



DEMOCRATIZATION AND TNI REFORM

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Abstract:

This article is written to answer four questions: what kind of civil-military relations is needed for democratization; how does military reform in Indonesia affect civil-military relations; does it have a positive impact toward democratization; and finally is the democratization process in Indonesia on the right track.

Keywords: Civil-military relations; Indonesia.

Resumen:

Este artículo pretende responder a cuatro preguntas: qué tipo de relaciones cívico-militares son necesarias para la democratización; cómo afecta la reforma militar en Indonesia a las relaciones cívico-militares; si tiene un impacto positivo en la democratización; y finalmente, si el proceso de democratización en Indonesia va por buen camino.

Palabras clave: relaciones cívico-militares; Indonesia.

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Introduction

At the inauguration of Marsekal Djoko Soeyanto as the TNI commander in Chief, President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono asserted that the military has to remain professional, should not involve itself in politics, and be consistent in following the path of military reform. The president's assertion brought a sense of relief that in the fourth administration since Soeharto stepped down from office, the movement toward democracy which obliged the military to reform themselves from past autocratic nature is still in the agenda of the new elected President.

This article is written to answer four questions: what kind of civil-military relations is needed for democratization; how does military reform in Indonesia affect civil-military relations; does it have a positive impact toward democratization; and finally is the democratization process in Indonesia on the right track. Because of limited space, this paper does not elaborate the matters in chronological order of administration, but rather it analyzes the matter using theoretical framework and parameters laid down in the second part of the paper. The theoretical discussion in part two reveals that for democratization to progress "Civilian Supremacy" and "Objective Civilian Control" has to exist in Indonesian civil-military relations. Using those theories, I would set an appropriate analytical ground to analyze what the nature of post Soeharto civil-military reform was and what type of improvement is needed for democratization in Indonesia to progress.

After describing the progress of reform in the third section of the paper, the fourth section of the paper outlines existing impediments analyzing the issue using Alagappa's and Huntington's framework, I would argue that Indonesia is on the right track in its democratization trajectory even though it has not reached the end state yet. Hence, military reform that has taken place has to some extent has been tilted in favour of civilian authority resulting in healthier conditions for the establishment of democracy. However, further investigation indicates that while there has been a positive progress, "civilian supremacy" and "objective civilian control" has not been fully attained.

The fact that the military not only shows a reluctance toward civilian authority measures, its effort to revive territorial command structure, and the difficulties witnessed in military business divestment, are some obstacles indicating that Indonesia's trajectory toward democracy has not reached maturity. Based on further investigation, I propose that to fully attain the desirable level of healthy civil-military relations, Indonesia needs to address those obstacles first.

1. Theoretical bases

To answer the question whether the current civil-military relations and military reform that took place in Indonesia after the 'Soeharto New Order era' have contributed positive progress toward democracy, it would be better to lay down several theoretical bases relevant to this issue.



1.1. Civil-Military Relations

A) The Scope of Civil-Military Relations

The first explanation on civil-military relations is derived from classical work from Huntington's 'The Soldier and The State'. He argued that

the military institution of any society is shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideology, and institutions dominant to the society. Military institution which reflects only social values incapable of performing effectively their military function, on the other hand, it is impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub of all problems of the civil- military relations.²

The second work presented by Muthiah Alagappa is also valuable. It provides for an emphasis on civil-military relations. Even though he argued that civil-military relations studies covers not only the relationship of the military to the state but also its relationship to political and civil societies³, in order to keep the study on civil-military relations in focus and manageable, Alagappa proposed to narrow the study not to include the civil society⁴. In general the "civil" component in civil-military relations normally refers to the state (minus the military), political society, and civil society. In this paper, I will not include the element of civil society; rather I will emphasize the non-military apparatus of the state, especially the political, administrative and juridical institutions⁵. The support for this argument was provided by Huntington who also emphasizes the *state* factor. He argues that

the principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the military to the state. Here the conflicts between functional and societal pressures come to a head. The state is the active directing element of society and responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including military security. The social and economic relations between the military and the rest of the society normally reflect the political relations between the military and the state.⁶

B) The Patterns of Civil-Military relations

The next step is to see different types or patterns of civil-military relations proposed by Janowitz, Huntington and Alagappa. Afterward, this section describes which pattern provides a theoretical example of a healthy civil-military relationship –supposedly as a prerequisite- for a democratic country.

² Huntington, Samuel P. (1967): *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 2

³ Alagappa, Muthiah (2001): *Coercion and Governance : The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, p. 4

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 4

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 4

⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and The State*, *op. cit.*, p. 3



Janowitz differentiates civil-military relations pattern into two distinct nations, old and new⁷. For him the old nations are represented by the industrialized states show three patterns of civil-military relations:

- The aristocratic model: In this model, there is a comprehensive hierarchy that delineates both the source of authority and the prestige of any member of the military elite. The low specialization of the military profession makes it possible for the political elite to supply the bulk of necessary leadership for the military establishment.
- The totalitarian model: Janowitz argues that state in this model is characterized by the political control of the military, a centralized and authoritarian one-party political system.
- The democratic model: The civilian and the military elites in this model are sharply differentiated. Civilian-political elites exercise control over the military through a formal set of rules that specify the functions of the military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its power.⁸

From the three models of civil-military relations, Janowitz then stated that the democratic model in which the ‘civil’ can exercise sufficient control over the military should be the political objective⁹ and serve as the healthy example of civil-military relations in a state.

In describing civil-military relations in developing nations he stated that there are five models: (1) the authoritarian personal control; (2) the authoritarian-mass party; (3) democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems, (4) civil-military coalition and (5) military oligarchy. In the case of Indonesia –since independence and the New Order era-, Janowitz categorized Indonesia as a civil-military coalition. In this model, the military expands its political activity and becomes a political bloc, the civilian leadership remains only in power because of the military’s active assistance¹⁰, and it serves as a bad example of civil military relation practice.

The next model of civil-military relations is the model proposed by Samuel Huntington. He argues that the-civil military relations should be projected into a form of civilian control over the military. He divided the civilian control into two categories: the Subjective Civilian Control and Objective Civilian Control¹¹. Subjective civilian control is achieved through maximizing civilian power, while minimizing military power by maximizing civilian groups influence in relation to the military. But, in this type of control, Huntington argued that the military will not serve its function as the “servant of the society” but rather to the interest of different civilian groups, which implied the possibility of an open conflict among them that at the end could bring the military into politics¹². According to Huntington the second model ‘Objective Civilian Control’ is much more favorable to be a healthy type of civil-military relations. Under this model the control is attained by maximizing military professionalism. Unlike the Subjective Civilian Control model, the Objective Civilian Control model implies that the professional military will serve as tool of the state. In essence, the Objective Control

⁷ Janowitz, Morris (1977): *Military Institutions and Coercion in the developing Nations*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, p. 78

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 79

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83

¹¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and The State*, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-83

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 81



model recognizes autonomous military professionalism, while the subjective denies an independent military sphere. Objective civilian control over the military is healthy for democracy because it shapes the military into a politically neutral institution¹³. Therefore accordingly; another important requirement of a healthy civil-military relation in a country is characterized by the existence of objective civilian control practices.

