



ICEI Instituto Complutense
de Estudios Internacionales

Building Public Support for Development Cooperation

Agata Czaplińska
PP 02/07

Abstract

The current development agenda envisages a substantial increase in volumes of development assistance along with changes in other policies which affect developing countries, including trade, debt and migration. Successful and sustainable international development cooperation policies and expenditures are believed to require a constituency for aid in donor countries. The paper explores the question of how public support for international development cooperation in donor countries can be built and nurtured. It attempts to identify factors which determine public attitudes towards development assistance and measures that can be undertaken by state authorities to exploit these factors to the advantage of a greater support for development cooperation. It reviews rationales and arguments which can be used to explain to the publics of donor countries the need of transferring a part of their national income to developing countries. It also presents approaches which have been developed by donors in order to enhance public understanding of the need for development cooperation and to strengthen support for development assistance.

Keywords: international development cooperation, public opinion, public involvement, Official Development Assistance (ODA), new donors.

Resumen

La actual agenda de desarrollo internacional prevé un substancial incremento de volúmenes de ayuda al desarrollo, junto con cambios en las demás políticas que afectan a los países en desarrollo, tales como la política comercial, de deuda y de migración, entre otras. Unas exitosas y sostenibles políticas de cooperación al desarrollo requieren, como se supone, la existencia en los países donantes de una ciudadanía que reclama la ayuda al desarrollo. En este artículo se investiga la cuestión de cómo impulsar y fomentar en los países donantes el apoyo público a favor de la cooperación al desarrollo. Se pretende identificar los factores que determinan las actitudes de los ciudadanos en cuanto a la ayuda al desarrollo, así como las medidas que las autoridades públicas pueden implementar con el fin de aprovechar dichos factores para conseguir un mayor apoyo público a la cooperación. Se revisan argumentos que se pueden empelar para explicar a los ciudadanos de los países donantes la necesidad de transferir una parte de su renta nacional a los países en desarrollo. Además, se presentan enfoques empleados por los donantes para facilitar la comprensión de la necesidad de cooperación al desarrollo, así como para aumentar el nivel de apoyo público a la ayuda al desarrollo.

Palabras clave: cooperación internacional al desarrollo, opinión pública, participación pública, Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD), nuevos donantes.

Agata Czaplińska (agata.czaplinska@interia.pl) trabaja en el Departamento de Cooperación al Desarrollo en el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Polonia, donde es encargada del área de comunicación e información sobre el programa de ayuda al desarrollo de Polonia y de educación al desarrollo. La autora es alumna del programa de Magister en Desarrollo y Ayuda Internacional en el Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI). Este trabajo es una versión resumida de la tesina realizada en el marco del programa. Los juicios expuestos en este trabajo representan sus consideraciones privadas y no necesariamente reflejan las opiniones de la institución en la cual trabaja la autora.

Agata Czaplińska (agata.czaplinska@interia.pl) works at the Development Cooperation Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she is responsible for communication and information on Polish development assistance programme and development education. The author graduated from the Master's programme in Development and International Aid delivered by Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI). This paper is a shortened version of her Master's thesis written within the framework of the programme. Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institution for which she works.

© Agata Czaplińska, 2007

El ICEI no comparte necesariamente las opiniones expresadas en este trabajo, que son de exclusiva responsabilidad de su autora.

Contents

Introduction	4
1. Public Support and official development assistance	5
1.1. Key dimensions of public support for aid	5
1.2. Importance of public opinion for aid policy	6
1.3. The profile of public attitudes towards aid in donor countries	6
1.3.1. Current levels of support for aid by donor country	7
1.3.2. Trends in public support	9
1.3.3. Public awareness of aid and development cooperation	10
1.3.3.1. Awareness about official aid	10
1.3.3.2. Humanitarian and emergency aid bias	11
1.3.3.3. Awareness and understanding of development issues	11
1.3.4. Arguments against aid	12
1.3.5. Motives and supported objectives of aid	12
1.4. Impact of public attitudes on aid policy	12
1.5. Determinants of public support for aid	13
1.5.1. Economic factors	13
1.5.2. Openness to and dependence on foreign trade	14
1.5.3. Social values and long-term socio-economic choices	14
1.5.4. Awareness of official aid and development cooperation policy	14
1.5.5. Interest in and awareness of development issues	15
1.6. Conclusions on chapter one	15
2. Aid justified	15
2.1. World development today	15
2.1.1. Global poverty and inequity	15
2.1.2. Globalisation and today's threats and challenges	17
2.1.3. Aid – a crucial aspect of the response	19
2.2. Justifications for aid	19
2.2.1. Aid as a Moral duty	19
2.2.2. Aid as a manifestation of justice	20
2.2.3. Aid as a human rights-based duty	21
2.2.4. Aid in self-interest: a mechanism of provision of global public goods	23
2.3. Conclusions on chapter two	25
3. Policies and instruments for mobilizing public support for development assistance	26
3.1. Development education and global education	26
3.2. Level of funding for communication and development education	27
3.3. Legislative and policy framework	29
3.4. Institutions and structures	29
3.5. Target groups	31
3.6. Programmes, activities and policy measures	32
3.6.1. Formal education	32
3.6.2. Information and communication on development policy	33
3.6.3. Stimulating public debate	33
3.6.4. The media	34
3.6.5. Promoting direct involvement and direct exposure	34
3.7. Conclusions on chapter three	35
4. Final conclusions	35
Bibliography	37
Annex 1: Millennium development goals	41
Annex 2: Donor ODA spending relative to the national income	42
Annex 3: List of acronyms	43

Introduction

The current development agenda envisages a substantial increase in volumes of assistance directed from the wealthier part of the world to developing countries with a view to enhancing their development efforts. The challenge is encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – a global plan to decisively reduce extreme poverty in all its key dimensions – which are derived from the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000. By agreeing to the Goals, the international community assumed co-responsibility for attaining a greater global cohesion. Goal 8 calls on the need to develop global partnership for development, which should include creating better trade and financial conditions for development and providing more generous development assistance.¹

By underwriting the Monterrey Consensus, agreed at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, developed countries committed to gradually increase volumes of development assistance, to ultimately attain the long-standing target of 0.7% of donor-country national income.

These commitments were reaffirmed by the European Union in May 2005, when the Council agreed on reaching by 2010 a collective aid target of 0.56% of members' national income and accepted a corresponding schedule of aid increments. The timetable obliges the EU-15 member states to achieve a level of 0.51% ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015. The new member states are obligated to strive to increase their ODA up to 0.17% of national income by 2010 and up to 0.33% by 2015.²

Along with quantitative aspects, the global development cooperation agenda foresees changes in an array of policies affecting development, including trade, debt and migration. It also calls for reforming aid instruments and management systems. All this with the aim of improving aid effectiveness and generating more suitable conditions for development.

However, the challenge that the donor community faces goes beyond figures, numbers and better administrative procedures. Conventional wisdom suggests that successful and sustainable development cooperation policies and expenditures require a constituency for aid in donor countries. Expanding aid programmes and budgets not only should be made known to the citizens but they also need to be understood and approved of. Otherwise, effectiveness of development policy may be endangered due to policy incoherence – e.g. if aid policy is contradicted by trade policy – and unreliable levels of funding. Ideally, support for development cooperation should come from a public sense of “ownership” of aid policies – i.e. a genuine identification with its ends and means.

The aforementioned task will be particularly demanding for newcomers to the donor community, such as the new member states of the UE. While still benefiting from incoming aid funds, these countries are at the very beginning of the process of recognition of their donor status. As the governments in new donor countries steadily increase aid budgets, to many of their citizens it does not seem obvious that their countries should assist others.

Public understanding of aid policies may appear more difficult seeing the anticipated gradual adoption of more sophisticated aid instruments³ and delivery mechanisms.⁴ While these are expected to enhance aid effectiveness, they also imply lesser aid visibility and weakening of a discernible link between donor societies and beneficiary communities in recipient countries.

This paper explores the question of how public support for development cooperation in

¹ Unless explicitly indicated, the terms aid, development aid, development assistance, foreign aid, and ODA are used interchangeably to refer to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). In line with the definition by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, ODA means technical assistance, grants or loans to developing countries (i.e. countries specified on the DAC List of Aid Recipients) which are undertaken by the official sector at concessional financial terms with the main objective of promoting economic development and welfare.

² As of 2005, the average for UE-15 was 0.44% ODA/GNI and for EU-10 it did not exceed 0.1 % ODA/GNI. For figures on ODA spending by particular countries see appendix 2.

³ Such as e.g. programme aid, Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) or General Budget Support, instead of project-based assistance.

⁴ Such as e.g. delegated cooperation or trust funds.

donor countries can be built and nurtured. It seeks to identify factors determining public attitudes towards development assistance as well as measures that can be undertaken by state authorities to exploit these factors to the advantage of a greater support for aid. It attempts to find reasonable and convincing arguments which can explain to the public the need of transferring a minor part of the national income to developing countries. It also intends to depict what approaches can be developed to enhance public support for development cooperation.

Chapter one addresses the question of relevance of public attitudes for development cooperation. It explains what public support for development cooperation actually stands for, how it is revealed and how it can be measured. The chapter clarifies why public support is needed in this policy field. It gives the profile of public attitudes towards aid, concentrating on the publics of the EU countries and results of public opinion surveys. It also reviews relationships between public support for aid and the volume of aid expenditures and examines assorted socioeconomic, political and historical determinants of aid allocations.

Chapter two deals with possible justifications for aid from the point of view of public support. It presents the major development challenges of today's world that call for more vibrant international cooperation, including development assistance. It outlines the main arguments which give explanation for why the societies of developed countries should contribute to global poverty reduction and assist poorer countries in their development efforts.

Chapter three explores measures that can be taken by donors to build and foster support for development aid. It reviews concepts, policies and instruments which have been developed, mainly within development cooperation programmes, with a view to raising public awareness of international development policies and programmes and thus facilitating understanding of development issues among societies of donor countries.

The final conclusions of this paper point to major considerations to be taken into account when tackling the problem of building public support for development cooperation. These include the conditions which shape public attitudes towards development assistance, the most convincing and realistic arguments that can be used in the short and medium term to communicate the need for a greater aid effort

as well as promising vehicles for conveying the message on development cooperation. Lastly, obstacles and opportunities for generating and strengthening support for development aid – with a special focus on the conditions of new donor countries – are identified.

1. Public Support and official development assistance

The analysis presented in this paper rests on the assumption that citizens' consent is indispensable for a substantial and lasting increase in development aid expenditures to come about and that such consent can be generated by undertaking deliberate measures to this end. The reasoning behind this assumption draws from the logic of political decision-making in democratic societies: increased aid levels and more coherent development cooperation policies require political will; political will is built through wide and sustained political support, which comes from the support base, that is voters. However, as it will be explained in the following paragraphs, the relationship between aid allocations and the position on aid and other development policy choices is more complex. This chapter explores the merit of public support for development assistance, presents the overall profile of donor countries' public attitudes towards aid and attempts to determine what factors are decisive in shaping public sentiments on the matter.

1.1. KEY DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AID

To begin with, it is important to consider what public support for development aid actually stands for and how it is manifested. Firstly, people in donor countries contribute to development cooperation through paying taxes. Regardless of one's attitude to development assistance, a part of his or her contribution to the state budget is spent on financing official aid programmes and other development-related cooperation policies undertaken by governments on behalf of the citizens. Customarily, as in many other policy fields, citizens' support for these governmental efforts is gauged by public opinion polling.

In theory, support for development cooperation could also be expressed through regular mechanisms of political accountability practi-

ced in democratic societies. This is of course subject to the condition that development cooperation is a part of party programmes, that voters take it into account when marking the ballot and that it is possible to distinguish this factor as more decisive than others. In reality, however, in electoral campaigns development cooperation is overshadowed by other, mostly domestic, policy concerns.⁵

Secondly, people contribute to development cooperation through their attitudes and individual decisions and choices made in the private sphere of life. Donations to Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) can serve as a proxy for public attitudes towards development cooperation (USAID 2002).⁶ In addition, one can make non-financial contributions to the works of NGDOs through volunteering. There is no doubt that spending money or time on something is much more meaningful and concrete than merely expressing opinion about it. Yet active participation and involvement of individuals goes beyond donating time: one can contribute his or her ideas and criticism, for example by engaging in the public debate. The spectrum of individual informed decisions that have to do with development issues also includes ethical consumer behaviour, such as purchase of fair trade goods.

1.2. IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR AID POLICY

Before entering into a more detailed analysis, consideration needs to be taken of why public attitudes towards development cooperation should matter to policy makers. Two major reasons for relevance of citizens' engagement in this policy field can be distinguished (McDonnell et al. 2003; Fransman and Solignac Lecomte 2004).

First, in democratic countries, public awareness and understanding of public policies are

⁵ As it will be explained further on, support for development cooperation in electoral processes is possibly expressed in a more indirect way.

⁶ USAID (2002) uses the volume of the US private assistance, which includes contributions from foundations, NGOs, trade unions, universities and colleges, and religious congregations, in addition to corporations and private remittances, to prove that the aid effort made by US society is far bigger than that gauged only by ODA.

desirable per se. A legitimate and effective democracy requires participation and active involvement of all citizens. In addition, it is important for political accountability to taxpayers. As regards international development, the public in donor countries benefit from the assistance given to developing and transition countries (further discussed in 0). Thus the public are "shareholders" in the sense that it is their taxes that finance aid programmes and their elected representatives who formulate and monitor realisation of aid policies. The "return" the public receive on this investment is greater prosperity and human security throughout the world.

Second, public engagement has an instrumental value to formulation and implementation of aid policies. International solidarity and generosity demonstrated by the public clearly indicates that it can provide a precious input and impetus in favour of more vigorous, coherent and efficient international development cooperation policies. Development cooperation is not an exclusive responsibility of governments. Civil society organisations, especially NGDOs and trade unions, already offer invaluable expertise and relevant ideas and have an important function in the implementation of development policies. The role of local governments and the business sector in this regard is growing. Conversely, lack of public engagement and awareness of the reasoning behind these policies is likely to cause resistance, to impede their sustainability and effectiveness as well as to obstruct mobilisation of new resources to finance them.

