



UNISCI Discussion Papers

AL QAEDA'S TRAJECTORY IN 2003

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1. Al Qaeda's trajectory in 2003

Despite being the most hunted movement in history, Al Qaeda and its associated organizations will pose a significant threat in 2003. Al Qaeda will fragment, decentralize, regroup in five zones of the world, work with like-minded groups, select a wider range of targets, focus on economic targets and population centres, and conduct most attacks in the global south. Although the group will be constrained from conducting coordinated simultaneous attacks against high profile symbolic or strategic targets in the West, together with its regional counterparts Al Qaeda will conduct similar attacks in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and even in Latin America. Despite heavy losses, including the likely capture or death of its core and penultimate leaders, Al Qaeda's anti-Western universal jihad ideology inculcated among the politicized and radicalized Muslims will sustain support for Islamism, Islamist political parties and Islamist terrorist groups. With the detection, disruption, and degradation of its human and material infrastructure, Al Qaeda may evolve and survive as a state-of-mind among Islamist territorial and migrant pockets. With a skewed US Middle Eastern policy, Islamist support for political violence will grow prompting terrorist groups to conduct mass casualty attacks, especially suicide bombings of economic targets and population centres.

Since October 7, 2001 when US-led coalition forces began to dismantle Al Qaeda's state-of-the-art operational and training infrastructure, its intention to attack has not diminished but its capability to attack has gravely suffered. With US working with several Middle Eastern and Asian governments, Al Qaeda's strength has depleted to a third of its rank and file especially the loss or capture of its key leaders and experienced operatives. For instance, in Afghanistan, its military commander Mohommad Atef was killed in a predator attack in Pakistan, its director external operations Abu Zubaidah and in UAE its maritime commander Al Nishri were captured. Al Qaeda as an organisation has gravely suffered severe disruption to its command and control. Therefore, the group is increasingly probing targets that can be attacked with least effort and least cost. In keeping with its doctrine of repeating its successes, Al Qaeda and its associate groups are increasingly adopting the tactic of suicide terrorism against soft targets.

While Al Qaeda's priority will be to attack US targets, it only has the resources and opportunity to attack US allies and friends. With diminished Al Qaeda assets and hardened US and Israeli diplomatic targets, the group will mount and attempt to mount attacks against

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British, French, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian targets and possibly other European and Japanese targets. Throughout 2002, Al Qaeda or its associate groups killed German tourists in Djerba, Tunisia, French naval technicians in Karachi, Pakistan, Australians and Westerners in Bali, Indonesia, and Israeli's Mombassa, Kenya. Osama bin Laden's pronouncements in October and November 2002 will be the best guide to unfolding Al Qaeda events in 2003. As such more effort is needed to track and target Al Qaeda experts moving worldwide and disrupt them from coordinating attacks together with Al Qaeda associate groups with which it had shared ideology, finance and training during the last decade in Afghanistan and in other conflict zones.

Countermeasures, especially target hardening, by law enforcement and protective services of vulnerable government personnel and infrastructure have forced Al Qaeda to focus on economic targets and population centres. Hardening of government targets will displace the threat to softer targets making civilians prone to terrorist attack. Economic targets especially the tourist and the hotel industry will suffer from terrorism. Churches, synagogues, and other non-Islamic institutions as well as trade and investment will remain particularly vulnerable. Similarly, hardening of land and aviation targets will shift the threat to sea targets particularly to commercial maritime targets. Due to the difficulty of hijacking aircraft to ram them against targets difficult to acquire from surface attacks, Al Qaeda will acquire and employ hand held Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). If appropriate and immediate countermeasures are not taken to target the Al Qaeda shipping network, SAMs under Al Qaeda control held in the Pakistan-Kashmir-Afghanistan theatre, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa will find its way to the Far Asia and to Europe, and possibly even to North America. Other groups operationally and ideologically unconnected to Al Qaeda will learn from Al Qaeda technologies, tactics, and techniques.

With US security forces and the intelligence community targeting Al Qaeda's nerve centre in Afghanistan-Pakistan, Al Qaeda will decentralize even further. While its organizers of attacks will remain in Pakistan and its immediate neighborhood, its operatives will travel back and forth coordinating with Al Qaeda nodes in the south. To make its presence felt, Al Qaeda will increasingly rely on its global terrorist network of like-minded groups in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Horn of Africa, Middle East, and the Caucasus to strike its enemies. Already attacks in Kenya, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Kuwait and Yemen seek to compensate for the loss and lack of space and opportunity to operate in Afghanistan. Its operatives will work together with Jemmah Islamiyah (JI: Southeast Asia), Al Ithihad al Islami (Horn of Africa), Chechen Mujahidin (Khattab faction: Caucasus), Tunisian Combatants Group (Middle East), Jayash-e-Mohammad (South Asia) and other groups it trained and financed in the past decade. In addition to its own members, Al Qaeda will operate through the Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and Takfir Wal Hijra – two groups it had infiltrated in Europe and North America. With the transfer of terrorist technology and expertise from the centre to the periphery, the attacks by the associated groups of Al Qaeda will pose a threat as great as Al Qaeda.

Although attacking inside North America, Europe, Australasia and Israel remains a priority, the measures and countermeasures taken by these governments will make it difficult for Al Qaeda to mount an operation in the West. Al Qaeda finds it less costly to operate in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East where there is lack of security controls. Therefore, most attacks will be against Western targets located in the global south. While focusing on



Western targets will remain a priority, Al Qaeda will continue to conduct operations against Muslim rulers and regimes supporting the US led “war or terror.” The physical security Pakistani and Afghan leaders Musharaaf and Karzai will remain particularly vulnerable and their regimes will come under sustained political challenges. While a number of Pakistani groups fighting in Kashmir will come under greater control of Al Qaeda, the group working together with the surviving elements of the Taliban will develop a clandestine network inside Afghanistan to conduct guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political assassination.

For greater impact, Al Qaeda conduct coordinated simultaneous attacks against symbolic, high prestige or strategic targets with the intention of inflicting maximum damage to human and physical infrastructure. With Al Qaeda resources under strain and its operatives coming under increasing scrutiny in the global north, Al Qaeda will be constrained from mounting multiple attacks in the global north. However, Al Qaeda and its associate groups are still able to mount multiple operations in the global south where they have greater leverage, space, and time to operate. For instance, JI attacked Sari and Kuta clubs and the US consulate in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002; and Al Qaeda attacked an Israeli owned hotel and aircraft in Mombassa, Kenya on November 29, 2002.

