SEMINARIO DE HISTORIA

Dpto. de Hª Social y del Pensamiento Político, UNED

Dpto. de Hª del Pensamiento y de los Movimientos Sociales y Políticos, UCM

Fundación José Ortega y Gasset-Gregorio Marañón

Curso 2015-2016

Documento de trabajo 2015/9

BRIDLED NATIVISM? ANTI-MUSLIM PREJUDICE IN SPANISH NORTH AFRICA AND IN CATALONIA

Aitana Guía

(Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute)

SESIÓN: JUEVES, 17 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2015, 19 H.

Lugar: Aula 11

Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset

c/ Fortuny 53, 28010 Madrid

Contacto: seminariodehistoria@gmail.com

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

Bridled nativism? Anti-Muslim prejudice in Spanish North Africa and in Catalonia **- AITANA GUIA -** Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy - Aitana.Guia@eui.eu

Introduction

The worrisome rise of xenophobia in Europe in the post-Cold War period is not in doubt any longer. If for the past couple of decades analysts considered that support for the French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party, and people's parties in Switzerland, Denmark, or the Netherlands was a temporary phenomenon that had reached its upper limits at around 20 percent of the electoral vote, by 2014 it is clear that populism and xenophobia are growing in all European countries and have surpassed the 20 percent electoral mark in Austria, Switzerland, United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, and Hungary.[1]

Scholars trying to make sense of the resurgence of populism and xenophobia in Europe catalog these parties and movements as extreme-right or radical right populists.[2] While I think this approach yields useful results in understanding the discourse, policies, and electoral success of xenophobic parties in Europe, it does not fully explain the widespread and growing appeal of these parties to so many Europeans. I am currently exploring the concept of nativism as a way to expand the analysis of anti-foreigner sentiments beyond the extreme or radical right. While scholars naturally tend to focus on the study of successful xenophobic movements, such as Geert Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom or Le Pen's French Front National, I analyze what we can learn from nativist movements that fail to obtain their goals and convince their "native" populations of their discourse. This article discusses what enables nativism to take hold in a region and what ultimately may trigger its demise. Nativist movements require a compelling sense of being under siege and in need of defending the "native" community

[1] Norway's Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) obtained 22.9 percent in the 2009 Norway parliamentary elections; the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) obtained 27.5 percent in the European Parliament 2014 elections, the French Front National obtained its best result in the same European Parliament election at 24.86 percent; the Hungarian Fidesz broke the 20 percent mark in its 1998 results to the National Assembly (28.18 percent) and has reached a staggering 52.73 percent in the 2010 election. It is not, however, the only xenophobic party in Hungary. If we add the electoral results of Jobbik at 20.3 percent of the votes for the National Assembly in 2014, Hungary becomes the European country with a stronger xenophobic and populist presence with 73.23 of the electoral vote; the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) obtained its best results in Austria's National Council elections in 1999 at 26.9 percent, then lost significant support, but by 2013 was up again at 20.5 percent; the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC) has obtained more than 20 percent of the vote to the Federal Assembly of Switzerland since 1999, reaching 28.9 percent in 2007; the Danish People's Party, Dansk Folkeparti, obtained its best results in the European Parliament elections of 2014 at 26.6 percent of the vote. Source: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html (accessed on July8, 2014) and Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD): http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ (accessed on July 8, 2014).

[2] See, for instance, Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe* (New York: St. Martins Press 1994); Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony J. McGann, *The radical right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1995); Cas Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press 2007); Andrej Zaslove, *The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord* (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2011); Andrea Mammone et. Al., (ed.), *Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: from Local to Transnational* (London; New York: Routledge 2012).

from a significant threat in order to erase social and ideological cleavages within the "native" society.[3] Nativism also requires a clear and non-negotiable definition of identity, which interestingly enough is not always based on ethnic features. In order to thrive, I argue that nativist movements require the elimination of competing narratives of belonging and the unity of a majority of the "native" people under the nativist banner.

Since claiming to be "native" to a particular territory and abrogating for your people the full rights that "natives" deserve is a constructed process, studying how some of these movements have attempted to designate themselves as natives, and whether their claim to "nativism" was accepted by their peers reveal the ways in which nationalist narratives emerge and, sometimes, recede or disappear. This article focuses on two examples of unsuccessful nativist constructions in the North African city of Melilla and the city of Vic in the region of Catalonia. In Melilla, under Spanish control since 1497, European-descendants unsuccessfully tried to use nativism to oppose the demands of access to Spanish citizenship by 20,000 Muslim residents in 1985. European-descendant Melillans claimed the true nature of Melilla was Spanish and European. Arabic and Amazigh minorities in the city, even those who had been born there, were considered "foreign aliens" that truly belonged to and spoke for neighbouring Morocco. They were also perceived to be a threat to the European heritage and unsuited to embrace Spain's democratic framework. Muslim Melillans were constructed as authoritarian-minded and this, together with their ethnicity, further disqualified them from belonging to the "natural" newly democratic majority.[4] In Catalonia, a region in Spain with a strong national movement and two official languages, nativism emerged when a radical right party proposed to erase the cultural and identity cleavages between ethnic Catalans and other ethnic Spaniards by finding a common enemy in Muslim immigrants. By inventing expressions such as "those of us from here" or "those of us from home", nativists were able to separate the Muslim immigrant other from those residents that, despite some of them being internal immigrants, saw themselves as rooted and deserving of the rights of full membership in Catalonia.

Nativism: a necessary concept for postwar Europe

The term "nativism" was coined by Louis Dow Scisco at the turn of the nineteenth century to describe principles advanced by the anti-foreign and anti-Catholic American Party, also known as Know Nothing Party in the 1850s United States of America (USA).[5] Since then, the use of the concept has been mostly applied to the American context but in an uneven way. As the historiographical analysis of Tyler Anbinder shows, Scisco's study was a solitary attempt to study this phenomenon. It would not be until the 1920s when scholarly attention was devoted to the subject and the study of nativism had to wait until the late 1930s to become an acceptable subject in the top universities. The most influential academic work on nativism has been historian John

[3] While a growing body of literature uses the expression "siege mentality" to refer to the sense of victimization that many Muslims have, already in 2002 an article in *Los Angeles Times* applied this expression to ethnic Europeans who feel their societies are being overtaken by immigrants, in particular Muslim immigrants. Ranan R. Lurie, "Siege Mentality in Fortress Europe: Unification has brought with it new fears of immigration", *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 2002.

[4] Aitana Guia, *The Muslim Struggle for Civil Rights in Spain: Promoting Democracy through Migrant Engagement, 1985-2010* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press 2014), 10-40.

[5] Louis Dow Scisco, *Political Nativism in New York State* (New York: The Columbia University Press 1901).

Higham's *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism*. According to Higham, "[n]ativism as a habit of mind illuminates darkly some of the large contours of the American past; it has mirrored our anxieties and marked out the bounds of our tolerance".[6] Between 1860 and 1925, Higham explained nativism as a complex ideology and identified three strands of US nativism directed against Catholics, radicals, and racialized groups that were woven together to form the fabric of modern American nativism.

While it remained a lively academic subject, nativism did not become a popular term until it was embraced by the media in the 1990s after California voters adopted Proposition 187, which severely limited the dispensing of state assistance to immigrants, and several conservative politicians, such as commentator Patrick J. Buchanan or Republican California governor Pete Wilson, made immigration restriction a centerpiece of their bids for office. It subsided for a few years, only to re-emerge again with Arizona's draconian anti-immigration legislation in 2010. Nativism is finally taken center stage in the United States again with the anti-Mexican, anti-Muslim comments of Donald Trump, the billionaire businessman turned Republican nomination contender for the US presidential elections in 2016.[7]

A similar study to Highman's of current European nativism still needs to be done. I have identified a recent trend in adopting the concept of nativism, as a type of exclusive nationalism that redefined who the "real" people of a political unit is and who consequently should have more rights and decision power to determine the characteristics of that society vis-à-vis a group considered as exogenous and incapable of assimilating, among historians, political scientists, and sociologists to refer to Europe.[8] Nativism is a broader term than radical right populism and allows researchers to move beyond studying the extreme-right to incorporate populist and regionalist movements more broadly.

