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Journal of Comparative Literature & Aesthetics

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In Honour of Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar (1908)
Retd. Professor of English and Vice-Chancellor, Andhra University,
India's Celebrated Comparative Aesthetician, Literary Critic and
the Academic Founder of the Indo-Anglian Literature
and Literary Scholarship.

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL:

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

I have been asked by the Editor to contribute "an autobiographical sketch" of my 'scholarly activities and associations", and referred for guidance to the way Prof. Wellek had spoken on the occasion of his 75th birthday and Prof. Sen Gupta has written about his "life and work" in an earlier issue of the Journal. While it is a rare honour to be named along with them (as also, by implication, with Ananda Coomaraswamy, in whose memory the inaugural Summer 1978 number was issued), I am duly sensible of my limitations and comparative insignificance, and I deem this a fortuitous conjunction rather than an earned distinction.

Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy was a polymath among scholars, a brave and intrepid pioneering spirit, a child of the Orient who carried the Light of India to the West, and a hard-headed student who mobilised the analytical high seriousness of the West to make his own marvellous revaluations of Indian art and culture. He strikes us today as a product of two cultures, including in his sensibility the best of both, and transcending them too and pointing towards a possible future exemplifying the quintessntial culture of universal man. Ananda Coomaraswamy is verily one of the gods of our idolatry, and I can only offer my homage, as I did when Sahitya Akademi organised his birth centenary celebrations in Madras in 1977.

Prof. Rene Wellek is a scholar whose range of reading and fecundity in writing almost out-Saintsbury Saintsbury. With his roots in Europe, Wellek has spread his foliage in America, and he is at home in many literatures and critical

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disciplines. Scholarship, research, literary history and criticism, poetics, aesthetics, stylistics— he takes them all in his easy stride. The bibliography of his writings is so Gargantuan that the only reaction can be 'Prodigious.' There is in his writing a sense of power and poise, an uncanny sureness of direction, and here and there an understandable heaviness as well. He is exhilarating, he can also be occasionally exasperating ; but he is always rewarding. Like Einstein devoting his Princeton years to the formulation of the unified field theory, Wellek too is apparently striving towards a philosophy of universal literature including and exceeding both national and general literature.

As for Prof. Sen Gupta, I have followed his career as scholar and critic since the publication of his first book, *The Art of Bernard Shaw*, over forty years ago. His series of volumes on Shakespeare entitle him to be hailed as our most dedicated and distinguished Shakespearian. His excursion into aesthetic theory, *Towards a Theory of the Imagination* (1959), broke fresh ground and encouraged others to follow his lead. I think we had some correspondence about Mark Hunter's lecture on 'The Substance of Shakespearian Comedy', but to my regret we have had no occasion to meet in person.

Now what have I to say about myself that can even remotely justify my being linked with these scholars and critics of international standing ? For one thing, we have all been wanderers between two (or several) worlds, ever seeking a base of enriched understanding. Like Sen Gupta, I too have been a student and teacher of Shakespeare, and my *Shakespeare : His World and His Art* was the fruit of decades of such absorption. Like Wellek (in collaboration with Austin Warren), I have also (in collaboration with my daughter, Prema Nandakumar) published a book of literary theory, *An Introduction to the Study of English Literature* (1966). I can thus claim a certain distant fellowship with these savants in an abiding faith in literary values.

Even so. I feel uneasy to embark on this 'autobiographical' exercise. I recall a similar embarrassing moment 30 years ago when C. R. Mandy, then Editor of the *Illustrated Weekly*, asked me to contribute my 'self-obituary'. It was to be one of a series (Mulk Raj Anand and R. K. Narayan were among the others), and mine was the 4th and appeared on 2 July 1950. Unhappily, the 'self-obituary' drove some readers to a wrong conclusion, and they started commiserating and making anxious inquiries. However, at the staff club in Andhra University, there was agreeable banter across the table, and the Vice-Chancellor and my other senior colleagues joined in the game.