1.3. THE PROFILE OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS AID IN DONOR COUNTRIES

Using opinion polls as a measure of public support for aid and development cooperation and as a basis for international comparisons has certain limitations. Opinion polls give information on purely declarative support: they attempt to measure public support for the principle of giving aid in general and people's satisfaction with the levels of ODA. Most commonly, the data is based on responses to questions asking: "Do you favour the provision of aid to poor countries?" or "Do you think it is important for your country to help poor countries?" (McDonnell et al. 2003; Fransman et al. 2004). Polls rarely deliver information on underlying attitudes and values and on preferable directions of aid. In addition, polls usually neglect people's approach to policy issues going

beyond aid, for instance trade, debt and immigration policy.

Smillie and Helmich (1998) observe that public interest in helping people in need and support for ODA are not necessarily equivalent. They explain that people may not have an attitude towards development cooperation but they have a clear attitude towards poverty reduction, yet they do not see ODA as a strategy to achieve it. In a similar vein, Fowler (1997: 133) makes a point about the temperature of aid funds. He differentiates between hot money donated to NGOs for child sponsorship in response to a particular appeal, which comes from individual concern and is loaded with personal warmth and expectations, and cold multi-million tax money going through numerous bureaucratic procedures to finance multilateral and bilateral aid programmes, and hitherto deprived of personal human attachment.⁷ In effect, surveys hardly ever distinguish between different types of donor agencies, such as international organisations, national governments and NGOs. Respondents tend to associate the United Nations and NGOs with “helping agencies” and to found their judgements on the most visible activities of aid agencies, that is to say those which attract media attention, either positive or negative (Box and Kruijer 1997).

Finally, poll-based data is believed to be not sufficiently reliable and systematic to allow for viable international comparisons. Poll findings depend not only on the wording of the questions, which is not uniform across countries, but on other circumstances as well, for example the particular point in time when the survey is carried out (Fransman et al. 2004).⁸ Comparable data on the practical support for aid, such as donations to NGOs or consumer behaviour, is even more limited. Therefore, the analysis presented here is based primarily on the declarative expression of attitudes towards aid, gathered in national polls and in Eurobarometer survey. A special Eurobarometer sur-

vey is undertaken every four years at the request of the European Commission in order to measure public support for international cooperation in the European Union.

1.3.1. Current levels of support for aid by donor country

According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey (2005), 91% of EU citizens can be understood to support development aid (see Figure 1). As already highlighted, this data refers to the principle of giving aid to poorer countries. It is based on a question about perceptions of importance of helping people in poor countries to develop and is calculated as a sum total of responses judging such help to be “very important” and “fairly important”.⁹ Even though the level of the aggregate perception of importance may seem high, a breakdown of the responses by the strength of the conviction shows (Figure 2) that only 53% of EU citizens take a strong stance on aid (responding “very important”) and as many as 38% of EU citizens are more reluctant supporters (responding “fairly important”).


As illustrated in Figure 2, the breakdown of the responses, as opposed to relying on the overall proportion of those believing in importance of development aid, is also more instructive in identifying in which countries people are most and least supportive of aid. In Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Malta Ireland, Italy, Poland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Greece, the overall perception of importance of aid exceeds the EU average of 91%. Nonetheless, as in the case of Italy, Netherlands and Poland, this does not necessarily correspond with high levels – i.e. above or much above the EU average of 53% – of strong conviction on the matter. The highest proportions of strong positive feelings about the importance of aid are to be found in Sweden and Cyprus, followed by Malta, Luxemburg, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom.

⁷As a matter of fact, Fowler (1997: 133) points to a somewhat warmer character of bilateral funds, as opposed to highly anonymous and impersonal multilateral aid, because they are destined to a discernible country and population.

⁸ Poll results can be largely biased for example when surveys coincide with humanitarian emergencies in developing countries, caused by natural disasters or conflict, which are often accompanied by public appeals for humanitarian assistance.


⁹ The exact wording of the question: In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, etc. to develop? (Eurobarometer 2005).

Figure 1
Support for aid in the European Union: overall perception of importance of helping poor countries to develop



SOURCE: Eurobarometer (2005).

Figure 2
Support for aid in the European Union: perception of importance of helping poor countries to develop broken down by the strength of the conviction



SOURCE: Eurobarometer (2005).


1.3.2. Trends in public support

Conclusions from various opinion polls indicate that support for development aid is not only high but also generally stable among the publics of donor countries (Stern 1998; Smillie and Helmich 1998; McDonnell et al. 2003).

Data from the consecutive waves of Eurobarometer surveys on attitudes towards development aid (see Figure 3) show a sharp increase

in perceptions of importance of aid in the first half of the 1990s (from 80% in 1991 up to 95% in 1995), which was followed by a decline in the second half of the 1990s (reaching a low of 76% in 1998). The trend has been reversed since then and a steady increase in the recognition of the importance of development aid can be observed.

Figure 3
Evolution of public support for aid in the European Union



SOURCE: Eurobarometer (2005).

The dent in the level of public support for aid in the European Union in the second half of the 1990s corresponds with the marked decline in aid volumes by OECD donors in the same period (see Figure 4).¹⁰ The so-called “aid fatigue,” as the phenomenon was baptized, was to be associated with public disillusion with development aid on account of its ineffectiveness. However, there is evidence contradicting the hypothesis of the “aid fatigue” or “compassion fatigue” among the public.¹¹ Ha-


ving examined thirty public opinion surveys, Stern (1998) observes that support has not dropped in comparison with 15 years before and even rose slightly. The fall in levels of ODA observed until 2001 was not matched by a decline in donations from the public to humanitarian and development NGOs. Quite the opposite, the public turned out to be increasingly generous. Likewise, grants from NGOs were more stable than official aid flows to developing countries (White 2002; McDonnell et al. 2003; Fransman et al. 2004).

¹⁰ This decline in aid volumes was partly due to the diversion of aid funds from the poorest countries to the former communist countries, of which many –particularly those located in Europe– do not qualify as ODA recipients (White 2002).

¹¹ The term “aid fatigue” originally referred to public disillusion with humanitarian aid and only later was extended to the alle-

ged overall reluctance towards development aid in general (McDonnell et al. 2003).

Figure 4
Evolution of ODA levels in OECD countries 1960-2003



SOURCE: DAC/OECD on-line database.

There are a few possible explanations of this sustained financial support for NGOs' efforts in the development field. It may mean that NGOs are preferred suppliers of development programmes, ahead of governments. Besides, the 1990s saw an upsurge in disasters and wars which received real-time media coverage, thus generating a convincing appeal for aid to the public (McDonnell et al. 2003).¹²

However, the data on high levels of public support for development aid has to be considered with caution and seen in the context of other policies of interest to the public. As a general rule, aid is not given high priority among public concerns. The public is inclined to give higher consideration to their domestic problems in the first place, especially domestic poverty and economic affairs (Smillie and Hel-

mich 1998; Stern 1998).¹³ In addition, aid ranks low among foreign policy priorities (Stern 1998).

1.3.3. Public awareness of aid and development cooperation

Another reason for reservation towards data on public support for development aid comes from low public awareness of official aid, development cooperation policies and development issues in general. As Ian Smillie once put it, "Public support is a mile wide and an inch deep."¹⁴

1.3.3.1. Awareness about official aid

First, only two thirds of citizens of the former EU-15 group and two in five in the ten new Member States realize that their governments

¹² Smillie and Helmich (1998: 26) observe that while some NGOs in some countries have registered a drop or a slowdown in donations growth, in general, donations for international development and emergency work during the 1990s have not declined for larger organisations. They explain that declines for smaller NGOs were likely to be a loss of "market share" to larger mainstream "brand-name" NGOs, rather than a sign of "compassion fatigue".

¹³ Smillie and Helmich (1998) comment, however, that the public bias towards dealing with domestic issues does not preclude public support for the principle of poverty reduction and for promoting development in other countries.

¹⁴ Quoted in Smillie and Helmich 1998.

provide aid to developing countries (Eurobarometer 2005).

Second, people tend to overestimate their government's aid effort substantially. Approximately 40% of Europeans declare not to know how much their government spends on foreign aid. Another 40% estimate aid volumes to be between 1-4%, 5-9% or more than 10% of the state budget. Only the smallest proportion assess the aid level to be less than 1% (Eurobarometer 2003), whereas, in fact, rates vary between 0.20% and 0.96% of GDP. In the same way, a majority of Americans wrongly think that about 20% of the federal budget is spent on foreign aid (Fransman and Solignac Lecomte 2004). Most Americans believe that the level of government spending on aid is comparable to expenditures on social security and medical care (Smillie and Helmich 1998: 22).

1.3.3.2. Humanitarian and emergency aid bias

Third, as a general rule, the vast public support for foreign aid is based upon the erroneous belief that it will be spent on remedying humanitarian crises (Fransman and Solignac Lecomte 2004). This widespread association of development aid with humanitarian assistance is largely due to the nature of coverage that developing countries receive in the media. The media, principally television, followed by print, is the primary self-identified source of information on developing countries among the publics of OECD countries (about 80% on average) (McDonnell et al. 2003). The media focus on war and famine, especially characteristic of television, tends to overshadow all other development-related issues. Given the often shallow and sensationalistic coverage of affairs of developing countries, dominated by negative images of disaster and conflict, the media bear a part of responsibility for one-dimensional perception of development aid and partial understanding of development issues among the public.

1.3.3.3. Awareness and understanding of development issues

Fourth, another indication of low awareness of development issues and the challenges of development cooperation comes from polls probing people's familiarity with the MDGs. The MDGs clearly set out key dimensions of extreme poverty and bind the signatories of the UN Millennium Declaration to decisively reduce

poverty to concrete targets. They represent the global anti-poverty consensus and constitute a framework for measuring development progress. However, public awareness of this development challenge is very low. Four years on since their adoption, as many as 88% of EU citizens declare not to have heard of the MDGs. The highest levels of awareness were registered in Sweden, Italy and Austria (27%, 19% and 18% respectively), where government-led or civil society-led MDG campaigns took place. Also worth noting is an overall low confidence in the achievement of the goals.¹⁵ For each goal, one in ten or less respondents believe the goal will "definitely" be achieved by the set date. The prospects for the attainment of the primary goal of reducing extreme poverty and hunger are met with scepticism of more than two thirds of EU citizens (Eurobarometer 2005).

Notwithstanding this gloomy picture, the literature on public awareness of development issues also points to a number of positive signs in this regard. McDonnell et al. (2003) observe that despite the emergency aid bias in public perception of aid and a lesser focus on other issues that add up to the agendas of donors (namely access of poor countries to Northern markets, reform of agricultural policies, education and capacity building, gender equality, environmental sustainability, etc.), there is evidence of an increasing recognition of non-aid policies such as international trade, debt relief and good governance in recipient countries as solutions for poverty reduction.¹⁶ McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte (2002) highlight a growing consciousness of the need for poverty reduction and a significant single-issue (occasionally in-depth) awareness. This particular awareness essentially refers to issues such as debt relief, fair trade, environmental sustainability or taxation of international financial flows (the Tobin Tax), which have been advocated for in well-targeted campaigns led by the NGO community and supported by opinion leaders and the media.

¹⁵ The respondents were asked about their confidence in the achievement of the goals upon being briefed on the origin of the MDGs and the underlying objective being to improve the lives of people in developing countries by the year 2015 (Eurobarometer 2005).

¹⁶ The conclusion is based on data from the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands (McDonnell et al. 2003).

1.3.4. Arguments against aid

The main argument of the small segment of the EU-15 public opinion not supportive of development aid resides in a higher priority attached to solving problems of domestic poverty, unemployment and of the economy. Suspicion that aid will be detoured and, instead of reaching the neediest, will benefit corrupt governments is the second most frequently given justification against aid. It is followed by a conviction that, before receiving aid, poor countries should stop fighting and buying arms. Excessive cost of aid and scepticism that aid is not conducive to the improvement of the situation in poor countries are pointed to by somewhat lower proportions of respondents (Eurobarometer 2003).

1.3.5. Motives and supported objectives of aid

As it has already been established, public attitudes towards development cooperation are characterized by a humanitarian bias. Poll results indicate that humanitarian concerns – particularly famine, starvation, malnutrition, war and conflict – are only second in importance to environmental concerns and take precedence before all other dimensions, such as poverty and global inequalities, international trade, governance or democracy issues (McDonnell et al. 2003).¹⁷ These findings correspond with the most popular objectives of foreign aid indicated by Stern (1998), namely health care, basic needs, disaster assistance, and protecting the environment. Stern also finds that people tend to more approve of aid to needy developing countries than to (former) strategic allies and tend to favour neighbours over the distant poor.

A strong appeal of humanitarian and emergency aid and a greater disposition to help the neighbours should come as no surprise, given that people are more inclined to support a cause with which they can identify and which can be easily translated into their daily lives. Vague concepts, such as poverty reduction, are met with reluctance and do not find fertile ground unless converted into clear messages and bac-

ked by a concrete objective. Lessons learnt from campaigns – such as the Jubilee 2000 Campaign (for Third world debt cancellation), land mines, MDGs – indicate that tangible expected results and a feeling of making a difference are more likely to get public support (McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte 2002). Aid is met with sympathy when it is seen as directly contributing to reducing human suffering. It is also observed that even though moral and humanitarian reasons predominate, there is also a growing recognition of self-interest as an additional motive (Smillie and Helmich 1998).¹⁸

1.4. IMPACT OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON AID POLICY

Having seen the profile of public attitudes towards aid, let's now consider the role of public opinion in aid policy-making. It is reasonable to expect that in democratic societies public preferences would be accounted for by policy makers who decide on aid allocations. In fact, the relationship between public support and government expenditures on ODA is found to be a very complex one (McDonnell et al. 2003). By analyzing cross-country data, Stern (1998) finds the relationship to be positive and especially strong among the Nordic countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden – and the Netherlands. This conclusion – and thus the hypothesis about direct influence of public opinion on aid policy – is challenged by findings from longitudinal analysis based on both global and single-country data. By contrasting generally high and stable average levels of support for aid with overall declining volumes of ODA (as percentage of GDP) in OECD countries, McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte (2002) contest the positive correlation. The elusive character of the relationship is further confirmed by evidence from particular countries where fluctuations in ODA and the level of support were going in different directions (Norway, Canada) or where no correspondence was observed (UK).

