

EVALUATION
OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE
IN THE SPANISH CASE

by

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Control is a fundamental activity in parliamentary democracy. It is a weapon in the hands of the opposition parties used not only for ensuring that the government acts according to the rules of the game but also for defending different proposals and programs and eventually it can provoke alternation in office.

Parliamentary control should be seen, first of all, as an institutional guarantee for the opposition(1). It is based on some particular formal procedures that are established by constitutions and Standing Orders of parliament. To explain how control activity functions in a specific case we must determine, first, which are the procedures, which are the principal and the secondary ones. We must also examine who can table the procedures, when can they be tabled and what is their goal. By the same token, to evaluate parliamentary control we must consider the diversity of procedures and explain why some procedures are more than others.

On the other hand, we must consider parliamentary control as a site for encounters between the opposition and the Government that, as Dahl(2) writes, offers the opposition the opportunity to challenge the government by influencing public opinion in order to increase support for itself. In this context control activity must be considered as a part of an oppositional strategy. Therefore, we have to pay attention to how parties use different procedures and their interests in using them.

Since the main goal of a parliamentary opposition is to participate in government, one can say that opposition parties can develop two main strategies: competitive or cooperative. When a group has a competitive strategy, parliamentary control helps it win public support for its cause and its candidates so that it can win a future parliamentary majority. High competition of a party is related to a close prospect for alternation in office. This has happened in Spain two times.

A party develops a cooperative strategy through parliamentary control when it has bargaining capacity in or with the government and can be influential in policy-making. Such is the case of small parties in multiparty systems in which they attempt to influence public opinion and win parliamentary seats in elections. However, they take for granted that they cannot govern except as part of a coalition. Sometimes they do not even want to participate in the government but just to support a minority government in parliament.

Via parliamentary control procedures, a competitive strategy of the opposition leads it to be critical of the government while a cooperative one leads it to be influential through indirizzo procedures. In both cases parties can act by scrutinizing policies in a particular and precise way or by monitoring the government behavior according to its general programs or proposals.

Actors of parliamentary control include not only groups but also individual MPs. In the Spanish case groups dominate the parliament arena and strong structured party discipline works in favor of groups(3). In addition, the most relevant procedures are

subject to group strategies and only written questions and administrative report requests are in the hands of MPs. However, they are usually linked to party strategies as a complementary procedure and a first step toward looking for information. So activity of single MPs is not very significant.

To analyze the Spanish case we are going to see, first, control as an activity of parliament, second, the different control procedures and, third, we consider it as an activity of the different parliamentary parties. We analyze six legislative periods from 1977, the constituent legislature (L-C), to 1996, when the fifth legislature (L-V) ended. We only consider parliamentary control in the Congreso de los Diputados because its activity is more important than that of the Senado(4). To study control we will elaborate different indicators which are percentages related to the number of cases in each procedure, so that we can have homogeneous data that can be compared.

1.- CONTROL AS PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY

In the case of Spain one can see in the three first legislatures a process of development of parliamentary activity, which has doubled with every legislature (see graph 1). Since L-III it has reached a level of more than 30 thousand tabled procedures. This growth was chiefly due to control procedures (PC).

From the data one sees that only in the mid-80's did the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados reach the normal pace of other parliaments in controlling the government(5). One can say that only in L-III (1986-89) did a period of normality begin in terms of parliamentary activity because before 1986 there was an outstanding time. The aim of the constituent legislature (L-C) was to elaborate and approve a Constitution under the necessary consensus. In L-I there was a process of consolidating the Spanish democracy with an unstable minority government(6) in which the consensus of the constituent period remained weak(7). Finally, L-

II was a time of alternation in government office.


On the other hand, we can see in graph 2 that since L-I control activity (A) has reached a normal level of more than 80 per cent of parliamentary procedures. Activity reached the highest level in L-I and L-V because there were minority governments and because there were strong opposition parties close to reaching alternation in office: the socialist party in L-I and the popular party in L-V. In L-III there was a rise of activity due to competition among center to the right groups, all of whom were very active in parliament.

If we also take into consideration the procedures of control over public broadcast companies (radio and TV), we can see that total control activity (A-1) increased constantly during the whole period. It means that information throughout public media increasingly became a focus of interest of the opposition parties.


On the other hand, if we pay attention to the effectiveness (E) of control in graph 2 we see that only after L-I it reached a normal level. More 70 per cent of all tabled procedures that were proceeded. The effectiveness was greater in L-II and L-III due to the fact that there were more opposition groups, particularly of center to the right, than in the other legislatures. Effectiveness is therefore related with opposition fragmentation.

Finally, when we compare again activity (A) and effectiveness (E) in L-I and L-V, we also see that the separation between both rates is smaller in L-V. The difference is explained by parliamentary experience of the popular party which was more precise and efficient in L-V than socialist group in L-I. (see table 18).

Graph 1: Parliamentary activity (PA) and parliamentary control (PC): number of procedures table



Graph 2: Activity (A) and effectiveness (E) of control as rates



(A) Activity rate: percentage of control procedures over the total parliamentary procedures

(A-1): (A) plus control procedures over public broadcast companies

(E) Effectiveness rate: percentage of table procedures that were proceeded, voted, approved, etc.

As a result one can say that control activity grew in two cases: when minority governments and strong parties are ready for alternation and when there is competition among opposition parties. On the other hand, effectiveness of control is higher when there is fragmentation and high competition among opposition parties.

2.- PROCEDURES OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

In the case of Spain there is a great variety of control procedures which at the same time are clearly differentiated. They are ruled by the Constitution of 1978 and the Standing Orders of 1982. To analyze them we will follow the classification of the data registry of the Congreso de los Diputados Archive, which is our source of information.

To study the relevance of each procedure we compare in each legislature the total number of procedure cases (T) with two other rates. One is the activity rate (A), which is the percentage of cases of the procedure under study in relation with the total number of control procedures tabled in the legislature. The other is the effectiveness rate (E), which is the percentage of cases that have been proceeded, accepted, voted, etc., in every procedure each legislature.

A) Control in committees

Generally speaking, control in committees is very significant in Spain. It is one sixth of the total activity and, if we keep out written questions (WQs) from the total, it is about one half of the activity (see table 1).

Spanish standing committees are specialized in every department and have both functions: to legislate and scrutinize the government. Committees are the regular way of working in the House and dominate the timetable. Every parliamentary group has a number of members in each committee according to its strength and

its vote is a party vote (voto ponderado).

Committees are very powerful since they can send for papers and records and can request appearances of ministers or other government members and civil servants or even citizens to inform. Government can be strongly monitored through committees because it is where negotiations usually are taking place and it is the most effective way to scrutinizing government policies day by day. Obviously committees are more relevant with minority governments as we can see in table 1 it happened in L-I and L-V; on the contrary, in L-II their activity weakened since it was the strongest majority of the whole period.