The European study of nativism can draw on previous work by historians of anti-immigrant prejudice. Leo Lucassen argues in *The Immigrant Threat* that nativism in Europe since 1850 has not been as clear cut as in the United States. In each European country, nativists have chosen to oppose whoever is the largest immigrant community, rather than having a common threat. In Germany, for instance, nativism defined itself

[6] John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press 1988): xi.

[7] Tyler Anbinder, "Nativism and prejudice against immigrants", in Reed Ueda (ed.) *A companion to American immigration* (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Pub. 2006), 177–201. National Conference of State Legislatures, "Arizona's Immigration Enforcement Laws", at http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/analysis-of-arizonas-immigration-law.aspx [Last accessed on November 25, 2015]; Evan Osnos, "The Fearful and the Frustrated: Donald Trump's nationalist coalition takes shape—for now", *The New Yorker*, August 31, 2015.

[8] Political scientists Hans-Georg Betz and Susi Meret were the first ones to export the concept of nativism from scholarship on American history to present-day Europe, see Hans-Georg Betz and Susi Meret, "Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam in contemporary Western Europe", *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 43, no. 3-4, 2009, 313-334 (21). Trend-setting Dutch historians Leo and Jan Lucassen have crucially adopted the concept recently. Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen "The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance", *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 87, no. 1, 2015, 72-101 (29). José Casanova, "The Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States", http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022282 [Last accessed on November 24, 2015]; and José Casanova, "Nativism and the Politics of Gender in Catholicism and Islam", in Hanna Herzog and Ann Braude (eds.), *Gendering Religion and Politics: Untangling Modernities* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009), 21-50.

against Poles before World War Two and Turks in the postwar period.[9] Part of the reason why nativism has not been as profusely studied in Europe despite the fact that it has become a mainstream political position, while in the US it is a more controversial and contested ideology, is that the USA and Canada have created national myths of origin based on immigration from Europe and have liberal elites that defend this myths against other elites aiming at banking on the politicization of immigration. In these countries, curtailing further European immigration had to be explained and justified on anti-Catholic or anti-radical grounds. On the contrary, the national myths of European countries are based on the settlement of peoples and their consequent rootedness and today's narratives of belonging still claim that there are "true", "autochtonous", "de souche" Europeans who are the "natural" inhabitants of a territory and others that cannot establish that centenarian or millenarian connection to the land. While in the US nativism needed to find a good justification to oppose further immigration, in Europe anti-nativist and cosmopolitan positions were the ones that were marginal and in need of explanation as opposed to the "naturalized" nativists.

Nativism can refer to the movement to restrict the flow of immigrants or more broadly to an ethnocentric view that seeks to maintain the racial, religious, and political status quo in a country. These two policy-oriented and philosophical approaches are not incompatible and in this article I use the term "nativist" to describe a person or party who fears and resents immigrants and minorities and their impact on Europe and who wants to take some action against them, whether through violence, immigration restriction, or limiting the rights of minorities or immigrants already in Europe.

There is nothing "natural" in the process of social construction of a "native" group. True Finns, for instance, as the nativist Finns Party was called until recently, have to be established as the natural majority, as the native descendants of the Finnish soil. In the process, alternative contenders to the position who could claim a longer presence in Finland, such as the Sami people, traditionally known in English as Lapps or Laplanders, are necessarily denaturalized as un-Finnish.[10]

Nativism is not a historical necessity either. Alternative forms of nationalism which oppose nativism and can fight racism can emerge side by side nativist projects. Higham named this alternative type of nationalism "America's cosmopolitan faith", and defined it as "a concept of nationality that stressed the diversity of the nation's origins, the egalitarian dimension of its self-image, and the universality of its founding principles."[11] In a similar fashion but for the Canadian context, philosopher John Ralston Saul has argued in favour of a Canadian national mythology that includes the contribution of first nations and thus embraces its mixed origins, its *métis* aboriginal-European heritage.[12] This is just but the latest, more complex, and historically informed recreation of the Canadian national myth. It comes after decades of success of the doctrine of multiculturalism Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau created in 1971.

[9] Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 1850* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2005).
[10] The Finns Party English Website, https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/kielisivu/in-english/ [Last accessed on November 25, 2015]; Veli-Pekka Lehtola and Linna Weber Müller-Wille, *The Sámi People: Traditions in Transition* (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press 2004).
[11] Higham, *Strangers*, 334.
[12] The best known proposal of considering Canada a métis nation is philosopher John Ralston Saul, *A Fair Country:*
Telling Truths about Canada (Toronto: Viking Canada 2008).

Multiculturalism in Canada successfully shifted the nation's imagery from a nation with two founding peoples, French and English colonists, to a nation that slowly incorporated the contributions of first nations and multiple immigrant communities from all over the world. And as the latest 2015 federal election when the conservative party incumbent used nativism to remain in power, anti-nativist constructions of national identity may overcome nativist logics if they are well established.[13]

Melilla: North African Spanish Nativism

Melilla is a mid-sized Spanish city located on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, at the northeast edge of the Moroccan Rif Mountains. Prior to the 1497 conquest of the city by Spain's Catholic Monarchs, Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragon, Melilla was part of the Kingdom of Fez. Although bordering Imazighen tribes and Moroccan authorities have repeatedly threatened the sovereignty of the enclave, Melilla has remained a Spanish military outpost since its conquest. In addition to being an important military hub, Melilla's free port was integral to the transport of both legal and illicit goods, and its economy was dependent on trade with the surrounding Moroccan territory, as well as on investments and tax breaks from Spain. By 1975, however, Melilla's economic splendor was behind it and its free port status was threatened by Spain's application to join the customs union of the European Economic Community (EEC).

Melilla reached a peak population of 81,182 in 1950. Most European descendants came from the Spanish provinces of Madrid, Malaga, Barcelona, Seville, the city of Ceuta, and other Andalusian provinces.[14] The census of 1985 put the population of Melilla at 52,388—2,827 of which were of Moroccan descent. But because the border that divided Melilla and Morocco was porous, the number of undocumented residents was unknown. Some Muslim leaders claimed that 27,000 undocumented residents lived in Melilla. A 1986 census indicated they were 17,824, that is, 25.3 percent of Melilla's official residents in 1985. Undocumented Muslim residents were either Moroccan citizens, stateless, or held a colonial document called a Statistics Card (31.1 percent), which was used for little more than identification. Muslim Melillans called the card a "*chapa de perro*", a dog tag.[15] Regardless of their numbers, undocumented residents of Melilla had none of the democratic guarantees enshrined in the 1978 Constitution. Before the 1980s, undocumented residents were barred from purchasing real estate or renting apartments, travelling to mainland Spain, receiving unemployment benefits, and accessing the

[13] Multiculturalism Directorate. *Multiculturalism and the Government of Canada* (Ottawa: Multiculturalism Canada 1984); *Multiculturalism: Being Canadian* (Ottawa: Dept. of the Secretary of State of Canada, 1987); Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada. *Multiculturalism: what is it really about?* (Ottawa: Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada 1991); Elspeth Cameron, *Multiculturalism and Immigration in Canada: an Introductory Reader* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press 2004); Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, *De la nation à la multination: les rapports Québec-Canada* (Montréal: Boréal 2007); Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, *Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany* (Vancouver: UBC Press 2012). For the 2015 election, see Parker Donham, "Stephen Harper's Challenge to Canadian Identity", *The Atlantic*, October 18, 2015.

[14] INE, historical census data. 1970 census, Volume II, Provincial Data, http://www.ine.es/inebaseweb/pdfDispacher.do?td=144968 [].