¹⁷ On the basis of UNFPA and MORI survey *Population Issues in the Developing World: 1996 and 2001 Public Opinion Research* in 13 European countries, quoted by McDonnell et al. 2003.

¹⁸ Self-interest is understood here as a recognition of effects of a growing interconnectedness among remote societies; it means understating of consequences of the development gap to the well-being of people in the developed world.

McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte (2002) argue that it is due to shallow public awareness and understanding about global development and poverty issues, that public opinion fails to influence policy making in this area. Without in-depth knowledge about development issues, the public is thought to be incapable of articulating its support by undertaking effective actions to exert pressure on decision-makers.

Olsen (2000) explains that a possible link between public opinion and development aid should be considered in a broader context of foreign policy-making. As regards foreign policy, decision-making is confined to an elite of political leaders and their advisors. The public is easily influenced and manipulated by their opinions and attitudes, because it is more concerned with domestic issues than with international affairs, of which it has a limited knowledge. Given that development cooperation belongs to foreign policy, mechanisms of decision-making on aid follow the same top-down pattern and take little account of general public's preferences. In particular, a weak link between the government and the public in this policy field consists in centralisation of decisions on aid, limited involvement of parliaments (scarce debates on development cooperation) and NGO monopoly on dialogue with the government.

Furthermore, an analysis of the changing development cooperation policy in the United Kingdom led to the conclusion that the influence of public opinion resides in providing a basic political context within which development is seen as important, rather than in determining the outcome of particular policy debates (ODI 2003).

1.5. DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AID

Finally, consideration has to be given to how public attitudes towards development cooperation are formed and what forces are relevant to the process. Research into the matter relies on cross-country comparisons –taking into account people's attitudes, historical backgrounds of societies and their socio-economic arrangements– as well as on analysis of socio-demographic data and declared values and opinions (measured by polls) within a single country. A few clusters of possible explanations for people's stance on foreign aid can be distinguished.

1.5.1. Economic factors

There is a reasonable assumption that people enjoying economic well-being, high levels of income and an optimistic economic outlook would be more willing to share their resources. Having analyzed correlations between rates of public support for aid and three indicators of economic well-being, namely GDP growth, unemployment rate, and the health of domestic public finances (budget balance), Stern (1998) finds the relationships not to be significant, thus proving this hypothesis to be false.

More specifically, the positive correlation between support for aid and unemployment rates pointed to a stronger support in countries with higher unemployment rates. The weak negative correlation between support for aid and the health of public finance indicated a stronger support in countries with fiscal deficits.¹⁹ The correlation between support for aid and real GDP growth rates was found to be weak, suggesting only marginally stronger support at times of economic prosperity.

However, evidence from longitudinal studies from a number of countries shows a stronger influence of perceptions of economic well-being on attitudes towards maintaining or increasing levels of aid and point to a lessening support in bad times or in a sentiment of economic crisis. In Sweden, for instance, support for aid tends to increase when Swedes expect their economy to perform better and falls when the economic prospects are more pessimistic. It has been observed that support for aid dropped when the Swedish government announced budget cuts because of macroeconomic difficulties (McDonnell et al. 2003: 202).

The conclusion on the non-decisive character of economic conditions in donor countries in relation to support for aid can be further supported with examples of countries such as Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, which in the 1990s were considered to be low-income donor countries, yet strong supporters of aid. A higher disposition to international solidarity in

¹⁹ Stern (1998) further explains that larger fiscal deficits may be linked to a larger public sector role in a society and therefore greater public support for public assistance both at home and abroad.

Ireland, Spain and Greece may arise from their own history of poverty, famine and conflict (McDonnell et al. 2003). Another possible reason for sympathy towards giving aid in these countries may be their recent status of recipients of external resource transfers (i.e. from the EU budget) (Stern 1998).

1.5.2. Openness to and dependence on foreign trade

Another possible explanation is derived from potential effects of country's openness to foreign economic influences. It could be expected that a bigger role of foreign trade in the domestic economy would result in a greater public concern for the social, political and economic welfare of other nations. Testing the hypothesis with two proxies of exposure to international trade, that is a country's level of trade dependence (the value of export and imports against GDP) and tariff levels revealed a weak positive relationship with rates of support for aid in both cases. This leads to the conclusion that dependence on and openness to international economic exchange may only marginally contribute to a bigger support for aid (Stern 1998).

1.5.3. Social values and long-term socio-economic choices

Furthermore, development cooperation policy can be perceived as an international projection of donor-country domestic policies, particularly redistribution mechanisms that characterize the organisation of social relations (Noël and Thérien 1995). In line with this reasoning, public attitudes towards aid should be rooted in social values and reflect a vision of the society that people want to live in. Aid generosity of Nordic countries and their commitment to welfare society give good reason for the assumption that societies concerned with domestic solidarity, equity and the welfare of the disadvantaged should be more supportive of international aid.

Social and institutional arrangements identified by Stern (1998) as instrumental in probing this assumption include: domestic income equality, level of social spending, size of

government, and equity of foreign aid allocations.²⁰ Indeed, according to his findings, domestic income equality and the size of the government sector in relation to the overall economy appear to be strongly correlated with support for aid: societies where the income gap between the rich and the poor is smaller and where government expenditure as percentage of GDP is higher turn out to be more supportive of aid. The level of government spending on programmes such as social security and welfare (as percentage of GDP) and the degree to which donor country aid programmes target the neediest countries are also relevant, but less significantly.

1.5.4. Awareness of official aid and development cooperation policy

It has been already highlighted in point 0 that people's knowledge about official aid is generally low and superficial. Yet studies carried out by Fransman and Solignac Lecomte (2004) find evidence on its significance for public attitudes: the more people are aware of aid and development cooperation policies, the more they are supportive of them. It was found that in donor countries which succeeded in maintaining the levels of ODA in the 1990s, the public had been made aware about the development cooperation programme and the justification for it (McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte 2002). Nordic countries are renowned for the level of their ODA spending and their societies are believed to be best informed on the issue by their respective governments. For instance, owing to an active and sustained information and communication policy by the Danish government, more than nine in ten Danes recognize DANIDA as the agency for development cooperation and more than a half of them correctly estimate the percentage bracket of ODA (McDonnell et al. 2003). In the Netherlands, public debate on aid brought about a greater scepticism about its effectiveness. Nonetheless, it did not lead to a diminished support but rather to strengthened support that is more critical (NSC 2005).

²⁰ Equity of foreign aid allocations is understood as the degree to which donor country aid programs target the neediest countries, based on per capita income.

However, international cooperation is held to be a non-transparent policy area (McDonnell and Solignac Lecompte 2002). With the aforementioned notable exception of the Nordic countries, efforts of development agencies in donor countries to inform and educate the public about official aid programmes are considered to be generally insufficient: they are often limited to publishing annual reports and making official statements in the form of press releases to announce increases in ODA volumes and are usually poorly funded (McDonnell et al. 2003).

1.5.5. Interest in and awareness of development issues

Further statistical evidence points to a strong relationship between support on the one hand and interest in and awareness of development cooperation on the other: people who believe in the importance of development cooperation are strongly interested in global development issues and have a good knowledge of problems occurring in developing countries. Conversely, people who are indifferent towards development policy show low or no interest in development issues and poor knowledge of problems of developing countries. Similar findings come from analysis of demographic determinants of public opinion: younger, better educated and urban-dwelling respondents tend to be more aware and supportive of development cooperation (McDonnell et al. 2003).

It would be convenient at this point to consider how interest in development problems is generated. It is reasonable to assume that the degree of interest in and the level of understanding of development issues are related to people's interest in international affairs in general. In addition, historical conditions such as donor-country colonial past, coupled with links with former colonies, may stimulate a better understanding of international reality and poverty questions. Then, exposure to development issues through receiving immigrants may play a role. Finally, what is especially relevant for this analysis, interest in development issues may result from the impact of deliberate government policies to this end. In effect, it has been found that higher levels of public spending on development education and aid-related information activities correspond with better awareness and higher ODA/GDP ratios (further discussed in 0) (Edwards 2002; European Conference 2005; McDonnell et al. 2003).

1.6. CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER ONE

The literature reviewed for the purposes of the foregoing analysis does not give conclusive evidence of a direct relationship between public attitudes towards aid in donor countries and the level of expenditure on official aid programmes. Intensity of foreign commercial exchange and economic well-being appear not to be decisive for support for foreign aid. Support turns out to be related to domestic social arrangements: donor societies with higher income equality and higher levels of public spending are more supportive of development cooperation. Lastly, disposition to help poorer countries depends on knowledge about government development assistance programmes and general awareness of development issues: support is higher among people with better knowledge in these areas.

2. Aid justified

Why to be concerned with the fate of people elsewhere in the world? In the name of what, should people in developed countries resign from a part of what they –individually and collectively– have been working for and transfer it to where development achievements have been less significant? This chapter presents major rationales for such international transfers. It focuses on justifications which seem to be most relevant for building public support for development assistance and which may serve as promising arguments in the debate on the place of emerging donors in the aid system. With a view to situating the analysis in the context of today's realities, discussion on the justifications is preceded by an overview of major world problems of today.

2.1. WORLD DEVELOPMENT TODAY

2.1.1. Global poverty and inequity

Results of monitoring progress on the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals, a development agenda to which leaders from all over the world committed on behalf of the citizens of their countries, present a gloomy picture of world development achievements:

“Extreme poverty remains a daily reality for more than 1 billion people who subsist on less than 1 dollar a day. Hunger and malnutrition are almost equally pervasive: more than 800 million people have too little to eat to meet their basic energy needs. For

young children, the lack of food can be perilous since it retards their physical and mental development and threatens their very survival. More a quarter of children under five in developing countries are malnourished” (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005).

Efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger are often hindered by natural disasters and conflict. Hunger and poverty, in turn, easily lead to conflict, especially when combined with inequality. Out of 13 million deaths in large-scale conflicts in 1994-2003, more than 12 million were in Sub-Saharan Africa and Western and Southern Asia. Just five diseases –pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria, measles and AIDS– are res-

ponsible for half of all deaths in children under five. As of 2004, an estimated 39 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, of which 25 million in Africa. AIDS has claimed 20 million lives and reversed decades of development progress in worst-affected countries. Africa has 12 million AIDS orphans. During the 1990s, extreme poverty dropped in a large part of Asia, fell slowly in Latin America, changed little in Northern Africa and Western Asia, and rose and then began to fall in transition economies. But Sub-Saharan Africa, where the poverty rate was anyway highest, saw further deterioration: the number of people suffering hunger increased by 34% (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005).

Box 1**Causes of poverty: reasons for failure in achieving the MDGs (UN Millennium Project 2005)**

Poor governance: lack of rule of law and unaccountable governments resulting in corruption and violence, inefficient administration, unsound economic policy choices, inappropriate public investments in education, health and infrastructure and inadequate support for science and technology, and denial of human rights.

Poverty traps: local and national economies too poor (i.e. lacking fiscal resources and savings) to finance investments needed in infrastructure, social services, and public administration.

Pockets of poverty: uneven progress which leaves some parts of an economy, or some parts of a society, behind. This is particularly relevant for large middle-income countries with considerable regional and ethnic diversity and evident in cities with a dual reality of great wealth and slums (Southern Mexico, Northeastern Brazil, Latin American cities).

Areas of specific policy neglect: effects of policymakers’ unawareness of the challenges, their inability to address them, or from a deliberate disregard of core public issues (e.g. environment and gender).

World progress has been uneven. In the second half of the twentieth century Western Europe, North America and Oceania experienced rapid economic growth. In other regions, some countries which were initially lagging behind seized the economic opportunities resulting from foreign investment and technological advance. Since the mid-1970s, GDP per capita quadrupled in East Asia. In Latin America and the Arab states gains were relatively modest. But at the turn of the past century in more than 80 countries income per capita was lower than at the beginning of the 1990s. Predicted convergence of income and trickle-down effects from richer to poorer countries did not come about and inequalities increased. The income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest countries

and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960. By the late 1990s, the fifth of the world’s people living in the highest-income countries had 86% of world GDP, while the bottom fifth just 1%; 68% of foreign direct investment, while the bottom fifth just 1%; 74% of world phone lines, while the bottom fifth just 1.5%. Developing countries represent 85% of the world’s population but account for 93% of the world’s disease burden and only 11% of global spending on health. Income inequalities within countries have been also increasing for the past 30 years, impeding poverty reduction (UNDP 2000; UNDP 2002; World Bank). Many large and populous middle-income countries, such as Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia, which are home to millions of the

world's poorest, are highly polarized in both economic and social terms.²¹

Explaining shortfalls in progress towards the achievement of the MDGs on the global scale, the UN Millennium Project (2005) points to four overarching reasons for hitherto failure: poor governance, poverty traps, pockets of poverty, and areas of specific policy neglect (see Box 1). The UK Commission for Africa (2005), while recognizing the relevance of history and geography for the lack of development in Africa, identifies four major groups of obstacles to development in this continent: political, structural, environmental and technological, and human (see Box 2).

2.1.2. Globalisation and today's threats and challenges

The problem of global poverty and inequalities cannot be addressed without considering the changes in today's world reality and the driving forces that shape current political, economic, and cultural trends which, combined, are commonly referred to as globalisation. Held (2000) defines globalisation as "a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power." In other words, globalisation involves fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal dimensions of social existence, with far-reaching implications for virtually every facet of human life.