Table 1: Control activity in committees as %

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
of the total PC	17	23	8	12	18	20
without WQs	57	59	33	51	46	54

B) Questions

Questions are the most important parliamentary procedure in number. They were almost 3/4 of the total activity. Questions must be tabled in a written form, but can be answered written or orally, it depends on the MP who asks. Oral questions can be tabled to be answered on the floor of the House or in committee. Their advantage is to set up a small debate. However, they are not always answered which reduces their effectiveness.

In Spain **written questions (WQs)** make up more than half of the total PC as in other parliaments, and the total amount is similar to the standard of other countries such as France(8). Their large quantity is due to the fact that there is neither any limit nor any control by parties on the number each MP can table. Questions, together with requests for administrative reports, have been the main procedure in MPs hands. They were very relevant when the groups were weakly structured as happened to the popular group

in L-II (see table of PP).

Other advantages of WQs are that they are always proceeded and their answers are very precise. As a result, as we can see in table 2, written questions always had the highest rate of effectiveness, usually reaching the maximum. That is why it is considered a good source of parliamentary control. This procedure looks for a very precise information and at the same time provides a means of policy scrutiny.

Table 2: written questions

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T..	304	3820	9200	19458	15309	14886
A..	32	56	70	71	52	56
E..	76	84	91	92	93	87

Inspired by the question time of the British Parliament, in Spain there is a two hour weekly session on Wednesdays for debating **oral questions on the floor of the House** directed to Cabinet members to consider fresh topics. Every oral question opens a debate of five minutes. The Prime Minister began participating in this procedure in 1983. We can say with Sole and Aparicio(9) that it is a satisfactory procedure although it does not have the political impact that it has at Westminster.

MPs are those who table oral questions. However, in order to permit the greatest participation of MPs, the possibility for an MP to propose a number of questions is limited and it should be administer by parties. Limited time for oral questions reduces its activity rate although its number was very normal according to French parameters(10). Its effectiveness, however, has been always very high since more than two parts of them were answered. It was even higher in the last three legislatures after the procedure was improved in Standing Orders of 1982.

Oral question on the floor of the House was very relevant in L-II in which their activity rate was twofold the other legislatures. This was because it was the most suitable procedure

for critically controlling and keeping watch over the building up of a new government program after alternation in office.

Table 3: oral questions on the floor of the House

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	28	412	1584	1510	2003	1610
A ..	3	6	12	6	7	6
E ..	55	46	60	72	75	74

Oral questions in committee have been a relevant procedure to open a discussion with the government about a precise topic. It usually consists of a small debate between a government member (from the second level of the government) and an MP of about half an hour. When these questions are not answered in time (in one period of sessions), they are converted automatically into written questions. This happens to about one third of them (see table 1). That is why its efficacy is lower than other question procedures.

Oral questions in committee have been a good way to have a very specialized and precise control evidenced by the fact that they were mainly used by the strong opposition groups for monitoring policies.

Table 4: oral questions on committee

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	119	745	245	1593	2464	1865
A ..	13	11	2	6	8	7
E ..	38	59	40	57	51	52
converted	15	261	182	440	705	620

C) Interpellations

Interpellation is a traditional control procedure in Spain. Until Standing Orders of 1982 though, it was not very well differentiated from questions. Since then, interpellations provoke a special debate about a general topic on the floor of the House

in which all parties participate (it can affect the whole government or just a department). Interpellations are administered by groups, which have a limited number in every session period (one for every ten MPs), and are debated in Wednesday's question time. Interpellations can end in a motion as it has happened sometimes.

Table 5: ordinary interpellations

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	129	389	67	37	27	6
A ..	14	6	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1
E..	30	41	8	--	--	--

Since 1983 **Urgent interpellations** can be tabled and therefore are proceeded faster than ordinary ones. They became the normal procedure and improved its effectiveness, reaching 80% in L-V.

Since interpellations are limited by a timetable, its activity rate is not significant. In comparative terms, the number of interpellations in Spain is slightly higher than the German one as has historically been the case(11). However, its effectiveness rate has been increased since 1983 in a process parallel to the progressive strength of the opposition. As a result, one can say that interpellations have been a tool for critically controlling government policies, and they have been very efficient when the opposition was strong.

Table 6: Urgent interpellations

	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T..	143	177	198	136
A..	1	0.6	0.7	0.5
E..	42	65	76	81

D) Motions

A motion can only be tabled after an interpellation, and it is debated and voted on the floor of the House. Once tabled, the parties can formulate amendments. The relevance of motions is that they permit the House to manifest its opinion about a present problem (in two weeks) and to evaluate the government position, which was presented in the interpellation debate. Interpellations connected with motions force the government to explain to the public its point of view about a problem which is being discussed in the media(12).

The activity rate of motions is lower than that of interpellations but logically has the same pace. Its effectiveness is closely linked to the strength of the opposition, and we can see a clear jump in the rate with the minority governments in L-I and L-V. Only a small part of interpellations gave rise to a motion, but in the three last legislatures interpellations provoked a motion frequently.

Table 7: Motions

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	37	75	37	102	145	108
A ..	4	1	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4
E..	8	45	96	23	28	46

E) Non-law propositions

Non-law propositions are also called resolutions or agreements of the House(13). A number of times they are tabled after a government communication. Since 1982 they are exclusively reserved for the parties. They can be debated in the floor of the House or in a committee according to the proponent's group will. Obviously, debates on the floor of the House are about the most transcendent topics. Debating non-law propositions is similar to interpellations and motions, and the different groups can propose

amendments. Debates in plenary sessions happen during question time of Wednesdays.

Non-law propositions played a very important role in Spain and its use has been constantly increasing since L-II. Before 1982 its activity rate was very high for two reasons: its procedure was confounded with that of the oral questions and it was a time of consensus and therefore the activity of indirizzo was very significant.

Since acceptance of non-law proposition debates depends on the majority, we can see that the stronger the opposition the higher the activity and effectiveness rates. As a result, activity increase of this procedure from L-II is parallel and opposite to the loss of strength of the socialist group and it jumped in L-V in relation to L-IV because there was a minority government. Effectiveness of this procedure is not very high, but its importance is most often due to the existence of a debate.