[15] INE, www.ine.es. For more on the 1986 census, see Ana I. Planet, *Melilla and Ceuta: Espacios-frontera hispano-marroquíes (*Melilla: Ciudades Autónomas de Melilla y ceuta/*UNED, 1998*), 30-37. Rocío García, "Chapas de perro", *El País*, June 10, 1985. See also, Peter Gold, *Europe or Africa? A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2000).

nearest hospital in Malaga without special travel authorization from the government delegate.[16] Neighbourhoods were segregated, with European descendants living in the modernist-style downtown or in newly constructed suburbs, while African descendants lived in shanty towns with no running water or sewage.[17]

While Melilla's and Ceuta's irregular residents had been tolerated as customary, the 1985 Immigration Act was going to radically change this by demanding all foreigners in Spanish territories to apply for a resident and work permit. It developed provisions to grant foreigners the fundamental rights enshrined under the Spanish Constitution. The 1985 Act also increased border policing capabilities and attempted to restrict the numbers of immigrants who were permitted to enter the country. The Act cited Spain's colonial past and offered "preferential treatment" to Latin Americans, Portuguese, Filipinos, Andorrans, Equatorial Guineans, Sephardi Jews, and Gibraltarians who "identified with or had a cultural affinity to" Spain. Residency and work permits were expedited for these immigrants, as was the mandatory waiting period—shortened from ten years to two—otherwise required before applying for citizenship.[18] Although Spain held the disputed territory of Western Sahara until 1975 and parts of northern Morocco until 1956, the Immigration Act denied preferential treatment to immigrants from these territories. While it made a point to include Sephardi Jews, whose ancestors had been expelled from Spain in 1492, it ignored Muslims and *Moriscos* (converted Muslims) who were expelled in successive waves between 1492 and 1614. Centuries of autocratic rule and religious homogeneity in Spain contributed to designate those perceived not to share Spain's culture and identity, as did the fear of a growing population of Muslims who would gain Spanish citizenship quickly if granted preferential rights. Cool relations between Spain and Morocco, meanwhile, revived the historic rivalry between Christian Spain and Muslim North Africa, further fuelling Muslims' exclusion.

However, of the groups that had maintained longstanding cultural and historical ties to Spain, perhaps the most blatant form of exclusion was visited upon those Muslims who were born in, or were long-time residents of, Ceuta and Melilla. Under the Immigration Act, these individuals were automatically considered foreigners, and thus were forced to apply for residency and work permits. These approximately 20,000 undocumented residents differed from other immigrants in that they did not need to be smuggled into Spain; the border had been permeable before the 1980s, and many people from Melilla's hinterland could simply relocate to the city at will. Melilla-based journalist and writer Ricardo Crespo suggested this exceptional borderland situation could be used to solve the problem created by the Immigration Act:

> The Immigration Act is too narrow for Muslim Melillans. After many years of extraordinary abuse, we should compensate them with an Exceptional Law that takes into account the full extent and complexity of

[16] Government delegates (*delegados del gobierno*) are representatives of the national government in autonomous regions and cities. They supervise areas under the jurisdiction of the national government and coordinate efforts with regional administrations.

[17] Luis Rincón, "Melilla no es tierra de todos, es tierra de unos", *Melilla Hoy*, May 2, 1985, 8-9.

[18] Article 26 (deportation), Article 4 (constitutional rights), Article 5 (suffrage rights), Article 7 (freedom of assembly), Article 8 (freedom of association), Preface, and Article 23 (preferential treatment). Law 7/1985, on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain, July 1, 1985, *BOE* 158, July 3, 1985, 20824-20829.

> their situation. Otherwise, the Immigration Act is almost entirely anti-Muslim, and on some points probably unconstitutional as well.[19]

The Spanish ombudsman advocated special legal provisions for Muslim Melillans outside of the Immigration Act. In December 1985 *El País*, Spain's leading pro-democracy newspaper, urged the government to exempt from the Act at the very least holders of the colonial Statistics Card. If the government did not exempt card holders, the paper argued, these people risked losing *arraigo* (rootedness, or seniority rights in legal terms), and might have to wait ten more years to apply for citizenship.[20]

The early 1980s was a difficult period for Melillan ethnic Europeans. The post-World War II wave of decolonization rendered European control of contested African territories anachronistic. The United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 1960, together with Moroccan calls for the return of Ceuta and Melilla, made Spanish control of these cities problematic. Memories of decolonization in the Spanish Sahara were bitter. While Spanish authorities in the late Franco years had promised a peaceful transfer of power, premised on the right to self-determination for the native populations of the region, Morocco and Mauritania claimed traditional ties to the territory and, as Franco was dying, both countries participated in the division and occupation of the former Spanish colony. The 1975 Green March, which saw hundreds of thousands of unarmed Moroccan civilians, inspired by King Hassan II and protected by Moroccan troops, occupy the Spanish Sahara was particularly frightening for European descendants in Ceuta and Melilla. They feared they would not be able to resist a similar move against their cities and dreaded the possibility that their own government, weakened during the transition to democracy, would be reluctant to use force to defend them.

Their greatest fear was Morocco. After negotiations in 1984 between Spain and Britain over the future of British-held Gibraltar, Hassan II warned that "[w]hen Spain recuperates Gibraltar, I believe she will find it difficult to maintain her sovereignty over both sides of the Strait [of Gibraltar]". This was a restatement of what was known in Morocco as the "Hassan II's doctrine", the idea that the resolution of the issue of Spanish-controlled Ceuta and Melilla was linked to the resolution of the Gibraltar question.[21] To compound nativist fears, Spain's agreement to join NATO in 1986 excluded the two cities from its mandate to protect Spanish territory. Morocco was, after all, a strategic ally to the United States. Worse still, Spain had announced its intention to reduce its military presence in North Africa and some Spaniards, such as renowned writer Juan Goytisolo, as well as the then still strong Communist Party of Spain, favoured ceding Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco. Economic uncertainties overlapped with military threats. Both cities were apprehensive about Spain's

---

[19] Ricardo Crespo, "Algunas interrogantes sobre la Ley de Extranjería", *Melilla Hoy*, November 22, 1985, 6.

[20] Editorial, "Moros y cristianos", *El País*, December 17, 1985.

[21] Cited in Fernando Orgambides, "Hassan II afirma que la situación de Ceuta y Melilla es anacrónica", *El País*, March 8, 1986. Said Saddiki, "Ceuta and Melilla Fences: A Multidimensional Border?" CPSA Conference, 2010, 8. http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Saddiki.pdf [Last accessed on November 28, 2015].

impending incorporation into the EEC and the consequences this could entail for their economies.[22]

Yet perhaps the greatest immediate threat in the eyes of local nativists[23] was the rising number of Muslims in Melilla. According to the then Socialist mayor of Melilla, Gonzalo Hernández, this growth was a "crucial problem for the city's future". Hernández favoured a firm implementation of the Immigration Act to reduce the proportion of Muslims in Melilla. Juan Díez Cortina, leader of the Nationalist Party of Melilla, echoed this view when he warned that "Melilla could die due to excessive Moroccanization". Some nativists believed an increase in the number of Muslims would lead to the election of a Muslim mayor, a sign that would surely signal the loss of Melilla's European character.[24]

Nativists rejected any suggestion that Muslims could be their equals as citizens. In the nativist imagination, ethnicity and descent determined national loyalties. Nativism was premised more on ethnic loyalty than national identity or identification. As such, if a European descendant sided with Muslim Melillans, he or she was branded an 'other'. For example, when journalist Ricardo Crespo, a Spaniard of European descent, attended a local soccer game, nativists in the crowd shouted, "A Moor has come", "It smells of Moor here", and "That Moor sickens me". Crespo had to be escorted out by police.[25] Nativist rejection was strong for Muslims, but it was even stronger for those Muslim Melillans who had become Spanish citizens. According to Aomar Duddu, an economist and Melillan Muslim leader, when "a Muslim with a Spanish National Identity card keeps his Moroccan citizenship, he is (we are) considered doubly dangerous, a fearsome fifth column, radio-controlled and financed by Hassan II or Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who should be neutralized immediately".[26]