The spatial dimension of globalisation involves deterritorialisation, meaning that an increasing range of social activities occur irrespective of geographical location of the participants, as well as social interconnectedness, implying a growing impact of geographically distant events and decisions on people's lives. The temporal dimension of globalisation entails velocity and long-term character of the processes. It is often argued that the constitutive processes of globalisation, namely flows of trade, capital, people and ideas, are by no means a sudden or a new phenomenon. What distin-

guishes the current globalisation is their recent acceleration. Compression of space and time, mutually reinforcing, are fuelled by unprecedented advances in transportation, communication and information technology.²²

From the perspective of international development, several implications of globalisation seem to be especially relevant. Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation and consequent participation in its benefits has been highly disproportionate, thus enhancing existing inequalities. Acceleration of the processes which used to be more gradual in the past made adaptation and adjustment difficult both for individuals and whole societies, leaving behind many world outcasts. National economies are increasingly more entangled with each other. A new global division of labour is emerging, whereby fields of national and regional specialisation deepen rather than diminish disparate levels of the value added to the global output. Nation-states –both individually and collectively, as intergovernmental organisations– thus far the main locus of power, are losing ground to non-state transnational actors, including corporations and civil society organisations. Decision-making on global affairs is more often taken through informal gatherings and summits outside the multilateral system. Despite the growing involvement of non-state actors in setting norms and standards, systems of regulation and control in such fields as trade, finance, and investment remain mostly national in scope, while their repercussions are transnational. As a result of increasing interconnectedness, security is no longer exclusively viewed as security of states but more as human security.

²¹ Gini index for Brazil is 59.3, for Mexico 54.6, for China 44.7. By comparison, 25 for Sweden, 36 for the United Kingdom and 40.8 for the US (World Development Indicators 2005).

²² Held (2000) points to four features of globalization: extensity, intensity (growing magnitude), velocity, and deepening impact of activities, processes, and interactions.

Box 2**Causes of poverty: obstacles to development in Africa (Commission for Africa 2005)**

Political: poor governance (looting of the resources of the state, bribery, underprovision of social services) and conflict.

Structural: fragmentation, transport costs, dependence on primary commodities.

Environmental and technological: low agricultural productivity, climate, water, desertification, deforestation, and technological development.

Human: health, education, and the growth and age structure of population.

Box 3**Six clusters of threats to international security identified by the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN 2004)**

Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation

Inter-State conflict

Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities

Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons

Terrorism

Transnational organised crime

An approximation to the question of current global problems can be drawn from the changing concept of international security. The recent UN call for a new security consensus, as presented in the report “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” delivered by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, is based on a more comprehensive approach, which goes beyond international war and conflict and recognizes as a threat to international security “any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system” (UN 2004). In line with this definition, contemporary threats to peace and security extend to civil violence, organised crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as well as poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since their consequences can be equally extensive and catastrophic.

The threats of today are interrelated and mutually reinforcing: poverty is strongly associated with the onset of civil war and puts strain on the environment, leading to overexploita-

tion of natural resources. Environmental stress, brought about by overpopulation and shortages of land and other natural resources, is likely to cause civil violence. Infectious diseases (such as HIV/AIDS and malaria) aggravate poverty. Environmental degradation intensifies exposure to diseases. Civil war debilitates states, hampers economic growth, facilitates transnational organised crime and provides fertile ground for terrorism. Thanks to transnational criminal groups, access to weapons of mass destruction becomes easier. Illicit trade in arms and commodities fuels civil wars.

Because of rising interdependence, vulnerability to problems traditionally associated with poor countries is not confined to the developing world. Even the strongest economies are affected by weak national financial systems elsewhere. Vulnerability goes in the opposite direction, too. A terrorist attack on Europe or the United States can have adverse effects on people everywhere. Protection against threats in today’s world is beyond the capacity of a single state and requires international cooperation.

2.1.3. Aid – a crucial aspect of the response

However questioned and criticized for its ineffectiveness and strings attached,²³ foreign aid has proved to be effective and did render and facilitate unquestionable achievements in many cases. The Marshall Plan, having cost the United States 1% of the annual national income for four years, was instrumental in reconstructing Europe after the Second World War. Smallpox was defeated by little more than US\$100 million of targeted aid. Mozambique transition in 1991-1997 and subsequent double-digit economic growth rates would not have been possible without foreign assistance. Aid deserves merit for social sector improvements in Tanzania and Uganda (Commission for Africa 2005; Sogge 2002; UN Millennium Project 2005). Aid by itself –without domestic reform in developing countries and accompanying measures in international trade and debt policy– does not suffice to ensure development. But it is necessary to assist development, particularly in the poorest countries, which cannot attract private direct investment and for which aid is the largest source of external financing (White 2002; UN Millennium Project 2005).

The UN Millennium Project (2005) argues that poverty can be much reduced within a few years if a number of simple measures with high potential for bringing short-term gains in people's well-being are taken immediately. The so-called "quick wins" include, among others, eliminating school and uniform fees, distributing free insecticide-treated bed-nets in malaria-endemic zones, and regular de-worming of schoolchildren. The team headed by Jeffrey Sachs has calculated that developing countries' domestic financing for these practical steps as well as for more comprehensive interventions leading to the MDGs will have to be matched by donors' assistance amounting to US\$135 billion in 2006 and rising up to US\$195 billion by 2015. The UK Commission for Africa (2005) estimates that the programme for reform in Africa it proposes, embracing governance, public investment and social spending, will cost an additional US\$75 billion per year in overall public expenditure and will require an additional US\$50 billion per year in aid.

2.2. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AID

2.2.1. Aid as a moral duty

First and foremost, the basic and oldest fundamentals for giving aid are moral values, not allowing for indifference to human suffering. Arguably, the vast part of donations to NGOs, which are predominantly driven by compassion for the disadvantaged, is a response to an inner moral duty and a manifestation of a sense of personal obligation to lend a hand to those less fortunate.

Religion, by tradition, has played a leading role in inducing empathetic attitudes. The catalogue of moral norms of major monotheistic religions –Christianity, Islam and Judaism– includes clear obligations to assist the needy to the best of one's capacity. Zakat (alms) is one of the five basic precepts of Islam. Originally thought as a compulsory care for the poor and hungry, widows and orphans, it turned into a sort of mandatory tax paid by Muslims all over the world. The second of the two basic Christian commandments summons to love your neighbour as yourself. The Social Doctrine of the Church teaches that solidarity and brotherhood are laws given by God on the grounds of equal worth and dignity of all men, since each is God's image. Nevertheless, the religious aspect of the moral argument may not have a universal appeal because of questionable existence of God as the creator of and the lawmaker for the human race.

In addition, the moral duty, or more precisely moral debt, stems from the single historical process, pervaded by colonialism, genocide and slavery, which led to different social positions of the global scale. In this light, foreign aid is meant to compensate the massive wrongs which left some a lot worse off than others.

Lastly, it can be argued that denial of aid means conscious inaction with regard to poverty, especially its extreme manifestations such as hunger and disease, and thus is ethically unacceptable.²⁴ Pogge (2001) emphasizes that the developed world's failure to make a serious effort towards poverty reduction may constitute not merely a lack of benevolence

²³ See for example Sogge 2002.

²⁴ Dubois (undated) indicates that the sheer definition of poverty delineates limits of what is socially unacceptable.

but an active impoverishing, starving and killing of innocent people by economic means.

2.2.2. Aid as a manifestation of justice

A second justification can be found in the premise of global justice. It is derived from Rawls' theory of justice (1971), which sets out the provisions and procedures of a fair society. Rawls applies the notion of social contract to determine what social and political principles individuals would choose if they were in a situation which rules out pursuing one's own interests exclusively. Rawls constructs the concept of the "original position," where representatives of citizens are placed behind a "veil of ignorance," thus being unaware of morally irrelevant features of the parties they represent:

"I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations. (...) First of all, no one knows his place in a society, his class position or social status, nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the social features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. This is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilisation and culture it has been able to achieve. (...) It is taken for granted, however, that they know the general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basics of social organisation and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice" (Rawls 1971: 118-199).

The knowledge in possession of the individuals is to guarantee that the principles chosen would be to everyone's advantage and would promote one's aims and interests whatever these turn out to be. Rawls concludes that individuals would normally prefer more primary social goods, that is to say rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth and self-res-

pect²⁵, rather than less (Rawls 1971: 123) and that they would agree on two principles of justice:

The liberty principle, which assures that each person would have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

The difference principle, according to which social and economic inequalities (a) would be justified only if they were to the benefit of the least advantaged and (b) would be attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971: 266).

In line with these principles, a just system requires an equal distribution of all primary social goods as well as an arrangement of transfers and benefits that enhances the expectations of the least privileged (Rawls 1971: 267).

Originally, Rawls applied his concept of justice to arrangements within a single society. In *The Law of Peoples*, his later work, Rawls transferred the concept to the international level and made representatives of "peoples," and not individuals, parties to the contract. His international extension of justice, however, is limited to the duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions which prevent them from having a just or decent regime in their attempt to establish just domestic institutions. It does not involve the difference principle and thus the transfer of wealth to less advantaged societies with a view to satisfying the principle of distributive justice. In Rawls' view, such a principle would be unfounded since each society bears sole responsibility for its place in the global economic order and its wealth depends on the values and institutions it historically decided to adopt. In addition, he finds emotional ties between distant peoples on the globe not strong enough to give ground for a sense of international justice which would allow for global redistribution, thus maximizing the collective wealth of the least privileged (Hinsch 2001; Pogge 2001).

²⁵ Rawls (1971: 54) explains that primary social goods are things that a rational man is presumed to want, whatever a person's rational plan of life.

The domain of application of the difference principles was extended to the global realm by Rawls' followers.²⁶ This laid a foundation for the concept of global justice providing for intersocietal distribution of income and wealth. Pogge (2001) holds that both the domestic and the international order, that is to say social and economic inequalities they feature, should be regulated by the same rules. This position juxtaposes the egalitarian principle, assuming that all members of society have as equal citizens equal claims to share the fruits of social cooperation, with the global scope of intersocietal cooperation in today's world. Hence, on condition that societies have equal standing as participants in a system with an international division of labour and that intersocietal economic cooperation (flow of resources, goods and services) is sufficiently dense, producing both positive and negative externalities, societies should share the fruits and the burden of their joint cooperation efforts (Hinsch 2001). In line with this reasoning, distributive justice should not be an exclusively domestic area and should apply to the global community irrespective of national borders.²⁷ If placed behind the "veil of ignorance," not knowing their fate in the global order, representatives of societies would agree on principles favourable to all and would allow for an unequal distribution of global wealth only if it was to the mutual advantage of all parties involved.

2.2.3. Aid as a human rights-based duty

Seen through the lenses of a rights-based approach to development, development aid is not an option but a duty of the international community and of each of its members. The duty is derived from international commitments embodied in international human rights law, particularly concerning economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development. The duty is based on the principle of univer-

salinity of human rights, which implies that all have a responsibility for assuring that human rights are respected, protected, promoted and provided everywhere.

Rights-based approach to development views the realisation of human rights both as the ultimate goal of development and as the way to achieve it. In line with this perspective, human rights and human development are mutually reinforcing. Development is seen as a process of realizing human rights and fundamental freedoms, enhancing human capabilities and expanding choices and opportunities so that people can live the lives that they value (Sen 1999; UNDP 2000). Achievement of human rights, in turn, is vital for securing people's well-being and guaranteeing a fair, non-discriminatory and enabling social environment. In other words, poverty means a denial of human rights and unfulfilled human rights impede overcoming poverty.

Rights-based approach uses human rights as a common framework for development policy. It builds on the rights discourse encompassing both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two 1966 Covenants, on civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights respectively (see Box 4).²⁸ The vision of development as a human right is reflected in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the General Assembly in 1986 as a result of advocacy efforts by developing countries:

"The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy eco-

²⁶ Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Brian Barry, among others (Hinsch 2001).

²⁷ Gosepath (2001) observes that the theory of global justice has to be conceived of in the context of globalization, particularly in terms of the nation-states' loss of power to supranational actors such as international alliances and transnational corporations. The theory of global justice is running ahead of time because the process of globalization and the diminishment of power of nation-states is still not widely recognized.

²⁸ The body of international human rights law consists of international and regional instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 provide the cornerstone for human rights.

The other milestone documents include: 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 1984 Convention Against Torture, 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 1994 Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1998 Treaty setting up the International Criminal Court.

conomic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (Article 1, paragraph 1).

Box 4
Human rights

Right to life and liberty
Equality and non-discrimination
Political rights and freedoms
Right to social security
Right to work
Right to health
Right to food
Right to housing
Right to education

A right claimed by one person implies a corresponding duty for someone else to take action. However, mechanisms of fulfilment of human rights are a complex issue and there is no consensus on to what extent the international community, including state and non-state actors, is responsible for securing them. While the Declaration on the Right to Development assigns the responsibility for development to all human beings, it identifies states as being primarily responsible for the realisation of this right. In principle, realisation of human rights relies, above all, on the implementation and application of international human rights law in the domestic legal system.²⁹ Developing countries have particular difficulties in fulfilling human rights, especially as regards economic, social and cultural rights, which, assuming the goodwill of their leaders, is partly due to their limited institutional capacities and partly to their financial constraints. Yet, on account of the universal and indivisible character of human rights, meaning that they belong to all human beings simply because they are humans and that all rights are equally important, their implementation is a legitimate concern for all the members of the international com-

munity. While it is widely agreed that the international community, and rich countries in particular, has a moral duty to support human rights, the financial dimension of this duty is a question of debate. The controversy concerns binding legal obligations for such measures, mainly with regard to economic, social and cultural rights (ODI 1999).

The Declaration on the Right to Development calls for individual and collective action by the states on the national and international level.³⁰ Both the Declaration and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights make explicit references to development assistance as a means necessary for facilitating the full realisation of rights and ensuring development:

“Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective international cooperation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development” (Article 4, paragraph 2, Declaration on the Right to Development).

“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures” (Article 2, paragraph 1, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).

“The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as (...) the furnishing of technical assistance...” (Article 23, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)³¹.

²⁹ As a declaration, and not a treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a legally binding document subject to ratification procedures. Yet, it includes elements of international customary law, that is norms that are legally binding to all states, irrespective of whether a state is a party of a treaty setting forth the norms.

