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EMILIO CASTELAR Y LA "GUERRA DE ÁFRICA"

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A year before Spain invaded the north of Morocco with 45,000 men, an incident occurred that threatened to undermine the already tense relations between Spanish authorities and the Moroccan Sultan. According to the Consul-General Juan Blanco del Valle, three women—a mother and her two daughters—sought the refuge of the Spanish consulate in Tangier "para abrazar el Catolicismo." Having entered the city in the company of a "renegado" Spanish soldier, they were discovered and put in prison. Blanco del Valle, writing with emotion about the captives to the Spanish Secretary of State in Madrid, claimed that they "comenzaron a gritar que eran españolas, como lo demostraba el trage con que se habían disfrazado, y que deseaban ser conducidas a mi presencia."[1] With the mother awaiting an exemplary punishment, there were disturbances as the three were brought to the residence of the consul. Just as the execution was about to take place, Blanco del Valle, "en armonía con los sentimientos humanitarios del Gobierno de S.M.," intervened on her behalf. Ultimately, however, the consul could not find any justification in the treaty between the countries to provide the women with asylum, as they were subjects of the Moroccan Emperor. But he agreed to return them to the Sultan only with a formal promise that they would not be punished and would be able to reclaim their liberty immediately. He ended the note by confidently stating that he had upheld the national honor and dignity of Spain, and he subsequently received accolades from his superiors. This episode, and many others similar in tone and content, linked the protection of the faith and of the faithful to national pride—a key element of mid-nineteenth-century Spanish nationalism. Gendered and racial themes intertwined as Spaniards took up the mantle of the civilizing mission. In turn, this rhetoric became a linchpin of Spain's growing involvement in north Africa and the Caribbean in the 1850s and 1860s.

The narrative of nineteenth-century Spanish imperialism wove together a complex cast of characters, the core of which included an intrepid soldier or diplomat vanquishing an aging tyrant, the defender of an antiquated political and social system epitomized by the subjugation of women. Spaniards believed their efforts to shelter non-European females within the orbit of the Catholic church served as proof of their progressive values.

[1] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: December 10, 1858) Blanco del Valle to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, in Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (M.A.E.C.), Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075. The importance of dress as a sign of European identity is emphasized in many of the letters sent from different consular posts in Morocco. See, for example, *Excmo. Sr.* (December 4, 1862) Isidoro Millas to Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tetuán, H 2077.

Whether fact, as in the case of Blanco del Valle in the prelude to the War of Africa, or fiction, exemplified by popular plays from the era, heroic Spaniards were presented as noble and disinterested protectors of Christian mores in the colonial world. For instance, the 1859 zarzuela *The Martyrs of Cochin China* underscored the religious justifications for Spain's participation alongside the French in the invasion and occupation of Tourane, Annam. Catholicism took center stage, as the murder of a missionary in 1857 had precipitated Spanish intervention in the far east. The play used the backdrop of these actual events to make an emotional appeal for an imperial venture ostensibly designed to protect Annamese Catholics. The play begins as the two protagonists, both "indigenous Christians," are to marry, their vows presided over by a Spanish missionary in defiance of the local sovereign's attempts to extirpate Roman Catholicism. The governor of Saigon, Thi-ur, the embodiment of the Oriental despot, is furious that they have professed publicly the religion of the "European barbarians." When the bride-to-be refuses to join Thi-ur's harem and abandon her spouse, the entire Christian community is put on trial, accused of betraying Annamese laws and their sovereign. Before being sentenced to death, they are asked to renounce Christianity and defile a cross by trampling it on the ground. The plot twists and turns as María, the bride, realizes that she is the daughter of one of Thi-ur's ten wives. As the Christians are about to be executed, canon fire is heard in the background, and the Spanish and French flags are seen on the horizon. The soldiers come and save the day, and the captain says: "Ante la Cruz divina/ juro morir,/ a vengar las ofensas/ de mi pais."[2] Such popular dramas offered a version of the civilizing mission as a duty to atone for the crimes of patriarchal tyrants such as the fictional Thi-ur and provide for their ouster. Offenses committed against women and against the Catholic faith served as pretense for a revived, sentimentalized imperialism.

Despite the staging of empire to popular acclaim, the dominions of the Spanish Monarchy stood in stark contrast to the global reach of rival empires in the 1860s.[3] Spanish imperialists looked at French successes in Algeria as a model, especially for having put down the resistance of Abd al-Qadir, but they also celebrated France for having rebuffed British entreaties to negotiate a settlement to end the conflict in the

[2] Victor Esmenjaud, *Los mártires de Conchinchina: Zarzuela en 3 actos en verso* (Valladolid: 1859), 5-43.
[3] Over eighty plays were written about the War of Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century. See Marie Salgues, *Teatro patriótico y nacionalismo en España: 1859-1900* (Zaragoza, 2010).

1840s.[4] Spaniards appreciated French bravado in the face of British pressure to scale back imperial ambitions, and a jingoistic press urged Spain to "imitate France."[5] After a series of perceived slights, including hostile acts committed against its outposts in North Africa, Spain went to war in October of 1859; shortly thereafter the Spanish Monarchy reincorporated Santo Domingo and sent troops to Mexico with the French.[6] British diplomacy, however, ultimately prevented further incursions southward and ended the conflict in Morocco. By April (Mexico), May (Morocco), and June (Annam) 1862, Spanish imperial advances had been thwarted. In each case, officials, notably Secretary of State Saturnino Calderón Collantes, argued that Spain had not been pushing for territorial aggrandizement. From newspapers to the theater, the Spanish public insisted otherwise, with imperial adventures galvanizing the popular imagination.

As France and Britain continued to expand into Africa and India, Spain only held a tenuous grip on the north of Morocco. Few long-term economic gains were seen. Yet Queen Isabel II was lavished with praise for having initiated a new Reconquest in the tradition of her namesake Isabel la Católica. The Spanish government invested the war in Morocco with great symbolic significance. In the Philippines, Jesuits established the St. Ignatius church in 1863 and named the parish Tetuán to honor the bravery of the soldiers in the most significant campaign of the conflict. Having melted down artillery captured on the battlefield, artisans crafted statues of lions, emblematic of Spanish fortitude, to guard the entrance to the Spanish Cortes.[7] How can we understand such contradictions? Is it possible to reconcile the limited successes of Spain's imperial enterprises with the hold that an empire had on the public sphere? And in spite of popular support, why did a nascent civilizing mission in Africa, followed by campaigns in the Caribbean and the Pacific, fail to unify the metropole?

[4] Handwritten correspondence with the Military Governor in Melilla from 1845 emphasizes the great "prestige enjoyed by Emir Abdel-Kader in this country." *Sr. Coronel Gobernador de la Plaza de Melilla* (Granada, April 30, 1845), in Archivo General Militar de Madrid (A.G.M.), Fondo de África.