2. Resilience

Al Qaeda has suffered with the arrest of nearly 3000 organisers, operatives and supporters in 98 countries from October 2001. With the increase in pressure, Al Qaeda is increasingly depending on its associate groups to conduct attacks. Traditionally, Qaeda with better trained, more experienced and highly committed operatives wanted to attack more difficult targets especially strategic targets and leave the easier and tactical targets to its associated groups. Today, with Al Qaeda operatives working closely together, the lethality of the attacks conducted by the associate groups of Al Qaeda is increasing. As Bali demonstrated, the attacks conducted by the associate groups of Al Qaeda can be as lethal as the attacks conducted by Al Qaeda itself. With attacks conducted by Al Qaeda’s associated groups posing a threat as great as Al Qaeda, the theatre of war will widen. US assistance, presence and influence will grow in the Muslim World generating wide ranging reactions.

With the loss of Afghanistan as a “liberated theatre of jihad,” Islamists will seek to create new theatres. Dr Ayman Zawahiri, Osama’s deputy, designated successor and principal strategist of Al Qaeda considers Afghanistan and Chechnya as the only two liberated theatres of jihad. Already due to the difficulty of movement of recruits and flow of support from Islamist migrant pockets in the West and in the Middle East to Afghanistan, there has been a partially diversion of support to Chechnya. Although there is a significant reserve of Afghan trained active and sleeper terrorists in the West, terrorists entering the West to attack Western targets may be trained in a number of theatres especially Chechnya. With Al Qaeda fragmenting several other groups will take over the role of waging a universal jihad. More territorial Islamist groups will espouse universal agendas and more Muslim separatist groups will become vulnerable to penetration by Islamist groups.

Al Qaeda will be operating across the technological spectrum but is likely to use low-tech high impact attacks, especially civilian infrastructure to attack civilian society and critical infrastructure. With greater border controls, members and associate members of Al Qaeda will use what can be readily purchased off the shelf especially from pharmacies, chemist shops, and hardware stores. Al Qaeda members will live off the environment and turn commercially



available material into weapons. Al Qaeda's Tunisian member conducted a suicide attack against the oldest Jewish synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, using a LPG truck; JI used a consignment of chlorate purchased from the port city of Surabaya in Indonesia against targets in Bali; and 9-11 hijackers used passenger aircraft against America's icons. The latter attack, an Al Qaeda detainee said was "like using your own finger to prick your eye." Using multiple identities, Al Qaeda members will travel to target countries, receive instructions, plan and prepare attacks through the Internet, and attack targets. They will generate support from low level crime, organized crime, infiltrated charities, and from politicized and radicalized segments of their migrant and diaspora communities.

With the capture of the 9-11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohommad alias Mohommad the Pakistani alias MP, the head of the military committee of Al Qaeda on March 1, 2003, Al Qaeda has lost tactical control of its cells (See Annex). He was central in the planning and preparation of attacks. His persona highly influenced the nature of almost all Al Qaeda attacks. First, mass casualty attacks, second, the abundant use of suicide terrorism, third, bombings, and fourth, assassination. As mass casualty attacks need a large number of operatives, greater resources, and planning over a long period of time, Al Qaeda today will be able to conduct a fewer attacks but still they are likely to become spectaculars or theatrical attacks. Assassination will be used more frequently although suicide bombings will be the most predominant form of attack. As suicide attacks are very difficult to disrupt in the execution phase, 2003 will see the tactic of suicide terrorism being used more widely. As Al Qaeda maximizes its successes and partial successes of attacks and minimizes its failures, suicide attacks will become increasingly common. Although Al Qaeda's long term and sustained interest to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents has not diminished, conventional terrorism will remain the preferred mode of attack.

3. Conclusion

US policies towards the Middle East especially the unilateral US threat to invade Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian issue will strengthen support for Islamism, Islamist political parties and terrorist groups. US's skewed foreign policy will continue to pose a significant terrorist threat to Western interests both at home and overseas. In many countries, Islamism will move from the periphery to the centre, making it difficult for many governments to openly support US led "War against terrorism." With support for Islamism rising, Islamists will campaign either politically or violently or both in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and other emerging democracies. In addition to well-organized groups, individual terrorists will mount operations, similar to the shooting at the El Al counter at the Los Angeles Airport on America's Independence Day 2002. With more news in the media about Islam, the Muslim public will become more aware of Islam. The number of Muslims directly supporting violence will remain very small but there will be more support for a Muslim way of life, especially the implementation of Sharia laws. Furthermore, the need to wage jihad in support of their suffering brethren will rise among politicized and radicalized segments of the Muslims.

If the threat posed by Islamism is to be countered and the life span of Islamist terrorist groups is to be shortened in the long term (10 years), the current Western especially the US approach of 95% military and 5% ideological will have to be reversed. To reduce the space for the Al Qaeda to survive and grow, the international community must develop a multi-pronged, multi-dimensional, multi-agency, and multi-jurisdictional approach against terrorism. Failure



to develop a comprehensive long term strategic response will mean, Al Qaeda changing shape, surviving and continuing the fight.

As much as 2002 was, 2003 will be a year of experience and learning both for government law enforcement and intelligence agencies. With the wider acknowledgement that there is no standard textbook for fighting Al Qaeda, it will be a learning process where new structures and institutions will have to be built and shaped to fight a rapidly evolving cunning and a ruthless foe, willing to kill and die. To win, governments will have to repeat their successes and build upon their successes.

In its founding charter, Al Qaeda Al Sulbah (The Soild Base) is defined as the “spearhead of Islam” and the “pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements.” The existing and emerging Islamist groups burdened with the Al Qaeda ideology will pose a continuous terrorist threat. Although Al Qaeda as a physical entitle will be relegated to history, it has at least partially accomplished its primary role of “showing the way” to other groups especially the need to go beyond a limited territorial agenda and wage a universal jihad. The momentum Al Qaeda has so successfully unleashed will spawn and sustain a dozen existing and emerging Islamist groups at least in the immediate (1-2 years) and in the mid term (5 years).