1.2. Civil-Military relation and Democratization

It is well-known that civil-military studies came to the 'spotlight' in relation to democratization for many observers because many of the countries that were having problems democratizing were seen to have 'a unhealthy' civil-military relationship. Yuddy Chrisnandi argues that the slow progress of democratization in Indonesia is caused by the excessive intervention of military in political life, thus implying bad civil-military relations¹⁴.

Hence, in order to address the challenge of democratization and its relation to Indonesia's civil-military relations, I lay out the concept in the next section.

A) The Phases of Democratization and Post Transition Challenges

Democratization can simply be defined as a process toward democracy, and most comparative theorists generally recognize three phases of democratization:

1. Transitions

Scholars refer to a transition as the interval between one political regime and another, or others suggest that a true transition begins with a breakdown of an authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of a democratic regime, characterized by free elections¹⁵.

2. Consolidation

Andreas Schedler suggests consolidation is institution building, in particular, the construction of all organization necessary to move a regime beyond mere elections toward liberal democracy. Hence, Linz and Stepan provide the definition of consolidation that probably has the widest acceptance. They suggest that a democracy is consolidated when it occurs as 'the only game in town'- meaning that a democratic regime is consolidated if no significant actors, national or international attempt to replace it, and if a substantial majority of public opinion believes that democracy is the best way to govern society and if governmental and nongovernmental forces agree to solve conflicts as outlined by the rules of democratic process¹⁶.

3. Established Democracy

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-84

¹⁴ Chrisnandi, Yuddy (2005): *Reformasi TNI: Perspektif Baru Hubungan Sipil-Militer Indonesia*, Indonesia, Penerbit Pustaka LP3ES, p. 136

¹⁵ Hood, Steven J. (2004): *Political Development and Democratic Theory*, Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe Ed, p. 25

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26



Normally scholars do not refer to conditions where democracy persists as being established, but rather as being advanced or mature democracies. Perhaps, established democracy can be characterized by the existence of a strong notion of rights, democratic virtues and confidence that democracy has an enduring quality not found in other regimes.¹⁷

Other scholars such as O' Donnell proposes to analyze democratization in terms of two transitions; the first being the transition from authoritarian rule to the inauguration of the democratic government and the second being the consolidation of the new democracy. Consequently, a transition results in the creation of a new democratic regime, whereas consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that regime.

One school of thought asserts that the crucial value of this moment –post transition- is that no one can guarantee that the process is irreversible. Even though the transition has succeeded in installing a new regime that does not necessarily imply that the situation could not deteriorate and break the consolidating process. That is why Caroline Boussard argued that the most important facet in democratic consolidation is a period to ensure the focus be placed on anti democratic institutions and non elected actors that can influence the political process negatively¹⁸. Accordingly, the most prominent institution that can negatively affect the consolidation is the military. This focus is important, because the existence of such anti democratic institutions can endanger the maturing process of political institutions that are needed in building a democratic state.

Similar to that, Huntington also implied *that post transition problem stemmed directly from the phenomenon of regime changes from authoritarianism to democracy*. The main issue and concern from studying many cases (for example in Latin America), is how to reduce or curb the military involvement in politics, establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations¹⁹, and put the military under 'Objective Civilian Control'.

Larry Diamond argues that, in order for democratization in the new transition states to succeed, civilian supremacy above military institutions is a necessity²⁰. Therefore by assessing the nature of the civil military relations – i.e. through military reform - in post Soeharto Indonesia, we can determine whether the democratization has been on the right track or not. Using theories cited above, I would argue that if civilian supremacy is on the rise and objective civilian control truly exists, then I could conclude that democratization in Indonesia is indeed on the right track.

1.3. Setting the Parameters for analysis

From the previous explanation, we can set at least two types of parameters to analyze Indonesian democratization by looking at the current state of civil-military relations in Indonesia, and to match those conditions with the prevailing theoretical bases.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26

¹⁸ Boussard, Caroline: *Crafting Democracy : Civil Society in Post Transition Honduras*, p. 53, available at http://www.lasociedadcivil.org/uploads/ciberteca/crafting_democracy_caroline_boussard_hon_copy.pdf

¹⁹ See Huntington, Samuel P. (1991): *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 208-210

²⁰ Diamond, Larry and Platner, Marc F.: *Hubungan Sipil Militer & Konsolidasi Demokrasi*, p. XXXIX



The first useful parameter is laid out by Samuel Huntington in his ‘objective civilian control’ model which consists of several characteristics:

1. High level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence;
2. The effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy;
3. The recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military;
4. As a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.²¹

Besides Huntington, Muthiah Alagappa also identifies a useful tool to analyze the existence of high civilian supremacy. If previously O’Donnell and Huntington argued that democratization requires some form of civilian supremacy to progress, Alagappa provides an appropriate description in order to assess whether there is a high or low level of civilian supremacy compared to the military institution. In order to identify the level of civilian supremacy, Alagappa suggests analyzing the scope and jurisdiction of the military involvement in five different areas: (1) the military’s political participation, (2) the institutional autonomy, (3) socioeconomic role, (4) security policy making, (5) involvement in illegal activities.

Alagappa further explains that ‘scope’ refers to the breadth of military participation in governance. Though important, scope alone is not sufficient to identify an expansion of military political role. For the latter to occur, scope must be accompanied with an increase of jurisdiction, which is the authority to make and implement policy. If the military itself decided on these roles or coerced the government into authorizing them, one might argue a case of role expansion and an increase in military influence.²² The important notion in this second parameter is that the combination of scope and jurisdiction will show the level of civilian supremacy over the military. If the scope and jurisdiction of the military is high then civilian supremacy is low and implies an unsuitable condition for democratization, and vice versa.

2. Post-Soeharto Civil-Military Relations

2.1. Indonesia Military’s Undemocratic Practices and the Need for Reform

Analyzing Alagappa’s five parameters -the Military Political Participation, the Institutional Autonomy, Socioeconomic Role, Security Policy Making, Involvement in Illegal Activities - it was obvious that the overwhelming role of the Indonesian military under the New Order exhibited a high involvement in politics, placed the civilian supremacy at the lowest level and implied a unhealthy civil-military relations uncondusive for democratization. Using the Dual

²¹ Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): “Reforming Civil Military Relations”, in *Civil Military Relations and Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F.Platter, London, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-4

²² Alagappa, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-38



Function doctrine that legitimizes the military to perform defense and social political activities without constraints, the military was used by Soeharto as a perfect tool to his regime and to strengthen GOLKAR²³ as his political ‘vehicle’, as well as using the military as a repressive tool to diminish all possible competitors. Systematically Soeharto was able to militarize the social and political aspects of society, and made the military a foundation for his administration.

The control of socio-political aspects was so blatant and excessive that some analysts consider the New Order a military regime. The excessive military’s role in socio-political realm can be observed by looking at several facts: in the first decade of Soeharto’s administration, 70% of cabinet members had military background; the appointed parliament members from the military amounted to of 20 % of 1000 members; until 1999 out of 27 provinces, 15 governors²⁴ had a military background; and large amount of military deployment in civilian departments rationalized through the ‘Kekaryaan’²⁵ doctrine.²⁶ Along with their involvement in politics, the Indonesian military is also known for its involvement in business practices.