In my school days, I cultivated Tamil, Sanskrit and English, but felt specially attracted (or so I thought) to Chemistry. Among my school teachers, I remember with gratitude G. Srinivasa Ayyar, who taught us Shakespeare (Mark Antony's oration), Goldsmith ('The Deserted Village') and Byron ('The Prisoner of Chillon'). While reading 'Hamlet' as rendered by Charles Lamb, Ayyar augmented it by reading and elucidating long passages from the play itself. Since I couldn't proceed to Madras to do Chemistry, I pursued my college education at Tirunelveli and Palamcottah, and graduated in Mathematics. Among my teachers of English were M. V. N. Subba Rao, K.T. Krishnaswami and N. Balakrishnan (Hindu College) and P. L. Stephen and the Rev. A. Leleau and Jerome d' Souza (St. Xavier's). It was an odd thing for a Tamil boy to learn to love English, but somehow this happened. While I owed much to these and other teachers, Fr. Jerome d' Souza was to be a continuing inspiration and a life-long mentor, and I felt fulfilled when he graciously contributed a Foreword to my *Gerard Manley Hopkins*, published by O.U.P. in 1948.

After graduation, I spent a few years in North Ceylon as a teacher of English and Mathematics. My students were to appear for the Cambridge Senior Certificate examination, and the course included plays by Shakespeare. During those years of my nonage, I taught *Henry V*, *Julius Caesar*, *Much Ado*, *Twelfth Night* and *The Tempest*. Strangely enough, this was the time I read Ibsen, and Prof. Jayagopal Bennerjee of Calcutta University was generous enough to publish my series of 7 articles on the Norwegian dramatist in the *Calcutta Review* (1930-1). It was also during my 'Sri Lanka' interlude that I became an inveterate reviewer of new literature. One of the earliest books I reviewed was Lytton Strachey's *Elizabeth and Essex* (1928), and Strachey — after reading my review — sent me an autographed copy of the American edition of the book, a priceless possession with me.

Returning to India, I took my M.A. in English as a 'private' candidate, and presently joined the new college at Belgaum as 'Assistant Professor'. I spoke Tamil at home and taught English to Marathi and Kannada students. My classes were packed with about 150 students, sometimes sullen and restive, and at other times eager and responsive. I had to be a teacher doubled with a police sergeant, and I mastered early the art of propitiating the gods and goddesses of the gallery.

Aside from discharging my normal duties, I found time to read and write, both journalistically (I did a weekly literary causerie for years in papers like the *Federated India*, the *Mahratta* and the *Social Welfare*), and often with a more sustained

attention. My papers on Pater, Hardy, Marlowe, Milton and Wordsworth appeared duly in the Madras and Bombay University Journals. And my 'critical study' of Lytton Strachey was presently sponsored by Allied Publishers in India, Chatto and Windus in U.K. and Harcourt Brace in U.S.A. Desmond MacCarthy and Raymond Mortimer reviewed the book in leading literary articles in the *Sunday Times* and the *New Statesman* respectively, and there were other appreciative notices as well. Bouquets like "an accomplished critic of life and letters..." and "a very gifted critic of English literature..." were more than what even the vainest young author could have hoped for. Besides, the book secured for me, in 1939, the D. Litt. of Madras, my referees being Profs. Lascelles Abercrombie, Nichol Smith and George Gordon of the Oxford University.

My addiction to Strachey and interest in the art of biography were to persist, and it was especially satisfying that I should receive the Sahitya Akademi award in English for 1980 for my *On the Mother*, although it is a biographical homage in a very different cast and orientation from the Stracheyan exemplum of irreverent astringency.

Like my admiration for Strachey, my interest in Indo-Anglian literature goes back to the late nineteen-twenties. First I was drawn to the work of K. S. Venkataramani, whose book *The Next Rung* I reviewed in 1928 in the *Times of Ceylon*. When I came to Madras in 1931, I met him and other young writers like M. Chalapathi Rau, Manjeri Isvaran, K. Chandrasekharan, A. D. Mani and K. Ramakotiswara Rao (who was then Editor of *Triveni*). I wrote about the work of P. Seshadri, G. K. Chettur, Humayun Kabir and others, and 'Indo-Anglian' slowly acquired a currency of its own. My first monograph on the subject, *Indo-Anglian Literature*, came out in 1943 with an Introduction by C. R. Reddy, the book being sponsored by the P.E.N. All-India Centre. This was followed by the rather larger volume, *The Indian Contribution to English Literature* (1945). I seized opportunities as they came to bring this body of writing to the notice of scholar and 'common reader' alike. Then came my stint as Visiting Professor of Indo-Anglian literature at the University of Leeds (1959), and my lectures there were later published as *Indian Writing in English* (1962, 2nd enlarged edition 1974). My enthusiasm for this 'freak' literature was to cause amusement, if not embarrassment, to some Professors of English in India, but now at long last 'Indian Writing in English' is an accepted orthodoxy in our Groves of Academe. The *Illustrated Weekly* published, in its issue of 4 January 1970, George John's series of verses on 'Indo-Anglian luminaries', and this was the bit abut me :

Professor Iyengar :
Indian Writing in English
Is his favourite dish.
And he prefers *The Life Divine*
To the best English line

(The others mentioned were R.K. Narayan, Mulk Raj Anand, Nirad Chaudhuri, B. Rajan and Khushwant Singh.)