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ANNEX

Khalid Shaikh Mohommad: The 9-11 Mastermind

Khalid Shaikh Mohommad is the most feared terrorist in the world. The Kuwait-born US-educated Khalid organized Holy Tuesday, the operation to strike America's most outstanding landmarks on September 11, 2001, the single biggest terrorist attack the world has ever witnessed. As the mastermind of Holy Tuesday, the Al Qaeda code for 9-11, Khalid is today the most hunted terrorist. Khalid is not an operative but an organizer of terrorist attacks. As he does not directly conduct terrorist attacks, his identity remained illusive and his personality largely unknown to the intelligence community until mid-2002.

Khalid belongs to the rare category of highly experienced organizers of terrorist attacks across international borders. In the profession, his predecessors includes Imad Mugneyev, the coordinator of the bombing of the US marine barrack and French paratrooper HQs in Lebanon (1983) and Israeli targets in Argentina (1992, 1994) and Illich Ramirez Sanchez alias Carols the Jackal, the organizer of the hostage taking of 11 oil ministers in Austria (1975), bombing of three pro-Israeli newspapers in France (1974), and the Air France hijacking in Greece (1976) culminating in the Entebbe raid. As an important functionary and thereafter the head



of Al Qaeda's military committee, Khalid was the key planner of several Al Qaeda landmark operations: the first World Trade Center bombing in New York (1993), assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto (1993), Oplan Bojinka (plan to destroy a dozen US airliners over the Pacific, assassination attempt of Clinton and Pope John Paul II, and ram commercial airliners on to the CIA HQ and the Pentagon in 1994-5) and Operation Holy Tuesday.

There are several other operations where his hand has not been exposed such as the slaying of two American officials killed in Karachi in March 1995, and four American oil workers in Karachi in November 1997, both in retaliation for Pakistan's extradition and US sentencing of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani responsible for the murder of two and injury to three CIA employees outside the CIA HQs in Langley in January 1993. Although Kansi did not belong to Al Qaeda, like Khalid he was a Baluchi from Quetta, the capital of Balochistan Province of Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan. Although Ahmad Saeed Omar Sheikh of Jayash-e-Mohomad, an associate group of Al Qaeda, committed the murder of Pearl, it was an Al Qaeda operation. With the depletion of Al Qaeda strength since October 7, 2001, Khalid is known to have enlisted the services of Jayash-e-Mohomad and other Pakistani groups that shared training and operational infrastructure with Al Qaeda and Taliban throughout the 1990s. Pearl's research of Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, led him to Karachi, also the forward headquarters of Khalid. Sensing the threat, the Pakistani intelligence community believes that Khalid ordered Pearl's death. As Yosri Fouda of Al Jazeera who interviewed Khalid in Karachi in June 2002 was leaving, Khalid gave him a copy of the Daniel Pearl slaying video and a 112-paged manifesto justifying 9-11 operation.

Among the fraternity of terrorists, he remains one of the few surviving leaders still able to conceptualise grand designs, prepare a blue print, and carry them out effectively and efficiently. To quote an Al Qaeda member: "Khalid thinks big...he engages in systematic and meticulous planning spectacular or theatrical terrorist operations. He is a creative genius..." To quote a former Intelligence Chief of the Philippines National Police Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza: "He behaves like he's an intelligence officer. He appears and disappears. He has safe houses. He is very, very clever." In his capacity as the head of the military committee, Khalid dealt with a wide range of personnel both within and outside his committee. In addition to consulting with bin Laden and Al Zawahiri, the Al Qaeda leadership, he regularly interacted with Al Qaeda experts who were young and impressionable. At the time of their capture, Abu Zubeidah, head of external operations was 31, Mohommad Mansour Jabara, coordinator of the suicide attacks in Southeast Asia, was 22, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Chief Logistics Officer of 9-11 was 30, and Hambali, head of operations for Southeast Asia, was 36.

Khalid fills a void in the operational community of taking an idea and operational sing it with the vast global network he had built over the years. As much as he had access to youth willing to kill and die, Khalid had sufficient funds. Whenever he needed funds, Khalid discretely approached businessman, politicians and charity workers he had cultivated over the years. Rarely did anyone decline or refuse a request for assistance from Khalid. What Al Qaeda lacked were trusted individuals located in the west with sufficient knowledge of the west to receive, protect and guide the suicide terrorists to their enemy targets. Recruiting and positioning Al Qaeda members and supporters strategically in forward and rear bases for immediate and subsequent exploitation was Khalid's specialty. It was Khalid who always communicated with these assets and not the other way around. Although he knew the weaknesses and limitations of technologies in conducting terrorist operations, he intelligently



exploited the technologies available to him. In July 2002, the four-bedroom apartment he was living in Karachi, Pakistan, had three laptops and five mobile phones.

As far back as 1992, he developed a plan together with his nephew and protégé Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to bomb the World Trade Center in New York, topple one tower on the other and kill several tens of thousands of people. The operation killed six injured over 1000 and caused extensive damage to the structure. In July 1993, Khalid funded an operation to assassinate Benazir Bhutto, the woman Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 1995, Khalid planned an operation across the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and other countries to destroy a dozen US airliners. Since the mid-1990s, he was an important functionary and later the head of Al Qaeda's military committee that conducted multiple attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and planned another two-dozen attacks worldwide. His roles vary dependent on the operation and circumstance - directly participating in the bombing of a Philippines Airline flight from Cebu to Tokyo that killed a Japanese executive and injured others in December 1994; chairing the planning meetings of Holy Tuesday in Asia and in Europe, and wiring money to Yousef for Oplan Bojinka and to 9-11 hijackers. With experience, his operations have become complex often involving assets and operatives across many countries. For instance, Holy Tuesday involved operational planning in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Germany, Spain, UAE, UK and US. With his unrivalled and unmatched career, he presents a clear and a present danger to the international system.