Table 8: Non-law propositions on the floor of the House

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	69	241	96	164	272	261
A ..	7	4	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.9
E ..	38	17	17	14	16	32

Table 9: Non-law propositions in committee

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	52	421	128	245	514	692
A ..	6	6	0.9	0.9	2	3
E ..	23	12	20	16	15	32

In the Spanish case, non-law propositions and motions, which are very similar, are something in the middle of legislative and control activity. They permit a critical control of the government, and both are related to the Italian idea of indirizzo, which means influence in parliamentary terms. None of them has legal effects, but they do have political effects. Usually their

relevance is due to the publicity of their debate. Through them parties ask the House to adopt a proposal usually related to government policies. Sometimes this proposal asks the government for a particular action, legislative initiative, etc., or sometimes it criticizes the government (reprobation motion). Othertimes it thanks the government(14).

Indirizzo activity was very high in L-C and L-I on account of the consensus of the democratic transition. It also affected its effectiveness, but this rate was higher when there was a minority government in L-I and L-V.

Table 10.- Indirizzo procedures

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
A ..	16	11	2	2	3	4
E ..	23	25	19	18	20	37

F) Appearances in Parliament

Appearances can be requested by the House or can be decided by the government itself. Not only ministers but also other government members and civil servants are subjected to this procedure. They open informative sessions where the government explains its behavior or its new plans and opposition can ask for information.

This procedure is the second in number, and it is more than ten per cent of the PC in the whole period. While appearances on the floor of the House are not very significant, they are really important in committees. In committee 80% are referred to second level government members and civil servants (H.Off.), and the debate is more precise and specialized.

The number of appearances progressively increased in the whole period while, on the contrary, its effectiveness did not. In general it can be always considered high. That is because there is no limit for opposition parties to ask for appearances while the final decision to have an appearance is in the hands of

the majority. On the other hand, ministers are the ones who decide which government member should go to inform.

Consequently we can say that it is a very remarkable procedure in order to monitor and scrutinize the government policies.

Table 11: Cabinet appearances on the floor of the House

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ..	7	9	10	26	58	34
A ..	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
E ..	100	89	30	54	41	56

Table 12: Government appearances in committee

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T	188	612	918	2220	3656	3678
A	20	9	7	8	12	14
E	84	71	92	74	57	59
High Off.	n-d	n-d	n-d	1870	2934	2816

G) Cabinet communications to the House

Cabinet communications plans and programs are similar to appearance procedures. They are debated on the floor of the House or in committee. In the debate parties can propose a resolution supporting or against the Cabinet proposal. These procedures are usually initiated by the government before a legislative process takes place in order to look for an agreement or to learn the contra-proposals of the opposition parties(15). These procedures are of minor relevance, but were something significant in L-IV and L-V when the socialist government was loosing its parliamentary strength.

Table 13: Government communications, plans and programs

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T..	3	16	10	9	160	181

H) Administrative Reports

In addition to some obligatory and regular reports provided by institutions such as the Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) or the Accounts Jurisdiction (Tribunal de Cuentas), which act on behalf of Parliament, there are administrative reports. MPs request these reports from the government and they have become a really important measure of control.

As we can see in the data, usually more than 90% of the reports are requested from the central administration (C.Ad.), and their importance has increased legislature after legislature, becoming a good source of information for MPs for monitoring the government.

Table 14: Administrative report requests

	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T ...	133	732	1928	4957	3168
C.Ad ..	130	732	1826	4716	3026
A	2	6	7	17	12
E	68	56	65	87	88

I) Investigative committees

Investigative committees are set up ad hoc to look into particular subjects. They are a very powerful procedure of control, but they are usually rejected by the majority. Their parliamentary capacity is the same as standing committees, the difference being that they have secret meetings. Their work ends with a final resolution that could be critical with the government.

Investigative committees have been scarce because it is difficult to set one up since it should be proposed -apart from the Congreso or the Cabinet- by two parliamentary groups or at least by 1/5 of MPs. That is why their activity rate is very low and their effectiveness even lower. Logically, both are higher when there is a minority government or when there is a general agreement among parties to set one up, as has happened most of the time.

Another type of control by committee that can be set up in Spain are inquiry committees or subcommittees for gathering information about minor problems. According to the data, these were relevant in L-IV and L-V, but data was incomplete in relation to the years before.

Table 15: Investigative committees

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V
T	6	11	9	14	20	25
A	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
E	83	27	44	0	15	20
Other I.C.	--	--	--	--	61	71

Some conclusions about control procedures are that we see a great variety of procedures which permit many possibilities of control. Some procedures such as WQs or administrative reports allow the individual activity of MPs, representing local interests or group interests, while control in committees is very specialized and related to an activity of monitoring the government. There is also activity of indirizzo through non-law propositions and motions that permit the critique and orientation of the government. There are procedures of critical control such as debates on the floor of the House, interpellations, appearances and investigative committees. Finally it is possible to scrutinize the government by carefully examining its policies by questions, reports and appearances. For this reason, it can be said that control is a well developed parliamentary activity.

We also find three periods in which the use of control

procedures evolved. The first two legislatures were a period based on democratic transition consensus and the beginning of parliamentary life. In L-C and L-I there was an important activity of indirizzo together with consensual activity looking for agreements mainly in committees. On the other hand, interpellations and questions were not very well defined yet.

A second period is L-II and L-III chiefly based on general scrutiny of government policies due in part to the strong majority. The main activity was questioning the government. At the same time, looking for information through administrative reports began to be relevant.

Finally, the third period was L-IV and L-V in which the strength of opposition parties produced a specific kind of control centered on monitoring and criticizing the government. This was a time of critical control. The principal procedures were appearances of government members and requests of administrative reports and non-law proposals.

3.- CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES

The Spanish system can be classified as a moderate multiparty system(16). It is characterized by a basic consensus with strong centripetal trends(17) supported by a moderate electorate(18) that favors alternation between two big national parties of the left-right continuum. It does not reach a bipartisan mold because there exist divergent geographical areas where dominant nationalist parties have been generated, and these parties are necessary and vital to minority governments(19).

As we can see in table 16, the party system evolved in two periods. From 1977 to 1982 (L-C and L-I) there was a reformist minority government supported by a weakly organized party. Relationships among parties were based on a consensus to set up a new constitution. By joining forces, different socialist groups gathered in the PSOE that became the dominant opposition group.

In the second period from 1982 to 1996 (L-II, III, IV and V),

there was a socialist government that began with a strong majority and ended as a minority government. The opposition groups evolved from an initial coalition division with high competition among its groups to a formation of a dominant center to the right party: Popular Party. The small stable nationalist groups supported the minority government in parliament. On the left, the communist group progressively increased its strength to a competitive position with the government.