³⁰ Article 4, paragraph 1.

³¹ Furthermore, as regards the right to an adequate standard of living, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights compel states to “take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent” (Article 11, paragraph 1).

The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR 1990), in its comment on the nature of State parties obligations arising from the Covenant, identifies international cooperation for development and thus for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights as an obligation of all states. The Committee emphasizes that without an active programme of international assistance and cooperation on the part of the states which are in the position to assist others, the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights will remain an unfulfilled aspiration in many countries. Advocates of right-based approach, such as the United Nations Development Program, point to a special relevance of development aid for strengthening capacities of governments in developing countries so that they are able to comply with their obligations.³²

2.2.4. Aid in self-interest: a mechanism of provision of global public goods

Finally, the rationale for aid can be drawn from its utility in addressing problems of concern to all, irrespective of national borders. Aid can be destined to selectively finance areas neglected or underfunded by domestic efforts and thus contribute to the production of global public goods and mitigation of effects of global public bads.

Public goods³³ are goods in the public domain. Unlike private goods, which are delineated by clear property rights attached to them in order to prevent other individuals from their consumption, public goods are available to all and potentially affect everybody. In principle, public goods are characterized by non-excludable benefits and non-rival consumption. Once a public good is provided, its benefits are available to a large or unlimited number of consumers at zero or negligible marginal cost, since excluding others from enjoying its benefits is difficult or impossible (e.g. streetlight). Non-rivalry means that consumption of a public

good by one person does not reduce the amount available to others (e.g. peace and security) (Reisen et al. 2004; Kaul and Mendoza 2003).³⁴

A public good can be qualified as global if its benefits are quasi-universal in terms of countries (involving more than one group of countries), people (covering several or all population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the basic needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul et al. 1999).³⁵ Global public bads (GPBs) share the features of global public goods but what is desirable is their prevention rather than their production (e.g. atmospheric pollution, cross-border drug smuggling).

Box 5 Areas of Global Public Goods identified in Kaul et al. 1999

- Equity and justice
 - Market efficiency: trade regimes and international financial stability
 - Environment and cultural heritage
 - Health
 - Knowledge and information
 - Peace and security
-

The public character of the goods in question also refers to their provision, which is conditioned on contributions of many parties (e.g. law and order depend on the general level of respect for social norms and institutions). Nonetheless, seeing large externalities and the difficulties in excluding others from partaking

³² UNDP (2000) points to three ways in which development cooperation can directly contribute to realizing human rights. First, by increasing support for capacity building for democracy and the promotion of civil and political rights. Second, by increasing support for poverty reduction. Third, by introducing an explicit right-based approach to aid programming.

³³ The term good in this context refers to goods, services and conditions.

³⁴ Goods which meet both criteria are considered to be pure public goods. Yet fulfilling only one of the criteria is sufficient to make a good public. The range of partially public goods includes club goods (barriers to access can be imposed if exclusion costs are low, e.g. by charging fees), network goods (individual utility grows with the number of users, e.g. Internet), goods subject to congestion (e.g. roads), commons (e.g. fisheries) (Alonso 2002).

³⁵ On the basis of its geographical extension, a public good can be classified as international (if its benefits cross national borders of the producing country), regional (if it displays spill-over benefits to countries in the neighbourhood of the producing country, in a region which is smaller than the rest of the world), and global (if it benefits consumers all over the world, not necessarily to the same extent) (Reisen et al. 2004).

of the goods or in enforcing adequate compensation, possible providers of public goods feel no natural incentives for their production. Therefore, public goods have to be provided through non-market mechanisms, traditionally attributed to government intervention.³⁶

Showing a natural disposition to being affected transnationally and intergenerationally, the environment is undoubtedly the primary area commonly associated with global public goods. However, the number of spheres of human activity with similar dispositions is growing (see Box 5). Kaul and Mendoza (2003) explain that some goods are naturally global (e.g. moonlight), but most global public goods are national public goods that have become global by policy choice (e.g. norms and standards) and as a result of globalisation (e.g. disease control). With escalating cross-border and worldwide activity and mobility, repercussions of underprovision of public goods and overproduction of public bads in one country have an increasingly global reach.

“Failed states” (Afghanistan) are a safe heaven for illicit trade and terrorists and therefore undermine international security. Largely deficient public health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are poorly equipped to contain AIDS epidemic, thus posing a threat to world health beyond the continent itself. International travel and trade brought about an increase in prevalence within industrial countries of diseases previously endemic to the South (Archibugi and Bizzarri 2004). Since the early 1970s, 20 diseases have re-emerged or spread, often in more virulent or drug-resistant forms. The recent appearance of the West Nile virus in the USA is a reminder that not all of these diseases are confined to the developing world (Kaul and Faust 2001). Corruption has many international implications: it impedes making credible commitments crucial for international agreements to function effectively, obstructs enforcement of anti-money laundering measures, and distorts optimal management of natural resources, for instance rain forests (Eigen and Eigen-Zucchi 2003). A recession in a ma-

nor economy distresses many others through trade and investment links. Financial crises can spread from one continent to another in a matter of hours, often not sparing economies with good fundamentals (Kaul and Mendoza 2003).

Provision of many public goods relies basically on national policies (supervision of banks, pollution control, public health system) or on the national realisation of international commitments (such as norms and standards, including human rights). Kaul et. al (2003b) make a point that from the production side, global public goods can be seen as globalized national public goods or as a sum of national public goods plus international cooperation. For instance, international financial stability entails that every country has to be preoccupied with its own financial system as well as with possible contagion from other countries. Similarly, national efforts to control and eradicate infectious diseases, no matter how well financed, will be ineffective without collaboration on a wider scale.

The largest part of global public good financing is national: it is estimated that national public spending on global public goods is 200 times international spending. However, spending in industrial countries is five times spending in developing countries (Kaul et. al 2003a). Undeniably, resources and capacities of developing countries are far from sufficient to supply their citizens with national public goods and thus to contribute to the adequate provision of global public goods. Nor are developing countries aptly equipped to participate in the process of definition of international measures and policies leading to creation of global public goods, such as multilateral trade regimes, let alone to ensure their implementation.

Box 6
Key development GPGs identified by DFID (Speight 2002)

Knowledge generation and dissemination
Communicable disease eradication
The global commons
A free and open trade system
International financial stability
Protection from crime and narcotics
Global peace

³⁶ Nevertheless, public goods not necessarily have to be provided through a direct state action. In effect, a spectrum of modified market mechanisms designed so as to ensure cooperation and equitable burden-sharing is quite extensive, including for example by assigning property rights, quotas or setting taxes.

Countries at dissimilar levels of development may have disparate preferences for assigning national and global public goods, but the fate of even the richest individuals rests on these preferences. Economic development prospects for Northern industries in Southern regions depend on development achievements in the South, which is largely undermined by deficient public goods such as basic education, health or good governance (see Box 6). Over-exploitation of fossil fuels, minerals and other non-renewable natural resources, in which many developing countries abound, endangers future supplies of crucial inputs for economies of industrial countries (e.g. coltan for mobile phones and other electronics). As the title of the report of the UK Commission for Africa (2005) suggests, because of our shared needs and linked destinies, development in Africa is in *Our Common Interest*. As a matter of fact, the report identifies self-interest as the first reason for bothering with Africa's problems.

In many cases, as regards biodiversity preservation and climate stability for example, poor countries may be able to deliver inputs to global public goods more cheaply than rich countries. If production of some goods is cheaper in poor countries, then it would be reasonable that these countries produce the goods in larger quantities than rich countries. However, in order to do so, poor countries would have to refrain from allocating part of their resources, anyway limited, for domestic ends. Accordingly, international income transfers are necessary to compensate developing countries for the extra costs they incur in producing global public goods that they would not supply if guided solely by national self-interest (Kaul et al. 2003a).

Naturally, aid is by no means the only answer to the underprovision of global public goods by poor countries. Yet often it appears to be more efficient than richer countries support poor countries in meeting their commitments than that they shoulder the costs of the resulting overproduction of global public goods. In particular, aid was found to best contribute to public goods provision when these goods hinge on the "weakest link". For instance, eradication of diseases such as malaria or smallpox depends on the effort of the last countries to harbour these diseases (Kaul et al. 1999). In effect, according to calculations made by the OECD (Reisen et al. 2004), in the years 1997-2001 spending on international public goods accounted for around 30 per cent of ODA: half on global and half on regional public goods.

Nonetheless, it is also argued that treating financing global public goods as aid expenditure largely distorts the idea of development assistance, which should be focused on national development priorities of poor countries. Since donor countries participate in the consumption of global public goods, they benefit from the spending they allegedly make in support of developing countries. Consequently, this line of argumentation recommends that funding for global public goods should come from non-aid accounts and should be included into the budgets of relevant sectoral ministries (Kaul et al. 1999; Kaul et al. 2003a).

2.3. CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER TWO

The aforementioned rationales in support of aid to developing countries are not contradictory. Quite the opposite, they can be perfectly used as complementary arguments in support of a greater aid effort to be made by societies in donor countries. However, not all of them may turn out to be equally convincing and able to sustain support for aid.

The biggest weakness of the moral and ethical argument resides in its unilateral character. Moral duty is basically a duty of one party: it does not rely on mutual responsibilities and –irrespective of the rhetoric of equality– situates the recipient of aid in an inferior position.

Effectively, in the current discourse on international development (both governmental and civil-society-led thinking) there is the evident shift of emphasis from charity to justice (Commission for Africa 2005; McDonnell and Solignac Lecompte 2002). Universality of human rights and justice, which are rooted in the principle of genuine equal standing of all people, have a better appeal and a greater potential for attracting public support, including active and self-organised engagement. In today's more interconnected world, the cost of inaction in the face of poverty goes beyond moral anguish of those who demonstrated indifference.

An effective argument in favour of aid must show how problems allegedly pertaining to developing countries are embedded in, and matter to, people's daily lives. The concept of global public goods serves as a useful perspective for illustrating how all benefit from a successful addressing of problems whose implications recognize no borders. It offers a persuasive framework to explain when and why the ensuing burden should be disproportionately shared

between richer and poorer countries and why developing countries should be compensated for what they can uniquely contribute to the common global good.

3. Policies and instruments for mobilizing public support for development assistance

Chapter one concluded that support for development aid in donor countries depends, among others, on people's knowledge about international development policy realized by their governments and on general awareness and understanding of development issues. People –as individuals and collectives– who are better informed about official aid programmes demonstrate more favourable, even if critical, attitudes towards aid than people who are uninformed. Similarly, support for aid is higher among people who are more aware of and more interested in global development issues.

Response to the needs and gaps in public awareness in these areas rests, in principle, on two separate but closely related pillars: on information and communication about development policy on the one hand, and on development education on the other. The first one pertains to the tissue of accountability mechanisms in democratic societies: it attends to citizens' right to be informed about their government performance and about allocation of public money. It can be compared to, but should not be reduced to, Public Relations work. By focusing on a particular development cooperation programme or a set of policies, it attempts to inform and explain aid to the public, along with persuading about its purposefulness. The second one is meant to facilitate understanding of a complex international reality and aspires to change mindsets and behaviours. Basic differences between the two lie in their objective scope, temporal aspects and the potential to affect people's attitudes. Whereas information and communication about development policy intends to influence perceptions and raise awareness in the short term, development education seeks to arouse lasting value-based consciousness with the ultimate goal of producing a sustained change in people's behaviours. Needless to say, both approaches are mutually reinforcing: development awareness makes it easier to understand and approve of

government development assistance policies, while familiarity with official aid programmes stimulates interest in international development.

Development cooperation programmes have generated an array of communication and educational approaches aiming at mobilizing public support for development assistance in donor countries. Referring to "the state of the art" can be especially useful for new donors,³⁷ for whom the exercise of communicating increasing aid efforts to the public is particularly challenging. This final chapter intends to present what measures can be taken by official aid agencies and relevant authorities so as to improve public understanding of international development and development policies and eventually secure public support for them. It gives an overview of concepts, policies and instruments applied by donors with considerable and valuable experience in development cooperation and with inspiring achievements in the field of awareness raising and development education.

3.1. DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION AND GLOBAL EDUCATION

While terms such as "information and communication" are generally understood, this is not necessarily the case with "development education". The rudiments of the concept can be found in 1974 UNESCO's General Conference Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The document underlines that education "implies the entire process of social life by means of which individuals and social groups learn to develop consciously within, and for the benefit of, the national and international communities" and that it should promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or

³⁷ New donors within the UE are not absolute novices to development cooperation. However, seeing that their involvement prior to the transition from communism to democracy and market economy was guided by principles differing from modern day approaches to poverty reduction, which are based on partnership with developing countries and their ownership of development policies, and that it was supported by much biased rhetoric rather than by genuine public understanding of development problems, new donors actually cannot draw from much of their earlier experience.

religious groups, including awareness of the increasing global interdependence between peoples and nations, and foster international solidarity and cooperation. The advancement of the concept of development education benefited from richness of approaches and perspectives contributed by NGOs, e.g. Oxfam or Save the Children, and international organisations, such as UNICEF, as well as from the philosophy of sustainable development.

According to the Development Education Association (DEA), a UK umbrella association of organisations promoting global perspectives in education, development education “aims to raise awareness and understanding of how global issues affect the lives of individuals, communities and societies and how all of us can and do influence the global society we live in – as active global citizens. It aims to bring global perspectives into all aspects of learning – the schools, universities, local community initiatives, the media.” More specifically, development education is explained as “lifelong learning that:

- explores the links between people living in the “developed” countries of the North with those of the “developing” South, enabling people to understand the links between their own lives and those of people throughout the world
- increases understanding of the economic, social, political and environmental forces which shape our lives
- develops the skills, attitudes and values which enable people to work together to take action to bring about change and take control of their own lives
- works towards achieving a more just and a more sustainable world in which power and resources are more equitably shared.”

The North-South Centre of the Council of Europe applies the term “global education,” defining it as “education that opens people’s eyes and minds to the realities of the world, and awakens them to bring about a world of greater justice, equity and human rights for all”. This umbrella term is understood to encompass:

- Development Education,
- Human Rights Education,
- Education for Sustainability,

- Education for Peace and Conflict Prevention and
- Intercultural Education,

which are the global dimensions of Education for Citizenship.