Khalid is a professional terrorist. He has spent most of his adult life planning, preparing and executing terrorist attacks. He is unrelenting in continuously talent spotting, recruiting, motivating, training, identifying targets, reviewing plans, and positioning operatives in key countries to execute attacks both against military and civilian targets. Khalid functions by operating a state-of-the-art agent handling system where operatives recruited, trained and assigned to the military committee are dispatched worldwide with missions. For instance, Khalid missioned the Al Qaeda dirty bomber, Jose Padilla, a US national of Latin American origin and a convert to Islam. On a tip off from the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Padilla was arrested by the FBI at Chicago's O Hare Airport on May 8, 2002. Similarly, another member of the military committee Abu Muhammad Al Masri, one of Khalid's protégé's asked the American Taliban John Walker Lindh at the end of his training in Camp Al Farook in Afghanistan in mid 2001: "Would you do a martyrdom operation?" meaning a suicide attack against US, European or an Israeli target. To manage such a vast network efficiently he must accept the risks, travel frequently, and be as close as possible to the theatre of operations. As head of the military committee, with the specific responsibility for targeting US, its allies and friends, KMS has always accepted the challenge and lived outside the "base area" and operate in the "field" whether it is in Europe, the Middle East or in Asia. In preparation for 9-11, he applied for a US visa but was turned down. Similarly, after 9-11 Khalid could have remained on the Afghan-Pakistan border with other leaders but instead he moved to a four-storey building in 15th Commercial Street, Defense Housing district in residential Karachi on June 14, 2002 to facilitate the movement of Al Qaeda operatives back and forth from Pakistan and Afghanistan to the rest of the world. He is likely to remain in Pakistan. To mitigate the risks, Khalid has developed the skills and the techniques over the years, both by example and by trial and error. He is both a master at disguise and at blending into the local culture and population.



Khalid earned the trust and respect of the Al Qaeda leadership by serving as one of Osama bin Laden's earliest bodyguards. Thereafter, bin Laden dispatched Khalid to the Philippines where he trained ASG and MILF members in his specializations - bomb making and close quarter assassination - in 1991. As an outstanding organizer, bin Laden gave Khalid substantial operational authority. Unlike most other Al Qaeda terrorists and leaders, Khalid's motivation is not religion but retribution, retaliation and revenge. He is driven by pure vengeance - a single mission to punish the United States of America and its friends. Unlike most other Islamist terrorists, his lifestyle demonstrates a duality. Although Khalid portrays that he is a believer, he is not strict Muslim. Khalid is jolly, sharp, hardworking and liked acting. Although he is authoritative and serious when it comes to work, he is known to joke and play with colleagues to ease the pressure on him and on them. Khalid's past record in the Philippines reveals that he is a playboy, a frequent visitor to Manila's red light district - its Karaoke bars and mirrored go-go clubs - and a womaniser. To impress Rose Mosquero, a dentist Khalid once courted in the Philippines, he phoned on her mobile and said: "look out of the window and look up." There was Khalid and his nephew Yousef waving from a helicopter flying over her clinic holding a banner "I love you." Khalid also met Yousef's girlfriend Carol Santiago, who has since then disappeared from the Philippines. In contrast to bin Laden and his followers, who lived frugally and a sparten life style, Khalid was flamboyant, spent lavishly and enjoyed life. For instance, the 9-11 suicide hijackers lived in econo lodges, but Khalid lived in plush hotels. Khalid entertained several women in five star hotels. Together with their associates, Khalid and Yousef visited both hotel bars and nightclubs in Manila. To women he met in Manila, Khalid portrayed himself as a wealthy businessman from Qatar. For the uncle and nephew, it was not only work but also play. In December 1994, Yousef and Khalid took a scuba diving course in Puerto Galera, a beach resort south of Manila. Despite the entertainment and the fun, they always took their profession seriously - to target the US, its Allies and its friends.

Many of Khalid's operatives hold him both in fear and reverence. Even after his best operative, Yousef, who planned to assassinate Prime Minister Bhutto, President Clinton, Pope John Paul II, and bomb US airliners over the Pacific, was arrested he did not divulge the name of Khalid. Although Yousef refers to bin Laden, he does not refer to his immediate superior Khalid. Even in an off-the-record discussion with the FBI, Yousef refused to answer certain questions. Despite the risk of receiving a 240-year sentence, Yousef stated that he does not wish to compromise others, meaning Khalid. In preparation to assassinate President Clinton who was visiting Manila, Yousef "made contact with a person he described as an 'intermediary' but who he would not further discuss." Furthermore, bin Laden consistently denied Yousef as one of his operatives because of the Al Qaeda leader's fear that his uncle Khalid would be identified.

Khalid was responsible for introducing two principles to the group. First, Al Qaeda's loosing and learning doctrine. If Al Qaeda fails in an operation, suffers human and material losses, still it is not considered a strategic loss, provided the group learns, improves, and vows not to repeat its mistake again. As such Al Qaeda could revisit its failed operations and engage in retargeting the same old targets using improved or better tactics. Although Al Qaeda failed to destroy the World Trade Center in February 1993, it succeeded on September 2001. Similarly, Yousef failed to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1995 but Khalid returned to the Philippines via the southern backdoor in September 1998 with the intention of assassinating the Pope planning to visit Manila in January 1999 for the canonization of Mother Ignacia. In



early 1999, Khalid was observed "hanging around a nightclub in Malate, Manila." Second, Al Qaeda should be a goal-oriented and not a rule-oriented group. For instance, with the disruption of Al Qaeda plans to attack government, diplomatic and other hard targets were disrupted in Southeast Asia, Khalid approved a proposal by his Southeast Asian representative Hambali to attack population, economic and other soft targets. The bombing of "bars, café's or night clubs frequented by Westerners" in Southeast Asia including the Bali attack on October 12, 2002 received the blessings of the Al Qaeda leadership.

After Khalid was identified as a foreign terrorist working with both the MILF and the ASG in 1991, he has been on the run. However, he has demonstrated his ability to function effectively over long periods of time under extreme pressure. Despite being placed on nearly 100 watch lists and tracked by two-dozen governments even before 9-11, he has managed to both organize and operate across the world. As a master of disguises he alters his appearance frequently. He is portly, light brown in complexion, brown eyes, thinning dark hair, and has a long round face. During the past decade he has gained weight, and has been described as "relatively short" and "slightly overweight" by Al Qaeda detainees in US custody. He is 5 foot 5 inches (1.55 meters) and weights 160 pounds (72 kilograms). He often sports a closely trimmed beard and mustache and wears glasses. He tints his hair, the color ranging from dark brown to black. He wears western cloths, speaks very good English, and travels frequently. Dependent on the circumstance he either portrayed himself as a rich businessman from Doha, Qatar or a trader of holy water from Medina, Saudi Arabia. Even amidst a high threat to his life, Khalid is considered an active and an impatient man, constantly working, organizing, and moving. When the Al Jazeera's Yosri Fouda met with Khalid and his head of logistics for 9-11, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, he observed that Khalid's "hands never stopped moving as he wandered erratically around us. He was the doer while Ramzi was the thinker."