Table 16: parliamentary parties between 1982 and 1993

CONSTITUENT-1977			1st LEGISLATURE-1979		
(L-C)	A	B	(L-I)	A	B
	%	%		%	%
UCD	47		UCD	48	
SOCIALIST	30	57	SOCIALIST	28	54
Cat. SOC.	4	7	Cat. SOC.	5	10
A.P.	5	9	Basq. SOC.	2	3
CATALAN	3	6	CD.	3	5
BASQUE	2	4	CATALAN .	2	4
COMMUNIST	6	11	COMMUNIST	7	13
MIXED	4	6	BASQUE .	2	4
- US-PSP .	2	3	ANDALUCIAN	2	3
			MIXED	3	
2nd LEGISLATURE-1982			3rd LEGISLATURE-1986		
(L-II)	A	B	(L-III)	A	B
	%	%		%	%
UCD ..	3	8	SOCIALIST	53	
SOCIALISTA .	58		POPULAR	21	44
POPULAR	30	72	CATALAN	5	11
CATALAN ..	3	8	BASQUE	2	4
BASQUE	2	5	CDS	5	11
MIXED	3		MIXED: AGRUPACIONES		
- CDS.....	1	1	- PDP	6	13
- PCE ...	1	3	- PL	3	7
			- IU	2	4
			MIXED: REST. ...	3	
4th LEGISLATURE-1989			5th LEGISLATURE-1993		
(L-IV)	A	B	(L-V)	A	B
	%	%		%	%
SOCIALIST ..	50		SOCIALIST .	45	
POPULAR.....	30	61	POPULAR	40	74
CATALAN	5	10	CATALAN	5	9
CDS.....	4	8	BASQUE ...	1	3
BASQUE	1	3	IU.....	5	9
IU.....	5	10	C. CAN..	1	1
MIXED	4		MIXED	2	

Source: Memorias de legislatura del Congreso de los Diputados

A: Parliamentary strength: group percentage over the total No. of MPs; B: Opposition strength: group percentage over the total No. of opposition MPs.

On the other hand, Standing Orders had to be reformed in 1986 due to division among opposition parties. Then they set up new small party structures called Agrupaciones Parlamentarias to act in the House with limited power.

To study the control activity of parliamentary parties we elaborate several indicators. First we consider the strength of each party in parliament (table 16-A) and its relative strength in opposition (table 16-B). Second, for every party we consider its activity (A), effectiveness (E) and precision (P) of its control in total and the same rates for every procedure each parliament (tables 17 to 22). Finally, we establish a relationship among all those indicators (i.e. party activity and opposition strength).

A) Parliamentary control by the Socialist group (table 17)

The socialist party was the main opposition party between 1977 and 1982 with about 65% of the opposition strength. Its activity rate was always higher than its strength in the House. In L-I the rate was even higher, close to its opposition strength, and very efficient and highly accurate. This was due to the fact that the socialist group was developing a highly competitive strategy oriented towards alternation. Between 1982 and 1996, however, its activity was not relevant at all since it was a government party and intra-party relations were handled out of the House.

When we analyze its activity as a main opposition party by procedures, we see that most of it was in committees through oral questions and non-law propositions, and (in L-I) appearances in committee. They had high activity rates, being relevant in relation with the total activity of the group (T), high effectiveness and also high accuracy in oral questions and appearances. The group was also effective and precise in written questions and report requests. All this shows a clear tendency of closely monitoring the government by a very specialized control,

particularly in L-I when it was close to alternation.

On the other hand, interpellations, motions, government appearances in plenary meetings and oral questions on the floor of the House, although important as an activity, were not very significant. There was some debate with the government and some indirizzo from the socialist side, but the consensus between the government and the socialist group was mainly based on agreements made out of the House.

The socialist division was not significant and all groups worked together as the dominant opposition and as a future party of government. They really had only one organization with a strong leader, but there were three groups and three opportunities to speak in every debate. While Basque socialists were not active at all, Catalan socialists played some role in indirizzo and in asking oral questions in committee. Though catalan socialists were active in all fields in L-C, generally speaking, it was backing the main socialist group.

Since L-II, the socialist group has had low activity, but this activity has been very precise and efficient. Activity was higher in L-II than in any time after (with the biggest majority), and it was mainly oriented to looking for information in bureaucrat hands through administrative reports.

As time went on, oral questions in plenary sessions and non-law propositions became important, especially in L-V when factionalism in the group (that arose in L-IV) became relevant and when different sub-groups were practicing some indirizzo activity that could not be worked out in regular meetings with the government.

B) Parliamentary control by the Popular group (table 18)

In L-C and L-I the popular party was a small conservative group (AP and CD) with less than 5% of parliamentary strength representing residual anti-reform, old time, francoist interests.

It was very active and efficient in Parliament. In fact, its activity rate was always higher than its opposition strength, and its effectiveness rate even higher. Moreover, it had a high level of accuracy and was particularly active in L-C when its activity rate was twice its opposition strength.

Through oral questions in plenary sessions and through indirizzo procedures in both legislatures, the group tried to influence to center to right government policies and. At the same time, it made clear to the public that it was strongly opposing the reformist policies. The group was more effective and accurate in opposing reformist policies in the constituent legislature.

In the socialist period the popular group was the main opposition party and behaved as such in spite of the fact that its parliamentary strength varied over the period, reaching 40% of representation only in L-V. That is why, generally speaking, its control activity always went over 60% and was superior to its opposition strength. On the other hand, its effectiveness and accuracy rates were even higher (over 80%), showing the strong competitiveness of the group in a trend towards a quasi-two party system.

An example of that competitiveness can be seen in L-III when the popular party had a higher rate of activity than in L-IV and had less parliamentary strength. This was due to the fact that populars tried to assume the first place as opposition group among right to the center groups and began closely controlling the government (the decrease of its activity in L-IV and L-V was inversely related to the activity growth of the United Left).

If one pays attention to procedures, one sees that the popular group tabled most of the written questions, which were very relevant in relation to the total activity of the group(T), and report requests. Both procedures also had high effectiveness and accuracy rates. It is significant that single MPs played an important role in the case of the popular party.

Oral questions on the floor of the House and interpellations had a meaningful high accuracy which shows the tendency toward

critical control of the government. On the other hand, monitoring the government by procedures in committee became more and more important as time went on in terms of activity and effectiveness. Oral questions and appearances became relevant in relation to the total activity of the group in L-IV and V. However indirizzo procedures had low rates of effectiveness and accuracy though it slowly increased during the period.

In sum, since 1982 the popular group has been closely scrutinizing the government, an activity in which MPs have played an important role. Monitoring the government with the aim of critically controlling the government was also an important activity.

Considering control by legislatures, one can see the different oppositional situations of the popular group. Although a dynamic of bipartidism began in L-II, the popular group was actually a divided coalition in which the conservative allies - liberals and christian-democrats coming from the former governing reformist group-, wanted to be differentiated in parliamentary debates.