AbdurRahim Ghazali argues that there are three reasons why military reform in Indonesia is urgent for the sake of Democratization:

1. The socio-political role of the military has overwhelmed all non military realms, stifling the aspirations of the people.
2. The military intervention in law enforcement activities –i.e. the police and judicial institutions- had engendered a sense of distrust of the people for law enforcement institutions, and in many cases initiated protracted conflicts and human right violations (i.e. the murder of Labor activist Marsinah,etc).
3. The military involvement in business institutions had nourished corruption practices and in some cases inflicted financial losses for the government²⁷.

The resignation of Soeharto on 21 May 1998 changed the whole situation; the usual ‘untouchable’ position of the military could no longer be sustained. After the reformation movement, the military was put under the spotlight, pummeled with harsh criticism for past abuses and blamed by many as responsible for the slow democratization process in Indonesia. The military had no option but to launch series measures to reform their institution.

2.2. Post Soeharto Military Reform Development

An agenda pushed by pro democracy forces was to diminish as soon as possible the capacity of the military for overwhelming intervention in social and political life; return them back to the barracks; and build a more professional military.

²³ GOLKAR or Golongan Karya is a political party found by Soeharto to support his regime. Hand in hand with the military, GOLKAR proved to be an effective way to maintain the New Order regime

²⁴ Sukardi, Rinakit (2005): *The Indonesian Military after The New Order*, Singapore, Nias Press, ISEAS, p. 151

²⁵ Kekaryaan doctrine is a doctrine that allows the deployment of active military officers in civilian department

²⁶ See Rabasa, Angel and Haseman, John (2002): *The Changing Political Role of The Military*, Santa Monica, RAND, p. 4

²⁷ Ghazali Abdurrahim: “Reformasi Hubungan Sipil Militer sebagai Prasyarat Demokratisasi”, *Kompas*, 16 Agustus 2002



Alagappa provides a useful tool to analyze whether the demand for military reform has created a suitable condition for democratization, by analyzing the issue of civilian supremacy and the rate of military intervention.

A) Military Political Participation

Alagappa proposed three arenas to be carefully looked at: increase or decrease in the military's political salience; changes in the extent and means of military political participation in politics; and changes in military's self conception²⁸.

The doctrinal reform, moving toward the New Paradigm

The first and foremost demand of '*reformasi*' in order to ensure the distance of the military from politics was by reforming doctrines used to legitimize their role in politics, namely the Dual Function. Dual Function doctrine stated that all military personnel had two obligations, which is as a defense-security entity as well as socio-political entity.²⁹ This doctrine was used by the TNI as a tool to legitimize their involvement and heavy penetration in civilian affairs, including civilian bureaucracy and political parties.

In order to meet the *reformasi* demands, the ABRI Commander In Chief, General Wiranto announced the implementation of ABRI's New Paradigm in social and political role on 5 October 1998, which consisted mainly four points.

- Changing the method so as not to be in the forefront. This meant that the pioneering and modeling roles of the military in society, nation and state life, which were dominant in the past and objectively needed at that time, were now given to the civilian institutions.
- Changing the concept from its role of control to influence. This meant the socio-political role of the military, as part of its total role, was no longer to appoint the military personnel to civilian posts but rather to contribute to constructive thinking.
- Changing the method from direct to indirect influence. Since the socio-political role of the military in the past had led to its involvement in day-to day politics, the principle of indirect influence meant the military was to be stripped of its socio-political role in day-to day politics.
- Role sharing with the other components of the nation. This meant that the socio-political role of the military should be integrated with the roles of all other parties in the integrated national system".³⁰

Looking at the paradigm shift, although the military was willing to shift from the old way of intervening political affairs, the New Paradigm did not completely abolish the military role

²⁸ Alagappa, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35

²⁹ Dwifungsi Soebijono (1992): *ABRI : Perkembangan dan Perannya dalam Kehidupan Politik Indonesia*, Yogyakarta, Gajah Mada University Press, p. 56

³⁰ Sukardi Rinakit, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106



in social and political life. Rather the New Paradigm tried to re-position the military's standpoint by adapting to the new political environment.

KONTRAS, as the leading NGO criticizing the development of Indonesian military reform stated that at least there are several points that indicate a half hearted paradigm shift in this New Paradigm³¹.

Firstly, there are no clear statements to abolish completely the Dual Function; rather the New Paradigm still included the socio-political role of the military. KONTRAS argued that the second and fourth points in the New Paradigm are indicators that the military was still unwilling to retreat completely from politics.

Secondly, regarding role sharing the military clearly did not admit –or at least- realize that the military past role in political affairs was destructive and endangering Indonesia democratization. Furthermore the New Paradigm did not lay out the concept of civilian supremacy above the military institution.

The doctrine of dual function obviously still influenced the conception of the new paradigm previously declared on 5 October 1998. That is the reason why the wording of the statement seemed more like a redefinition of the TNI's socio-political role. However with the issuance of the TAP MPR (House of Assembly Act) number VI in the year 2000, the social and political role was completely eliminated and the Dual Function role was no longer relevant; the military had to focus their function as the nation tool for defense.³²

Other evidence of the growing confidence of civilians in their relationship with the military is the abolition of 'Kekaryaan' doctrine during the Abdurrahman Wahid administration. Historically, Soeharto issued Presidential Decision Number 79/1969 as a legal basis of 'Kekaryaan' which legitimized the appointment of military officers in civilian positions. President Wahid then liquidated the 'Kekaryaan' programme along with the body that supported it, the BABINKAR (Badan Pembinaan Kekaryaan). Two set of proposals, followed the abolition: those who wished to stay in civilian posts had to retire from the military while those who wishing to stay in the military would be deployed in TNI headquarters (MABES TNI).

Incremental Step toward Complete Eradication of Military's Social Political Role

Subsequently, after abolishing Dual Function doctrine, the military had to introduce several measures to demonstrate to society its complete withdrawal from its socio-political role and commitment to stay professional. I will argue with descriptions below that the socio-political role of the military had to be curtailed incrementally since the end of the New Order in order that civilians could exercise control over military.

³¹ KONTRAS (2003): *Politik Militer dalam Transisi Demokrasi Indonesia*, Jakarta, Kontras, pp. 25-28

³² Peran TNI Abad XXI, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, p. 6



The Continual Retreat from Parliament

The most prominent evidence of the military intervention in political matters was their presence in parliament although they did not have to compete in elections. Until the mid 1990's, the military held 100 free seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). After the fall of Soeharto, the military and police representation was reduced from 75 to 38 seats and was scheduled to be phased out from the DPR in 2004 and MPR (House of Assembly) in 2009.³³ Fortunately, in 2002 House of Assembly (MPR) annual meeting, the Commander in Chief (Gen. Endiartono Sutarto) decided that the military should get out from the parliament sooner, in year 2004³⁴.

Therefore after the 2004 general election, there were no representatives of military institution in both MPR and DPR. The phenomena of early military withdrawal from the parliament could be interpreted that the military needed to perform its commitment for reformation clearly before a watching public. Moreover, the withdrawal also sent a signal that to a certain extent the military had to comply with civilian demands.

The Announcement of Neutrality in Political Arena

In New Order era, the military institution was pressured by the regime to mobilize and sustain political support for Golkar Party as the incumbent political vehicle to stay in power. The 'spirit' of reformation pressed military to demonstrate its neutrality toward all political parties, including its 'old partner' GOLKAR.