Khalid is not only a military figure but also a man of many other skills. Although Khalid is committed to operating at the cutting edge of terrorism, he was also involved in and supported the non-military activities of Al Qaeda. He was very much a party to Al Qaeda's decision to publicise its landmark operation. It was to demonstrate Al Qaeda's resilience, determination and ability to strike again. However, even when Khalid met with Fouda, the Al Jazeera journalist, in Karachi in June 2002, the arrangements made reflects the meticulous planning adhered to by Khalid. When the journalist was brought to one of his safe houses, an Al Qaeda operative placed and taped cotton wool onto Fouda's eyes, got him to wear dark glasses. After arriving at the safe house, Al Qaeda did not want the neighbors to observe that they were escorting a man who was blind folded. The Al Qaeda operative got Yosri to hold on to one end of a long box, creating the impression that Yosri was helping him to carry it, and the Al Qaeda operative led the way into the safe house guiding Yosri through several steps. Of all the journalists, Al Qaeda only authorized Fouda access to Al Shibh and Khalid. Although Fouda interviewed both of them he was sent only the audiotape of Al Shibh. Nonetheless, Khalid and Al Shibh were both media savvy.

During the past decade, law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies have identified Khalid to use at least 50 aliases. They are Walid Muhammad Salih Ba Attas; Khalid Shaikh; Khalid Al-Shaikh; Mohammad Khaled; Khalid; Salim Ali; Ali Salem; Muhammed Khalid Al-Mana; M Almana; Ashraf Refaat Nabith Henin; Ashraf Refaat Nabih Henin; Nabih Hanin; Fahd Bin Abdallah Bin Khaled; Muhammad Muhannadi; Ashraf Ahmed; Ashraf; Ahmed Refaat; Khalid Abdul Wadood; Khalid the Kuwaiti; Babu Hamza; Mukhtar; Al-Mukh;



Muhammad Ali Al Balushi; Mukhtar Al-Baluchi; Abdul Rahman Abdullah Al-Ghamdi; Khalid Mohammad Mohammad; Khalid Shaikh Mohammad; Khalid Mohammad; Khalid Al-Shiekh; Khalid Abdul Wadood; and Khalid Saeed Muhammad. Although Khalid appears older, Khalid frequently uses two birthdays - April 14, 1965 and March 1, 1964. In addition to using forged and adapted passports, Khalid uses several fraudulently obtained passports - African (Sudanese), Middle Eastern (Saudi) and Asian (Pakistani). For instance, his Saudi Arabian passport is no C174152 with expiration date April 23, 2005 lists his date and place of birth as September 24, 1968 and Saudi Arabia respectively. Similarly, he received Pakistani passport numbers 488555, issued at the Pakistani Embassy in Kuwait and 113107, issued at the Pakistani Embassy in Abu Dhabi on July 21, 1994, the latter with an expiration date of September 18, 1997. In 1995, the FBI retrieved a photograph of Khalid from Yousef's Toshiba laptop, the first indication that he was an important terrorist. Even before the FBI and the CIA knew the link between Khalid and bin Laden or Khalid and Al Qaeda, Khalid has been a wanted terrorist. Nonetheless, by using multiple identities, Khalid has evaded law enforcement authorities worldwide and operated on every continent including in Latin America. For instance, operating under the Egyptian name Ashraf Refaat Nabih Henin, Khalid obtained a Brazilian visa no 194-95 (C0077250) issued in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

From the very inception, Khalid adhered to the strictest principles of security. He operated clandestinely even as far as other Al Qaeda leaders and members were concerned. When the detonator of the bomb meant for assassinating Bhutto accidentally blew up in his face, Yousef was rushed to the Agha Khan Hospital for treatment of his hands and an eye. His accomplice Abdul Shakur, a Baluchi Al Qaeda member met Khalid who visited Yousef at the hospital. Although Shakur had visited Bait-ul-Ansar and trained at Al Farook and other Al Qaeda camps and even participated in sensitive operations, Khalid identified himself as a trader in holy water from Medina. Khalid deceived him by convincing him that he was living in Madeena Munawara and engaged in import-export business. Khalid also convinced him that he "imported containers of Abe Zam from Saudi Arabia for sale to Karachi through a company called Al-Majid Importers and Exporters." Operating strictly on a need-to-know basis, Khalid breaks routine, varies time, changes plans regularly, and trusts no one with his personal, and whenever possible with organizational security. Instead of communicating over the phone or email, Khalid dispatch couriers and operatives with guidelines and instructions. For instance, immediately before 9-11, Khalid dispatched Mohommad Mansour Jabarah alias Sammy, a 21-year old Canadian from St. Catharines, Ontario, and a suicide bomber Ahmed Sahage to join with Hambali and plan attacks in Southeast Asia, beginning with the Philippines. Although he remained in touch with his field organizers and operatives, quite early on in his profession, Khalid mastered the art of protecting himself by positioning "cut-outs" between front-end organizers and operatives. For instance, even the Al Qaeda member Abdul Shakur tasked to assassinate Bhutto knew Khalid as Munir Ibrahim Ahmad operating as Abdul Majid Madni. Khalid had several layers of protection - even if one was breached, there was another, and behind that a third. As an extremely cautious and a security conscious terrorist, Khalid could afford to operate not far away from the center of action but at the same time remain untouched. The security measures taken by Khalid that prevented several governments investigating terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s from identifying bin Laden as the financier and himself as the organizer. Although the Philippine authorities recovered components of a high powered rifle and laser scopes, Khalid respected for his marksmanship was not aggressively hunted. Similarly, the confession of Al Qaeda's first pilot Abdul Hakim Murad first in the Philippines and then in the US was not taken seriously. In addition to working with



Yousef to "plan the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993," co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad said that Khalid "supervised the plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II with a pipe bomb during a visit to the Philippines" and was "involved in the 1995 plot to blow up 11 US-bound airliners" over the Pacific.