Irrespective of the adjectives attached, these approaches to education share a common pool of essential features: value base, active and participatory learning, and pursuit of social change on local and global levels. They offer a range of views from different social and cultural groups around the world. They are founded on a justice perspective and a sense of individual and collective, as well as intergenerational, multi-aspect responsibility (social, economic, cultural, political, security) over the world. They inspire to explore connections and interactions between societies, cultures and environments and to provoke reflection and analysis of the roles that people can play within their own local contexts to build a fairer world. Last but not least, they involve life-long learning and are realized in both formal and non-formal learning environments.

3.2. LEVEL OF FUNDING FOR COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

As it has been pointed out in chapter one, public support for aid is related to the level of government expenditure on information about development policy and development education.³⁸ Understandably, higher level of inputs into information and development education should make it possible to reach a wider audience and develop good-quality programmes. This should result in better public awareness and deeper understanding of global processes and eventually lead to a higher support for development cooperation policies and international solidarity. A more critically informed public opinion should also be more committed and active in the private sphere.


As illustrated in Table 1, the level of spending on information, PR and development education can be benchmarked relative to total ODA or as expenditure per capita. Evidently, the

³⁸ This does not preclude that the level of support may also depend on the volume of spending by non-state actors.

group of leading awareness raising spenders in absolute numbers –the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Belgium– corresponds with the group of the leading ODA spenders in terms of the share of the national income (see

Table 2 in Annex 2). In relation to total ODA, donor spending on information and development education, with the exception of Belgium, does not exceed 1%.

Table 1
Expenditures on information, Public Relations and development education*



*As of 2002 for Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, UK, US; 2001 for Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark; 2000 for Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland; and 1998 for France.

SOURCE: McDonnell et al. 2003.

Awareness raising activities are generally assessed to be underfunded by donor countries. None of the donors meets the target of 3% of ODA recommended by the United Nations Development Program as required for development education (NSC 2003). More radical proposals called for 100% and 25% of ODA being dedicated to development education in richer

countries.³⁹ Their authors argued that only a heavy investment in public awareness can assure a broad and critical public support for global poverty reduction and cohesion, which in consequence would produce a real change in the commitment of these countries to attain global justice (NSC 2003; McDonnell et al.

³⁹ The proposal of 100% is attributed to Julius Nyrere, the former president of Tanzania (McDonnell et al. 2003). 25% was suggested by Michael Edwards (2002).

2003). Securing funding for development education seems to be especially relevant in the context of the ongoing increase of aid budgets. Without stable and predictable funding, it will not be possible to assure good-quality programmes and long-term planning of development education activities.

Voices from the development education lobby suggest that tying development education funding to percentages of ODA may be initially useful, but may prove problematic if ODA falls. Setting a per capita target is another option. Alternatively, development education could be fully integrated into formal education systems and funded from the budgets of relevant ministries (NSC 2003; McDonnell et al. 2003).

3.3. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Another indication of dedication to communicating with the public and development education can be found in the legislative and policy bases adopted by donor countries. In Austria and Belgium, for instance, these areas are explicitly legislated. According to the Austrian Law on Development Cooperation,⁴⁰ informing the Austrian public, through cultural and educational activities as well as Public Relations, are part of official Austrian development cooperation (NSC 2003). Communication, raising public awareness about development cooperation and development education are explicitly recognized as clear priorities of the Belgian law on international cooperation (McDonnell et al. 2003).⁴¹

In the Netherlands, every four years a policy paper on development education and awareness raising is elaborated by the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO), an autonomous body which promotes and supports global education on behalf of the Dutch government. After a consultation process involving public debate, the paper is submitted to the parliament and endorsed as a framework pro-

gramme (Höck 1996).⁴² Commitment of the British government to enhancing the impact and effectiveness of development awareness is expressly declared in DFID's White Paper "Eliminating World Poverty" (DFID 1997) and sustained in the strategy paper "Building Support for Development" (DFID 1999).⁴³ The strategy paper acknowledges the previous neglect in government funding of development education in the UK,⁴⁴ stresses the relevance of development education in changing peoples' behaviours and attitudes and puts special emphasis on the role of individuals' informed choices.⁴⁵ The Irish Development Education Strategy Plan 2003-2005 (Ireland Aid 2003) is founded on a rights-based approach to access to development education.⁴⁶ It emphasizes that development education contributes to global poverty reduction, among others, by enabling people to challenge policies that perpetuate poverty and to change unsustainable lifestyles. The paper clearly distinguishes between development education and raising awareness of the official aid programme. It underlines that improved public understanding of development issues and a better comprehension of the development cooperation programme should lead not only to increased support but also to a greater sense of ownership of the programme among the public.

3.4. INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES

It is argued that since government information and communication on development cooperation policy and development education are ba-

⁴⁰ The law was adopted in 1974 and reformed in 2002 (NSC 2003).

⁴¹ Adopted in May 1999 (McDonnell et al. 2003).

⁴² The paper includes guidelines for Dutch NGOs working in the field (Höck 1996).

⁴³ The strategy paper affirms the government's dedication to promote understanding of global interdependences, of major challenges and prospects for international development (especially the poverty reduction agenda) as well as of hitherto achievements and further potential in this regard (DFID 1999).

⁴⁴ Until 1997 there was virtually no official funding for development education in the UK and all the efforts in this field were NGO-driven initiatives.

⁴⁵ The strategy paper recognizes that informed public opinion helps ensure that the UK plays its full role in generating the international political will necessary to meet the international poverty eradication targets (DFID 1999).

⁴⁶ Its mission statement says as follows: "Everyone in Ireland will have access to educational opportunities to be aware of and understand their rights and responsibilities as global citizens and their potential to effect change for a more just and equal world" (Ireland Aid 2003).

sed on different approaches and should not be mistaken, these two areas should be governed by separate structures.⁴⁷ The separation is believed to ensure professionalisation of the information work along with a greater openness to and a wider representation of institutions –from both the governmental and non-governmental realm– involved in development education (Smillie and Helmich 1998; Höck 1996). Actual institutional arrangements in donor countries vary not only by the degree of such separation but also by the degree of centralisation and by the nature of involvement of civil society organisations in the definition and implementation of development education policies.

In the Netherlands, there is a clear distinction between execution of and funding for information work regarding development cooperation and development education. Information work is carried out by the Information and Communication Department of the MFA, which is responsible for communication concerning all foreign policy areas, development cooperation included.⁴⁸ Development education and awareness raising are entrusted to the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO),⁴⁹ which operates as an autonomous administrative authority under the MFA and is fully government-funded (NSC 2005).⁵⁰ The general aim of the NCDO is to strengthen support for international cooperation and sustainable development and for the achievement of the MDGs among the Dutch public. Its programmes are designed in cooperation with various minis-

tries and then implemented mainly, but not exclusively, by ways of funding activities of other organisations and institutions. Along with the funding and coordination roles, the NCDO launches its own initiatives, engages in capacity building and facilitates public and political debate on development cooperation policy and its coherence.⁵¹ Respected as a “Centre of Excellence” in the field of global education, NCDO is the largest and most well-resourced funding structure in this field in Europe and has served as a model for other countries developing such structures (NSC 2003).

In Austria, information on development issues and development education up to 2005 were realized by the Department for Development Cooperation of the MFA and KommEnt (Society for Communication and Development), a specialized service agency modelled on the Dutch NCDO. The Department for Development Cooperation focused primarily on “macro-communication” directed to decision makers, public administrations, business sector and larger audiences within the Austrian public. “Micro-level communication,” including awareness-raising and information work with more specific partner and target-groups, was outsourced to KommEnt on the basis of three-year competitively tendered contracts with the MFA and the Ministry for Education, Science and Culture. KommEnt provided support to NGOs in the field of information, development education and culture by means of funding and coordination of projects, improvement of programmes, capacity building and training, and networking. In addition, it conducted quality assessment and research activities and contributed to policy formulation.⁵² Following the setting up in 2004 of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) –to serve as an operatio-

⁴⁷ The question of institutional arrangements to address development education is further complicated by the fact that it resides at the intersection of development policy and education policy. Therefore, its adequate conceptualization, quality assurance, financing and realization requires an intensive collaboration of at least two ministries.

⁴⁸ The Dutch MFA has a two-fold structure. It is composed of five policy-making directorates and several departments which are engaged in either policy-related or support activities. Development cooperation is handled by the Directorate General for International Cooperation. www.minbuza.nl

⁴⁹ The NCDO is the oldest development education support structure in Europe. Its predecessor, the National Committee for Development Education (NCO), was established by the Dutch government in 1971 and in 1996 merged with the Council on Environmental Education to become the National Committee for International Co-operation and Sustainable Development.

⁵⁰ At certain stages several ministries provided funding to and through the NCDO, while the MFA has always been its key funder and in 2005 it provided the full budget (NSC 2005).

⁵¹ The NCDO's highest decision-making structure, the National Committee, relies on representation of diverse civil society organisations, including churches, trade unions, NGOs, private sector, migrant organisations and local and regional authorities.

⁵² Decisions on funding were consulted with KommEnt's four specialist advisory bodies (education, culture/film, science/publication, public relations/media), which included representatives from civil society organisations. The advisory bodies also decided on the guidelines for development education and awareness building on global issues. Definition of KommEnt's long-term objectives lied in the Council, which was composed of representatives from the political, academic, education and development cooperation sector, media, churches, trade unions, employer's federation, international organisations, and NGOs.

nal unit administering and implementing the bilateral cooperation programme– the main tasks of KommEnt have been integrated into the Agency (NSC 2003; NSC 2006).

In Ireland, the responsibility for both public awareness of the development cooperation programme and development education lies in a dedicated unit in the Development Cooperation Directorate (Irish Aid), a division within the Irish MFA which administers the aid programme and conducts development policy. The Communications, Information and Development Education Section, as the unit is called, was established in 2002 to take over the work of the former National Committee for Development Education (NCDE), an agency under the MFA.⁵³ Along with developing and implementing information and communication strategy for the Irish development cooperation programme, the section is responsible for the realisation of a strategic plan for development education (mentioned in point 0). It is supported by the Development Education Advisory Committee, appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to offer policy advice on development education, to oversee reviews and evaluation of development education activities and to manage an annual consultation forum on development education (Ireland Aid 2003).⁵⁴

In Norway, information activities on bilateral aid are carried out by the Information Department of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), a directorate under the MFA. The broader North-South issues are addressed by NGOs under two separate framework agreement arrangements: with 1) the RORG-Network, an NGO-network dedica-

ted to development education⁵⁵ and with 2) so-called “big five” Norwegian NGOs (Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Peoples Aid, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children - Norway) that have been receiving Norad funding for development education since 1997. The framework agreements with the “big five” are based on a four-year strategy plan and require that a specific part of funding is used for projects and activities that these organisations carry out together (NSC 2003).

In the UK, DFID's Information and Civil Society Department⁵⁶ carries out information and communication work as well as promotion of development awareness and education. It administers a number of development education grant schemes, including the main one: Development Awareness Fund. The responsibility for small grants financed from this fund is devolved to the Development Education Association, a national representative NGO-civil society development education umbrella body, and its sister networks in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (NSC 2003).⁵⁷ In principle, DFID works through strategic partnerships in different priority sectors and regions. In 2002, it started supporting new forms of partnership (Strategic Grant Agreements) addressed to broader sectors of civil society not primarily focused on international development (such as trade unions, professional associations, local government, faith groups, black and minority ethnic groups). The scheme has a substantial development education component.⁵⁸

3.5. TARGET GROUPS

Government explicit and implicit strategies in both areas (i.e. information and communica-

⁵³ The NCDE had independent decision-making functions and apparatus, relying on representation of the ministries in charge of foreign affairs and education as well as on civil society involvement, including trade unions, youth and women's organisations. In its original terms of reference, the NCDE's role included policy formulation, research, consultation, evaluation and advocacy. In practice, however, it was perceived predominantly as a funding agency and its policy-making functions were assessed as unsatisfactory (Ireland Aid 2003; NSC 2003).

⁵⁴ This body, entrusted with appraisal of grant applications, includes representatives of the ministry of education, the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment, and an independent consultant. National Council for Curriculum and Assessment is an advisory body to the Minister for Education (Ireland Aid 2003).

⁵⁵ Initially (1991-1992), the RORG-Network functioned as an informal and loose network and was officially established in 1999. Until 2003, it was funded by Norad on the basis of annual applications from the NGOs. The new four-year arrangement is meant to stimulate innovative projects and broader cooperation among NGOs on development education.

⁵⁶ The Information and Civil Society Department makes a part of DFID's Information, Knowledge and Communications Division.

⁵⁷ CADA in Northern Ireland; IDEAS in Scotland; Cyfanfwdy in Wales (NSC 2003).

⁵⁸ As of 2006, DFID has signed seven agreements, providing on average funding of £335,000 per organisation over an initial period of three years (but long-term commitment is intended).

tion work and development education/awareness raising) rely on targeting principally groups or segments of society that are either already interested in development issues and supportive of development cooperation –thus being “fertile ground” for awareness raising work– or sectors that are unfamiliar with development topics. For example, Information Department of Belgian DGIC targets segments of society that are already favourable to development cooperation (McDonnell et al. 2003). DFID decided to concentrate its initial work around four main complementary target groups with a high potential: formal education sector, media, business and trade unions, and faith communities (DFID 1999).

The groups can be identified through public opinion polling and analysis of declared level of interest, engagement and support for development cooperation. Subsequent examination of the declared sources of information on development issues can lead to identification of target groups with the biggest multiplying potential.

Irrespective of their development awareness level, children and youth are believed to be a “natural public” for development education activities. It is during adolescence when identity starts to be formed and when values concerning democracy and social relations are forged (NetAid 2004).⁵⁹ Journalists, teachers and decision-makers are most commonly considered to be the “multiplying agents” best positioned and prepared to influence public opinion. Institutional information multipliers include faith-based organisations and NGOs, traditionally active in and concerned with development issues, in addition to universities and research institutions.