Nativists considered Muslims Melillans uneducated enemies of democracy with "fanatic" mentalities that belonged to "our 1940s [the period of early Francoist rule]".[27] Nativist reactions to Muslim activism against the 1985 immigration act were premised on a descriptive understanding of democracy. According to this view, democratic practices were reduced to the narrow space provided by electoral politics, established political parties, and associations such as trade unions, all of which were controlled by European descendants. When Muslims created their own organizations, these were perceived as authoritarian in nature and as a front for Moroccan interests in Melilla. Nativists felt justified in this position by their feeling of European superiority, ethnic solidarity, claims of victimization towards mainland Spain, and a rhetorical embrace of ethnic and cultural integration while simultaneously recycling old Orientalist stereotypes concerning the inability of Muslims to practice, or even to understand, democracy. Their criticism of Muslim Melillans as undemocratic paradoxically echoed

---

[22] Juan Goytisolo, "De la OTAN a la ley de extranjería", *El País*, March 6, 1986 and Carlos Yárnoz, "El incierto futuro de Ceuta y Melilla", *El País*, February 17, 1985.
[23] A "nativist" favours the interests of established citizens over those of immigrants or perceived immigrants.
[24] Cited in Yárnoz, "El incierto futuro".
[25] Ricardo Crespo, "Discriminación", *El País*, December 8, 1985.
[26] Aomar Mohamedi Duddu, "Legalizar Melilla", *El País*, May 11, 1985.
[27] Noé Villaverde, "Ceuta y Melilla", *El País*, June 1, 1985.

how nativists themselves were perceived in mainland Spain. According to *El País*, Melilla was subject to “an authentic religious and racial ‘apartheid’.”[28]

The gap between the two communities was not merely a matter of perception; nativists also feared losing their privileges and entitlements if forced to share power and resources with their Muslim neighbours. Civil servants and law enforcement officials sustained the status quo of discrimination against Muslim Melillans as well. *El País* argued that the judiciary did not adequately protect Muslims and that defence lawyers contributed to Muslims’ social ostracism by refusing to represent them.[29] Nativists held control of local authorities and elected representatives to Spain’s Senate and Congress. The June 1986 general election was in many ways a test run for how much Melilla’s European descendants would support inclusion of their Muslim neighbours. The results were not auspicious. Because nativists largely felt let down by the Socialist government in Madrid, which they claimed had favored local Muslims, they shifted allegiance to the conservative Popular Coalition. The party went on to win all three Congress and Senate seats.

As other colonial settler populations before them, nativists also felt victimized and feared being ostracised and abandoned by mainland Spaniards. Editorials in *El País* confirmed this apprehension by comparing local nativists to other European colonialists, and even South African racists. “Political discrimination coloured by racism, the worst traditions of religious fundamentalism, abuse of the most basic respect for human dignity” was not the image the country wanted to promote, bombastically editorialized *El País*. Nativists’ protests, it continued, “recalled the historical short-sightedness and political insensitivity that many European nations often displayed when they had been forced to live together with other peoples”. Moreover, the PSOE’s initial support and acquiescence in nativism recalled the socialism and “pacification” campaigns of Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister during the Algerian War of Independence.[30] Nativists were caught in a circular loop: the more they excluded Muslim Melillans, the more they were out of synchrony with politicians in Madrid, which increased nativists’ sense of abandonment and isolation even further, and made exclusion of Muslim Melillans more pressing as a matter of survival in the face of a capital that was not backing them. Melillan Nativists were not able to convince politicians in Madrid and mainland public opinion of the reasons why Muslim Melillans should be excluded from citizenship.

In addition to their association with the ills of colonialism, nativists also provided a reminder of the historical mistakes Spanish society would have to leave behind in the transition to democracy. According to *El País*, Nativists held “despicable views of religious intolerance and ethnic discrimination that recalled the sad days of Spain’s

[28] Editorial, “Racismo español”, *El País*, May 26, 1985. Carlos Yárnoz, “El incierto futuro de Ceuta y Melilla”, *El País*, February 17, 1985. C.Y., “Un militante del PSOE dice que fue expulsado por criticar el racismo en Melilla”, *El País*, September 2, 1985.

[29] Editorial, “Racismo español”. The number of Muslim Melillans with Spanish citizenship was low due to an expensive and convoluted citizenship application process. Lawyers charged Muslims the equivalent to three months’ salary for an unskilled worker to process their claims, and requested a report of good conduct from the government delegate. From 1975 to 1982, Spain granted citizenship to 2,000 Muslim Melillans; after 1982, less than 20 applications were processed per year. By 1985, more than 700 applications awaited processing. García, “Chapas de perro” and Carlos Yárnoz, “El Gobierno tiene un plan reservado para conceder la nacionalidad española a un mayor número de musulmanes”, *El País*, December 1, 1985.

[30] Editorial, “Racismo español”.

past". Nativism exhumed Spain's "historical nightmare, the expulsion of Spanish Jews by the Catholic Kings and of the Moriscos by the Austrian [Habsburg] monarchs". Nativist protests were a "remnant of [the days of] old Christianity and blood purity [*limpieza de sangre y de cristianismo viejo*], which the Spanish government seems tempted to re-enact in Melilla". The government, *El País* maintained, had to stand up against the ancient privileges of "old Christians", those with "Castilian ancestry and a pink complexion … Racism does not only occur in [Apartheid] South Africa".[31] Despite these exaggerated comparisons, the point remained that its treatment of minorities was a test for Spain's fragile decade-old democratic institutions, culture, and constitution. Nativists, again, were unable to detach themselves from these damning associations that made any other arguments, for instance security, weak by comparison.

Neither nativists nor Muslim Melillans had much experience with democratic practices in 1985. A mere ten years since Franco's death, eight since the first democratic elections, and seven since the approval of the Spanish Constitution, Melilla's parties and organizations lacked the presence of a 'democratic memory', established democratic practices, or an internal hierarchy in the structure of political organizations that would help them navigate entrenched ethno-cultural conflicts. Moreover, Melilla's borderland status, coupled with its ethno-cultural diversity, made democratization more challenging and messy than elsewhere in Spain. As Renske Doorenspleet argues, democratic consolidation is "probably only threatened by civil society when the active dominant coalition is anti-democratic".[32] That was the case in Melilla. Not only nativists were unable to convince the rest of Spain of the need to exclude Muslims from citizenship, but they themselves became a threat to democracy in embracing an ethnic definition of identity incompatible with religious pluralism and other fundamental rights enshrined in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. In 1985, nativists organized the largest demonstration in the city's history, attended by 35,000 to 42,000 people. Attendees used the march to reaffirm the Spanish character of Melilla and chanted "Melilla for Spaniards alone". Mayor Hernández called it "a success; the entire population participated"—minus, of course, the approximately 21,000 Muslims whom he did not consider Melillans.[33] While nativists in Melilla genuinely supported the rule of law and the establishment of new democratic institutions, their descriptive understanding of democracy, combined with their adoption of passive citizenship, rendered them oblivious to both the exclusionary nature of their positions as well as the democratizing efforts of their Muslim neighbours.

Nativism in Melilla ultimately failed, but that was not a given outcome from the beginning. As I have extensively explained elsewhere, Muslim Melillans and their few allies had to fight hard during two years, risking their physical integrity and freedoms, to be able to achieve their ultimate goal: an exemption from the Immigration Act and removal of the nativist barriers that hindered their access to Spanish citizenship.[34] Their success was not immediate. Their access to Spanish citizenship was slow, gradual, but ultimately all who wanted to become Spanish and qualified, was granted citizenship. Muslim Melillans could not have done it alone. Had Madrid not ultimately sided with

[31] Editorial, "La vergüenza de Melilla", *El País*, January 29, 1986 and Editorial, "Racismo español".
[32] Renske Doorenspleet, "Deviant Democracies", in Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Democratization* (London and New York: Routledge 2012), 200.
[33] Carlos Yárnoz, "La manifestación en favor de la ley de extranjería se convirtió en un acto de reafirmación de la españolidad de Melilla", *El País*, December 7, 1985.
[34] Guia, *The Muslim Struggle for Civil Rights in Spain*, 10-40.

them, Melillan nativists might have as well succeeded and stopped the integration with equal rights of Muslim Melillans. It was thus the combination of Muslim activism and the geostrategic interest of Spain to maintain Melilla as democratic Spanish territory that allowed for the defeat of nativism in the city.