Despite launching the largest ever investigation following 9-11, the counter measures enacted by Khalid took the US and other governments eight months to identify Khalid as the key planner of Holy Tuesday. The US government identified Khalid as the mastermind of 9-11 only in June 2002 after Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda's head of foreign operations was arrested after a gunfight in Pakistan in March 2002. Although Abu Zubaidah identified Khalid as the mastermind of 9-11, the US intelligence community did not believe him. For three months, FBI and CIA operatives corroborated Abu Zubaidah's revelations that it was Khalid who masterminded 9-11 and not himself. Holy Tuesday was so well compartmentalized that the US authorities came to know of the details of 9-11 only after the arrest of Al Shihb, exactly one year after the event. The revelations of Al Shihb after his arrested in Karachi immediately before 9.00 a.m. on September 11, 2002, enabled the US government to conclusively identify Khalid as the mastermind of 9-11. Considering his past, Khalid has been fortunate to evade capture. For conspiring to hijack and bomb several transatlantic flights heading for the US in January 1995, US federal prosecutors in New York indicted Khalid in January 1996. Although the FBI offered US \$ 2 million for information leading to his capture, there was little effort to specifically target him until October 2001. In December 2001, FBI placed him on the list of the 22 most-wanted terrorists and offered US\$ 25 million, the same reward offered for information leading to the capture of bin Laden.

Khalid's ability to operate in the Asian, Middle Eastern and in the Western worlds accorded him significant protection. Although of Asian origin, he grew up in the Middle East, and studied in the US. As such, unlike most Al Qaeda members, Khalid could organize and operate in a number of environments with equal ease. He communicates in perfect Urdu, Arabic, and English. In appearance, he could pass off as an Asian or as an Arab or even an American Muslim. He operates with non-Arabs such as Hambali (the senior most non Arab in Al Qaeda), but because Al Qaeda was largely Arab he operated primarily through the Arab rank and file. His companions, whether it was in Chechnya, Georgia, UAE, Qatar, Germany, Malaysia, Indonesia or Pakistan, were mostly Arabs. For instance, when police raided two Al Qaeda safe houses used by Khalid in Gulshan-e-Iqbal neighborhood in Karachi on September 11 and 12, 2002. All but ten arrested including the two killed, were Arabs. Although Khalid escaped operations in the Philippines, Qatar, Brazil and Pakistan, the closest a government came to arresting Khalid was in Karachi.

Khalid's origin remains in dispute. US government reports initially stated that Khalid's father was the first imam of al-Ahmadi mosque in Kuwait and was stripped of his citizenship after a dispute with a leading Kuwaiti family. Born as Khalid Al-Shaikh Muhammad Ali Dustin Al-Blushi in Kuwait on April 14, 1965, Khalid spent his early years in Fahaheel, south of the city. Being born in Kuwait does not automatically qualify someone as a citizen. After Khalid was identified as the mastermind of 9-11, the US intelligence community stated that he was a Kuwaiti national. After the European Union issued in December 2001 a terrorist list citing Khalid as a Kuwait, the Kuwaiti information ministry denied that neither Khalid nor his father were Kuwaitis. The Kuwait intelligence service checked all its records and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its missions overseas clarified to governments worldwide that the



"said person in question is not a Kuwaiti national and does not hold a Kuwaiti passport." Although born in Kuwait, he acquired Pakistani citizenship. After obtaining a Pakistani passport from the Pakistani Embassy in Kuwait on December 6, 1982, Khalid left Kuwait for the US. After studying at the Chowan College in northeastern North Carolina for one semester in 1984, he transferred to another US university in North Carolina where he obtained a degree in mechanical engineering. Thereafter, he moved to Pakistan and served as the secretary of Abdul-Rab Rasool Sayyaf, leader, Ittehad-e-Islami, one of seven large groups that fought against the Soviet troops and Najibullah in Afghanistan. Sayyaf was well disposed towards bin Laden and to Abdul Rajak Janjalani, the founder leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group, who may have named the Moro group in his honour. As there were many Arabs in the ranks of Ittehad-e-Islami, Khalid established a wide network during the second half of the 1980s. In 1991, Khalid followed bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohommad Jamal Khalifa to the Philippines, strengthened cooperation with the Moro groups, founded a base of operations, and established a leadership base in Malaysia. On his return to Pakistan, he engaged in anti-Shai operations in Pakistan, including the assassination of prominent Shia leaders and bombing Shia shrines, and trying to liquidate Bhutto, a pro-West woman leader. He also expanded his network also recruiting and enlisting many from Kuwait. From Fahaheel, where a significant percentage of Palestinians lived, many Arabs and Pakistanis joined, supported or sympathized with Al Qaeda. Among them were Yousef; Abdul Shakur, the attempted assassin of Benazir Bhutto; Wadi Al Hage, secretary to bin Laden; and Abdul Hakim Murad, the first Al Qaeda pilot, and his associate Nasir Mubarak, also a pilot who trained at the same US flight school. Once again, this demonstrated that Al Qaeda recruited from familial and social networks.

On his second visit, Khalid lived in the Philippines from August 1994 to September 1996. Until the Yousef's cell was exposed, Khalid lived mostly on the top floor of Manila's Dona Josefa Apartment where Yousef experimented with explosives to destroy US airliners. The apartment was Al Qaeda's operational center until a fire erupted. In fact, Khalid had arrived in Yousef's apartment just as the apartment caught fire, but managed to escape. After the detection of the Yousef cell in Manila, Yousef fled to Pakistan where he was arrested. Khalid who knew Yousef since childhood, was affected by his arrest in Pakistan but Khalid remained in the Philippines. Due to the security measures he adopted, Khalid was confident that he would not be arrested. He was observed visiting the VIP Restaurant in the Harrison Plaza Complex in Manila. Khalid was frequently "seen hanging around the restaurant almost everyday at around 1000-1100 p.m. An Arab national, Anton Hannania, usually accompanied Khalid. After Yousef fled Manila, the FBI mounted an operation together with their Philippine counterparts to arrest Khalid at the Bandido (Bandit), a restaurant in Manila, he frequently visited in early 1996. The operation went wrong due to the increased visibility of FBI and other agents. Khalid immediately left Manila for Doha, Qatar. In Qatar, he lived at the estate of Abdullah bin Khalid and worked at the Public Works Ministry. Abdullah bin Khalid was among the influential Islamists who supported Al Qaeda and received bin Laden twice in the mid 1990s. When the FBI and CIA tracked Khalid to an apartment in Doha, and was about to arrest him, the US government believes that a senior Qatari official tipped him. Although the Qatar government was willing to hand him over to the US, the process of getting permission to arrest him took time. Together with an associate, Khalid fled Qatar using forged passports. In the fall of 1996, Khalid surfaced in Brazil. The CIA arranged through its liaison with Brazil's security service to arrest him but he slipped away. Khalid reappeared in the Middle East and Europe in 1997 and 1998, building a network for the purpose of attacking US targets.