Activity in every field of PC was very relevant in L-II due to the fact that this group was the main opposition actor. However, it is significant that most written questions and a large number of report requests were tabled by populars. It shows a type of control mainly in single MPs hands related to the lack of cohesiveness of the group at that time.

The high activity rate of oral questions on the House is also remarkable as well as the fact that interpellations together with activity in committees (non-law propositions and appearances) played an important role. It explains the limited control capacity of the group since socialist alternation. There was also a strong majority in the House and that is why activity was oriented to being after the government in a critical way.

Because of its electoral failure in L-III the coalition of the popular group broke down, allowing the group to keep only 44% of opposition strength. It then began a process of renovation and

power centralization. Leadership changed, and the party was renamed "Popular Party".

In terms of control the group was again most active in written questions and report claims and very active in oral questions and appearance requests in committee, which were very precise. The group then developed a general tendency of monitoring government policies.

In L-IV, the popular group consolidated as the core of the center to the right with 61% of opposition strength and became even more unified and disciplined. In L-V, the group reached 40% of representatives and 74% of the opposition strength. It then had a chance to enter government.

In the last two legislatures the monitoring trend of L-III was reinforced. In addition, there was a growth of activity in requests of investigative committees, in particular in L-V. On the other hand, interpellations and oral questions on the floor of the House became relevant procedures with a high rate of accuracy.

All this means that in the last two legislatures there has been an increase of competitiveness between the main opposition party and the Government. The confrontation was based on critical debate that became more exciting and heated as corruption cases on the side of the government were exposed.

In sum, in the whole period (1982-1996) one sees that the popular group evolved to become a very cohesive main opposition party into which all other center to the right groups were integrated. That is why the group had to be the most active in control and had to develop a close monitoring of the government looking for public debates in which to fight not only its policies but also its behavior due to corruption cases.

C) Parliamentary control by center to the right groups (UCD, CDS, PDP and PL) (Table 19)

The Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) was the supporting

group of the minority reformist government of L-C and L-I. It was a divided group so that every decision in parliament had to be negotiated among its factions and opposition parties at the same time. With a leadership crisis in 1981 the Prime Minister changed, it became a small group in decomposition in L-II.

The UCD activity was not significant. In L-C it was active in oral questions on the floor of the House, which was neither very efficient nor precise procedure. That activity was due to the lack of cohesion of the group and to the fact that part of the government-majority relationship was carried out in the House. In addition, it was also active by non-law propositions showing that the group participated in the indirizzo activity of the Congreso related to the transition consensus that was also working on the floor of the House.

The Centro Democrático y Social (CDS) group split from UCD in L-II. It was a reformist center party linked to the international liberal organization and obtained more than 5% of MPs. It was relevant in regional governments forming coalitions with socialists or the popular party.

The group played an important role as controller in L-III and IV. It always had a higher activity rate than its parliamentary strength. It was higher and more effective and precise in L-III than in L-IV. It is interesting to see how low an activity it had in written questions and administrative report claims. However, the activity in oral questions and appearances in committee was remarkable with a high accuracy too. Its activity in committees was also significant. Moreover, it was very active in indirizzo, particularly in L-IV and was also effective and precise.

One can say that CDS was playing an important role in parliament in L-III. It was very active and aimed to be well known by the public. Acting usually as a cohesive group, centrists were tabling procedures in every field of control because they were working out a strategy that was both cooperative and competitive at the same time. They wanted to become a needed coalition

partner for a future government with socialists, and they were competing with the popular and other small center to the right groups for the same electorate.

In L-IV, the CDS lost parliamentary strength which is reflected in less activity. At the same time the plan of being a needed coalition party faded, so its activity was directed at becoming more influential instead of monitoring government policies.

The Partido Liberal (PL) and the christian-democrat (PDP) were two small center to the right groups separated from the popular coalition in L-III. They were not big enough according to Standing Orders to form a parliamentary group and had to set up an Agrupacion.

Only the Partido Demócrata Popular (PDP), whose rate level was logically in relation with its parliamentary strength, developed an important activity of control. Its activity was similar to that of CDS and catalan groups although with a higher accuracy. Its main activity was related to indirizzo where its rate was higher than its opposition strength. Its activity was also relevant in motions, in oral questions, and requests of appearances in committee with high accuracy.

Similar to the rest of minority groups, the christian-democrats become very active as a group oriented toward influencing government policies mainly through parliamentary debates. At the same time, it tried to control government in a specialized way. The explanation of all that is that they were not only monitoring government policies but openly and publicly competing with other center to the right groups.

D) Control by the communist group (PCE- IU) (table 20)

The communist group has been a national party competing with the socialist group. In L-C and L-I the communist party (PCE) had more than 10% of opposition strength, but in L-II after the

socialist victory it became a marginal group. In L-III it set up a coalition, Izquierda Unida (IU), and there was a leadership change which intensified its competition with the socialist group. At that time, its limited parliamentary strength forced it to become an Agrupación. However, in L-IV it reached 10% of the opposition strength becoming the third national party.

United Left (IU) developed an intense control activity in all fields, which was always higher than its strength in the House and among opposition parties. It was even higher in legislatures in which it had a formal group and especially in the last one in which activity more than doubled its opposition strength.

The two periods of parliamentary life clearly affected this group with completely different data for every one. Effectiveness and accuracy of its control activity were low in L-C and L-I. However, in the socialist period effectiveness rate was close to its activity rate, and accuracy grew dramatically. In addition, its activity increased in the last two legislatures with high effectiveness and precision at the time when the socialist government was losing parliamentary strength. This shows that the leftist group was closely monitoring the government policies.

Paying attention to the different procedures, one can see that this group was fundamentally active in indirizzo (with high effectiveness). In addition, the group tended to be very active and accurate in committees and very accurate in interpellations and motions. Its rates of activity and efficiency in written questions and administrative report requests increased in the last two legislatures.

Generally speaking, the group had been oriented to open debates with the government mainly with the aim of monitoring its policies. At the same time the group developed an activity of precise, specialized, and critical control.

If we consider the different legislatures, we can see that indirizzo throughout non-law propositions was very important in the first two. This group mainly tried to influence policy in a cooperative strategy. In L-II and III due to the weakness of the

group, it was mainly active in committees where it developed a monitoring activity.

Finally, in the last two legislatures it worked in all fields of control and was very efficient in monitoring the government. It developed a competitive attitude with the socialist party, and was critical and dialectical in debates. This behavior was linked to the fact that the group was trying to mobilize the same electorate that socialists were, who were disgusted with industrial and work policies and corruption cases at that time.

E) The parliamentary control by the Catalan group (Minoría Catalana) (Table 21)

The Catalan group, Minoría Catalana, is a small nationalist group that appeared in L-C and has become very stable since then. In L-III it reached 5% of parliamentary strength, and in L-V became a supporting party in parliament of the minority socialist government.