"Els de casa": nativism in a divided society

The city of Vic, located in the Catalan interior, represents for many Catalans "Old Catalonia", an "authentic" Catalan place that is free from the increasing heterogeneity of Barcelona and other large cities. Unlike Barcelona and other larger metropolitan centers, Catalan is still the dominant language. In the modern period, Vic developed attractive textile and porcine industries, which brought Spanish-speaking immigrants from other parts of Spain and, since the 1980s, also North-African Arabic or Tamazigh speakers. Catalonia is what Juan Díez Medrano has called a divided nation, a nation in which various ethnic groups vie for hegemony. "Since some segments of the nationalist organizations' potential support base identify with their claims and objectives while others do not, and may even actively oppose them, the 'nations' in whose name peripheral nationalist organizations claim to speak are in fact *divided nations*.' While many Catalan nationalists would deny that Catalonia is a divided society, arguing that ethnic background and culture are irrelevant to the Catalan civic model, it is at least a region with two dominant languages, Spanish and Catalan, and two main ethnic groups, ethnic Catalans and other Spaniards.[35]

Platform for Catalonia (PxC) was founded by the politician Josep Anglada i Rius in Vic in 2001. Anglada acted as its president and leader until he was expelled from the party in 2014, right before the party lost 90 percent of its local councillors in the 2015 elections. The PxC gained rapid success in Vic and spread from there to other surrounding towns. The party's mandate was to "better control immigration and improve security for citizens". It encouraged segregation in housing, discouraged religious pluralism, and refused to accept Muslims as equals, in the same vein as the Austrian Freedom Party or the defunct Pim Fortuyn List in Holland.[36]

As with the leaders of some these other hardline parties, Anglada has a checkered past. He belonged, for example, to two fascist groupuscules in the 1980s. Even though Anglada did not use the same Francoist language and tactics in the PxC, he ultimately did encourage a similar national pride and xenophobia. PxC, however, was not a traditional far right party in the Spanish fashion. Connections with the far right and a xenophobia program has made scholars place it in the radical populist family of parties, but both Xavier Casals and Aitor Hernández-Carr have highlighted that the PxC refused

[35] Juan Díez Medrano, *Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), 10.

[36] For more on PxC ideology, see "Informe sobre Plataforma per Catalunya", August 22, 2010, which used to be on their website and now it is available at, http://www.foro-ciudad.com/barcelona/cabrera-danoia/mensaje-8270308.html [Last accessed on November 30, 2015]. See also Josep Anglada, *Sin mordaza y sin velos* (Barcelona: Rambla Media Ediciones, S.L., 2010) and Miquel Erra and Joan Serra, *Tota la veritat sobre Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC): L'ultradretà Josep Anglada al descobert* (Barcelona: Ara Llibres 2008). For a comparison of far-right European parties in modern times, see Betz and Meret, "Revisiting Lepanto, 313-334 and Susi Meret, "The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support", Ph.D. Series 25, University of Aalborg, 2010.

to accept the established dichotomy between Catalonia/Spain and this feature differentiated it from traditional Spanish far right parties.[37]

Unlike other far right movements in Spain, the PxC did not prioritize the interests of Spanish over Catalan speakers. Through a consistently bilingual literature, it endorsed the unity of the Spanish nation. It superseded the entrenched dichotomy between Catalonia and Spain by stressing the "common enemy"—i.e., Muslim immigrants—and the need to unify under a regional identity compatible with a larger national one. PxC's slogan for the 2010 elections to the Catalan Parliament was "*primer, els de casa*" [those from home, first]. By simultaneously adopting an idiom that refers to "us", or "those from home", and avoiding identity battles—it was never specified whether this "us" referred to ethnic Catalans or ethnic Spanish—Anglada and his party moved their discourse beyond the Catalan/Spanish dichotomy, adopting Islamophobia as a unifying feature.[38] This novel nativist identity construction was probably the most striking component of PxC. It could have had a productive future in Catalonia, as the large opposition to mosque construction suggests, had it not been for more powerful identity constructions emerging simultaneously.[39]

If in the 1990s, Osona was known for its innovative multicultural initiatives, media focus shifted to the PxC's provocative discourse. In the early 1990s, public and semi-public schools were forcibly integrated in Vic and Manlleu; when the number of immigrant students reached 15 percent, students were redistributed to other schools. The aim, said authorities, was to prevent educational segregation and stigmatization of immigrant children. If these numbers could be kept low, reasoned local authorities, native parents would not complain and white flight from local schools—occurring in Osona since the early 1990s—could be avoided.[40] After fifteen years of the system known colloquially as the "Vic Model", the Catalan Ministry of Education flipped existing policy on its head and segregated new arrivals within the school system.[41] Rather than distribute migrants in mainstream integrated classrooms, as had previously been the case, the government restricted them to dedicated classrooms called *aules d'acollida* [welcome classrooms], issuing them a separate curriculum. The school system was responding to demands from native parents who could not afford to send their children to private schools that their children be sheltered from immigrants. The measure was enthusiastically backed by the PxC. "Each day, [The Catalan Ministry of]

---

[37] Xavier Casals, "La Plataforma per Catalunya: La eclosión de un nacional-populismo catalán (2003-2009)", Working Papers 274 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials 2009). Xavier Casals, *Ultracatalunya: L'extrema dreta a Catalunya: De l'emergència del búnker al rebuig de les mesquites (1966-2006)* (Barcelona: L'Esfera dels Llibres 2007). Aitor Hernández-Carr, "El salto a la nueva extrema derecha: una aproximación a los votantes de Plataforma per Catalunya", *Política y Sociedad*, vol. 50, no. 2, 2013, 601–627 (26).

[38] Josep Anglada, interview with author, Vic, July 22, 2008.

[39] Jordi Moreras, *Una mesquita al barri: Conflicte, espai públic i inserció urbana dels oratoris musulmans a Catalunya* (Barcelona, Fundació Bofill 2009), http://www.fbofill.cat/sites/default/files/1607.pdf [Last accessed November 23, 2015]; Avi Astor, "Mezquita No! The Origins of Mosque Opposition in Spain", GRITIM Working Paper Series 3, 2009, 1-42 (42).

[40] Pascual Saüc, Jordi and Carles Riera. *Identitat cultural i socialització dels fills d'immigrats magrebins a la comarca d'Osona* (Barcelona: CIREM 1991).

[41] Jaume Carbonell Sebarroja, *Magribins a les aules: El model de Vic a debat* (Vic: Eumo 2002). Ignasi Vila, *Llengua, escola i immigració: Un debat obert* (Barcelona: Graó, 2006).