Al Qaeda's watershed operation to destroy America's most outstanding landmarks took two and a half years of thinking, planning and preparation. It began with a visit by Khalid to Hamburg in early 1999. Khalid met with Ramzi bin Al Shibh and Mohommad Atta alias Mohamed El-Emir, the nucleus of the Al Qaeda cell in Hamburg. Atta who studied English at the American University in Cairo had moved to study city planning at the technical university in Hamburg in 1992. Without the prospect of finding a job, Atta became increasingly frustrated and religious when Al Qaeda recruited him and his roommate Al Shibh at the Al Quds mosque in Hamburg. The turning point of the Hamburg cell from an Islamist cell to a terrorist cell was in November 1998 when Atta, Al Shibh and Said Bahaji moved into the Marienstrasse apartment. In mid 1999, Khalid dispatched four reconnaissance units to America in pairs or singles over the space of five to six months to mount surveillance on the intended targets. Due to navigation reasons, White House that was on the list was taken off and replaced with the US Capitol. Al Qaeda 'Holy Tuesday' operation was originally called the Manhattan and Washington Raids. Al Qaeda used the Arabic word, ghazwah, which refers to a raid against enemies of the Prophet. Al Qaeda leader bin Laden's intention was to force the US to withdraw from Saudi Arabia and disengage itself from the Middle East, the intention of the 9-11 operational team was to inflict maximum social and economic damage as well as to humiliate the US. Khalid selected the team cautiously and over a period of time. At least some of the hijackers dreamt of crashing flying objects to targets even before they were recruited.

In the autumn of 1999, Atta - who hated high-rise buildings - traveled to Kandahar and met with Khalid at Al-Ghumad House in Afghanistan. The house, where they planned Holy Tuesday, was named after the Saudi Al Ghamdi clan - four of whose young members would be the musclemen in the hijackings. The Holy Tuesday operational team, chaired by Khalid, configured into a consultative council. In addition to the pilots Mohommad Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, Hani Hanjor, and Ziad Jarrah, the council consisted of Khalid al-Mihdar, Atta's deputy, Nawaf Al-Hazemi, Said Bahaji, and Ramzi bin Al Shibh, all of who left Hamburg in late 1999 or early 2000 and trained in Afghanistan. If Atta was arrested or killed, Al Hazemi was designated to lead the operation. As their passports had Pakistani visas and to prevent them from being subjected to suspicion when they applied for their US visas, immediately after Atta, Al Shehhi and Jarrah returned to Germany they reported that their passports were stolen. As Al Qaeda believed that it would be a risk for the members of the operational team to return to Afghanistan, they decided to hold the first planning meeting in Malaysia in January 2000. Twelve Al Qaeda members arrived in Malaysia in January 2000, the CIA identified Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf Al Hazemi. Except Hani Hanjor who was living in the US prior to launching the operation, Al Mihdar and Al Hazemi were the first 9-11 operatives to enter the US from Bangkok on January 15, 2000. Al-Midhar obtained a multiple entry visa to the to enter the US, yet the CIA failed that he be placed on a State Department Watch List to prevent him from coming to the country. Both Al-Midhar and Al Hamzi were not placed on US Watch Lists until August 23, 2001. Both Al Mihdar and Al Hazemi traveled to Thailand with the assistance of Hambali, who organized the Malaysia meeting. Both Tawfiq Al Attash alias Khallad from Yemen, Chief Planner of the USS Cole bombing and Hambali paid the hijackers. For the 9-11 operation, Khalid too applied for a visa to enter the US but his request was turned down. It demonstrated Khalid's fearlessness to enter the very heartland of his enemy in order to strike and destroy its most outstanding landmarks. When Atta arrived in New York in June 2000, he carried with him a report of potential targets made by Al Qaeda reconnaissance teams in mid 1999. Atta and Al Shehhi chose Huffman Aviation in Venice,



Florida to learn to fly in the summer of 2000 because it was warm and cheap. As it was risky for all the Al Qaeda members to train in one flying school, Jarrah enrolled in the nearby Florida flight Training Center, also in Venice. Hanjour, already living in the US and a trained pilot, underwent further training in Arizona. Despite being hunted by the US intelligence community for his role in the USS Cole bombing, Al-Shibh applied on four occasions for a US visa to enter the US. Al-Shibh the fourth of six brothers from Yemen and brought up by his mother after his father died 14 years ago wanted to be one of the suicide pilots. Al Shibh met his replacement Moussaoui in the UK in December 2000. Moussaoui entered Kuala Lumpur with the intention of learning to fly but was unhappy with the quality of training at the flight school in Malaysia and decided to train in the US.

Atta, his deputy Hazemi and other pilots studied security arrangements at airports and aircraft. The hijackers determined the best time to attack the cockpit was during 15 minutes after takeoff. After the operation Al Shibh told Yosri Fouda, an Al Jazeera journalist : "The group storming the cockpit is formed of two persons. It would be the nearest group to the cockpit. in order to seize the opportunity when the door is opened...and enter into the cockpit swiftly, take it over and slaughter those inside. And then the brother pilot comes very quickly....to guide the aircraft." Five months before 9-11, Khalid chose a dozen Saudis from the martyrs department of Al Qaeda as musclemen. For martyrdom operations, there was an excess of volunteers in Afghanistan. After they were handpicked and trained in the Spring of 2001, Al Qaeda recorded their last will. Although they knew that they were going to die, they did not know how, when and where until the last moment. They entered the US by July 2001 demonstrating Al Qaeda's capability to infiltrate operatives into the US without much difficulty. >From an agent in Afghanistan Egyptian intelligence knew in July that 20 Al Qaeda members - four of them Cessna trained - had entered the US. Although the Egyptian service informed the CIA, there was no response.