The Catalan group was the most active among nationalist groups. However, its activity was not very relevant in relation to its parliamentary strength. Although its effectiveness was lower than its activity rate, its accuracy was remarkable. It can be said as a result that its control activity was efficient. On the other hand, the group was more active in L-C and L-I than afterwards. However, it was more precise with the socialist governments.

In terms of procedures the group had the highest activity in non-law proposition in the floor of the House and interpellations and was very effective and accurate (these are the highest rates when compared with the rest of the groups). The group had also a high activity, in relation with the total of the group (T), and accuracy in oral questions on the floor of the House. All this shows that the Catalan group was chiefly centered on public debates with the goal of being influential and its high rates

shows that the group was very efficient.

The high precision in committee procedures is also significant, in particular with the socialist government. This added to activity growth asking for administrative reports shows a tendency to be more active monitoring policies in a very precise way.

In terms of legislatures, one finds that since L-II the group developed a trend of provoking public debates on the floor of the House with the aim of being influential through oral questions - which reached 25% of its total activity in L-III and were very precise. From L-III its activity evolved towards monitoring the government by procedures in committee and report requests. There was also an increase of critical control by tabling motions with a high rate of accuracy.

Finally, in L-V when the group became a supporter of the minority government, the indirizzo procedures of the group were reduced on account of its influence in regular meetings têt a têt with the government. At that time the group was active monitoring policies through appearances in committees and asking for reports.

In sum, the Catalan group always developed an activity aimed at being influential in a cooperative strategy. It finally became a supporting party of government in parliament, a fact that reinforced its bargaining power but forced it to be a straight controller of government policies.

F) The parliamentary control of the Basque nationalist group (Grupo Vasco) (Table 22)

Maintaining a stable parliamentary strength of 2% since L-C the nationalist group from the Basque country (Grupo Vasco) has tabled only few procedures. Its activity indicator has been always under its parliamentary strength although accuracy of its activity has been always high. Its lowest activity rate was in L-III when the party had a crisis and split, but it grew in L-II and L-IV.

As other small groups its activity was mainly developed in indirizzo procedures basically non-law propositions. Since L-II it increased its activity in committees with a high degree of precision, so we can say that it managed to be influential. This group also monitored the government by oral questions on the floor of the House and appearances in committee, in which it was very accurate. For this reason one can say that it was also efficient in controlling policies.

When considering legislatures, we see indirizzo as the main activity of Basque nationalists in L-C and L-I while in L-II we see that appearances in committee, interpellations and motions had high rates in all indicators. By that time, its activity was aimed to produce a critical control of policies.

In L-III, its activity evolved toward questions that pointed out its limited capacity of control. Finally a trend began of being influential while at the same time of monitoring the government in L-IV. This trend was reinforced in L-V when its activity increased a lot and was relevant in all kind of procedures.

In conclusion, one can say that the Basque group had low activity and mainly aimed at being influential in the decision-making process. It acted with accuracy as a result of being a small and stable group.

4.- CONCLUDING REMARKS

First of all, one can affirm the great vitality of the Spanish parliamentary democracy from the viewpoint of control activity.

In the Spanish case the control of the executive has been continuously growing in the first parliaments, reaching a normal level of activity in L-III. It has been the main parliamentary activity in terms of number of procedures. In addition it was developed in big amount of activity. In the last legislatures

administrative report requests and procedures carried on in committees have been very relevant in number. All this shows that parliamentary control is a fundamental activity of the House and has been very precise and specialized with the time.

Although parliamentary activity in Spain is chiefly in hands of parties, which are highly disciplined organizations, the largest number of control procedures (written questions or report requests) were produced by single MPs. They are rather relevant when a party lacks cohesion, but they are usually considered as a complementary mechanism of the group activity.

Diversity of procedures signifies a great development of the parliamentary control. In the case of Spain this great variety of procedures opens a great number of possibilities for controlling the government. That parties use some procedures instead of others with efficacy and accuracy depends on the party system and the strength of the majority.

Generally speaking, parliamentary control in Spain from 1977 to 1996 had different trends. In the two first parliaments, due to constitutional consensus, indirizzo procedures were dominant. In L-II and L-III, though, due to the strength of the socialist government and the division of opposition parties, control was mainly aimed at scrutinizing policies. Finally, in the last two legislatures with a strong opposition parties, parliamentary control was directed towards monitoring and criticizing government policies.

The use of the different procedures by parties depends on their oppositional strategy since parliamentary control is an arena of relationship between government and opposition. Through control procedures, parties can behave competitively or cooperatively with the government. The main opposition group in L-C and L-I, the socialist party, developed an strategy that was both competitive and cooperative. It was competitive in trying to attract support from the public opinion and to gain government, which happened in 1982. It was cooperative because of the constitutional consensus and the need of stability of minority

governments.

In the socialist period of government the main opposition party, the popular group, developed a competitive strategy. When it had a prospect to enter government in the last parliament became highly competitive, based on very critical control. However, its competitiveness was limited by its low opposition strength in L-II and L-III and redirected toward its electoral competition with other center to the right groups for the same vote.

Among the small center to the right groups, the liberal reformist CDS developed at the same time a competitive and cooperative attitude toward the socialist government. It was competitive in order to win bargaining capacity, and cooperative to be influential in policy making. Small nationalist groups were usually cooperative with the governments with the goal of being influential. At the end the Catalan group became a parliamentary supporter of the socialist government. Finally, the communist group was cooperative with the reformist government in the constituent period but was very competitive with the socialist government.

5. TABLES (17-22)

To understand tables:

Total A: percentage of procedures tabled by the group in relation with the total control activity each legislature

Total E: percentage of procedures of the group that have been proceeded, voted, etc. each legislature

Total P: percentage of procedures of the group that have been proceeded, voted etc., in relation with the procedures tabled by the group each legislature (Total E in relation with Total A)

For every procedure:

T: percentage of cases tabled in relation with the total activity of the group each legislature.

A: percentage of cases tabled by the group in relation with the

total number of cases tabled for a single procedure each legislature

E: percentage of cases tabled by the group that have been proceeded, voted, etc., each legislature

P: percentage of cases that have been proceeded, voted, etc., in relation with the cases tabled by the group each legislature.