More recently, trade unions, business sector and diaspora communities have been identified as key audiences and partners. Relevance of trade unions is growing especially in the context of the current debate on trade liberalisation and delocalisation of manufacturing and services to developing and transition countries. In some Northern countries trade

unions realize courses on the impact of globalisation on their members, discussing problems of supply chains and core labour standards (DFID 1999; European Conference 2005). DFID (1999) identifies business sector as “both a target and a potential key partner in building greater awareness and understanding of development issues”. It underlines its crucial role in influencing public attitudes, especially regarding social responsibility in the workplace and the community. In the Netherlands, the NCDO launched a special programme intended to stimulate greater interest in development in developing countries by the Dutch business community and to encourage active and sustainable investment (NSC 2005). Working with diaspora communities is seen as an appropriate way of assuring voices from the South, especially as regards debate on cultural diversity and intercultural understanding (European Conference 2005).

3.6. PROGRAMMES, ACTIVITIES AND POLICY MEASURES

Donor governments and development educators build on a range of instruments and approaches to communicate development policy and raise development awareness among both general and targeted audiences. Obviously, the overview presented here is by no means exhaustive. It is rather meant to highlight most interesting and promising ideas from the point of view of the needs of new donors.

3.6.1. Formal education

Development educators agree that development and global education should be integrated into school curricula and mainstreamed in the programmes of higher education institutions. Global education should not be treated as a privilege but rather as a right to which everybody is entitled and as a public good from which everybody benefits (NSC 2004). Feasibility of integration of global development education into formal education systems depends on the degree of their centralisation and on schools’ and school districts’ curricular autonomy. In Finland, for instance, development education was part of school curricula since the early 1970s. Since 1994, however, schools have more freedom in curriculum and the government, as well as NGOs, promote development education among teachers by providing teaching materials, supporting teachers tours and study groups. Global education is

⁵⁹ Not only is youth more receptive to development education activities but is it also relatively easy to reach through a formal education system. Youth is identified as one of the key audiences of global education activities promoted by the North South Centre of the Council of Europe.

compulsory in Belgian schools: each school has to have a visible global education activity every year. In order to assess and adequately address the actual needs of the formal education sector in the UK, DFID conducted an audit of material, human and organisational resources. Its results are believed to have improved guidance for teachers on international development issues.

3.6.2. Information and communication on development policy

Donors developed communication tools which go beyond ensuring visibility of development cooperation programmes and complying with the legal obligation of reporting to the public on the execution of the international development policy (in the form of press releases, annual reports, and summaries of evaluations). In fact, donor agencies adopted many measures traditionally applied by NGOs, such as own media (magazines, newsletters, internet portals), thematic campaigns and educational materials.

Internationale Samenwerking [International Cooperation], a free monthly magazine for the general public published by the Dutch government, has one hundred thousand subscribers. *Sam Sam* [Together] is read by half a million Dutch senior primary schoolchildren and there is another magazine for secondary school level youth (McDonnell et al. 2003). Each issue of *Kehitys-Utveckling* [Development], Finnish quarterly magazine, is devoted to a different development theme. The Austrian government produces thematic publications on bilateral aid priority countries.

So as to foster interest in its activities, Sida practices an open door policy. It has moved its headquarters to a more central location in Stockholm so that the passing public be tempted to use Sida public education services. It has developed an open culture where the staff canteen and the library are open to the public and a café on the ground floor became a popular bar in the evening (McDonnell et al. 2003).

3.6.3. Stimulating public debate

Government efforts to increase public awareness and ownership of development cooperation policy may also involve inciting and promoting public debate on directions and allocations of aid.

Political culture in Sweden provides for carrying out policy debates in an open manner, allowing for active involvement of various stakeholders and the general public. In 1999, the Parliament appointed the Commission of Inquiry into Swedish Policy for Global Development to investigate how to formulate coherent policies to combat poverty under the new conditions created by globalisation. Its mandate was to determine how Swedish policy for sustainable development should be furthered at a time of ever-increasing global interdependence. Consisting of representatives of all political parties, NGOs, trade unions, business associations, different ministries and Sida, as well as academic consultants, the Commission worked in an open way, with a long list of public seminars, hearings and partner meetings. It travelled to towns and cities to discuss the issues with interested citizens (McDonnell et al. 2003).

In line with its declared commitment to openness and dialogue about its policies (DFID 1997), in 1998 DFID launched a Development Policy Forum process, a nationwide series of meetings during which participants from various civil society sectors (NGOs, trade unions, ethnic minority groups, businesses, local government, community and faith groups) were invited to spend a day discussing current development issues with a government panel travelling to different cities in the UK. The process was intended to raise awareness and deepen understanding of current issues and to “share thinking and ideas” on development, involving “individuals and representatives drawn from across society” (DFID 2002). Each of the three rounds of the Forum (1998, 2000 and 2002) focused on a different set of issues, ranging from humanitarian aid and conflict, corruption, aid effectiveness, aid untying, trade and development and the role of the private sector.⁶⁰ In addition, the Secretary of State makes regional visits around the UK with the aim of building support for development and raising awareness of DFID's work. The visits usually involve a public forum for an invited

⁶⁰ 1998 round: partnerships, improved aid effectiveness, humanitarian aid and conflict reduction. 2000 round: trade, corruption and aid untying. 2002 round: potential of globalization to reduce world poverty, in particular, the relationship between environment and development, trade, the role of the private sector in international development (DFID 2002; ODI 2003).

audience, with presentations and questions sessions. They are considered to be a good opportunity for development issues to be covered in the local media (ODI 2003).

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) fostered public debate on the nature and the role of Canadian development assistance through publication in June 2001 of a discussion paper entitled “Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, New Approaches to Canadian International Assistance Programme.” The consultation process on the issues raised in the paper –in particular, geographical and sectoral concentration, policy coherence, tied aid, funding for NGOs, role of private sector and accountability– involved direct meetings with individuals and civil society organisations. It also included submitting opinions and comments by Canadians and people overseas through an interactive website. (McDonnell et al. 2003; CIDA website).⁶¹

3.6.4. The media

Public development awareness is largely influenced and shaped by the media, chiefly television, which is the major source of information on developing countries and world issues. Dissemination of information through mass media has a greater coverage potential than using the aforementioned own channels crafted in donor information departments. As signalled by DFID, the first step to work with the media on awareness raising is to analyze the content of the coverage they give to developing countries, to investigate into media policy makers’ approach to this coverage and to test audience attitudes. The study conducted by DFID in 2000 with major television companies concluded that one of the reasons for the unbalanced coverage of developing countries (disasters, bizarre events, travel and wildlife) was reluctance of media policy makers’ to invest in programming which could bring lower audience ratings. Many donor governments, e.g. Danish, British or Finnish, attempt to close this incentive gap and to promote better quality programmes by providing travel grants to journalists for field trips to developing

countries in order to encourage production of documentaries.⁶² Finland adopted an even more long-term approach: it supports a number of journalist training courses to nurture interest and understanding of developing issues among future journalists.

3.6.5. Promoting direct involvement and direct exposure

Providing opportunities for personal engagement in development issues and direct exposure to development alternatives is perhaps the most powerful way to enhance awareness of seemingly distant concerns and invisible mutual connections.

Dutch Kleine Plaatselijke Activiteiten [Small Local Activities] programme is assessed as particularly successful in promoting direct involvement of the Dutch in development. The program supports groups that raise funds for a specific assistance project overseas, which is then used as a basis for stimulating interest, understanding and commitment among the wider public. Under certain criteria, half of the cost is matched by the NCDO, which also covers promotion and education work. The groups involved in projects are often from service organisations (e.g. Rotary) rather than from groups already associated with development, such as NGOs. This is believed to broaden public engagement and foster grassroots involvement (McDonnell et al. 2003; NSC 2005).

The merit of volunteer service and exchange programmes, long-established in development cooperation,⁶³ though sometimes notorious for their supply-driven character, lies in their perspective-changing potential. Norway changed the formula of its former Volunteer Service (Fredskorpset) by launching an innovative programme whereby participants are recruited from companies, institutions and NGOs in Norway and developing countries to work in a corresponding and co-operating business

⁶¹ The discussion paper and the debate served as a basis for CIDA's new policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness “Canada making a difference in the world”, published in 2002.

⁶² For example, DFID's Travel Bursary and Documentary Research Fund offers grants to television journalists to assist them in creating programs on developing country issues.

⁶³ For example, Norwegian Volunteer Service and the US Peace Corps were established at the beginning of the 1960s.

abroad for one to three years.⁶⁴ Exchange of volunteers goes three ways: Norwegians go to developing countries; young adults from the South come to Norway or may go to another country in the South (Fredskorpset 2003).

Twinning of communities is yet another way to foster links between local governments, schools, industries, as well as cultural and sports organisations.

3.7. CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER THREE

Potential lessons to be drawn from the foregoing brief overview should not so much concern concrete solutions –which are always dependent on the particularities of political and administrative systems– but rather general considerations to be taken into account by donors intending to elaborate strategies for building a constituency for development aid. There are ample opportunities to exploit synergies between an improved awareness of a development cooperation programme and a better public understanding of development issues.

Creating a solid legislative or policy foundation for raising development awareness should be helpful in signalling political commitment in this area and in setting a reference framework which would advise on novel concepts. Policy-makers should not be afraid of a greater transparency in development cooperation policy and of initiating public debate in this regard, since such measures can help create a sense of ownership of the aid programmes and form a more critical and aid-supportive public. Information on development cooperation policy and development education are not equivalent and require different approaches, including dedicated support structures. A range of non-state actors can offer an invaluable contribution to both policy-making on and implementation of development education. Their involvement should be systemically incorporated into official programmes through setting up of adequate institutional arrangements, such as advisory bodies or grant allocating and evaluating committees. Effective development education programmes require intra-governmental cooperation to allow for integrating develop-

ment awareness needs into curricula realized in the formal education system. Moreover, awareness raising both through formal and non-formal education has to be given high budgetary priority – it demands securing appropriate public funding. Resources for development education and awareness raising should be earmarked in the budget of the Ministry of Education or linked to ODA spending. When designing awareness raising programmes, it should be remembered that real awareness involves changing perspectives and behaviours, but information and facts alone are not sufficient to change them. Therefore, high impact measures have to combine learning with active engagement.

4. Final conclusions

The current discourse on donors' efforts to provide more assistance to developing countries –which would allow for the realization of the Millennium Development Goals– assumes that public support for a sustained increase in aid budgets is essential.

The preceding reflection on public attitudes towards aid in donor societies leads to the conclusion that even though public attitudes may not translate directly into the levels of development assistance spending, they are an important factor which conditions effectiveness of international development policies. The feelings of public opinion give a basis for an overall political context within which the debate on cooperation and aid policies is developed. Studies into public attitudes towards development assistance affirm that the most valuable support base for aid is a critical one – one making informed personal choices, capable of voicing effectively its concerns and of exerting political pressure.

As inferred from the foregoing review of factors potentially influencing public support for aid, awareness of official development cooperation programmes and understanding of global development problems in general are more decisive for public attitudes towards aid than such economic factors as the well-being of the donor country or the scale of its involvement in foreign trade. These factors turn out to be equally important to support for development assistance as domestic egalitarian social arrangements.

Public opinion polls reveal that humanitarian concerns are the leading motives for providing

⁶⁴ Under the previous formula participants were recruited from among agronomists, health workers and teachers.

assistance to poorer countries. People in the North are most preoccupied with problems such as famine, health and environment, that is those which can be easily seen from one's own personal perspective. Though ethical and moral considerations and charity approaches are dominant in the established argumentation in favour of assistance to developing countries, there is a tendency towards presenting aid as a manifestation of greater global justice. In the same vein, donors' rhetoric on development cooperation puts increasingly more emphasis on the enlightened self-interest. Its growing prominence is apparent in discussions on security concerns: poverty is portrayed as a threat to prosperity anywhere in the world.

On the basis of the aforementioned rationales, it can be deduced that an effective message in support of development cooperation should address the following conditions: it should show a direct relationship between people's everyday lives; it should build on the links between societies; it should expose global interdependencies; and should emphasise reciprocity. Motivations referring to the "common good" –rather than sheer altruism and goodwill– can be expected to gain ground along with the progressing impact of globalisation.

Fostering public support for development cooperation requires taking an active approach to communicating with the public. Evidence from a number of donor countries indicates that an informed public, even if critical on certain aspects, is an ally of official development assistance. The range of potential information and communication assets which can be advantageous in this regard includes policy-makers who engage in public debate on development cooperation.

It should be remembered, however, that providing facts alone may not be sufficient to secure a lasting public commitment to growing aid budgets and evolving aid policies. Such commitment requires that people understand a wider context in which development cooperation policies are defined, implemented, evaluated, and re-defined. Moreover, explaining the need for greater development assistance efforts involves challenging perspectives. The aforesaid mission can be fulfilled by quality development education which attempts to facilitate understanding of global development problems and to change attitudes and behaviours.

Opportunities for fostering development awareness, and thus support for development assistance, in new donor countries can be found, for instance, in the strength acquired in the relatively novel area of civic and European education. Methods and capacities developed through intensive civic and European education activities can be fairly easily adapted to address global issues. Enthusiasm of the youth for foreign languages, volunteering, and cultural exchanges is another good promise for promoting direct engagement with people in the South and better understanding of development problems.

Through well designed communications on development cooperation programmes and development education –two separate but complementary fields– donors can endeavour to create a virtuous circle, in which aware citizens willingly participate in voluntary action in support of development, object to policies that perpetuate global poverty and demand more and better development assistance.

