khorasan. Though Taliban is still the key player in most of Afghanistan, ISIS has occupied the eastern Nangarhar province, adjacent to the tribal areas of Pakistan operating from more than eight districts in the province and expanding.

Wilayat Khorasan has conducted multiple attacks targeting Hazara Shi'ites and the security forces in Afghanistan and released an array of brutal beheading videos. This group comprises members largely of breakaway factions of the Pakistani Taliban who are based on Afghan soil. The group has expanded further into other parts of Nangarhar in the east, Farah in the north and Helmand in the south in Afghanistan. It also maintains influence in specific parts of Pakistan. ISIS has also been engaged in sporadic clashes with the Taliban, which refuses to acknowledge the former as a stakeholder in the Afghan state. With the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan ISIS is likely to emerge as a formidable force posing a challenge to the Taliban in the mid to long term.

ISIS has also expanded in to Libya. Numerous terrorist groups took roots in the country after Muammar Gaddafi was killed in 2011. Majlis Shura Shabab Al Islam (Islamic Youth Consultative Council) and a faction of Ansar Al Sharia in Libya pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi creating Wilayat Al Barqah, Wilayat Fizzan and Wilayat Al Tarabulus respectively. In addition to consolidating control in the declared provinces, ISIS is likely to expand further. Sirte, a backup capital for ISIS, has become a base for the group's operations, logistics and training.

Similarly, Boko Haram based mainly in northern Nigeria pledged allegiance to Al Baghdadi and subsequently renamed itself Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) also known as Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya. In Algeria, ISIS created Wilayat al-Jazair; in Yemen, Wilayat Sanaa; and in Saudi Arabia, Wilayat al-Haramayn. In addition to mounting attacks in Algeria, ISIS conducted and claimed attacks against the Houthis in the Yemeni provinces of Lahij, Aden, Abyan, Shabwah, Sa'ada, Sana'a, Ibb, Taiz, al-Jawf, al-Bayda, and Hadramawt. On 20 March 2015, ISIS targeted two Zaydi mosques in Sana'a and a government facility in Sa'ada killing 137 and injuring 345.

ISIS also seeks to attack Saudi Arabia to take control of Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina before attacking Israel to take control of Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem - the third holiest site in Islam. Calling for the overthrow of the House of Saud, ISIS has carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia's Najd and Hejaz provinces and likely to target the ruling family in Saudi Arabia.

In June 2015, ISIS proclaimed Wilayat Qawqas in northern Caucasus under the leadership of Abu Muhammad Al Qadari. The terrorist groups in the four out of six subdivisions that come under Al Qaeda's Islamic Emirates of the Caucasus have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Moreover, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, an Egyptian militant group that pledged allegiance to Al Baghdadi in 2014, creating Islamic State of Iraq and Levant - Sinai Province or ISIL-SP (Wilayat Sayna), bombed the Russian airliner killing 224 on 31 October 2015. The attack was carried out in retaliation to the Russian support for the Assad regime and bombing of ISIS positions in Syria.



#### **4. Mapping the Threat into the Future**

A number of issues characterise the future trajectory of the threat. First, despite losing territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS will continue to attempt to expand into parts of Africa, Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus and Asia. ISIS is actively recruiting in western Balkans, including Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. Similarly, ISIS is recruiting in Southeast Asia with the intention of declaring a Wilayat either in Eastern Indonesia or southern Philippines. In 2015, Bahrum Naim of Katibah Nusanthara (Archipelagic Battalion of ISIS in Syria) issued instructions to Southeast Asian groups to attack both domestic and coalition targets. With recruitment of Chinese Muslims, ISIS is likely to declare a Wilayat in Western China where a large number of Uighur recruits and their families from Xinjiang have joined ISIS though some have also joined its rival group - Jabat al Nusra which is an Al Qaeda affiliate.

Second, using its newly constituted external operations wing staffed by foreign fighters, ISIS will attempt attacks including spectaculars like 9/11 in the countries which, either individually or jointly are in offensive against the group in Iraq and Syria. The November 2015 Paris attacks demonstrated ISIS's capability to collaborate with locals to strike overseas. The Paris-template, a copycat version of the attacks in Mumbai in India in November 2008, is likely to be repeated in a number of countries.

Third, online activity will continue to garner recruits for ISIS and help it radicalise more Muslims from vulnerable segments all over the world. ISIS ideology of hatred seeks to replace mainstream Islamic teaching among Muslim communities. However, even as about 80 to 90 percent of social media sites transmitting ISIS propaganda are hosted on U.S. and European servers, lack of political will and clear strategy have failed the governments and their agencies from counter-messaging, taking down ISIS platforms and degrading ISIS's strategic communication and information capabilities.