To show its commitment, military leaders publicly announced institutional neutrality in political activities, especially in elections. In his address at the Commemoration of the birth of the TNI on 5 October 2003, General Endriartono Sutarto stated that it is illegal to use any TNI personnel or institution to support any political party. Further more he emphasized the TNI commitment not to use its rights to vote or be voted into office and to remain neutral in the 2004 election.³⁵

Not only did the military deliver its commitment to neutrality publicly, but its leader also demonstrated practical evidence in keeping a distance from real practical politics. Gen. Wiranto for instance, refused Habibie's proposal to become the candidate for Vice President in the 1999 election. This tradition was repeated again in the pretext of 2004 election when TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto rejected many invitations to be vice president candidate.

B) Institutional Autonomy

Utilizing the term institutional autonomy, one should analyze civilian control over the military's organization and management³⁶. It implies that "civilian supremacy" requires civilians to have sufficient and proportional jurisdiction in managing internal military

³³ Rabasa, Angel and Haseman, John; *op. cit.*, p. 47

³⁴ "Ketika Jendral Bilang Golput", *Suara Merdeka*, 2 September 2002

³⁵ "Purnawirawan Jangan Gunakan TNI sebagai Sarana Cari Dukungan", *Kompas*, 2 October 2003

³⁶ Alagappa, *op. cit.*, p. 35



organizations. It means that civilian authority over promotions of senior officers; defense budgetary control; position for defense minister; involvement in defense policy; was no longer 'taboo' subject.

The Internal Reform of the Military

Sukardi Rinakit describes that the TNI internal reform program can be categorized into several steps³⁷:

1. Separation of the police (POLRI) from the military body
2. Abolition of the Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (WANSOSPOLPUS) and the Regional Council for Socio Political Affairs (WANSOSPOLDA).
3. Changing of the socio-political staff of ABRI into the territorial staff of the TNI
4. The abolition of the military assignment in civilian posts through retirement and change of status
5. The organizational severance from GOLKAR and establishing a proper distance from other parties

Total Re-organization?

The military's internal re-organization is significant because the New Order regime had manipulated the military to serve its purposes. Therefore, the organization's capacities that served autocratic purposes had to be removed in order to ensure that military institutions will no longer have the capability to disrupt free and fair political processes needed to allow democratic consolidation to progress. The internal re-organization measures launched in the reform era by the government was directed to achieve such ends.

The military ability to manipulate socio-political life was weakened by eradicating WANSOSPOLPUS and its socio political staff. The military co-optation of civilian bureaucracy was reduced through the eradicating of military assignments to civilian posts. The neutrality from GOLKAR ensured the disconnection of military support for any specific political party. Lastly, the separation of the police force from the military necessitated the military to focus on its national defense role. Thus, military's internal re-organization program was a significant process in demonstrating both the increasing civilian authority over the military and the abolition of suppressive instruments.

Exercise Civilian Authority over Traditional Military Postings

Other important evidence recognizing the rise in civilian supremacy is through growing civilian authority in a field that was previously dominated by the military. By looking at the government policies – reviving civilian position in public administration; reducing the Army

³⁷ Sukardi, *op. cit.*, pp.108-109



dominance; appointing a civilian as a Defense Minister and liquidating military government agencies - I would conclude that there was an incremental progress toward increasing civilian authority.

The Civilianization of the Public Administration

In years past, active-duty military officers served routinely as cabinet ministers, director-generals within government departments, provincial governors, mayors, and many other positions. Now, political reform has civilianized the bureaucracy. Individuals with military backgrounds are allowed to continue to serve in the Indonesian cabinet and other civilian government positions, but active duty officers are now required to retire before they were allowed to serve in those positions. And importantly, active military officers were no longer appointed to those positions by the government, but rather the position was opened for democratic competition by means of election.

The Tradition of a Civilian as Minister of Defense

For the first time, after more than 40 years, the successive *reformasi* administrations appointed Mafud MD, Matori Abdul Djalil and Juwono Sudarsono, individuals with no military background as Defense Minister. Many people saw this as a step to further decrease the political role of the military as well as to spread a more 'civilian' outlook in the military dominated Department of Defense. Wahid himself, on one occasion stated that he hoped the appointment of a civilian Defense Minister would further strengthen civilian consolidation in the ongoing democratic transition³⁸. This tradition is also followed by his successor Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The Appointment of Non Army High Official in Strategic Positions

The other breakthrough pioneered by Wahid's administration was his appointment of Admiral Widodo AS as the TNI Commander in Chief. Again, in Indonesian history it was the first time for the Armed Forces to have a Commander in Chief who was not from the Army. More over, it was not the only position given to non Army officers. Other positions like the chief of BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis/ Strategic Intelligence Body) and chief of TNI Information Center (KAPUSPEN) were also given to officers from the Air Force. This policy was also followed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who appointed Air Force officer Marsekal Djoko Soeyanto as the TNI Commander In-Chief.³⁹ This progressive step was praised by many Indonesian analysts because it broke the long period of Army dominance, broadened the reform nuance in the TNI, and allowed for proportional power division among various military forces.

³⁸ Muradi (2005): *Kegamangan Politik TNI pada Masa Transisi*, Bandung, UNPAD Press, p.120.

³⁹ "Presiden Lantik Panglima TNI dan KASAU", *Media Indonesia*, 13 February 2006.



Liquidate the Military Government Agency

Bakorstanas (Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability) and Litsus (Special Research Institute) were well-known institutions used by the military in the New Order to stifle and deter political opposition.

Bakorstanas in the first place was an agency established by the government to coordinate efforts from departments and institutions in tackling any disturbance, challenges and threats to national stability. In the long run, Bakorstanas was taken over by military officers to launch repressive measures against any opposing opinions.

Litsus was an agency developed to detect and ‘cleanse’ any activities related to communism or to the remnant of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). This body was known for its indiscriminate actions against those allegedly involved with forbidden organizations, and in several cases this agency was used to hamper any political actors by accusing them of being sympathetic to communism.

Thus, President Wahid’s decision to eliminate both agencies was fruitful to encourage more political participation and contributes positively to allow for free competition essential to consolidating the democratic transition.

C) Socio Economic Role and Illegal Activities

Controlling Military Businesses

There are several reasons why controlling military business is important for the notion of civilian supremacy in ensuring democratic consolidation:

1. One of the main reasons is when the military finances their activity outside the legal national budget; civilian authority will lose a legitimate method of controlling the military. Although the parliament has a right to control, monitor, and decide the amount of budget for the military, its authority is limited only to the official state budget. Problems can occur when the military start using financial sources outside the state budget to fund its activities. If the DPR (Indonesian Parliament) could not control and monitor “income” from external or off-budget financial sources, the military has an opportunity to act independently of parliament control, and by that extension, independent of civilian control.
2. The second reason is that, unmonitored business activities will encourage corrupt practices. The nature of secrecy evident military institutions makes it logical to conclude that the military will run their businesses in the same manner – meaning business operations compromised by the lack of transparency and possibly prone to corruption. One example of such practices was the misuse of approximately Rp.173 billion (US\$17.3 million) discovered by Major General Wirahadikusumah at a KOSTRAD linked foundation.



Indonesian Corruption Watch, one of the leading NGOs in fight against corruption practices, identifies three types of military businesses⁴⁰.