Education gets closer to the positions of the PxC", claimed Anglada. SOS Racismo denounced the new approach as discriminatory.[42]
In Osona and other parts of Catalonia where the PxC gained ground, diversity became a matter of containment, a separate reality relegated to another town, district, neighbourhood, or school. In Vic, a new peripheral, poor, and neglected area where many Muslims have relocated has been dubbed Vic II. Meanwhile, the "Real Vic"—affluent, central, and well-accommodated—continues to be populated by native Catalans who vote Catalan nationalist parties or until 2015 PxC.[43]

Anglada believed that he would become Vic's mayor in the near future. In the November 2010 elections for the Catalan parliament, the PxC's first regional electoral appearance, the party received 75,321 votes, or 2.42 percent of the overall vote. In 2011, the party increased, by five, its presence in Catalan city halls to reach a peak of 67 local councillors.[44] Anglada purposely adopted a strategy that was similar to that which allowed the French Front National to place second in the 2002 presidential elections: the securing of a local base as a platform for the transition to regional or even national politics.[45] The party had success in a traditionalist and conservative city like Vic, but also in those areas that had been hit by the postindustrial economic shift and had traditionally voted socialist. So far, the mix of populist and Islamophobic discourse has not been as successful as in other European countries. Anglada's discourse, however, has made it more acceptable for mainstream parties to blame immigrants for crime and antisocial behaviour, and Muslims in particular for cleavages in social cohesion. The most obvious example was the conservative mayor of the city of Badalona from 2011 to 2015, Xavier García Albiol. Albiol's slogan for the 2015 Badalona local elections was "Let's Clean Badalona." What needed to be cleansed, was not certain, but Albiol's previous leaflets linking Romanian Roma with crime and opposition to the construction of mosques made it easier to infer that he was going to clean Badalona of everything "natives" deemed undesirable.[46]

While in 2011 it seemed that Anglada's version of nativism may create a counter-narrative to traditional pro-Spanish and pro-Catalan national affiliations, by 2015 its time had passed, overtaken by the strongest pro-independence movement Catalonia has ever seen. Rather than ethnic Catalans and ethnic Spaniards in Catalonia finding common ground as Christian, White Europeans under threat by Muslims, around half of

---

[42] Josep Anglada and "Ple municipal", *Osona.com*, March 3, 2008 [last accessed on November 22, 2015]. See also SOS Racismo, "Comunicat de SOS Racisme davant la proposta de la Generalitat de crear centres educatius especials per als immigrants que arriben amb el curs ja començat", [last accessed on November 22, 2015]
http://www.fapac.cat/sites/all/files/Comunicat%20Sos%20Racisme%20Centres%20Acollida%20Inicial%20%282008%29.pdf.

[43] The same phenomenon has occurred in the Catalan cities of Badalona, Mataró, and Santa Coloma. Astor, "Mesquita No!", 27.

[44] Miquel Noguer, "El partido xenófobo de Anglada quintuplica su resultado en Cataluña", *El País*, May 24, 2011.

[45] Harvey G. Simmons, *The French National Front: the Extremist Challenge to Democracy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press 1996); Edward G. DeClair, *Politics on the Fringe: the People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1999); Gabriel Goodliffe, *The Resurgence of the Radical Right in France: from Boulangisme to the Front National* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2012); or more recently, Emmanuel Todd, *Who is Charlie?: Xenophobia and the New Middle Class* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity 2015).

[46] Toni Sust, "CiU ignorarà la reobertura de la causa contra Albiol per xenophobia", *El Periódico*, May 25, 2011.

the Catalan population begun to find common ground in another possible antagonist: Madrid. The pro-independence movement successfully attracted Catalans regardless of their ethnic roots, socio-economic status, or ideology.[47] While it has not been as successful as the Scottish National Party in welcoming religious and cultural minorities in its midst, it has certainly succeeded in elevating independence as the only relevant issue in the political agenda and thus suffocating any other social concerns or alternative identity constructions. Sonia Alonso and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser make a compelling argument in explaining why the radical right has not had the same success in Spain as in other European countries.[48] They argue that exogenous factors, such as the electoral system, the decentralized nature of the political structure, and the strategy of mainstream conservative parties make it difficult for the populist radical right to establish a nation-wide presence. I concur with the authors that in Spain there is as much a demand for radical right populist parties as in other European countries. To their structural and exogenous reasons for why Spain is "no country for the far right," the lack of a compelling nativist construction of identity that could overcome and unify regional and cultural affiliations into a single unit necessary to face a single enemy is lacking. The Catalan early experience with nativism, however, may very well set an unsavory example.

Nativism and Identity

Nativists seeks to limit the universal and civic characteristics of citizenship for members of a given state. Their goal of preserving the ethnic, religious, or cultural "natural" features of a given country forces them to oppose civic constructions of citizenship. In Melilla, nativists opposed the granting of Spanish citizenship to Muslim Melillans on the grounds that they were not ethnic European, were culturally unsuited to embrace democratic values and politics, and their religious and ethnic affiliations turn them into agents for the Moroccan enemy. Nativists proposed that naturalization, which was at the time granted with 10 years of legal residency in Spain, should take into consideration the religious, ethnic, and ideological features of the applicant. Thirty years later, access to status in Catalonia, which is a necessary first step towards naturalization in Spain has adopted some of these features. Undocumented immigrants have a better chance at obtaining residency in Catalonia by social rootedness (*arraigo social*) if they have taken Catalan language courses on top of all the other requirements established by Madrid (job contract, three years of residency, and family ties with documented residents).[49]

Before 1985, Muslim Melillans crossed the border between Morocco and Spain on a daily basis. This made Melilla into a borderland, an area marked by the constant wrangling and negotiations inherent in all cross-border travel. The concept of a borderland, as distinct from a colonial enclave, defines an area horizontally according to its geographical proximity to the surrounding hinterland, rather than defining it vertically in relation to the power differential vis-à-vis the former colonial metropolis.

[47] Guillem Rico and Robert Liñeira, "Bringing Secessionism into the Mainstream: The 2012 Regional Election in Catalonia",
Journal: South European Society and Politics, Vol. 19, no. 2, April 2014, 257-280. Anwen Elias, "Catalan Independence and the Challenge of Credibility: The Causes and Consequences of Catalan Nationalist Parties' Strategic Behavior", *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, vol. 21, no. 1, 2015, 83-104.

[48] Sonia Alonso and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right", *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 20, no. 1, 2015, 21-45.

[49] Act 10/2010, May 7, of Welcoming Immigrant and Returning Persons in Catalonia, *BOE* 139, June 8, 2010, 48955.

In his study of borderland identities in Italy, for example, David H. Kaplan argues that the emergence of multidimensional identities in border areas is less likely in those border regions where coexisting nationalities representing different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups occupy conflicting positions. In Melilla, cross-border identifications were discouraged by authorities on both sides of the border. Muslim Melillans thus found their identities both marked by the state's borders and limited by its practice of territorial exclusion and demands of exclusive loyalty.[50]

To the governments of both Spain and Morocco, as well as to nationalists in both countries, national identity was a singular and exclusive concept: Muslim Melillans were either Spanish or Moroccan—they could not be both. While unconditional loyalty to a single national identity is a defining character of modern nationalism the world over, by the 1980s much of the developed world was grappling with more fluid concepts of identity. Globalization and the increasingly vociferous claims of identity politics reduced national identities to one more affiliation among many others, and not necessarily the defining one.

Borderlands such as Melilla, where ethnic, religious, and culturally diverse populations lived together in close quarters, were particularly ill-suited to a rigid and restrictive definition of national identity. While Melillans of European descent had no qualms about considering themselves exclusively Spanish, Melillans of African descent had to juggle with competing and often conflicting identifications. Nativists feared this multiple identifications, considered that loyalty to Spain precluded any other loyalties or identifications, and demanded of Muslim Melillans single loyalties if they wanted to become Spaniards.

The majority of Muslim Melillans supported Spanish sovereignty over the city; how they negotiated their identity on a personal level was an entirely different matter. When pressed on this point, Duddu claimed in an interview from 1986 that he was "Hispano-Moroccan".[51] Duddu's transformation from Spanish Melillan in 1985 ("I never use the term Moroccan nationalized in Spain", he claimed: "Muslim Spaniard is better"), to Hispano-Moroccan in 1986 ("We're tired of having to confirm our Spanishness by opposing our neighbouring country"), to solely Moroccan in 1987 was perhaps indicative of the mood and the pressures felt by many Muslim Melillans. Duddu had tried a constitutional patriotism *à la* Jürgen Habermas when he said that Muslim Melillans "want to abide by the Spanish Constitution, ensure justice, liberty, equality, and harmonious relations between the communities in Melilla."[52]

Abdelkader Mohamed Alí, another key Muslim leader, in line with sociologist Zygmunt Bauman's concept of fluid modernity, claimed that multiple identities were indeed compatible and that most Muslim Melillans considered themselves a mixture of

---

[50] David Kaplan, "Territorial Identities and Geographical Scale", in H. Guntram and D. H. Kaplan (eds.), *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 1999), 31-49 and David Kaplan. "Conflict and Compromise among Borderland Identities in Northern Italy", *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* vol. 95, no.1, 2000, 100–107.
[51] Enrique Chueca, "Dudú evita pronunciarse sobre la españolidad de Melilla", *El País*, November 15, 1986.
[52] Aomar Mohamedi Duddu, "La Ley de Extranjería en Melilla o la legalización de la esclavitud", *Melilla Hoy*, December 11, 1985, 6; Luis Rincón, "Interview with Aomar Mohamedi Duddú. Melilla no es tierra de todos, es tierra de unos", *Melilla Hoy*, May 2, 1986, 8-9. See also Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2001).