[5] Cited in Susan Martin-Márquez, *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity* (New Haven, 2008), 54.

[6] Juan Antonio Inarejos Muñoz, *Intervenciones coloniales y nacionalismo español: La política exterior de la Unión Liberal y sus vínculos con la Francia de Napoleón III (1856-1868)* (Madrid, 2010).

[7] José Álvarez Junco, "El nacionalismo español como mito movilizador. Cuatro guerras," in *Cultura y movilización en la España contemporánea*, ed. Rafael Cruz and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (Madrid, 1997), 52.

C.A.M. Hennessy observes that "the period of greatest internal stability in the fifty years after 1833 was the five years of [Leopoldo] O'Donnell's Liberal Union between 1858 and 1863 when…the Army was engaged…in Morocco, Mexico, in the Pacific war, San Domingo, and Cochin China." Thus he asserts that "O'Donnell had little to fear from the opposition of either Progressives or Democrats."[8] Other historians emphasize the political turmoil, even within the ranks of enlisted men, that epitomized the era. Albert García Balañá describes a scene of soldiers parading through the streets of Barcelona in triumph upon returning home from Morocco in 1860. They caricatured the Spanish General Ramón Narváez and the moderate faction of liberals, equating them with an Oriental despot the likes of whom they had just defeated.[9] José María Jover stresses the domestic ramifications of military interventions, arguing that overseas expeditions allowed political elites to maintain order and mitigate social tensions in the metropole.[10] Success—albeit limited—in such wars, however, did not seem to temper rising social and political discontent, as the "Glorious Revolution" brought more radical figures into power in 1868, followed closely by the declaration of Spain's First Republic.

In dialogue with Edward Said, historians of late have debated vigorously issues of culture and imperialism. Bernard Porter has challenged the idea that the British Empire played a significant role in metropolitan culture and everyday life, insisting that the entire venture was in many ways the product of a confluence of unusual circumstances.[11] Porter's contention that the empire required very little commitment prior to the end of the nineteenth century does not correlate with an assessment of Spain's imperial fortunes, whose overseas expeditions necessitated significant expenditures and received the blessing of competing political factions of *progresistas*, *moderados* and conservatives. On the other hand, the idea of a civilizing mission certainly resonated within Spain and in many ways underpinned the war effort in Morocco. The Archbishop of Madrid insisted that the campaign represented a struggle against the enemies of the *patria*, of God and of

[8] C.A.M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement 1868-74* (Oxford, 1962), 13.
[9] Albert Garcia Balañà, "Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la Guerra de África en Cataluña (1859-1860)," in *Marruecos y el colonialismo español (1859-1912). De la Guerra de África a la "penetración pacífica,"* ed. Eloy Martín Corrales (Barcelona, 2002), 61.
[10] José María Jover, "Caracteres del nacionalismo español, 1854-1874," *Zona Abierta* 31 (April-June, 1984), 15.
[11] Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford, 2004).

religion. This sentiment was echoed by the anticlerical intellectual Emilio Castelar, who clamored for troops to fight in North Africa armed with the sacred fire of patriotism, their imminent victory blessed by heaven.[12] Castelar, who would later become a leading republican political figure, unapologetically wrote that Spain was destined to civilize the primitive races of Africa and to baptize them into Christian civilization.[13] Alice Conklin has explored the "idea of a secular *mission civilisatrice*" and the blindness of nineteenth-century French republicans toward West African cultures.[14] Yet Spaniards emphasized that their efforts must "shine the light of Christianity" upon colonized peoples.[15] All of this runs contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the driving forces of nineteenth-century colonialism—economic and social domination. If, as Josep Fradera astutely observes, "la función histórica del colonialismo del siglo XIX, y en muchos casos del anterior, fue transformer la naturaleza de las sociedades asiáticas y africanas en términos que resultasen funcionales a las necesidades de las economías europeas," then Liberal Union adventurism did not adhere to the same rationale.[16] While economic factors certainly pushed Spain to join France and Britain in besieging Mexico in 1861, they do not provide an explanatory paradigm for considering the invasion of northern Morocco and the war in the Dominican Republic during O'Donnell's administration. As demonstrated in a diverse array of sources, from letters and diplomatic correspondence to newspapers, plays, and military records, Spaniards in many ways justified their imperial wars of the 1860s as racial and religious struggles, and the cultural conflicts that resulted were often mediated through the lens of Spain's own history and its Catholic faith.

Toward War in Africa

In 1858, a series of disturbances in the northern reaches of Moroccan territory, many occurring outside the jurisdiction of the both the Moroccan state and Spanish frontier posts, foreshadowed the violence and war that began in October 1859. Piracy and smuggling certainly contributed to deteriorating relations between Morocco and Spain, as

[12] Álvarez Junco, "El nacionalismo español como mito movilizador," 48.
[13] Emilio Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África* (Madrid, 1859), 5.
[14] Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, 1997).
[15] *Aspecto diplomático de la cuestión de Marruecos, por un diplomático* (Madrid, 1859), 24; Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 5.
[16] Josep M. Fradera, *Gobernar colonias* (Barcelona, 1999), 32.

a number of hostile acts had been reported in the late 1850s.[17] French forces seized key strategic areas just inside Morocco's border with Algeria, and Spanish strongholds Ceuta and Melilla faced continuing incursions launched by the restive towns surrounding them.[18] Even the Sultan, Muley Abd-ar-Rahman, failed to quell unrest on the western coast of Morocco in Zemmour.[19] Symbolized by the occupation of Tetuán, the War of Africa saw a burgeoning jingoism spread across Spain, in part a response to British machinations designed to prevent the rise of a second Spanish Empire.

In the spring and summer of 1858, the British engaged in a series of diplomatic maneuvers to cement their position in the increasingly unstable environs of North Africa. First, they provided a steamship for three sons of the Sultan, who were headed to Alexandria on their pilgrimage to Mecca. The Sultan returned the favor with the gift of a tiger, a "unique and strange way" of showing appreciation, according to a Spanish diplomat.[20] More significantly, the British were open to selling arms to the Moroccans. The Sultan, with the memory of the 1844 bombardment of Tangier still fresh in his mind, sent a delegation to London to purchase 120 cannons, weapons that would be used to fortify their ports and defend against future French attacks.[21] But they also could be used in the event of conflict with Spain. And by October, rumors swirled in Madrid of an alleged assassination of a Spanish consular agent by Moors in Tetuán, news that was denied vigorously by diplomats in Tangier.[22] Such a slight might have been used as a pretext for war.[23] In private correspondence, exactly one year before the War of Africa, the British ambassador John Drummond Hay presciently called attention to the possibility of a large-scale Spanish invasion of the Rif:

[17] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: August 30, 1858) no. 66; *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier, September 9, 1858) Blanco del Valle to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho. no. 72, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[18] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: July 4, 1858) Carlos de España to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, no. 53, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[19] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: July 6, 1858) Carlos de España to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, no. 54, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[20] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: May 12, 1858) Carlos de España to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho. No. 36, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[21] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: August 5, 1858) no. 62, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[22] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: October 20, 1858) Blanco del Valle to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, no. 91, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[23] On the "flyswatter incident" as a pretext for war, see Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, 2011), 25.