Fourth, without unanimity and unity among the countries, offensives against ISIS will continue to be ad-hoc and ineffective. Until now cooperation at the strategic level and coordination of operations beyond exchange of information and intelligence has eluded the countries fighting ISIS or being affected by its atrocities.

Last but not the least, refugees and asylum seekers from conflict zones to the West are susceptible to ISIS's message. ISIS is likely to exploit them to target its enemies in the countries that the refugees are flocking to in large numbers. Unfortunately countries involved do not have effective policies and plans of action to mitigate the humanitarian crisis arising out of the outflow of refugees in such a large number.

#### **5. Responding to the Threats**

Today, ISIS presents a four dimensional threat to most governments - ISIS Core in Syria and Iraq, ISIS Branches, ISIS Global and ISIS online. Countering these threats requires both conventional combat strategies including boots on the ground and creation of new capabilities especially those involving communication management to produce and disseminate counter narratives against radical messages. It also involves community engagement. More specifically, these capabilities include expanding elite counter terrorism tactical units; increasing the numerical strengths of national security services; developing a robust legal framework on preventive detention; raising dedicated units to police the cyber domain; and an integration of capabilities by shifting from counter- terrorism cooperation to collaboration.



Arguably, the key to dismantling the ISIS core in Iraq, Syria and Libya is increased intelligence-led military operations to kill or capture its leaders, dismantle its support and operational structures, training camps and financial infrastructures. Both special and general purpose forces on the ground, in addition to air campaign, is essential to degrade and destroy ISIS.

Governments must take steps to deny ISIS the opportunity to expand its territorial control. This involves identifying and securing vulnerable areas as a physical deterrent. Building trust among the inhabitants of these areas for their respective governments is equally important. Moreover, tempo of ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria created the momentum for the spawning of associated groups outside the primary theatre. In order to break this momentum, it is paramount to focus on both the core area and the satellite provinces and break their nexus.

New executive and legislative tools are necessary to proscribe entities and personalities that advocate, support and participate in ISIS activities. They should be investigated, charged, and prosecuted.

Given ISIS's growing presence in the virtual domain, governments should step up their efforts to prevent extremist and terrorist exploitation of the internet through a robust legal and governance framework. This also requires partnerships with business firms, civil society and community groups. The key to building enduring and effective partnerships lies in complementing the whole-of-government approach with a whole-of-society approach. The strategy is to build and sustain a community of experts including religious scholars to develop and disseminate counter- narratives to the extremist propaganda through the internet, more specifically through the social media to prevent radicalisation. It also involves measures to implement de-radicalisation programmes to rehabilitate those that have already fallen victims to extremist propaganda.

Most importantly, governments, irrespective of whether they are directly affected by the threat and despite political and ideological differences, must put their acts together and present a common front to degrade and destroy ISIS, Al Qaeda and other similar groups. However as mentioned earlier the responses have so far been ad hoc, piecemeal and lacking in cooperation and coordination which have largely been ineffective and often counterproductive.

## **6. Conclusion**

Terrorism is not new to the world. Throughout the ages it has manifested in many forms most notably from ethno-political and left and right wing terrorism as the predominant source of political violence of the 20th century to its current politico-religious variety spearheaded by groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. While the previous versions of political violence could be contained though not eliminated altogether, it is not easy to speculate how and when the current threat can at least be managed. This is due to the peculiar nature of the threat itself – a hybrid with potent mix of distorted religiosity with pseudo politics that moreover does not recognise any constraint in the use of violence.

The world, led by the U.S. fought Al Qaeda and significantly degraded its core capabilities including its core leadership. With ISIS, a newer version of the threat confronts the international community. But it will be naïve to believe that groups like ISIS can overthrow the existing world order. ISIS has sustained itself so far due mostly to inaction or ineffective response. Notwithstanding the current capabilities of these groups there are key vulnerabilities like territorial control and increasing revulsion among the Muslims themselves



due to extreme brutality and barbarism by these groups that the governments can exploit. On a positive note, a consensus of sorts is slowly emerging among the countries involved with regard to the strategy to deal with ISIS, especially with the Vienna plan and its aftermath though it is difficult to speculate on its implementation. But there is no substitute to a multi-pronged and multi-national response to the type of threat that groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS pose against humanity.





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Curso 2015/2016  
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  - El caso de Mali
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  - El caso de Afganistán
  - El conflicto árabe-israelí y palestino-israelí.
  - El Africa Subsahariana

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Del 4 de Abril -20 de Mayo 2016 (lunes a jueves de 16:30 a 20:30 horas). 60 horas (48 teóricas, 12 prácticas. La parte teórica se imparte durante el mes de abril quedando 4 tardes salteadas en mayo para la realización de las simulaciones en grupo). Las clases se impartirán en la Facultad de CC. Políticas y Sociología de la UCM, Campus Universitario de Somosaguas (autobuses A, B, H, I), tren ligero.

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