1. Formal Business. This includes business activities involving military as an institution.
2. Informal Business. This includes business activities that do not include military as an institution but only individuals from the military both active and retired.
3. Criminal Economy. Business activities that usually manifest itself in the form of illegal protection services or through illegal activities such as illegal logging or gambling.

Those practices in reality are very hard to control. Moreover, the fact that state budget can only cover one third of military operational requirements, is usually proposed as a strong reason for the military to cover it up by doing business. Mahfud MD, Minister of Defense in Abdurrahman Wahid administration commented that *“The state up to now can not finance even the military minimum requirement. State can only fund thirty percent of it; the rest is being funded by military business units. That is why for the time being I do not agree to eradicate all military business. If we are concern about the corruption, then what we have to do is to eliminate the corruptors, not the business unit”*.⁴¹

The effort to control the military businesses had started as early as Abdurrahman Wahid era by pushing for transparent auditing practices of military businesses. Progress was made through the issuance of the Bill 34 (TNI act) which stated that five years after the enactment, the TNI business units had to be ‘controlled’ by the government.⁴²

Progressive improvement is also shown by the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration. He laid out steps needed to organize the military business units that in the end will be transferred to full government control either under the Department of Defense or the Department of Finance. The General Secretary of Department of Defense asserted that there are several measures to be taken; making an inventory list of military business units with the date line of 27 September 2005; verifying the corporations running the acquisition process of military business units which have the total minimum assets 15 billion rupiah and above would be managed in the form of holding company; and issuing presidential regulations as the further legal basis⁴³. The military business that has been audited and formally recorded is around 1520 units⁴⁴. All of which will be divided into 7 to 10 holding companies. To urge the process, General Edriartono Sutarto asserted military’s commitment to accomplish full divestment of military business to government. He stated that in two years the TNI will accomplish the task of transferring the units into full government control.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Widayako, Danang, et al.(2002):*Bisnis Militer Mencari Legitimasi*, Jakarta, Indonesia Corruption Watch, pp.12-13.

⁴¹ Yulianto, Arief (2002): *Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca ORBA: Di tengah Pusaran demokrasi*, Yakarta, PT.Raja Grafindo Persada, p.136

⁴² Marpaung, Rusdi et al.(2005): *Menuju TNI Professional : Tidak Berbisnis dan Tidak Berpolitik*, Jakarta, Imparsial, p.263.

⁴³ “Informasi Pengalihan Bisnis TNI”⁹ september 2005, en <http://www.dmc.dephan.go.id/html/jakstra/2005/september/Pengalihan%20Bisnis%20TNI.htm>

⁴⁴ “Bisnis TNI yang sudah Diinventarisir sejumlah 1520”, *Republika*, Tuesday 14 March 2006.

⁴⁵ “Panglima TNI : Masalah Bisnis TNI sesuai target”, *Kompas*, 29 November 2005.



D) Security Policy Making

The last issue that needs to be examined is the realm of security policy making. Alagappa proposed that jurisdiction over security matters is an important indicator of the relationship of the soldier and the state. Continued military control of security policy making in post authoritarian states indicates a partial civilian control and the lack of democratic consolidation. This means, increasing civilian control over the security issues would demonstrate the progress of military subordination and the sign of positive democratic consolidation.⁴⁶ In Indonesia, positive developments were seen through the enactment of a legal right basis for civilians to exercise and to increase their role in security policy making.

The issuance of regulations increasing civilian jurisdiction

At least two laws have been enacted by the parliament that contributes to the expansion of civilian authority in security realm and the enhancement of military professionalism; the Bill No 3 year 2002 (UU 3 tahun 2002) on National Defense, and the TNI Bill no 34 year 3004 (UU TNI no 34/2004). One of the important contributions for Indonesia's civil-military relations could be seen from analyzing Article 14 to Article 17 in Bill no 3 year 2002 which granted authority to the President and the Defense Minister to formulate the general guidelines of the state defense policy. The other important bill enacted by the parliament during the Megawati era was the TNI Bill that regulates the TNI to specifically perform a solely defense function; defines TNI as a professional military, which is a well trained, educated, and equipped; and not involved in politics or business⁴⁷.

3. Analysis and impediments

3.1. The new path to Civilian Supremacy

Using Alagappa's parameters, one can argue that by looking at the surface there were extensive reform measures instituted since the fall of Soeharto regime and evidence of a decreasing role for the military in politics. The military had been through a series of doctrinal reforms; it had changed the old doctrine of dual function and 'Kekaryaan' that legitimizes their extensive role outside of defense. It had no socio-political organs any more due to its internal reform such as: the abolishment of socio-political organs from the military; the removal of oppressive instruments (Bakorstanas and Litsus). The military is also keeping its distance from politics; by completely withdrawing from the parliament and announcing its commitment to be neutral in politics. Its involvement in business is also incrementally controlled by the government through a divestment programme for military's business units. The civilian government also succeeded in exercising its authority in defense and security policy. The appointment of civilian for Minister of Defense; the increasing civilian authority in military senior officer appointment; and the enactment of new laws extending civilian jurisdiction were examples of expanding civilian authority. These examples demonstrate that Indonesia had entered a new stage of civil-military relations.

⁴⁶ Alagappa, *op. cit.*, p.36.

⁴⁷ Translated from UU TNI no 34 thn 2004.BAB II pasal 2.d. (TNI Bill no 34/2004 article II verse 2.d.)



If we consider Huntington's perspective of Objective Civilian Control, indeed there are movements toward Huntington's ideal. The military does not enjoy the dominant role in politics. They have to accept civilian authority and decisions in many areas. The removal of Wiranto (a powerful General in the Wahid era), the acceptance of the military of appointments of senior ranking military officers coming from non-Army backgrounds as the TNI Commander in Chief, and the auditing of military business practices that would be unthinkable in the New Order era. Based on that evidence I would say that indeed a healthier civil-military relationship is in the process of being established.

Despite all that positive trends, has the Objective Control over military and civilian supremacy implied the military's minimum role in politics had been fully attained? Is it enough to consider those procedural steps to have fulfilled the requirement for healthy civil-military relations needed for democratization? Has Indonesia been able to comprehensively put the military back to barracks, thus paving the way for democracy?

I would argue next, that while it is correct to say there was a positive progress toward better civil-military relations, this did not mean that democratization had attained its objective. The argument I describe below, shows that the process was colored by military resistance and several impediments (existing military business and territorial command structure). The civil-military relation is also experiencing fluctuation. Analysts such as George Aditjondro⁴⁸ would argue after few years of military reform, there is still no guarantee that the old autocratic attitude of the military could completely disappear and not re-appear in the future.

3.2. Do they just fade Away?

Aditjondro's worries are not without reasons. Questions of whether the military would fully and willingly comply to civilian authority, are crucial issues. It may sound contradictory, because using Alagappa's framework, the military's role in politics shows a decreasing trend. But by looking further at the dynamics around the process, the military also demonstrated resistance and influence against several measures taken by civilian government. At the end the term "Civilian Supremacy" is still questionable.

Government has incrementally run measures to divest military business units and made laws to emphasize the point that military does not involve itself in business. However, are all forms of military business being controlled by the Government? Up to now, not only has the government failed to restructure military's Territorial Command (KOTER)⁴⁹, but the military also demonstrated its refusal to reform KOTER. Such reticence on the part of the military allows us to question its willingness to comply with civilian control. Will the military regain its influence in politics? Or do they just fade away only to wait for the right moment to re-appear? Below, I will describe reasons why democratization has not yet been attained, and why civilian supremacy is not fully realized.