Bibliography

- Alonso, J. A. (1999), *Estrategia para la cooperación española*, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid.
- Alonso, J. A. (2002), "Bienes públicos globales y cooperación al desarrollo," in *Intermón-Oxfam: La Realidad de la Ayuda 2002-2003*, Intermón Oxfam, Colección Informes 23, Intermón Oxfam, Barcelona, pp. 127-153.
- Archibugi, D., Bizzarri, K. (2004), "Committing to Vaccine R&D: A Global Science Policy Priority," *Estudios de Economía Aplicada*, 2004, vol. 22, pp. 251-271.
- Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2004), *Three-Year Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development Policy*, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for Development Cooperation and Technical Cooperation with Eastern Europe, Vienna.
- Beitz, C. R. (2001), "Does global inequality matter?," *Metaphilosophy* 32: 95-112.
- Bernard, A., Helmich, H., Lehning, P.B. (1998), *Civil society and international development*, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Lisbon, OECD, Paris.
- Box, L., Kruiter, A. (1997), *Rebuilding support for international cooperation: new constituencies in a global village*, ECDPM, Maastricht.
- Cimoszewicz, W. (2004b), "Pomagać innym, kierując się i rozumem, i sercem", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 4 November 2004, p. 23.
- Clark, J. (ed.) (2003), *Globalizing Civic Engagement. Civil Society and Transnational Action*, Earthscan, London.
- Commission for Africa (2005), *Our Common Interest. Report of the Commission for Africa*, Commission for Africa, London.
- Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1990), General Comment No. 3, 14/12/90, The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1).
- Council of the European Union (2005), *Conclusions of EU External Relations Council - Accelerating progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals*, CL05-130, 24 May, Brussels.
- Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.
- Development Education Association (2003), *Global Perspectives in Higher Education*, The Improving Practice Series, DEA, London.
- DFID (1997), *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century. White Paper on International Development*, Department for International Development, London.
- DFID (1999), *Building Support for Development Strategy Paper. Raising public awareness and understanding of international development issues*, Department for International Development, London.
- DFID (2000), *Eliminating world poverty: making globalization work for the poor. White Paper on International Development*, Department for International Development, London.
- DFID (2001), *Trade Unions and DFID: Working Together to Eliminate Poverty*, Department for International Development, London.
- DFID (2002), *Development Policy Forum 2002. Final Report*, Department for International Development, London.
- Dubois, A. (undated), "¿Por qué no se eradica la pobreza? La responsabilidad de los gobiernos del Norte, del FMI y del Banco Mundial," mimeo.
- EADI (2002), 10th EADI General Conference: From Aid Recipients to Re-emerging Donors: The Role of Accession Countries in EU Official Development Assistance, September 2002, (www.eadi.org).
- Edwards, M. (2002), *Un futuro en positivo: la cooperación internacional en el siglo XXI*, Intermón Oxfam, Barcelona.

- Eigen, P., Eigen-Zucchi, C. (2003), "Corruption and Global Public Goods," in I. Kaul et al., *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalisation*, Oxford Press, New York, pp. 577-595.
- EuroBarometer (2003), *L'Aide aux Pays en Développement, Eurobarometer 58.2*, European Commission, Brussels.
- EuroBarometer (2005), *Attitudes towards Development Aid*, Special Eurobarometer 222, European Commission, Brussels.
- European Conference on Awareness-Raising and Development Education for North-South Solidarity (2005), reports and working papers, Brussels 18-20 May 2005.
- Fowler, A. (1997), *Striking a Balance. A Guide to Enhance the Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Development*, Earthscan, London.
- Fransman, J., Solignac Lecomte, H.-B. (2004), "Mobilising public opinion against global poverty," Policy Insights #2, OECD Development Centre, Paris.
- Fransman, J., MacDonald, A., McDonnell, I., Pons-Vignon, N. (2004), *Public Opinion Polling and the Millennium Development Goals*, OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No. 238, OECD, Paris.
- Fredskorpset (2003), *Fredskorpset's annual report*, Oslo.
- Gosepath, S. (2001), "The global scope of justice," *Metaphilosophy* 32; 135-159.
- Harding, G. (1968), "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science*, vol. 162, Issue 3859, pp. 1243-1248.
- Held, D, et al. (2000), *Global Transformations: politics, economics and culture*, Polity, Oxford.
- Hinsch, W. (2001), "Global distributive justice," *Metaphilosophy* 32; 58-78.
- Höck, S. (1996), *The Organisation and Funding of Development Education and Awareness Building on Development Issues in four European Countries*, KommEnt, Salzburg.
www.komment.at/dokumente/download/studie_ev.pdf
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.
- Ireland Aid (2003), *Deepening Public Understanding of International Development. Development Education Strategy Plan 2003-2005*, Ireland Aid, Dublin.
- Jan Paweł II (2005), *Pamięć i tożsamość*, Znak, Kraków.
- Kaul, I., Faust, M. (2001), "Global public goods and health: taking the agenda forward," *Bulletin of the World Health Organisation*, Vol. 79(9): pp. 869-874.
- Kaul, I., Mendoza, R. U. (2003), "Advancing the Concept of Public Goods," in I. Kaul et al., *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalisation*, Oxford Press, New York, pp. 78-107.
- Kaul, I., Grunberg, I., Stern, M. A. (1999), *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation In The 21st Century*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Kaul, I., Conceição, P., Le Goulven, K., Mendoza, R. U. (2003a), "How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods," in I. Kaul et al., *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalisation*, Oxford Press, New York, pp. 23-81.
- Kaul, I., Conceição, P., Le Goulven, K., Mendoza, R. U. (2003b), "Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today," in I. Kaul et al., *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalisation*, Oxford Press, New York, pp. 1-19.
- McDonnell, I., Solignac Lecomte, H.-B. (2002), "Public Opinion, an Ally of Development Assistance," *The New Paradigms of International Cooperation*, Edition No. 64, January-April 2002.

- McDonnell, I., Solignac Lecomte, H.-B., Wegimont, L. (2003), *Public Opinion Research, Global Education and Development Co-operation Reform: In Search of a Virtuous Circle*, Development Centre Working Paper No. 222, OECD, Paris.
- McDonnell, I., Solignac Lecomte, H.-B., Wegimont, L. (2003), *Public Opinion and the Fight against Poverty*, OECD Development Centre and North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Paris.
- Migliorisi, S. (2003), *The Consequences of Enlargement for Development Policy. Final Report*, Vol. I, Development Strategies-IDC.
- NetAid (2004), *Learning for Change. Strategies to Build a Domestic Constituency for International Development*, NetAid, New York.
- Noël, A., Thérien, J.-P. (1995), "From domestic to international justice: the welfare state and foreign aid," *International Organisation* 49, 3, Summer 1995, The IO Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 523-553.
- North-South Centre (2003), *National Structures for the Organisation, Support and funding of Development Education, a comparative analysis*, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe and KommEnt, Lisbon.
- North-South Centre (2004), *Global Education in Finland. The European Global Education Peer Review Process. National Report on Finland*, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Lisbon.
- North-South Centre (2005), *Global Education in The Netherlands. The European Global Education Peer Review Process. National Report on The Netherlands*, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Lisbon.
- North-South Centre (2006), *Global Education in Austria. The European Global Education Peer Review Process. National Report on Austria*, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Lisbon.
- North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, with the support of the MFA of the Netherlands, "Programme for Strengthening global Development Education in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia," Strategy Paper, 2004-2007.
- ODI (1999), *What Can We Do With A Rights-Based Approach To Development?*, Briefing Paper No. 3, September, ODI, London. http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/3_99.html
- ODI (2003), *Changing aid policies of the major donors: UK case study* (Second draft), ODI, London. www.odi.org.uk/Rapid/Projects/UK_Japan/docs/Conway_JBIC.pdf
- OECD (2005), *2004 Development Cooperation Report*, The DAC Journal, vol. 6, No. 1, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, ISBN 92-64-00735-0.
- Olsen, G. R. (2000), "Public opinion and development aid: Is there a link?", CDR Working Paper 00.9, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen.
- Pogge, T. (2001), "Priorities of Global Justice," *Metaphilosophy* 32; 6-24.
- Rawls, J. (2001), *The Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 18th session on 19 November 1974.
- Reisen, H., Soto, M., Weithöner, T. (2004), "Financing Global and Regional Public Goods Through ODA: Analysis and Evidence from the OECD Creditor Reporting System", Development Centre, Working Paper No. 232, OECD, Paris.
- Sen, A. (1999), *Development as Freedom*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Smillie, I., Helmich, H. (ed.) (1998), *Public attitudes and international development co-operation*, OECD Development Centre and North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Paris.
- Sogge, D. (1998), *Compassión y cálculo: Un análisis crítico de la cooperación no gubernamental al desarrollo*, Icaria Editorial, Barcelona.
- Sogge, D. (2002), *Give and Take: What's the Matter with Foreign Aid?*, University Press, Dhaka [Bangladesh].

Speight, M. (2002), "Global Public Goods: How Much Should DFID Allocate to Global Actions and Funding?", Strategic Review of Resource Allocation Priorities, Working Paper Work Stream 3, Department for International Development, UK.

Stern, M. (1998), *Development Aid: What the Public Thinks*, UNDP, Office of Development Studies, New York, <http://www.undp.org/ods/pdfs/dev-aid-what-public.pdf> .

Stiglitz, J. (2003), *Globalization and Its Discontents*, Penguin.

UN Millennium Project (2005), *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, UNDP, New York.

UNDP (2000), *Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development*, UNDP, New York.

UNDP (2002), *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world*, UNDP, New York.

UNDP (2004a), *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, UNDP, New York.

United Nations (2000), Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Proclamation of 31 August as the International Day of Solidarity, A/55/238.

United Nations (2002), Report of the International Conference on Financing Development. Monterrey, Mexico 18-22 March 2002, A/CONF 198.11, United Nations, New York.

United Nations (2004), *A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, United Nations, <http://www.un.org/secureworld/> .

United Nations (2005a), *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, United Nations General Assembly 59th Session A/59/2005.

United Nations (2005b), *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005*, United Nations, New York.

USAID (2002), *Foreign Aid in the National Interest, Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, Washington, DC: USAID.

White, H. (2002), "Long-run Trends and Recent Developments in Official Assistance from Donor Countries", Discussion Paper No. 2002/106, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki.

World Development Indicators (2005).

Websites consulted

www.ada.gv.at

www.dci.gov.ie

www.komment.at/eng_summary.cfm

www.minbuza.nl

www.ncdo.nl/index.php/article/view/337

www.oecd.org/dac/stats

www.ohchr.org

www.onz.org.pl/rozwoj

<http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int>

Annex 1

Millennium development goals

Millennium Development Goals were derived from the United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted in September 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly, to be achieved by 2015. Alongside the eight goals, a series of time-bound and measurable targets were defined to monitor the progress, using 1990 as a benchmark.

GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day

Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education

Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling

GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015

GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality

Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five

GOAL 5: Improve maternal health

Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

GOAL 6: Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources

Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water

Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020

GOAL 8: Develop a global partnership for development

Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory, includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction— nationally and internationally

Address the least developed countries' special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction

Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States

Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term

In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth


In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries

In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies— especially information and communications technologies

Annex 2

Donor ODA spending relative to the national income

Table 2
ODA as percentage of GNI (2005)



SOURCE: OECD 2006.

Annex 3

List of acronyms

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DEA	Development Education Association
DFID	Development for International Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IFI	International Financial Institution
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGDO	Non Governmental Development Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NSA	Non-State Actor
NSC	North-South Centre of the Council of Europe
OA	Official Assistance
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Development Assistance Committee of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Sida	Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Últimos títulos publicados

WORKING PAPERS

- WP 01/07 Álvarez, Isabel; Magaña, Gerardo: *ICT and Cross-Country Comparisons: A proposal of a new composite index.*
- WP 05/06 Schünemann, Julia: *Cooperación interregional e interregionalismo: una aproximación social-constructivista.*
- WP 04/06 Kruijt, Dirk: *América Latina. Democracia, pobreza y violencia: Viejos y nuevos actores.*
- WP 03/06 Donoso, Vicente; Martín, Víctor: *Exportaciones y crecimiento en España (1980-2004): Cointegración y simulación de Montecarlo.*
- WP 02/06 García Sánchez, Antonio; Molero, José: *Innovación en servicios en la UE: Una aproximación a la densidad de innovación y la importancia económica de los innovadores a partir de los datos agregados de la CIS3.*
- WP 01/06 Briscoe, Ivan: *Debt crises, political change and the state in the developing world.*
- WP 06/05 Palazuelos, Enrique: *Fases del crecimiento económico de los países de la Unión Europea-15.*
- WP 05/05 Leyra, Begoña: *Trabajo infantil femenino: Las niñas en las calles de la Ciudad de México.*
- WP 04/05 Álvarez, Isabel; Fonfría, Antonio; Marín Raquel: *The role of networking in the competitiveness profile of Spanish firms.*
- WP 03/05 Kausch, Kristina; Barreñada, Isaías: *Alliance of Civilizations. International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy.*
- WP 02/05 Sastre, Luis: *An alternative model for the trade balance of countries with open economies: the Spanish case.*
- WP 01/05 Díaz de la Guardia, Carlos; Molero, José; Valadez, Patricia: *International competitiveness in services in some European countries: Basic facts and a preliminary attempt of interpretation.*

POLICY PAPERS

- PP 02/07 Czaplínska, Agata: *Building public support for development cooperation.*
- PP 01/07 Martínez, Ignacio: *La cooperación de las ONGD españolas en Perú: hacia una acción más estratégica.*
- PP 02/06 Ruiz Sandoval, Erika: *Latinoamericanos con destino a Europa: Migración, remesas y codesarrollo como temas emergentes en la relación UE-AL.*
- PP 01/06 Freres, Christian; Sanahuja, José Antonio: *Hacia una nueva estrategia en las relaciones Unión Europea – América Latina.*
- PP 04/05 Manalo, Rosario; Reyes, Melanie: *The MDGs: Boon or bane for gender equality and women's rights?*
- PP 03/05 Fernández, Rafael: *Irlanda y Finlandia: dos modelos de especialización en tecnologías avanzadas.*
- PP 02/05 Alonso, José Antonio; Garcimartín, Carlos: *Apertura comercial y estrategia de desarrollo.*
- PP 01/05 Lorente, Maite: *Diálogos entre culturas: una reflexión sobre feminismo, género, desarrollo y mujeres indígenas kichwuas.*