> With regard to the supposed scheme of invading Reef by an army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and the intention attributed to the Spanish Government of making themselves complete masters of the Reef country, I beg to say from my knowledge of the warlike character of the people of Reef, the mountainous and almost inaccessible territory they inhabit,…and from the experience we have had of the results that have been obtained by the French Army in Algeria, that it would require a sacrifice of many millions of Dollars and of many thousands of men, and a war of many years before the Spanish Government could attain the object they are alleged to have in view….[T]he only result that could be obtained after the shedding of much blood and the loss of millions of Dollars, would be perhaps, the reestablishment of the old lines under the guns of the Spanish fortress of Melilla, an arrangement which might perhaps be attained by peaceful negotiation.

He concluded: "If the Reefians and Moorish troops were defeated and the Sultan's government were overthrown,…and a general revolution took place throughout Marocco,…the Spanish Government might then discover, perhaps, when too late, that it had entered precipitately into a rash and unprofitable war which would lead to complications, over which it could have little or no control."[24] His astute analysis suggested that Spain would face myriad challenges in prosecuting an imperial war and in consolidating new territories. What many would later describe as the "measly" gains from the War of Africa, concluded with the 1860 Treaty of Wad-Ras, were derided in nationalist invective throughout Spain.[25]

On October 22, 1858, Spanish authorities sent warships to the Moroccan coast in an act of what might be termed gunboat diplomacy.[26] Due to the Sultan's "indifference" to Spanish claims, the crown justified the operation in terms of an "obligation to protect the lives and interests of its subjects."[27] Spain had been seeking an indemnity for damages and harm caused by hostile actions at sea in 1851, 1853 and 1854 in the vicinity of Melilla. Diplomatic correspondence flatly stated that the naval vessels would stay on the Moroccan coast, weather permitting, until the conclusion of the affair. With the

[24] *My Lord* (Tangier: October 11, 1858) , in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[25] Cited in Martin-Márquez, *Disorientations*, 55. Also see, for example, *Carta de F.M.T. a su amiga Paz, sobre el final de la Guerra de África* (Tetuán: April 26, 1860), in Biblioteca Nacional (B.N.), Madrid.
[26] Stephen Jacobsen refers to the War of Africa as an example of "micromilitarism." See "Imperial Ambitions in an Era of Decline: Micromilitarism and the Eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858-1923," in *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Josep M. Fradera, and Jacobson (Madison, 2012).
[27] *El Gobierno de S.M.* (Madrid: October 22, 1858), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.

British as intermediaries, a small sum of $2,000 was suggested to bring an end to an escalating conflict. In turn, the Spanish would have to return the boats and merchandise that they had seized in retaliation. According to Drummond Hay, "It is to be hoped that the Spanish Government will not object to what appears to me to be the reasonable request and proposition of the Moorish Government; and that all existing differences may be now arranged in an amicable and satisfactory manner."[28] The French, according to Spanish sources, appeared willing to see Spain's territories on the border with Algeria fortified with peninsular settlers in order to foster the ideals of European civilization.[29] By the end of the year, the issue had been resolved with the British facilitating. Morocco paid an indemnity to the Spanish, and Spain reciprocated by returning vessels to the Rifeños.[30] The following month, it appeared to the Spanish consul that the Sultan had approved the expansion of Spanish territory in Melilla, representing a great victory for the diplomat.[31]

But as Spanish officials celebrated the resolution of the conflict, Spanish Consul-General Juan Blanco del Valle made some Machiavellian and ultimately fateful calculations. While Blanco del Valle welcomed the end of tensions with the Sultan, he urged officials in Spain to push for territorial concessions around all of their outposts in Morocco. Accordingly, he wrote: "ni la Francia, ni la Inglaterra, se opondrían [dicha ampliacion]; la primera, porque deseando la desaparicion completa de este Imperio, contribuiría, si necesario fuese, a su desmenbramiento…y la segunda, por lo contrario precisamente, porque de los berberiscos saca mas fruto, que le proporcionaría cualquiera otra nacion, para la plaza de Gibraltar y para su comercio marítimo."[32] He was confident that the British would not lose their economic predominance in the Mediterranean if Spain gained a small amount of additional territory in the region. He might have considered British warnings to the contrary, however, as Drummond Hay had cautioned: "The Spanish Government ought, however, to consider the peculiar position of the Sultan

[28] *My Lord* (Tangier: October 27, 1858), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[29] *Exmo. Señor*. Embajada de España en Paris, no. 628, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[30] *Alabanzas a un Dios único* (December 31, 1858), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[31] *Excmo. Sr*. (Tangier: January 22, 1859) Blanco del Valle to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, no. 16, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075. The borders of Alhucemas and el Peñon also were extended.
[32] *Excmo. Sr*. (Tangier: December 31, 1858) Blanco del Valle to Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, no. 131, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.

as Sovereign of the semi independent and barbarous tribes of Reef, and bear in mind the fact that it would be impolitic to demand of the Sultan engagements for the future, which may be of too stringent a character, and which if His Majesty could not fulfill them, might bring about between the two governments a more serious difference than the present."[33] Many of the peoples that had threatened Ceuta and Melilla operated independently of the Sultan's authority, and by treaty Spain was authorized to counter any acts of aggression with impunity.[34] Yet contrary to some of the more hawkish military figures in Spanish Morocco, like Melilla's commander Colonel Manuel Buceta, Blanco del Valle crafted a dangerous strategy of dissimulation.[35] While internal correspondence indicates that he did not seek a military confrontation, he certainly made bellicose pronouncements meant to intimidate and force the Moroccan Empire to pay further retributions for the acts of the largely autonomous Rifeño pirates.[36]

This policy had unanticipated consequences far to the west of Melilla. By the summer of 1859, a series of events took place in Ceuta that served to heighten tensions between the Spanish and Moroccan regimes. On August 21, the Anghera breached the Spanish presidio at Ceuta, knocking down sentry posts and pillars that demarcated the borders and destroying Spanish coats-of-arms in the process. The "Moors of Anghera," seeing the Spanish refortify their positions, continued to attack on August 23 with over a thousand men, according to Castelar's recounting of events.[37] The intensification of violence had a great affect on Spanish public opinion, and the groundswell of support for a war did not go unnoticed in the halls of government. The Consul-General in Tangier, Blanco del Valle, was sent to negotiate reparations with the heir apparent to the throne, as the Sultan Abd-ar-Rahman died on August 29. As he had already enjoyed great successes, in his own view, in expanding Spanish influence in the region, he continued to demand