Table 17: Parliamentary control by Socialist group

	L-C SC	L-C S	L-I SC	L-I SB	L-I S	L-II S	L-III S	L-IV S	L-V S

Totals									
A	4	34	5	0.6	53	6	2	4	5
E	5	33	5	0.6	55	6	2	4	5
P	76	56	68	72	71	84	85	85	76
Non-law propositions on the floor of the House									
T	14	8	5	--	2	0.1	--	1	3
A	7	38	6	--	37	1	--	6	16
E	12	42	12	--	40	6	--	32	40
P	60	42	33	--	19	100	--	93	80
Non-law propositions in committee									
T	8	7	4	2	6	0.8	2	0.8	2
A	6	44	3	0.2	52	5	3	2	4
E	--	40	2	--	57	24	21	13	10
P	--	26	7	--	13	100	100	91	73
Interpellations									
T	32	13	6	21	3	--	--	--	--
A	9	31	5	2	31	--	--	--	--
E	18	51	6	4	24	--	--	--	--
P	58	50	5	78	31	--	--	--	--
Motions									
T	14	4	0.3	2	0.4	--	--	--	--
A	14	38	1	1	24	--	--	--	--
E	20	60	--	--	21	--	--	--	--
P	40	43	--	--	39	--	--	--	--
Oral questions on the floor of the House									
T	5	1	2	12	4	18	31	11	37
A	7	14	1	1	37	8	9	27	31
E	13	20	2	2	41	10	10	32	34
P	100	75	80	80	50	75	80	87	81
Oral questions on committee									
T	19	28	16	7	13	0.6	3	10	3
A	6	74	7	0.4	61	2	0.7	0.1	2
E	9	96	8	0.2	64	3	0.8	0.1	2
P	57	49	71	33	61	60	67	25	52
Written questions									
T	27	37	60	43	60	35	44	32	28
A	3	39	0.1	0.4	56	3	0.9	3	2
E	3	36	5	0.4	57	3	1	3	2
P	70	71	78	83	86	95	95	95	80

Administrative report requests									
T	--	--	2	--	3	30	10	3	2
A	--	--	5	--	80	30	2	0.6	0.9
E	--	--	3	--	84	38	2	0.6	0.9
P	--	--	50	--	72	71	60	82	87
Cabinet appearances on the floor of the House									
T	3	0.3	--	--	0.1	--	--	0.1	--
A	14	14	--	--	11	--	--	2	--
E	14	14	--	--	13	--	--	4	--
P	100	100	--	--	100	--	--	100	--
Government appearances in committee									
T	--	0.3	4	12	8	15	10	18	23
A	--	0.5	2	0.8	48	12	2	6	8
E	--	--	2	0.6	40	12	2	7	9
P	--	--	54	60	60	95	86	66	64
Investigative committee									
T	5	1	0.3	--	0.1	0.4	--	0.1	0.1
A	33	67	9	--	9	33	--	5	4
E	40	80	--	--	33	--	--	33	--
P	100	100	--	--	100	--	--	100	--

Table 18: Parliamentary control by Popular group

	AP L-C	CD L-I	P L-II	P L-III	P L-IV	P L-V

Totals						
A	19	8	83	69	64	65
E	20	8	84	70	65	67
P	60	72	82	85	82	80
Non-law propositions on the floor of the House						
T	8	4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.8
A	22	10	57	48	42	58
E	19	17	31	30	27	35
P	33	30	9	9	11	19
Non-law propositions in committee						
T	3	7	0.5	0.3	1	2
A	12	9	48	8	36	40
E	--	6	56	13	25	40
P	--	8	23	7	10	32
Interpellations						
T	7	5	1	0.4	0.5	0.3
A	10	8	62	39	43	44
E	10	10	76	44	44	45
P	31	53	38	61	69	83
Motions						
T	2	2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2
A	11	17	49	45	46	46
E	6	32	20	39	28	40
P	25	85	11	20	17	40
Oral questions on the floor of the House						
T	6	10	11	3	4	5
A	36	14	76	39	42	49
E	60	8	73	39	40	48
P	90	26	58	72	71	73

Oral questions on committee						
T	9	2	1	4	8	8
A	13	1	54	51	64	72
E	88	1	58	48	66	72
P	25	44	42	53	52	52
Written questions						
T	63	64	76	80	54	63
A	36	9	91	78	67	73
E	35	10	91	77	67	73
P	74	89	91	92	93	87
Administrative report requests						
T	--	0.5	4	7	23	13
A	--	2	62	73	86	73
E	--	1	50	64	86	76
P	--	33	45	57	87	93
Cabinet appereances on the floor of the House						
T	--	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
A	--	11	40	27	29	44
E	--	13	--	--	21	21
P	--	--	--	14	82	80
Government appereances in committee						
T	--	5	5	4	8	8
A	--	4	54	36	40	37
E	--	6	53	34	37	35
P	--	100	90	71	53	55
Investigative committee						
T	1	--	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
A	33	--	56	43	60	54
E	40	--	50	--	33	60
P	100	--	40	--	8	23

Table 19: Parliamentary control by center to the right groups

	L-C UCD	L-I UCD	L-II UCD	L-III CDS	L-IV CDS	L-III Ag.PDP	L-III AG. PL

Totals							
A	8	4	3	9	5	8	1
E	9	5	3	9	4	9	1
P	66	77	84	80	77	87	74
Non-law propositions on the floor of the House							
T	7	3	0.2	0.6	3	0.6	1
A	7	3	1	10	15	9	2
E	15	--	--	19	30	9	--
P	20	13	--	--	--	--	--
Non-law propositions in committee							
T	5	5	1	2	3	1	2
A	8	4	4	16	9	11	2
E	7	10	--	15	20	6	3
P	25	33	--	16	33	74	16
Interpellations							
T	7	2	0.2	1	2	2	2
A	4	1	1	14	11	19	3
E	--	1	--	14	13	13	4
P	--	40	--	57	79	37	83

Motions							
T	--	--	--	0.5	1	0.7	2
A	--	--	--	14	12	16	5
E	--	--	--	9	20	22	--
P	--	--	--	--	--	31	--
Oral questions on the floor of the House							
T	8	13	20	8	10	7	18
A	21	9	5	13	7	10	4
E	7	11	6	13	7	10	4
P	17	54	72	76	76	70	69
Oral questions on committee							
T	8	3	0.2	13	9	8	5
A	5	1	0.4	20	5	12	0.9
E	4	2	--	22	3	12	1
P	33	80	--	64	32	59	73
Written questions							
T	60	70	20	51	40	69	14
A	14	5	0.8	6	4	8	0.2
E	16	6	0.9	6	3	9	0.2
P	84	87	100	88	82	99	98
Administrative report requests							
T	--	0.3	11	8	2	5	14
A	--	0.7	6	10	0.7	6	2
E	--	1	8	14	0.3	8	3
P	--	100	76	89	43	88	76
Cabinet appereances on the floor of the House							
T	--	--	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.1	--
A	--	--	10	15	16	12	--
E	--	--	--	--	8	--	--
P	--	--	--	--	22	--	--
Government appereances in committee							
T	--	3	46	16	28	6	38
A	--	1	19	17	11	7	5
E	--	2	19	18	10	6	5
P	--	78	89	78	51	63	73
Investigative committee							
T	4	0.3	0.7	--	0.2	0.2	0.3
A	50	9	33	--	15	36	7
E	60	--	50	--	--	--	--
P	100	--	--	--	--	--	--