In mid July 2001, Atta flew to Madrid and drove 500 miles to Cambrils, the Spanish coastal holiday resort near Tarragona. At the second planning meeting, Al Shibh and other Al Qaeda leaders met Atta. In keeping with Khalid's wish of giving operational leverage to Atta, the field operational commander decided on the choice and timing of the operation. Atta brought for Al Shibh relevant books and documents about the US that would strengthen Al Qaeda's knowledge to conduct future airborne suicide operations inside the US. Al Shibh brought with him a thick "how-to-fly" textbook, an air navigation map of the American eastern seaboard, how-to-speak English books, floppy disks, flight simulator CD-Roms, and other paraphernalia given to him by Atta. One of the books had the hand writing of Atta next to "how to perform sudden maneuvers." Atta also brought the annual flight schedules for airlines and other information that enabled Al Qaeda operational leadership that met in Europe to meticulously plan the hijacking of the airliners. This was necessary because Al Qaeda code forbid Atta from discussing the overall plan with any one of the 19 hijackers. In preparation for the assault, the final reconnaissance of targets was conducted from ground and from the air. By air, the Al Qaeda pilots traveled as passengers or rented planes and flew over the intended at close range but without evoking suspicion. The spirit of Al Qaeda's suicide hijackers in the US was high. It is reflected when Al Shibh recalls the last instructions to the 19: "You are going into battle, an unconventional battle against the most powerful force on earth. You are facing them on their land among their forces and soldiers with a small group of 19." The spirit of the hijackers was reinforced by multiple techniques. They were even named and referred to after Islamic heroes: Ziad Jarrah as Abu Tareq alias Tareq bin Ziad, the



conqueror of Andalusia (Spain), Marwan al Shehhi as Abul Qaqa alias Abu Qaqa, the conqueror of the Persians, and Khalid al Mihdar, as Sinan, a reference to the great Islamic architect of Istanbul. Similarly, they received "Instructions and Prayers" manual that kept them on course. Written during the "last hours of his life," Abdul Aziz Al-Omari, a hijacker provided spiritual comfort and guidance to the hijackers as they approached the climax of their mission: "Force yourself to forget that thing which is called world,"..."the time for amusement is gone and the time of truth is upon us ... If God grants any one of you a slaughter, you should perform it as an offering on behalf of your father and mother, for they are owed by you. Do not disagree among yourselves, but listen and obey."

Throughout the operation, Al Qaeda remained undetected in the US by adhering to the strictest principles of security. When Atta in the US and Al Shibh in Germany communicated by email in German through the Internet chat rooms in July and August 2001, Atta pretended he was a young man in America talking to Jenny, his girlfriend in Germany. "The first semester starts in three weeks...Nothing has changed. Everything is fine. There are good signs and encouraging ideas. Two high schools and two universities. Everything is going according to plan. This summer will surely be hot. I would like to talk to you about a few details. Nineteen certificates [reference to the 19 hijackers] for private study and four exams [reference to the four missions]. Regards to the professor. Goodbye." In keeping with his operating procedure, Khalid, perhaps the professor, communicated with Al Shibh and not with Atta until the last moment. Atef's last phone call to Khalid on September 10, 2001, was monitored by the US National Security Agency but it was translated from Arabic to English only after the attacks. In code, Khalid approved the operation for the four teams to strike. Similarly, three hours before Nizar Naouar, the Al Qaeda suicide bomber who targeted German tourists visiting the Jewish synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, on April 11, 2002, placed three calls of which one was to Khalid.

Khalid ordered key Al Qaeda operatives to withdraw from Europe and North America immediately prior to 9-11. For instance, Al Shibh dispatched his flat mate Said Bahaji, a German Moroccan, to Karachi, Pakistan. While some operatives have been identified by government intelligence agencies others have not. It is likely that Al Qaeda may task these operatives to return to the West using false, forged and adapted identification to plan, prepare and execute operations. After gathering his belonging, bin Al Shibh cleared the Marienstrasse apartment clean before arriving in Pakistan to inform Bin Laden. Through a messenger, Bin Laden only knew of the date of Al Qaeda's watershed operation on September 6.

Khalid's capacity to conceptualize, plan and operationalise low cost high impact operations has been constantly underestimated by the international security and intelligence community. As Khalid makes things happen, more than bin Laden, increasingly intelligence analysts are of the opinion that targeting Khalid should be a priority. If he survives the current hunt, Al Qaeda will certainly strike again. Each day he is free, the likelihood of another high impact terrorist attack especially a mass casualty attack increases. Unlike his contemporaries, restrained by their political controllers and paymasters, Khalid has always been determined to kill more, inflict maximum damage, and employ creative means and new methods, such as unconventional weapons or passenger airliners. When Khalid met Fouda in June 2002, Khalid said that initially Al Qaeda "considered attacking US nuclear facilities but decided against it" due to the risk of failure. To quote Khalid, "We decided not to consider this for now." Considering Al Qaeda's intention, if Khalid survives, it is likely that the group will go down



this route. Khalid's mindset is reflected when he told Fouda that Al Qaeda "hope to accomplish a thousand more assaults similar to September 11" meaning that Al Qaeda has not given up the fight. As an individual terrorist, Khalid poses the single biggest threat to domestic, regional and international security.

THE ORDER OF BATTLE²	
<i>WORLD TRADE CENTER [FACULTY OF TOWN PLANNING] FLIGHT 011 (WORLD TRADE CENTER NORTH TOWER)</i>	
Mohammad Atta	Abu Abdul Rahman al Masri (pilot and operational commander)
Sattam al-Suqami	Azmi
Walid al Shehri	Abu Mus'ab
Wail al Shehri	Abu Salma
Abdul Aziz al Omari	Abul Abbas al Janoubi (author of the Raid Manual)
<i>FLIGHT UA 175 (WTC SOUTH TOWER)</i>	
Marwan al Shehhi	Abul Qaqa al Qatari (pilot)
Fayez Rashed Beni Hammad	Abu Ahmed al Emirati
Hamza al ghamdi	Julaibeeb al Ghamdi
Ahmed al Ghamdi	Ikrama al Ghamdi
Muhammad al Shehri	Omar al Azadi
<i>FLIGHT AA77 PENTAGON [FACULTY OF FINE ARTS]</i>	
Hani Hanjour	Orwa al Taefi (pilot)
Nawaf al Hazemi	Rabi'a al Makki (deputy operational commander)
Salem as Hazemi	Belal al Makki
Khalid al Mihdar	Sinan
Majed Moqed al Harbi	Al Ahnaf
<i>FLIGHT UA 93 DESIGNATED TARGET: CAPITOL HILL [FACULTY OF LAW] BUT CRASHES IN PENNSYLVANIA</i>	
Ziad Jarrah	Abu Tareq al Lebnani (pilot)
Said al Ghamdi	Mo'ataz al Ghamdi
Ahmed al Haznawi	Ibn al Jarrah al Ghamdi
Ahmed al Na'ami	Abu Hashem

² The names and Al Qaeda names of the 9-11 suicide hijackers, list of targets and their code names.