[33] *My Lord* (Tangier: October 27, 1858).
[34] C.R. Pennell, "The Discovery of Morocco's Northern Coast," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 2 (1993), 229. Moroccans cited article 15 of the treaty between the two nations that gave Spain freedom to act militarily against hostile actions. See *Alabanza a un Dios único* (January 6, 1859) Mohammed El Jetib, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[35] *Escmo. Sr. D. Saturnino Calderón Collantes* (Tangier: February 1, 1859) Blanco del Valle, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075. On the debates between a military and diplomatic strategy, see Pennell, "The Discovery of Morocco's Northern Coast," 230-31.
[36] See, for example, *Alabanzas a un Dios único* (January 13, 1859), Blanco del Valle to Siied Mohammed El-Jetib, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tangier, H 2075.
[37] Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 48-49.

that Spanish territory be augmented, this time in Ceuta. Discussing matters in September and October, the Spanish pressed the issue, declaring that the "savage tribes" in the area had committed intolerable acts of violence against their property that had in turn violated their honor.[38] Initially, Sidi Mohamed, the new Sultan, appeared amenable to the key points put forward by the Spaniards, but a few weeks later negotiations broke down. On October 24, the Sultan wrote to the Spanish Consul-General: "Admitimos que esa población ignorante haya cometido una séria ofensa en atravesar los bien conocidos límites de la plaza de Ceuta y hostilizando su guarnición; pero bien sabeis que si la agresión continuó contra nuestra voluntad, y si no fueron castigados, fue porque el hecho tuvo lugar al ocurrir la muerte de nuestro amo Muley-Abderrahman, y el nuevo sultan, Sidi-Mohamed, no estaba aun proclamado."[39] The letter also disputed Spain's right to put to death those accused of the attacks, and it insisted that the Sultan truly desired peaceful relations with Spain. The British supported Spain's effort to receive reparations, but they hesitated to endorse imperial ambitions. According to internal correspondence, if "the violent acts of the Moorish tribes serve as a pretext for conquest, particularly on the coast, the government of Her Majesty is obliged to safeguard the security of Gibraltar." The occupation of Tangier was considered "incompatible" with British interests.[40] Although Blanco del Valle clearly looked to enlarge Spain's possessions in North Africa, Spain's Secretary of State Saturnino Calderón Collantes had been repeating the mantra that Spain did not harbor expansionist designs.[41] Thus when British diplomatic documents were publicized in the press, first in Gibraltar, and subsequently in Spain, it appeared to many that the O'Donnell government had been bowing to British pressure. The public was outraged and increasingly pushed for war.

Castelar described the sentiments of his fellow Spaniards as virtual war fever, especially after the exposure of British efforts to dissuade the Spanish from going to war in pursuit of territorial aggrandizement.[42] Judging from the number of donations, the war

[38] *El Sr. Blanco a Sidi Mohamed El-Katib* (September 5, 1859), in Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 50.
[39] *El Katib a Mr. Blanco*, in Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 57.
[40] *Lord John Russell a Mr. Buchanam* (sic), in Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 59.
[41] Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 60.
[42] Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 61. José Álvarez Junco emphasizes that "the press unanimously presented the actions that were going to be undertaken in the north of Morocco as the occasion to demonstrate to Europeans the persistence of the Spanish Monarchy as a great power." José

drew upon tremendous popular support, even from as far away as Cuba.[43] Bishops across Spain, including the Archbishop of Seville, and financial institutions, such as the Bank of Seville, gave money. Private citizens, both men and women, as well as town councils and regional governments, from Lérida and Zaragoza to Burgos and Córdoba, provided unsolicited funds. Plays, concerts and even bullfights were organized to benefit the war effort.[44] Troops embarked for Africa (and returned) amidst celebration and music. *Vivas* rang out in honor of God, Queen, and the Spanish people, while soldiers sang opera and zarzuela as they sailed.[45] For the first time in Spain, periodicals covered an imperial conflict with up-to-date news on a daily basis, in part due to a newly-installed telegraph cable that connected Ceuta to the peninsula. O'Donnell expressed great satisfaction with the new technology, exclaiming that now "África está unida a Europa."[46]

As Christopher Schmidt-Nowara has shown, many Spaniards presented the conflict in terms of a battle between civilization and savagery, part of the eternal struggle between Christianity and Islam.[47] Castelar, who narrated the Spanish experience in Morocco in the periodical *Chronicle of the War of Africa,* referred to Africa as a "geroglífico de la Historia," a place where ideas were born and died without leaving behind any relics. All of the great monuments of ancient history in Africa were like "grandes letras de un gran epitafio borrado por el tiempo" and were now lying in ruins. While once Spain and Africa had been connected, united by "misteriosas relaciones," Africa had become an impenetrable wall in modern times, closed off to progress.[48] For Castelar, an oppositional racial component underpinned history, although he believed that

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Álvarez Junco, *Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001), 511. See also Joan Serrallonga Urquidi, "La guerra de África. Una revisión," in *La política en el reinado de Isabel II*, ed. Isabel Burdiel (Madrid, 1998), 140-143.

[43] See, for example, *Isla de Cuba. Donativos que se ofrecen para contribuir a los gastos de la guerra con el Imperio de Marruecos* (January, 1860), in Archivo Histórico Nacional (A.H.N.), Ultramar, legajo 4668; *El Redactor* no. 293 (December 9, 1859).

[44] Emilio Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África* (Madrid, 1859), 5-6, 26, 58.

[45] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 23. Departing from Málaga, soldiers reportedly sang parts of *El Grumete* (The Cabin Boy).

[46] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 68.

[47] Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, 2006), 37.