Table 20: Parliamentary control by Catalan group

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V

Totals						
A	5	3	2	2	3	3
E	5	3	2	2	3	3
P	52	64	58	71	72	80
Non-law propositions on the floor of the House						
T	10	15	8	3	4	2
A	7	14	24	13	14	6
E	8	10	44	30	30	13
P	40	12	30	33	33	69

Non-law propositions in committee						
T	6	1	5	3	4	4
A	6	0.7	12	8	8	4
E	7	--	4	3	11	10
P	33	--	7	5	21	71
Interpellations						
T	29	17	3	3	1	1
A	13	10	12	11	9	3
E	10	13	33	8	5	--
P	27	54	25	45	64	--
Motions						
T	10	0.9	0.3	0.9	0.6	0.7
A	14	3	3	6	4	6
E	--	3	--	13	13	12
P	--	50	--	50	83	100
Oral questions on the floor of the House						
T	2	6	24	25	18	7
A	4	3	5	10	8	4
E	7	3	5	9	7	4
P	100	46	61	62	60	77
Oral questions on committee						
T	6	3	0.3	5	2	1
A	3	0.9	0.4	2	0.8	0.4
E	4	0.6	--	2	0.8	0.5
P	67	43	--	72	52	63
Written questions						
T	31	55	42	35	43	49
A	5	3	1	1	3	3
E	6	3	1	1	3	2
P	88	86	89	88	95	93
Administrative report requests						
T	--	--	2	6	6	13
A	--	--	3	2	1	3
E	--	--	5	3	1	3
P	--	--	100	94	87	87
Cabinet appereances on the floor of the House						
T	--	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
A	--	11	10	4	5	3
E	--	13	--	--	8	5
P	--	100	--	--	67	100
Government appereances in committee						
T	--	--	15	19	20	20
A	--	--	5	5	5	4
E	--	--	5	5	4	4
P	--	--	89	55	51	48
Investigative committee						
T	2	--	0.6	0.1	--	0.3
A	17	--	22	7	--	13
E	20	--	50	--	--	--
P	100	--	100	--	--	--

Table 21: Parliamentary control by Communist group

	C L-C	C L-I	4 MPs L-II	Ag.IU L-III	IU L-IV	IU L-V

Totals						
A	10	15	3	3	16	19
E	7	6	3	2	18	17
P	39	26	79	73	90	71
Non-law propositions on the floor of the House						
T	12	6	--	2	0.9	0.6
A	17	24	--	8	15	12
E	19	14	--	9	16	10
P	42	10	--	15	17	26
Non-law propositions in committee						
T	20	11	--	7	5	5
A	37	28	--	19	44	38
E	40	25	--	28	38	30
P	32	11	--	23	13	26
Interpellations						
T	35	0.6	1	0.9	1	1
A	26	2	7	6	27	38
E	28	2	33	3	31	43
P	32	43	40	50	78	81
Motions						
T	8	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.9	0.9
A	22	1	3	6	32	43
E	14	3	10	9	38	42
P	13	100	100	33	33	46
Oral questions on the floor of the House						
T	8	4	10	9	3	3
A	29	9	3	4	8	8
E	40	11	3	4	7	7
P	75	54	55	65	70	61
Oral questions on committee						
T	6	1	18	17	15	9
A	5	1	33	7	28	25
E	2	2	31	7	28	25
P	17	73	37	57	51	52
Written questions						
T	8	20	62	38	63	52
A	3	5	3	1	19	18
E	3	6	3	1	20	18
P	75	87	94	97	94	88
Administrative report requests						
T	--	0.5	0.8	7	10	11
A	--	5	0.5	2	10	18
E	--	3	0.9	4	10	14
P	--	50	100	94	90	71
Cabinet appereances on the floor of the House						
T	--	0.1	--	0.5	0.3	0.1
A	--	22	--	15	29	29
E	--	25	--	--	17	32
P	--	100	--	--	24	60

Government appereances in committee						
T	--	7	8	18	18	17
A	--	12	4	6	23	23
E	--	6	4	6	21	18
P	--	38	92	69	52	45
Investigative committee						
T	2	0.1	--	0.5	0.1	0.1
A	33	19	--	21	10	17
E	40	33	--	--	--	--
P	100	50	--	--	--	--

Table 22: Parliamentary control by Basque group

	L-C	L-I	L-II	L-III	L-IV	L-V

Totals						
A	2	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.9	2
E	2	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	2
P	67	65	79	78	70	68
Non-law propositions on the floor of the House						
T	40	13	2	3	7	4
A	9	3	2	3	7	8
E	19	5	--	--	16	8
P	83	29	--	--	35	33
Non-law propositions in committee						
T	7	6	1	2	1	12
A	2	0.7	0.7	1	0.5	10
E	--	--	--	3	3	14
P	--	--	--	33	67	44
Interpellations						
T	27	26	7	4	4	0.6
A	3	4	3	4	5	3
E	3	4	5	3	5	--
P	25	50	43	50	78	--
Motions						
T	--	4	2	2	1	--
A	--	3	5	3	3	--
E	--	--	20	--	--	--
P	--	--	100	--	--	--
Oral questions on the floor of the House						
T	7	7	23	21	28	10
A	4	0.9	1	4	4	4
E	7	2	1	4	4	3
P	100	100	65	78	74	68
Oral questions on committee						
T	7	2	1	4	2	--
A	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.2	--
E	2	0.2	1	0.4	0.1	--
P	100	100	100	50	40	--
Written questions						
T	--	37	13	46	29	43
A	--	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.5	2
E	--	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.4	2
P	--	90	100	97	82	93

Administrative report requests						
T	--	--	1	--	2	8
A	--	--	0.1	--	0.1	1
E	--	--	0.2	--	0.1	1
P	--	--	100	--	83	89
Cabinet appereances on the floor of the House						
T	--	--	1	1	2	0.3
A	--	--	10	8	9	6
E	--	--	--	--	4	11
P	--	--	--	--	20	100
Government appereances in committee						
T	--	6	48	9	23	22
A	--	0.4	5	0.7	2	3
E	--	0.6	5	0.7	2	2
P	--	100	89	71	73	36
Investigative committee						
T	13	--	2	1	--	0.5
A	33	--	22	14	--	13
E	40	--	50	--	--	--
P	100	--	100	--	--	--

6. NOTES

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