Muslim, Melillan, Rifian, and Berber/Amazigh. Some also added Spanish and Moroccan to this formula.[53] Muslim Melillans rejected what they saw as a static and homogeneous conception of national identity, one that led to the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them'. According to Mohamed Alí, the question of rights and citizenship took precedence over definitions of identity amongst Muslim Melillans. Terra Omnium decided to make a legal claim to Spanish citizenship, which its members viewed as independent of individuals' multiple identities and identifications. Mohamed Alí argued that Muslim Melillans should be entitled to Spanish citizenship without having to adopt and embrace Spanish identity, which for many Muslims—and ethnic Spaniards, too—was synonymous with Christianity. Most Muslim Melillans did not want to join Morocco because they rightly saw it as an underdeveloped and authoritarian state, and Spanish citizenship was one way they could ensure a democratic and prosperous future for themselves. For Terra Omnium's supporters, Muslim Melillans were merely constitutional patriots who aspired to enjoy the rights and responsibilities that came with Spanish citizenship. Granting citizenship to Muslim Melillans, argued Mohamed Alí, would be a first step towards widening the breadth of Spanish identity and tackling segregation and discrimination. Citizenship would be a path by which Muslim Melillans could begin to feel Spanish.[54] They fought to obtain Spanish citizenship, but also to include their hyphenated identities in what it meant to be Spanish. Their understanding of hybridity, similar to South Asian, West Indian, and African immigrants in Britain, embodied both inclusion and social cohesion.[55]

Identity in divided societies tends to follow a similar zero-sum game. While some people may refuse the choice of being Catalan *or* Spanish, opting instead for being Catalan *and* Spanish, both identity constructions have fought for hegemony since the explosion of regional nationalisms across Spain following Franco's death.[56] The notion that identities can be hyphenated, as they are in many other countries, was a rarity for the very first decades after Franco and is still contested. However, the idea of multiple identities, particularly simultaneous regional and national identities, has become more prevalent in Spain.[57]

As the emergence and demise of Anglada's nativism shows, identity construction in Catalonia is dynamic and constantly being recreated. Today's dominant Catalan nationalism is not the very same that the leader of the conservative dominant party and former president of the Catalan government Jordi Pujol had advocated for decades. While Pujol had an ethnicist idea of the nation and feared immigration and inter-racial

---

[53] Abdelkader Mohamed Alí, interview with author, Melilla, August 23, 2010. Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press 2004). For an anthropological study of how Muslim women in Ceuta negotiate their multiple identities, see Eva Evers Rosander, *Women in a Borderland: Managing Muslim Identity Where Morocco Meets Spain* (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm University, 1991).

[54] Abdelkader Mohamed Alí, interview with author, Melilla, August 23, 2010 and Mimuntz Mohamed, interview with author, Melilla, August 24, 2010.

[55] Tariq Modood, "Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism, and the 'Recognition' of Religious Groups", in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), 186.

[56] See, for instance, Kenneth McRoberts, *Catalonia: Nation Building without a State* (Don Mills, Ont.; New York: Oxford University Press 2001), Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga, *The reinvention of Spain: Nation and Identity since Democracy* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press 2007), and Montserrat Guibernau, *Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies* (Cambridge: Polity 2013).

[57] See for instance Félix Moral, *Identidad regional y nacionalismo en el Estado de las Autonomías* (Madrid: CIS, 1998).

mixing, today's Catalan movement cautiously avoids essentialist ethnic claims to the nation.[58] One way to do so has been to embrace and visibilize Catalan Spanish-speakers pro-independence organizations such as SÚMATE [Join us]. "Súmate está formada en gran parte por catalanes de lengua y cultura castellana/española que, por cuestiones familiares y/o de origen, hemos mantenido este patrimonio sin renunciar por ello a ser y formar parte activa de la comunidad nacional catalana." Moreover, SÚMATE erases the ethnic roots by saying that "No importa el orígen sino el destino."[59] Pujol's party, Convergencia de Catalunya, also created a foundation lead by Angel Colom, a former leader of the pro-independence party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, titled Nous Catalans [New Catalans] with a mandate to promote "una major iden-ti-fi-cació entre les per-sones nascudes a Catalunya i els nous cata-lans" and "l'encaix a Catalunya d la nova immigració vinguda d'arreu d món en les 2 darreres dècades".[60]

Not all is Lost: Nativism and Gender

In a postwar Europe increasingly committed to gender equality (Squires 2007), as evidenced by the establishment of mandatory female quotas in electoral lists, laws advancing gender equality (Lombardo and Forest 2012), and increasing legal and institutional protection for victims of sexual violence (Lovenduski 2005), European Muslim women have been charged with being victimized by a backward religion incompatible with women's autonomy, political agency, and rights. In this context, using a presume defense of women's rights to attack European Muslims is a new and crucial characteristic of nativist movements.

The 1997 report "Islamophobia: a challenge for us all", a pioneering attempt to understand anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe by the British Runnymede Trust, explained that there are closed and open views of Islam in Europe. One type of Islamophobic discourse concerns the belief that "Muslim cultures mistreat women, but that other religions and cultures have outgrown patriarchy and sexism." Another characteristic of this discourse is the treatment of Islam as a "single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities." Those positions that perceive Islam as intrinsically sexist, inferior to and different from the West because it is "barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist" exemplify closed views of Islam.[61]

One of the ways by which nativism in Europe today is different from nineteenth-century nativism in the United States of America is by the weight it places in women's liberation and gender equality to separate "us" and "them." Postwar Europeans have increasingly seen themselves as societies that embrace gender equality, at least on principle, and this newfound value demands to be extended to minorities and migrant communities in Europe that embrace "barbaric" or "backwards" conceptions of women. Among them, crucially, are Muslims and Roma, the two minorities who face largest barriers to full membership and citizenship in Europe.

---

[58] Guia, *The Muslim Struggle for Civil Rights in Spain*, 101-129.

[59] Súmate, manifiesto, http://www.sumate.cat/manifiesto/ and Súmate, "Quiénes Somos" http://www.sumate.cat/quienes-somos/ [Last accessed on November 15, 2015].

[60] Nous Catalans. El Diari Digital d'Immigració. http://www.nouscatalans.cat/ [Last accessed on November 15, 2015] and Fundació Nous Catalans. Organizació. https://ca-es.facebook.com/FundacioNousCatalans [Last accessed on November 15, 2015].

[61] Runnymede Trust. Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, "Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All", The Runnymede Trust, 1997, 7 and 5.