[48] On Castelar's "Hegelian" ideas of progress, see Jorge Vilches García, *Emilio Castelar, la patria y la república* (Madrid, 2001), 38-40.

in the near future peace would reign. He opined: "Esta armonía realizaremos en Africa: Dios protegerá nuestra causa, que es la causa de la civilizacion y de la justicia."[49]

Like Blanco del Valle, many Spaniards publicized their humanitarian efforts both before and during the War of Africa. Castelar often included stories that highlighted Spanish compassion on the battlefield. For instance, he wrote early in the campaign that the army had allowed a "moro," two children and a black man to return to the "campamento enemigo" after they had been discovered chasing livestock and unexpectedly encountered Spanish troops on the march.[50] Other stories showed a similar narrative arc, describing a family with two children being released and an older man allowed to go free with his cow.[51] Obviously, such tales appearing in the popular press helped to put a human face on the otherwise bloody campaigns of the military. Later, Castelar praised the discharge of two prisoners, arguing that such actions "difundirá entre ellos [los Moros] la idea de nuestra generosidad y buen comportamiento con los que caen en nuestro poder, y les puede hacer comprender que la obstinada resistencia que provoque el enojo del ejército, les es, no solo infructuosa, sino tambien perjudicial."[52]

Military regulations codified such benevolent intentions. A general order from December 1859 expressly forbade the burning of huts and shacks, as that kind of behavior was reminiscent of the "savages of Africa" rather than the "disciplined" Spanish army. Nonetheless, within two months, a regiment from Granada had burned 180 houses, supposedly abandoned, in the area of Anghera where unrest had sown the initial seeds of conflict. Local residents witnessed the rampage, crying out "¡fuera, perros cristianos!"[53]

Many accounts surfaced in the press lauding Spanish efforts to treat civilians caught up in the war with kindness, and they often emphasized that the true enemies of Spain were the Arabs. Castelar more often than not denigrated the "Moors" and their culture as bellicose and barbaric. He repeated the trope of Arabs as militaristic tribesmen, who learned to ride horses as infants, and soon thereafter were given a rifle. In combat, therefore, "El árabe es, pues, robusto, activo, valiente y sufrido. Su primer empuje, sobre todo, es temible….agitan sus armas, lanzan gritos salvajes y tratan al estilo de los héroes

[49] Castelar, *Crónica de la Guerra de África*, 6-9.
[50] Emilio Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África* (Madrid, 1859), 79.
[51] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 80.
[52] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 103.
[53] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 106, 126.

de Homero, de asustar de lejos a sus adversarios. Pasada esta primera impetuosidad, el árabe, si encuentra resistencia, se desmaya facilmente y huye diciendo: *Dios lo quiere: estaba escrito*."[54] Castelar described Morocco as an unknown and remote corner of the world with its inhabitants living in a semi-savage state of existence: "Sabido es el deplorable atraso del imperio marroqui; la absoluta ignorancia que en él reina con respeto a las ciencias y las artes, y la especie de estupor y oscuridad intelectual en que se halla sumida esta gente, ya por la estupidez del gobierno , ya por el carácter indolente del pueblo." Accordingly, few knew how to read, and fewer could write. Castelar opined that "es posible que la inmensa multitud se pase la vida sin tomarse el trabajo de pensar." He breezily dismissed Islamic spirituality, saying that "Unas cuantas oraciones que aprenden de corrido…y unas pocas ideas confusas acerca de la divinidad y de la otra vida, les bastan para sus necesidades religiosas."[55] For the Rifeños, he continued, the struggle against Spain represented "una guerra santa."[56] In summing up an Orientalist vision, Castelar argued that the Moorish race "ha perdido la raza mora el recuerdo de sus antiguas glorias."[57]

In many ways, public opinion in the peninsula was tied to the idea of a second Reconquest, with Isabel II following in the footsteps of her namesake. Northern Morocco had replaced Andalucía as the frontier for Spain's push southward. Castelar urged Spaniards to remember the necessity of "la honrosa mision de ser civilizadora, de llevar al Africa, junto con la religion que tanto engrandecísteis, los benéficos adelantos de la moderna civilizacion."[58] Spaniards, he grandiloquently pronounced, came to Africa "como soldados de la civilizacion, estableciendo la tolerancia, cimentando las libertades todas…; España te ha abierto al comercio del mundo."[59] A liberal imperialism, premised upon a Catholic civilizing mission, clearly undergirded Spain's invasion of Morocco.[60]

[54] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África* (original emphasis), 100.
[55] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 120.
[56] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 133.
[57] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 120.
[58] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 129.
[59] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 129.
[60] On the congruence between liberalism and imperialism, see Uday S. Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," in Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), 59-86.

Taking Tetuán

General Juan Prim y Prats led Spanish forces to victory at Tetuán, with much of the fighting taking place on February 4, 1860. The few remaining Moroccan and Rifeño soldiers in Tetuán began looting the city on the morning of February 6, but shortly thereafter it was taken definitively by Spanish troops.[61] Castelar, in many ways demonstrating both romanticism and naivety, argued for a simple campaign of pacification appealing to the hearts and minds of local residents. He quickly noted that "fácil sería abrirse camino a la obra de la civilizacion." The narrative of civilization conquering barbarism was enticing. Accordingly, the instincts that made the Moroccans into strong warriors likewise would facilitate the civilizing mission, as "su misma ferocidad y falta de cultura harán más fáciles nuestras relaciones y comunicacion, y por tanto nuestro predominio. Pueblo semisalvaje, se rendirá bien pronto a nuestro yugo si apelamos a sus sentimientos, a su corazón." As they were tied to their culture and religion, he wrote, "debemos respetar sus instituciones, sus usos, su religion….Pocos meses de trato fraternal con los enemigos de su fe bastarán para hacerles cambiar sus sentimientos hacia los cristianos."[62] Spanish liberal imperialists advocated a decidedly nineteenth-century ideal of humanitarianism. Nicolás María Rivero even proposed a congruence between the Spanish and African races.[63] Castelar advanced similar sentiments, writing: "Afortunadamente para la humanidad, ya pasaron los dias en que era posible esterminar una raza para sembrar una nueva idea: hoy la obra de la civilizacion no marcha por tan afrentosos caminos: el convencimiento y la razon han substituido a la fuerza."[64] Consequently, he believed that commerce was a key to Spain's success in Morocco, and that Tetuán would become "el primer mercado de Marruecos."[65] Almost everyone, including the principal merchants, were Jewish, and Castelar insisted that their religion be respected. Otherwise, he felt that they would abandon the city, taking their riches with them.

[61] Ahmad ibn Khalid al-Nasiri al-Salawi, *Versión árabe de la Guerra de África (años 1859-60)*, trans. Clemente Cerdeira (Madrid, 1917), 45.
[62] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 138.
[63] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 237.
[64] Ibid. On Spanish views of race in Morocco, see Joshua Goode, *Impurity of Blood: Defining Race in Spain, 1870-1930* (Baton Rouge, 2009), 89-91.
[65] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 138.

In publicizing correspondence from February 6, newspapers described the festivities in Tetuán, with the *Marcha real* playing and the remaining Jews and Moors receiving the Spaniards "con los brazos abiertos."[66] In the central plaza, Spaniards reported that notable Jewish residents "nos llamaban sus libertadores…diciendo: *¡Bien venido! ¡viva la reina!*"[67] General O'Donnell used the same words in his dispatch from Tetuán on February 8.[68] Prim, in an address to his soldiers, stated that the inhabitants "deben hallar un protector, no un enemigo, en cada uno de nosotros."[69] The artist José Vallejo sketched the "Puerta de la Victoria," a gate through the walls of Tetuán, with soldiers that appear to have just scrawled *Viva España* on a stone in the foreground. The seven gates to Tetuán were renamed, paying tribute to the Queen as well as famous figures from Spanish history, with Reconquest heroes foremost among them.[70] Likewise, the occupying forces immediately renamed streets after the royal family and different regiments.