⁴⁸ Aditjondro, George Junus: "Reformasi di Titik Balik?", *Wacana*, Vol 17, n° III(2004),p.3.

⁴⁹ Will be discussed later to show how important it is for democratization to progress



3.3. The continuous existence of indirect Military influence in Politics

A) The Opposition and Tense Relation in Abdurrahman Wahid era

Dr. Mohammad Mahfud MD (Defense Minister in Wahid's era) maintained that from his perception, Wahid was the most consistent president or maybe 'radical' in his maneuvers to launch reform measures for the military⁵⁰. I would agree with his opinion because most foundations for military reform were done in his era. The change of Ministry of Defense and Security to the Ministry of Defense; the appointment of a civilian as Defense Minister; the separation of the National Police Force from the TNI; the liquidation of Bakorstanas & Litsus; the dismissal of General Wiranto from his post of Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security on 15 January 2000 for his alleged involvement in East Timor human rights violation; extensive senior officer re-deployment⁵¹, and the appointment of the first TNI chief from outside the Army camp were measures pioneered by President Wahid. However, measures such as the 'sacking' of strong figure such as Wiranto and the extensive redeployment of senior officers following his dismissal, invited strong resistance from military.

In the beginning of his administration, the tension between Wiranto and Gus Dur did not surface. After a report indicated that Wiranto involved in the East Timor tragedy, then Gus Dur moved to dismiss Wiranto from his cabinet. Former State Secretary Bondan Gunawan stated that at least there are two important reasons behind Wiranto's removal; first, the 'sacking' was actually an attempt to rescue Wiranto from facing a potential International Tribunal; secondly, the measures were seen as necessary because Wiranto was a strong symbol of the old power of Soeharto's cronies and suspected by Wahid to have his own agenda related to the New Order remnants.⁵²

Although the dismissal was President Wahid's prerogative, it still invited strong opposition from several senior officers. The manner, in which Gus Dur dismissed Wiranto by an open announcement after his return from Switzerland, was used by the senior officers of the military to de-legitimize Gus Dur. For instance Maj.General Djaja Suparman implied "*that this step could hurt the heart of the TNI and provoke them to 'do something' about it*"⁵³. His argument was also strengthened by Soejono who strongly claimed that this measure clearly dishonored the TNI.⁵⁴ While Gus Dur saw the dismissal as a tool to gain public support for his desire to establish civilian supremacy, the military saw it as a humiliation. Munir argued that military used 'the Wiranto's sacking' as a momentum to consolidate itself internally. The military used it to strengthen internal solidarity against the reform measures seen by them as intervening in the internal matters of the military⁵⁵.

The military resistance emerged again after the appointment of Lt-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah as Pangkostrad (Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve) who was considered a progressive reformer by civilians. His open support for Gus Dur's decision to not only dismiss Wiranto but also to continue investigation of Wiranto and other military officers for their involvement in East Timor tragedy, had upset some senior officers. Most

⁵⁰ Haramain, A. Malik (2004): *Gus Dur Militer dan Politik*, Yogyakarta, LKIS, pp.vii-xii.

⁵¹ About 122 military senior officers were being re-deployed and promoted by Wahid in June 200. See Haramain, *op. cit.*, p.233.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.250.

⁵³ Muradi, *Berpijak di atas Bara*, *op.cit.*, p.125.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.125.

⁵⁵ Haramain, *op.cit.*, p.248.



senior officers deemed Agus to have violated the military's code of conduct and set a bad precedence for military unity.

The opposition from the military grew stronger, when once again President Wahid tried to promote Agus Wirahadi Kusumah to become KSAD (Army Chief of Staff) replacing Gen Tyasno Sudarto. The military especially the Army gathered the support of all Pangdam (Area Military Commander) to reject Wahid's plan. The success of the military opposition was seen when twelve Generals threatened to resign⁵⁶ if Gus Dur continued his plan. The military's open refusal demonstrated how military obstructed a command from the person supposedly considered its Supreme Commander. Based on his critical position at that time, there was no alternative for President Wahid but to drop his plan.

B) The controversial proposals of the TNI bill draft article 19

The signing of TNI Bill no 34 year 2004 in Megawati era has also demonstrated the ongoing strong influence by the military over her administration. The TNI Bill was initially drafted to provide a legal basis for military reform, and served as a legitimate effort to create a professional military and strengthen civilian control over it. The initiative to formulate the first draft was taken by TNI headquarters in 2001. In 2003 the rough draft of the bill was brought before the public and invited heavy criticism. The public evaluated that the draft contained too many loop holes and obscurities about military's obligation to continue its reforms.

What was seen as more controversial by public was the proposal for article 19 of the TNI Bill. The article itself was drafted by Mabes TNI (TNI headquarters) and demonstrated an implicit unwillingness of the military to leave behind its past role and influence in politics. The insertion of the article in February 2003 caught the public by surprise due to the controversial nature of new TNI powers implied by the article. The draft stated that: *(1) In an emergency, where the sovereignty, the unity of the state and the safety of the nation is threatened, the TNI commander in chief can authorize the TNI forces as an initial step to prevent greater losses to the state; (2) The usage of the TNI forces implied by section 1 has to be reported to the president at least in twenty four hours*⁵⁷.

According to TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto, the proposition was suggested by TNI Headquarters based on the consideration that although the command to use TNI force lay strictly in the hands of the president, in the event of an emergency the TNI Commander in Chief should also be granted the authority to deploy military forces. Then TNI commander would then report to the president within 24 hours⁵⁸.

The proposal aroused concerns from members of parliament and the public. It was seen to provide a legal basis for the military to deploy forces without prior approval from the president. Such an act could be lay the platform for the military to attempt a coup. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti agrees that this 'flexible' article could be interpreted as military's hidden intention to legalize coup attempt⁵⁹ based on a subjective understanding of the military's definition of the term 'emergency'. Moreover, this authority also opened the way for arbitrary use of force, the

⁵⁶ Sukardi, *op.cit.*, p.149

⁵⁷ Translated from Rancangan UU TNI no34 thn 2004 pasal 19

⁵⁸ See Rusdi Marpaung et al., *Menuju TNI Profesional Tidak Berbisnis dan Tidak Berpolitik*, p.115

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 120



neglect and by passing of the authority of the President and the parliament to had the prerogative to determine what conditions constituted an emergency.

Originally this controversial article was already discussed and then rejected by several members of the discussion team obliged to analyze the draft, but they could not come to a conclusion and decided to allow the TNI commander in chief to propose his definition⁶⁰. Although the article was rejected by the parliament, the proposal of this ‘coup article’ was seen by Ikrar as an attempt of the military to revive military’s political role and influence.

The bulk of the draft process of this law was done during Megawati’s administration allowing Sukardi Rinakit to argue that Megawati’s administration was more accommodative toward the military. What explains this behavior? I would argue that to understand this behavior –the accommodative attitude toward military- was linked to the history of Megawati’s cooperation with the military to bring down the Wahid administration. Maj.Gen. Saurip Kadi explained that the “...*military held an important role in toppling Wahid’s administration. The military was dissatisfied with Wahid maneuvers seen to be interfering too much in areas deemed to be in the military’s realm. Hence the TNI mobilized support to oppose Wahid*”.⁶¹ This phenomenon also strengthens the argument that the military still maintain its political influence.