The sociologist Jasmin Zine has called narrow perceptions of Muslim women as victims of an autocratic religion that undermines their individual rights, "gendered Islamophobia". If Islamophobia is "fear or hatred of Islam and its adherents that translates into individual, ideological and systemic forms of oppression and discrimination", then gendered Islamophobia "can be understood as specific forms of ethno-religious and racialized discrimination levelled at Muslim women that proceed from historically contextualized negative stereotypes that inform individual and systemic forms of oppression".[62]

Ethnic Europeans used the discriminatory treatment of Muslim women by Muslim men to attack Muslim activists and question their attachment to democratic values. The Pro Melilla Association and the Nationalist Party of Melilla, both extreme-right groups, issued a press release which raised this point: "[The men] separate the women from them and put them at the back during meetings … some leaders … want to put them back in veils; but we will free Muslim Melillan women and their sound of freedom will echo throughout Melilla". These groups did not explain how they planned to liberate Muslim women, but at least they mentioned that "we must admit that a decent salary for Muslim domestic servants is needed". Indeed, a fair salary would have gone a long way toward helping Muslim women liberate themselves.[63]

In Melilla, the fine art student and sculptor Karima Aomar Tufali summarized the predicament that Muslim women found themselves in. Aomar Tufali was a member of the women's organizing committee asking for access to Spanish citizenship in the mid-1980s. She believed that "Islam restricts freedom for women across the board and makes it so that even women support male dominance". She fasted during Ramadan out of respect for her father, a Quranic teacher, but "once in a while I have a beer or a ham sandwich". For young Muslim women faced a complex set of oppressions: economic exploitation and religious and racial discrimination from European descendants, and gender discrimination from fellow Muslims. In Aomar Tufali's words: "To be a belittled Moor and a woman is difficult enough. But to be a belittled Moor to Spaniards and a woman to belittled Moorish men" is impossible.[64]

The line between Muslim women as a victim in need of rescue and a threat when she embraces her religion visibly are two complementary strategies of objectification. Muslim women do not control their own lives and are responsible for their own emancipation, if that is at all one of their goals, but rather are at the mercy of Western saviors or other Muslims who use them as puppets. The best example that illustrates how ethnic Spaniards are using Muslim women as proxy for radicalization and a threat to gender equality in Spain is the electoral spot of the radical right party Platform for Catalonia (PxC) for the 2011 municipal elections in Catalonia.[65] The spot begins with a

[62] Jasmin Zine, "Unveiled Sentiments: Gendered Islamophobia and Experiences of Veiling among Muslim Girls in a Canadian Islamic School", *Equity and Excellence in Education* vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, 239-40.
[63] "Comunicado de APROME", *Melilla Hoy*, January 14, 1986, 5.
[64] The original Spanish reads: "*Ser morita y ser mujer ya es muy dificil. Ser morita ante los españoles y ser mujer ante los moritos musulmanes [es incluso más difícil].*" Karmentxu Marín, "Musulmanas en Melilla: Dejadas de la mano de Alá: La falta de documentación y el ambiente familiar dificultan la incorporación de las mujeres islámicas a la sociedad", *El País*, March 30, 1986.
[65] Plataforma per Catalunya, 2011 Official Spot for Municipal Elections in Catalonia, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNFA0EgaH0I&feature=kp&bpctr=1408622166 [Last accessed on October 31, 2015].

portrayal of Catalonia in 2011 and the viewer can see three young women playing skipping rope on a plaza to the sound of a traditional Catalan children's carol. One is dressed in regular western dress, but the other two seem to be ready for a night out in a club. They are wearing long stiletto boots, miniskirts, and tight tops that reveal bouncy breasts. They are highly sexualized, but also infantilized. One of them wears pony tails and a school-uniform looking jacket. After a dozen second or so, the image shifts to Catalonia in 2025 and the three women continue to play skipping rope but this time they are clad in burkas to the sound of raï music. The leader of PxC concludes the spot by saying "primer, els de casa" ["first, those of us from here/home"]. This spot illustrates how crude is the use of gender to promote fear of Islamisation of the West.

An anonymous comment on the YouTube spot site reveals the intended audience response sought after by the producers: "¡Qué niñas más buenas! puedo verlas saltar toooodo el día, definitivamente no deseamos que las tapen.... voten plataforma!" ["What hot girls! I could see them jumping aaaallll day long, surely we do not want anybody to cover them, vote Platform!"]. A male audience who enjoys and finds women turned into sexual objects unproblematic feels at home in the spot. So while PxC warns Catalans about the discriminations that "native" Catalan women will inevitably be exposed to if Muslim immigration is not curtailed, it reveals the sexism and paternalism of ethnic Catalans themselves. Women are portrayed as childish members of society in need of male protection and as luxurious objects whose sexuality needs to be preserved for the benefit of males, not for their own sexual emancipation. Women's agency, control, autonomy, and contributions to society beyond their looks and sexuality are erased. There is a long tradition of using benevolent sexism, a subjectively positive orientation of protection, idealization, and affection directed toward women that, like hostile sexism, serves to justify women's subordinate status to men by male defenders of a given land to attack enemies within.[66] It was used by racist southerners in the United States of America against male blacks depicted as a threat to white American women and it is being used in the West today against "patriarchal and sexist Muslims." In the sport of PxC however, the 'honour' of ethnic Spaniards is severely undermined by coarse sexualization. PxC manages to treat both 'liberated women'and 'oppressed women' as objects.

Of all the arguments that nativists used in Melilla and Catalonia, the gender card, either as benevolent sexism or as an ethnocentric defense of women's rights is perhaps the argument with more lasting credibility and broader appeal to both sides of the political spectrum.

Conclusion

This article explored the conditions under which nativism emergences and, in Melilla and so far in Catalonia, fades away. Nativism requires a fertile soil of fear and uncertainty. It resonates as a natural political position in communities that feel under a real or imagined siege. In Melilla, the real threat to sovereignty mounted by the King of Morocco, compounded with what was perceived as lack of support from Madrid, and uncertain economic times merged into a feeling among ethnic Europeans that their days were counted, that they were the only ones who had the will to protect their city as a European democratic city. In Catalonia, the sense of immediate threat from Muslim

[66] Peter Glick et. al., "Beyond Prejudice as Simple Antipathy: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism across Cultures", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 79, no. 5, 2000, 763.

immigrants was not as pervasive and convincing and thus the PxC had to work harder towards making the Muslim threat visible and tangible.

Feeling under siege triggers the creation of an emergency mentality that erases other socio-economic and ideological cleavages among "natives" in the face of a fundamental threat to who they are and what they stand for. When a significant section of the "native" society refuses to accept the nativist logic of us versus them and the need for emergency measures, then nativism is likely to fail. Particularly so when a section of the "native" society allies itself with the "otherized" minority to break nativist logics and defend pluralistic conceptions of belonging. In Melilla, the demise of nativism was underwritten by the Spanish government in Madrid, who in the end—albeit not at the beginning—sided with Muslim Melillans and worked towards granting them Spanish citizenship. In Catalonia, PxC was not successful in fully collapsing the entrenched nationalist lines—Catalan and Spanish—into a new construction of identity premised upon "autochthonous" versus "Muslims."

Nativism also requires to be a "naturalized" position, something untenable if other alternative narratives of belonging exist and have significant support. In Melilla, nativism did not have competing narratives of belonging, but once it was discredited by Madrid, an attachment to constitutional patriotism became a gathering point for all Melillans, regardless of their ethnic and religious background. In Catalonia, Anglada's nativism had to compete from the get-go with minority nationalism and unfortunately for him, the rise of nativism coincided in time with the largest upsurge in pro-independence sentiment in Catalonia. The economic recession that begun in 2008 could have been fodder for both movements, but minority nationalism had a larger popular base, had been present in various configurations for decades, and with support from conservative parties that hitherto had supported autonomy but not independence, it was able to turn itself into a mainstream massive movement that successfully claimed to be the "natural" identity construction for Catalans. Madrid (and sometimes Spaniards) became the new other. The imaginary threat of Muslim immigrants would have to wait to be awoken at a later date.

Writer Juan Goytisolo once described nativism as "a sacrosanct ethnic union against the Moor".[67] As the 2001 riots against Moroccan greenhouse workers in the Andalusian town of El Ejido or the 1999 xenophobic outburst against Muslim immigrants in the Catalan town of Terrassa demonstrate, nativism has as fertile a soil in Spain as in other European countries. Melilla, however, provided an example of how Muslim activists could successfully challenge the legitimacy of nativism in Melilla by convincing Madrid that the interests of Spain were better served by rejecting nativism in favour of pluralism. A similar choice is at the doorsteps of too many European governments today. But as this article has proven, nativism, as natural and hegemonic as it seems at times, can ultimately be overcome.

[67] Juan Goytisolo, "De la OTAN a la ley de extranjería", *El País*, March 6, 1986.