Newspapers quickly pointed out the excellent treatment meted out to the city's population, including its Muslim inhabitants. One such item described as typical "un soldado partia su pan o su galleta con un moro o con un hambriento judío."[71] An artist drew an image of soldiers coming to the aid of Tetuán's poor as corroboration of articles in the press. O'Donnell reiterated this emerging consensus in his dispatch from February 8, in which he told of an emerging *convivencia*: "hoy se le ve mezclado con moros y hebreos como si jamás hubiesen estado divididos, y como si toda su vida la hubieran pasado juntos."[72] A subsequent account revealed to the Spanish public the generosity of soldiers as they helped a poor, old Moorish woman who had fled the city to return home, providing her with some food, taking her on their shoulders, and carrying her to Tetuán.[73]

The taking of Tetuán, completed by morning of February 7, 1860, and the making of Spaniards, went hand in hand. Castelar was effusive: "Hemos reanudado nuestras

[66] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 142. Also see *El Cañon Rayado* no. 22 (March 22, 1860).
[67] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 142.
[68] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 163.
[69] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 171.
[70] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 164.
[71] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 149.
[72] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 163-164.
[73] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 151.

tradiciones: somos españoles, y ya este nombre se pronuncia con respeto en todas las cortes de Europa."[74] In cities across Spain, "[h]ombres, mujeres, niños y ancianos, con lágrimas en los ojos, corrían alborozados por calles y plazas…poblando el aire con entusiastas vivas al Ejército, a la Nacion, y repitiendo esa frase de ¡Gloria a España!" There was a palpable enthusiasm with which Madrileños received the news of taking Tetuán: "En entusiasmo con que se ha acogido en toda España, y sodre toda en Madrid…declara…cuán bien ha respondido el gobierno a la necesidad que sentíamos de lavar nuestra manchada honra y levantar el nombre español de la postracion en que yacia."[75] University students marched alongside people from all classes, waving Spanish flags as music played and *vivas* were chanted. Banquets and fireworks marked the festivities, and *Te Deums* were sung.[76] A lead editorial emphatically announced: "It is not the time to think, but to feel."[77] An emotional, romantic nationalism had taken root. One woman flew two flags that read: "¡Viva el ejército español y muera Mahoma!" Another flag read: "Muley-Habbas se va huyendo/ y corre con tanto afan,/ que se ha roto dos costillas/ al salir de Tetuan."[78] Castelar concluded with the idea that Spain's religious tradition served as the bulwark of a revived national spirit: "por fin se llamaba a la vida al sentimiento nacional, que resucitaba el Dios de nuestra historia."[79]

Reporting from Tetuán a few days after Spain's troops had entered the city triumphantly, Castelar's newspaper highlighted efforts to convert a mosque into a Catholic church, punctuated by a mass and solemn recitations of *Te Deum*.[80] Exactly three months after the first Spanish forces arrived in Tetuán, authorities issued an urgent order to the Moorish mayor. The decree insisted that, instead of having local engineers occupied with "cosas insignificantes," they immediately embark upon construction of a "una amplia y decorosa" Catholic church in the center of the city.[81] With religion and clerics at the vanguard of the occupation, the Spanish symbolically invested in a form of

[74] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 118.
[75] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 146.
[76] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 176.
[77] *La Discusión* (February 7, 1860).
[78] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 147-148.
[79] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 118-119.
[80] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 157.
[81] *Exmo. Señor* (Tetuán: May 4, 1860), in M.A.E.C., Obra Pía, Tetuán, OP 336.

religious reconquest that, in their view, complemented economic aspects of empire-building.

Public discourse tended to denigrate the non-European Rifeño culture. Echoing the infamous claim of Lord Macaulay, Castelar argued that European knowledge far surpassed that of the colonized Moroccans: "Así es que entre cincuenta volúmenes apenas se encuentra uno de historia o de literatura que tenga verdadero mérito o importancia."[82] Ironically, he also criticized the practice of forbidding Christians to read their sacred texts. But the ideal of the civilizing mission at times superseded the Orientalist lens through which Spaniards viewed the North Africans. For instance, by March, with a peace agreement in place, the peninsular press reported celebrations in Tetuán as news of the treaty spread: "moros y hebreos comenzaron a correr las calles, gritando: «Viva España, todos hermanos.»"[83]

Spanish observers noted that Tetuán had the "ribetes" of a European city, although the buildings had no symmetry, and the streets flooded when it rained. The distrustful character of the Arab was revealed through an examination of their housing, they stressed, as most dwellings had an "pobre apariencia."[84] Class divides in Tetuán often seemed invisible or indecipherable, and Spaniards had trouble distinguishing between the dwellings of the poor and those of wealthy families. Lavish inner sanctums often belied such simple exteriors. With a sexualized discourse, Castelar expressed the surprise felt by troops "al penetrar por una puerta humilde y encontrarse tras un torcido corredor con un lindísimo patio de bien labrados arcos, y con grandes salas adornadas con ricas alfombras."[85] With a mixture of admiration and disgust, he certainly gazed upon Tetuán as if he were seeing a city in Andalucía under Moorish rule: "con poco trabajo podria convertirse Tetuan en una ciudad tan bella como Granada."[86] And toward the end of February, Spaniards marveled at the changes that the occupation had produced, from the political to the economic. Writers discussed imminent rail service, the beginnings of a new municipal administration modeled after the Spanish *ayuntamiento*,

[82] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 174.
[83] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 216.
[84] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 174.
[85] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 149. On the "colonized female body," see Martin-Márquez, *Disorientations*, 130-142.
[86] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 150.

and measures to improve safety and hygiene. A theater had been established, and, Castelar asserted, "para que nada de cuanto constituye la vida moderna falte," the newspaper *El Eco de Tetuán* would be published.[87] Public health, administration, technology (both in terms of print and transportation), and culture constituted modernity from this perspective. But Catholicism played a defining role as well. Spaniards boasted of a new Golden Age inaugurated by the Battle of Tetuán, connecting the victory to Habsburg glories such as Lepanto.