3.4. The hard process of the acquisition and control of Military Business

Other parameters of success for Civilian Control, is through control of the military’s budget. Off-budget and independent military business practices would only jeopardize civilian control thereby endangering civilian supremacy. However, the already deep rooted involvement of the military in business - both legal and illegal - has complicated the procurement process aspects of military business. In reality, the military has also displayed certain oppositionist tendencies that could hamper the process.

A) Opposition in Gus Dur era

The strong reaction showed by the military for initiatives undertaken by Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadi Kusumah during Gus Dur era, revealed the military reluctance to adhere to transparent practices in its business activities. Agus ordered a thorough audit of the Kostrad linked business enterprises and managed to discover a financial scandal. The auditor found evidence of the misuse of funds in both foundations –the Dharma Putra Foundation and Mandala Airlines – allegedly done by Maj.Gen. Djaja Suparman. The scandal itself would cause approximately USD 9.2 million losses. Later, a similar illegitimate fund withdrawal was also found in Army’s business enterprise Kartika Eka Paksi at the cost of USD 6.6 million⁶². While this disclosure was widely applauded by the public, essentially this instance marked the decline of Agus W.K career in the military. He became a target for majority officers who still dominated the military. Lt Gen. Kiki Syahnakri explained why Agus maneuvers were hated by senior officers. Kiki argued that “*Agus’s measures in declaring the*

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 121

⁶¹ Haramain, *Gus Dur Militer, op.cit.*, p.284.

⁶² Hafidz, Tatik(2006): *Fading Away? : The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia Transition to Democracy, 1998-2001*, Singapore, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, p.163



scandal publicly was against the military ethical code and honor. Rather than revealing the scandal publicly, Agus should have reported only to his military superior to avoid further deterioration of the military's image"⁶³.

Agus's position was worsened by the fact that civilian support for him was unfortunately decreasing. At the same time, President Wahid was also unable to give him full support. Wahid himself was experiencing strong pressure from his political rivals due to his alleged misuse of Bulog (Logistical Institution) funds. Thus, at the time Agus needed a support from the president, Wahid could not provide it because he himself experienced a decline in influence and legitimacy. Having no political clout for protection in such an unfriendly environment, Agus was then 'sacked' from his position and brought before internal military trial for his act of violating military ethics.

B) The half Hearted Acquisition?

Deriving lessons from Agus Wirahadikusumah's experience, the successive administrations seem to take a more careful and incremental steps in controlling military business, even though it is already obliged by laws. Despite of the acquisition process that now has entered the process of auditing and inventory processing, there are several short-comings that should receive more attention:

- The process was not inclusive from the start. Analyst Kusananto Anggoro stated that the first mistake was the government's decision to give the task of auditing to the TNI not an independent auditor⁶⁴. The decision was seen by Anggoro to provide opportunities for military business units to escape divestment. Most business units experiencing decreasing assets allegedly mutated in order to avoid acquisition⁶⁵.
- The wording of the TNI bill "*professional military does not do business*" was criticized by public, because it does not provide a sufficient legal basis and sanction. The wording itself is too vague and open to multiple interpretations. Moreover, the wording does not recommend a clear limitation for military involvement in business. This explains why the informal type of military involvement in business is more difficult to control. Informal type of business involving both active (for instance they hold positions of either Chairman or investor) and retired military unfortunately could not be controlled, because it was seen to be in the private realm. This is quite worrisome, because in reality not only does the military use its influence in doing business but the informal practices are a dominant aspect of the military's modus operandi now⁶⁶. Lespersi, an NGO focused on military issues, agreed that the informal business of TNI is exactly the dominant type of business that is 'mushrooming' currently. For instance, the method of utilising 'strong influence' by putting an important figure from the military in a company, and using parties that are known as TNI 's business partner serves as example of the military's indirect

⁶³ See Haramain, *op.cit.*, p.251

⁶⁴ "Cara Pemerintah Mengambil Alih Bisnis TNI Sudah Salah Sejak Awal", *Republika*, Thursday 23 February 2006.

⁶⁵ Bisnis Perseorangan TNI tak diperiksa, *Republika*, 3 March 2006.

⁶⁶ Bisnis Perseorangan TNI tak diperiksa, *Republika*, 3 March 2006.



involvement in business. In this indirect method, the TNI will not be engaged directly; rather they become known as ‘sleeping partners’⁶⁷, and therefore become untouchable.

The TNI’s Intransigence of in maintaining its Territorial Command Structure (KOTER)

Of all reform processes that took place after the New Order, one dominant issue defended heavily by the military was the continual existence of the Territorial Command Structure (Komando Teritorial / KOTER). Before understanding the need to restructure KOTER, we have to analyze first how the new order used this KOTER structure and what its relation was to military penetration into the socio-economic and political life of society.

The idea of KOTER was initially proposed by General Nasution to mobilize fresh support from society as a military basis to fight the attempts at recolonization by the Dutch after Indonesia had proclaimed her independence. The key point in KOTER is that the military will penetrate society at every level to be able to mobilize the popular support needed to launch counter-attacks against the invader. The doctrine was renewed in 1962, and the structure of territorial command then expanded with the creation of KOTER structure parallel to civilian government infrastructure reaching to the lowest level, namely village administration. For instance, in the Province the military structure is KODAM (Regional Military Command); in the Residency it is the Sub-Regional Military Command; in the District, regent is shadowed by the KODIM (Military District Command); at the Sub District level there is the KORAMIL (Military Rayon Command); and in the village is the BABINSA (Village Development Non-Comissioned Officers)⁶⁸.

Soeharto in New Order era ‘manipulated’ KOTER along with Dual Function doctrine and used them as his instruments to strengthen and deepen the military penetration in society to gain support for his regime. Deviating from the initial role as a tool to initiate popular support against a potential foreign invasion, KOTER has been transformed by the New Order regime to be a successful tool to control society even at the lowest level. KOTER structure was also proven to be a useful instrument by the military to run its business units. The extensive structure of KOTER down to village level permits the military to maximize their socio-political and economic role. This was shown by military domination started from selecting Lurah (village head), Bupati (District Head), up to employing Military officers in many civilian posts. Babinsa and Koramil were also used to force people in the villages to vote directly for the GOLKAR party in elections. The existence of the military in nearly all levels of society then minimized the role of civilians to the point of even neglecting them because it was impossible for civilians to compete against military apparatus. In a nutshell KOTER had succeeded in maximizing the socio-political and economic role of the military while it minimized the civilian role.

The Re-emergence of KOTER in Reform Era

The reform movement had also tried to abolish KOTER, but the effort was not sufficient to reconstruct KOTER fully. In order to meet the demands of reform, Agus Wirahadikusumah again was the first military officer who openly proposed to restructure KOTER by reducing KODAM (Area Military Command). Agus’s drastic proposals were softened by his colleague

⁶⁷ Beni Sukadis, Hendra, and Eric (2005): *Menuju TNI yang Professional Restrukturisasi Bisnis TNI*, Jakarta, LESPERSI, p.143

⁶⁸ Sukardi, *op.cit.*, p.22



Lt.Gen. Agus Widjojo after senior officers such as Ryamizard Ryacudu and Bibit Waluyo raised strong objections against Agus's proposal. The solution accepted by the military at that time was that KOTER will be restructured and its preparation would take 12 to 19 years⁶⁹. However the restructuring has started by dismantling the bottom three rungs of Territorial structure -namely BABINSA, KORAMIL and KODIM- and detaching the Socio and Political Affairs Office from KOTER structure.