The Cultural Encounters of Prisoners, Spies, and Soldiers

Writers such as Pedro Antonio de Alarcón and artists including Vallejo also traveled to Morocco alongside the troops, conveying descriptions and sketches of the campaigns (in addition to peace negotiations, landscapes, etc.) to a public eager for the latest information. Orientalist tropes infused the imagery, creating scenes of cultural dissonance that displayed the scars of modern warfare. For example, Spanish soldiers described with fascination coming upon Jewish residents of Tetuán, who appeared to them to be members of the "European race," unlike the Muslims of North Africa. Many spoke a variant of Castilian, and soldiers realized that they were the descendants of Jews expelled from Spain in an earlier age epitomized by "intolerance."[88] Other episodes illustrated the growing mistrust that pervaded occupied areas, as Spaniards were unable to navigate effectively the cultural milieu of the Rif. In one case, a Spanish soldier, Ramón Rios, "spontaneously presented himself in [the Tetuán] Consulate." A dispute with the commander of his battalion apparently sparked his decision to abandon his post and desert. Rios claimed to have been threatened with death by an armed man, and said that he was taken into the mountains and forced to "abrazaba el mahometismo."[89] After finally escaping and making his way back into Spanish territory, he appeared to have chosen Spanish military justice over the prospect of integration into the local society.

Conceptions of identity were crucibles of the conflict, and interconnected networks of consuls, spies, and collaborators worked to govern and legitimize colonial

[87] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 156.
[88] Nicasio Landa, *La campaña de Marruecos* (Madrid, 1860), 152.
[89] *Excmo. Sr.* (August 13, 1862) Isidoro Millas to Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tetuán, H 2077.

rule, suppress dissent, and even capture fugitive Spanish conscripts. Prisoners, spies, diplomats, and soldiers negotiated the interstices of a new Spanish imperial project throughout the 1860s, and their actions provide a window into nineteenth-century cultures and identities. Writing in 1861 to Spain's Secretary of State Calderón Collantes, two Rifeño collaborators implored their benefactors for aid, as they had fallen on hard times in the aftermath of the occupation of Tetuán. One man spoke of being held prisoner by the Moroccan Prince Muley-el-Abbas during hostilities, the other of losing all of his worldly possessions prior to being incarcerated for months. From the safe haven of the Spanish consulate in Tangier, Caid Ahmed Ez-Zaruali worried that, if freed, they would be seen as spies and face harsh retribution. Ahmed el Morabet wrote: "Y si no nos ayudais, fuera de vosotros no tenemos más que a Dios: porque para los Musulmanes somos españoles."[90] Other examples similarly speak to the fear inspired by religious difference. In early 1862, reports that two hundred "Moors" had gathered on the streets one night caused great alarm in occupied Tetuán, and the Spanish immediately called up two battalions of soldiers to serve as reinforcements in case of a military engagement. Authorities soon realized that the crowd, far from expressing hostility, had congregated to celebrate Ramadan.[91]

The northern reaches of the Moroccan Empire and of the sovereignty of the Sultan served as a metaphor of the imperial encounter, as a permeable frontier between north and south, between "civilization" and "barbarism."[92] Although the crown employed interpreters and soldiers and recruited guards and spies from the local population as they attempted to pacify the regions under their control, Spanish officials constantly expressed concern over the conflicting loyalties of their collaborators. In the *Regulations of the Moorish Marksmen of the Rif*, for example, instructions clearly indicated that Rifeños maintained deeply-held religious convictions and had to be considered "enemigos irreconciliables de los que no siguen su creencia." They resisted the rigid discipline of the

[90] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: Sept. 21, 1861) Francisco Merry y Colom to Exmo. Señor Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, no. 164, in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Embajadas y Legaciones, Marruecos, H 1638.
[91] *Excmo. Sr.* (March 11, 1862), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tetuán, H 2077.
[92] Pennell argues that for "all intents and purposes, Moroccan sultans did not exercise any day-to-day control over the Rif in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." See Pennell, "The Discovery of Morocco's Northern Coast," 229. The Spanish consul in Tangier makes the same point in correspondence from September 21, 1861.

modern military and, according to the manual, did not consider it a "falta grave volver la espalda a la causa de los cristianos."[93] Other Rifeños were employed by consular authorities to capture Spanish deserters, and qualified individuals were brought on as spies.[94] The son of the British consul in Tetuán, Eduardo Butler, who was said to know the language and customs of the Rif extremely well, was asked to provide information to the Spanish in their struggle against the Moroccan Sultan. He rejected the offer, claiming that "Ni mi nombre ni mi honra me permiten ir como un espía al lado del ejército español."[95] Instead, he joined the Spanish forces as a soldier and soon died of illness. Mohamed El Tensamani, who traveled from Málaga to Melilla in early 1862, accepted the charge of assessing the state of public opinion among the peoples of the Rif. The Spanish recruited Tensamani because they believed that, as a trader, he enjoyed the confidence of the local peoples. Tensamani requested authorization not to declare his mission upon arriving in Melilla, "por temor de que sus correligionarios se enteren de los servicios que presta con gran discreción."[96] In addition to a passport, he was given a safe-conduct pass that he could show to Spanish authorities in case of emergency. The Military Governor of Melilla permitted Tensamani's entry only after being presented with this secret document and threatened to shoot him if he made himself suspicious during his travels.

While tensions certainly existed, examples abound of cooperation, negotiation, and cultural hybridity in the midst of the war.[97] Spanish soldiers just as often disappeared into the local population as Rifeño leaders worked with Spain's military and diplomatic apparatus. Although Spain ceded Tetuán back to the Moroccan Sultan in May, 1862, the Spanish consul general wrote in August that Tetuán still appeared "Spanish," in spite of

[93] *Reglamento de la Compañía de Moros Tiradores del Rif* (Melilla: October 15, 1859), in A.G.M., Fondo de África.
[94] Diplomatic correspondence expressed concern over desertion. See, for example, *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: July 31, 1860), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Marruecos, H 1638. The letter describes Spanish soldiers, "in a state of almost complete nudity," brought to the embassy by "Moors."
[95] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 75-76.
[96] *Exmo. Señor.* (Tangier: February 6, 1862), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Marruecos, H 1638.
[97] One local leader petitioned the Spanish authorities on the Chafarinas Islands for help with an irrigation project in 1861. *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: July 30, 1861), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, H 1638.

the presence of a sizeable number of "Moors" in the city.[98]

Diplomatic Conclusions

Not only did common soldiers and merchants serve in intermediary roles in an emergent imperial system, but the Prince, Muley-el-Abbas, brother of the new Moroccan Sultan Sidi Mohamed, played the role of go-between as well. As commander of the troops that entered into battle with the Spanish in the winter of 1859, he represented a formidable foe with tens of thousands of cavalry and possibly as many as 40,000 infantrymen.[99] But resistance crumbled as the Spanish pushed toward the interior, and diplomacy soon overshadowed the force of arms. On February 23, 1860, Abbas and O'Donnell sat down in what was described as a dignified meeting. O'Donnell wanted to make indefinite "possession" of Tetuán the centerpiece of the negotiations. He affirmed that the area under control of his troops "es ya nuestra tierra, es parte integrante de nuestra nacionalidad." He noted the strategic importance of staving off the French from the east and putting an end to piracy, and, of primary importance, linking Ceuta and Melilla. Abbas, clearly in a difficult position, was described in Spanish diplomatic correspondence as "hombre blando, no de guerra, como dicen los moros por aquí." [100] Unfortunately for the Spanish general and head-of-state, Sidi Mohamed did not attend the meeting. O'Donnell, in a subsequent defense his actions before the Cortes, explained that there had been two competing political factions in Morocco. The Moroccan emperor upheld a belligerent stance with the tacit support of the British, although the rival party, led by Abbas, sought peace after seeing the initial successes of Spanish arms in 1859. O'Donnell realized that the emperor's policies would take precedence and broke off the talks at the end of February. By June 1860, O'Donnell went as far as to publicly ponder the notion that Spain use its resources for internal, rather than external, development, such as the construction of roads, the rehabilitation of ports, and other public works.[101] In light of the ongoing conflict in Algeria and the costs of a thirty-year war, O'Donnell

[98] *Excmo. Sr.* (August 5, 1862), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tetuán, H 2077. In 1861, the consul stated that of the city's 11,000 inhabitants, there were five or six thousand Jews, just over a thousand "Moors," and several thousand Spaniards. *Al Excmo. Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado* (July 17, 1861).
[99] R.R. de M., *Crónica de la Guerra de África* (1860), 203.
[100] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 170-71.
[101] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 242-43.

emphasized that conquest in Morocco could take years. The resulting Treaty of Wad-Ras displayed Spanish ambivalence and dissention over the spoils of imperial warfare.

Thus the revelry and self-congratulatory rhetoric that marked Spain's victory in Tetuán quickly dissipated. Many nationalists and supporters of the war had taken to the streets demanding a bigger push into Moroccan territory. One student banner, displayed on February 14 in Madrid, read: "*Tomando a Tánger, Fez y Rabat, la paz.*"[102] Debates in the Cortes in the summer of 1860 dissected the treaty, and many publicly denounced the role played by the British in the negotiations with the Sultan. Rivero, a member of the Democratic Party, forcefully stated that Spaniards were unique in incorporating their religion, laws, and customs into their imperial ventures. By shoring up Spain's African frontiers and renewing the nation's glorious past, troops in Morocco "ibamos…a cumplir una mision civilizadora, de la cual podia aplaudirse la España y la humanidad." After discussing the diplomatic correspondence between Russell, Buchanan, and the Spanish government from September and October 1859, he concluded: "nosotros no hemos alcanzado lo que queríamos."[103] Indicative of the state of public opinion, Rivero's proclamations expressed the frustrations of many Spaniards who had seen their imperial ambitions thwarted.

In August 1860, Muley-el-Abbas was inspecting Spanish frigates and steamships docked at the port of Tangier as part of a diplomatic mission. On board the *Rey Francisco*, he reportedly paid a great deal of attention to new inventions—from the weaponry on board to a portrait of Queen Isabel.[104] Cultural encounters not only took place in Moroccan territory; Muley-el-Abbas visited Spain in 1861 as part of a formal delegation. The press covered his trip closely and described the curious crowds of onlookers who greeted him. Prominent local families hosted gatherings in his honor in Valencia, and women even covered themselves in his presence. One particular event generated a great deal of interest among journalists as the Prince, speaking through his interpreter, asked a young woman who had arrived with a black veil to uncover herself.[105] In sum, he seemed to embrace certain European mores and value Spanish technology and know-how while

[102] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 148.
[103] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África*, 237-239.
[104] *Excmo. Sr.* (Tangier: August 9, 1860), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Marruecos, H 1638.
[105] *La España* (October 4, 1861).

at the same time retaining his own cultural heritage. During the ceremonies marking the return of Tetuán to Morocco, the Prince recalled his journey with fondness in conversations with Spanish officials, noting specifically the attention he had received in Madrid and the respect the Queen had shown him.[106]

The narrative of conquest justified by a particularly Catholic vision of the civilizing mission underpinned the war effort in the Rif. A brief play, written in five acts, provides a romanticized rendering of the War of Africa replete with cultural stereotypes and a melodramatic corollary to the taking of Tetuán. The main character, Zulima from Anghera, had fallen in love with a Spanish soldier, Pedro. But she faced the wrath of her father for acting on her passion, and Pedro adamantly maintained that she convert from Islam and embrace Catholicism before they marry. As Pedro fled from the family's compound, he was taken prisoner by Zulima's father Abul. At the moment he is to be executed, he is rescued dramatically by a valiant comrade. Fighting ensues, and in a climactic denouement, Pedro wounds Abul, the father of his bride-to-be. Just then, a local man arrives ruefully announcing the taking of Tetuán, and Abul dies of his wounds. Zulima, at first, is horrified to find out Pedro killed her father. But soon she forgives him, agreeing to renounce her faith and to marry her "querido cristiano."[107] As an allegory for a sexualized form of conquest, the play portrays empire-building as a process of both moral and spiritual penetration. Martial and Christian values were entangled in this civilizing mission. Unlike Pedro's ultimate success, however, Spain was not able to best the British. Spanish forces were withdrawn from Tetuán in 1862, with Britain loaning Morocco money to pay off the indemnity of 400 million reales that was the centerpiece of the 1860 peace treaty. The most visible symbol of Spanish conquest, the city of Tetuán, had to be abandoned.

The rhetorical edifice of Spanish identity in many ways continued to hinge upon historical legacies and religious symbolism. Spaniards referred to the peoples of the Rif—Arabs and Berbers alike—with the catch-all term "Moors," a throwback to an earlier age, and defined their overseas wars as a continuance of Isabel la Católica's

[106] *Excmo. Sr.* (May 9, 1862), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tetuán, H 2077. Muley-el-Abbas visited a mountaintop shrine that hosted Muslim pilgrims as a symbolic conclusion to hostilities. *Excmo. Sr.* (May 30, 1862), in M.A.E.C., Correspondencia, Tetuán, H 2077.

[107] *La Guerra de Africa y la toma de Tetuán: episodio dramático-contemporáneo, en cinco actos y en prosa.* (1860), in B.N.

Reconquest. The Ayuntamiento of Havana, praising the War of Africa in a letter to Her Majesty Isabel II, succinctly applauded the triumph of "la Cruz sobre el vacilante y caduco poder del Islam."[108] Castelar wrote that Spain, as "el misionero de las naciones," bore the weight of destiny in civilizing peoples submerged in barbarism.[109] Spaniards certainly sought to "civilize Africa," but few in Spain embraced a particularly secular conception of the "civilizing mission." Foregrounding the historical and religious context to the War of Africa thus challenges the prevailing notion that material and secular considerations alone informed imperial narratives in nineteenth-century Europe.

[108] *Señora* (November 30, 1859), in A.H.N., Ultramar, legajo 4668.
[109] Castelar, *Crónica del Ejército y Armada de África,*169.