Unfortunately, up to now the progress of KOTER restructuring had stopped at that lower level –BABINSA, KORAMIL, KODIM- without any further development. The rise of Megawati administration from the brink of tense civil military relations during Gus Dur era made Megawati reluctant to press for more reform. It can be seen that starting from Megawati era, the military had become confident enough to openly maintain and even to revitalize KOTER.

The military maneuver to sustain KOTER was demonstrated in several areas;

1. The Proposal in RUU TNI (draft of TNI bill)

The military devises Article 9d in a way that it can be seen as a legal tactic to revitalize KOTER. The article asserted that 'The Obligation of the Army is to perform territorial establishment according to its role and authority in order to create a unity with the people'. This article makes obvious the intention of the military to revitalize KOTER. In this kind of arrangement, civilian institutions have to compete with the military structure from the lowest level up to the highest. Due to the fact that the military is known for its well established capability compared to civilian institutions plus a long history in dominating civilian affairs, for as long as the KOTER still exists the military will always impose its influence on civilian leaders.

2. Re-establishing KODAM in Aceh during Megawati period

The re-establishment of KODAM in Aceh was evidence showing the military's ability to pressure the government on security policy. The idea of setting up a KODAM in Aceh that initially had been liquidated as soon as Soeharto left office became public knowledge after its announcement by Brig.Gen Djali Yusuf, the Commander of the Operational Command (Pangkolakops) in Aceh. His idea was strengthened by public statements from both KAPUSPEN TNI and TNI headquarters (MABES TNI). According to Rizal Sukma, the proposal was problematic for two reasons. First by proposing stating its views publicly, the military demonstrated an ability to pressure the administration to resolve the Aceh problem utilizing conventional military approaches, in contradiction to the government who were willing to take more peaceful approach. Moreover, the proposal should have been first internally debated in the Department of Defense and have the assent of parliament rather than the military unilaterally declaring their intent before public; next it shows the real face of the military that stuck to its KOTER paradigm even though it was contrary to reform demands⁷⁰.

3. Public Statements and Expansion Plans

Due to the fact that the TNI bill fails to address explicitly the territorial structure, the military through KAPUSPEN declared publicly that there is no change in the KOTER

⁶⁹ Tatik Hafidz, *op. cit.*, p.155

⁷⁰ Rifqie M.Muna, *Likuidasi Komando Teritorial dan Pertahanan Nasional*, pp.33-39.



structure⁷¹. Following that interpretation, General Djoko Santoso, the KASAD (Army Strategic Reserve Commander) during SBY's administration announced his plan to expand the territorial bases to about 22 more⁷² consisting of 19 Makorem (KOREM headquarters) and 3 Makodim (KODIM headquarters). He further noted that especially in the era of fighting against terrorism, KOTER could be effectively utilized to pre-empt the terrorist activity from spreading. The plan was protested heavily by NGOs and public. First, the plan to revive KOTER has violated the spirit of total reform because it is in fact a reinvigorated autocratic instrument. Second, the fight against terrorism does not necessarily mean that the KOTER is needed. In the fight against terrorism, the Police and Intelligence forces are the security agencies that should be strengthened by the government.

By looking at the history of how KOTER was used by the New Order to strengthen the military's grip on society, I argue that the plan to revive KOTER could be seen as a 'move' by the military to regain its previous influence. Therefore in the foreseeable future, it is hard for us to see the complete abolition or restructuring of KOTER based on current evidence. The military indeed has demonstrated no intention to fulfill this restructuring demand, instead what we have seen is an open contestation by the military to sustain KOTER.

Conclusion: Will Democratization progress?

At the end of the day, all questions will boil down to one key theme, will democratization in a transitioning Indonesia have the opportunity to advance if we use the trajectory of post Soeharto of civil-military relations as a barometer?

From previous analysis, the civil-military relations in Indonesia are not something that is 'black and white'. It is fluctuating. The contestation between the civilians and the military could be described as 'tug of war', either side having a chance to win or to lose. But what important is not who wins or loses. Rather, it is a matter of whether democracy will prevail or not.

'Post Suharto Civil Military Development', we could see that indeed military involvement in politics is not as significant as in the New Order. All indicators show a significant decrease in military authority and jurisdiction in politics. The military's doctrine has been changed; its means to practical politics had been legally curtailed. Its autonomy in managing internal organization was clearly not immune any more from civilian involvement, the process of security policy making has now been opened for the civilian to participate, and their business practices are now entering a new period where control by civilian authority is growing. The legal basis for the role of the military and professionalism has been established through the promulgation of the TNI bill. Civilian supremacy is on the rise and Huntington's Objective Control to some extent is being exercised by civilian forces. Therefore looking at those phenomena, democratization in Indonesia is advancing and a healthier civil-military relations is a work in progress.

Despite all that progress, I would argue, that achieving progress itself is challenging. From the three different impediments described before (continual influence of the military, difficulties in military business divestment and KOTER), I argue that to some extent the

⁷¹ "Tak Ada Perubahan Struktur di TNI", *Kompas*, 1 October 2004.

⁷² "LSM pertanyaan Penambahan Komando Teritorial", 2 abril 2006, en http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/03/30/brk_20050330-39_id.html.



military has shown resistance toward civilian control. Only two administrations after Soeharto, the military were able to regain their influence and exercise indirect pressure on civilian forces on several issues. The example of the tension arising between civilians and the military in Gus Dur era and the military proposal of potential 'coup' bill, indicated that the military was not completely willing to be subordinated and preferred a balance of power relationship with civilians. The 'die hard' attitude of the military in maintaining the territorial command and the weak civilian efforts to re-shape the KOTER, strengthen my argument, that though the military is not as strong as during the New Order, they still remain influential and not totally subordinated to civilian leadership.

The issue of reaching objective civilian control and moving in the direction of civilian supremacy cannot be attained if the two issues of military business and Territorial Command structure have not been addressed. Both issues are connected; the continual existence of territorial command will carry with it political and economic implications. Politically, however, the parallel structure of military's KOTER on the ground will compete and influence the political structure of government, and the chance of military dominance remains a possibility, especially in conflict areas. Economically, the establishment of territorial commands itself burdens the defense budget. The nature of 'self budgeting' of the territorial structure at the end will 'provoke' the military to do business. If it happens, the civilian leadership will experience more difficulty to objectively control the military.

So how do we assess the prospect of democratization? I would argue that Indonesia is moving on the right track towards democracy. The key point to sustaining the momentum and keeping democratization from suffering set backs, is to continuously keep the military's involvement and influence in politics to the minimum. To achieve that end, in an era where the military's influence still exists and not completely curtailed is by making sure that military business is fully controlled and the 'hegemonic' KOTER structure is reconfigured. If we are able to resolve those impediments, then we can have healthier civil-military relations that will bring Indonesia closer towards democracy.