More recently, on my receiving the Sahitya Akademi award, the *Sunday Statesman* (5 April 1981) carried an article by D. Anjaneyulu with the facetious heading (supplied presumably by the Editor) "India's Mister English!" No doubt, for half-a-century and more I have pleaded for a recognition of the significant and truly meritorious work, creative and critical, done by so many gifted Indians through the English medium. But I am by no means 'Mister English'. After all these years, I am uneasy still with English. I talk Tamil whenever I can, and always I feel more at home in Tamil than in English. And yet most of my writing has been in English. A paradox, if you like !

The war years were a hectic and pretty agonising period, but for me they meant a decisive change of direction in my life. Earlier I knew Sri Aurobindo as a poet and patriot of the 'Bandemataram' days, but since 1942, he (along with the Mother of Sri Aurobindo Ashram) has been for me the prophet of *The Life Divine*, the exponent of integral Yoga, the symbolistic and epic poet of *Savitri* and the pathfinder to 'Next Future'. My biography of Sri Aurobindo appeared in 1945 (the revised and enlarged 3rd edition in 1972) and my *On the Mother* came out in 1952 (the greatly expanded two-volume 2nd edition in 1978). I had in the meantime moved from Belgaum to Bagalkot in 1944, and from Bagalkot to Andhra University, Waltair, in 1947.

My more than two decades (1947-68) in Andhra University saw the publication of *Gerard Manley Hopkins* (1948), *The Mind and Heart of Britain* (1955), *The Adventure of Criticism* (1962), *Francois Mauriac : Novelist and Moralist* (1963) and *Shakespeare : His World and His Art* (1964). I attended the Shakespeare Quatercentenary Conference at Stratford-upon-Avon, and I was happy that my book on Shakespeare had come out in time. It had a good press in U.K. and in India, and Prof. A. Closs of Bristol, reviewing it in the *Aryan Path*, remarked that the 700-page volume "will, for a long time, remain a most memorable and important homage to one of the world's greatest literary geniuses". The reviewer in the *Year's Work in English Studies* (Vol. 45) called my book a "substantial study" and added:

"Iyengar's early chapters give a clear and sensible account of Shakespeare's life, of the textual and bibliographical problems relating to his writings, and of theatrical conditions in his day. The bulk of the book, however, apart from a chapter on the poems, is concerned with the plays .. Iyengar has read very widely in Shakespearian critical literature of all kinds, and is himself a critic of penetration and judgement; his book is one of the soundest and most thorough general works on Shakespeare to have appeared in recent years".

The edition sold out within six months, and hasn't been reissued since. I have not lost hope that some publisher will one day give it a new lease of life.

Immediately after the Shakespeare Conference, I attended the first Commonwealth Literature Conference at the University of Leeds. Next year I went to Leeds and London again, and helped to usher into existence the Association of Commonwealth Language and Literature Studies, with Prof. A. N. Jeffares as Chairman. I also attended the 2nd Commonwealth Literature Conference at Brisbane and spoke on 'Commonwealth Literature : Themes and Variations'. Some of my papers and talks on Commonwealth Literature were collected in *Two Cheers for the Commonwealth* (1969). During my fairly long innings as Head of the English Department of Andhra University, I reorganised postgraduate teaching so as to find a place for American Literature, Indian Writing in English and Commonwealth Literature, with facilities for research also in these areas. During the last decade, several universities in India have likewise extended the base of English studies so as to give them almost a global coverage.

After 19 years as Head of the English Department, I served as Vice-Chancellor of Andhra University for about 30 months (1966-68). It was a period of excitement and tension when I had to live with campus crises most of the time. At last I resigned the Vice-Chancellorship, and found a heaven of peace at Sri Aurobindo Ashram, New Delhi, and the Mother named me the 'adhishthatha' of the place. Soon after, I was unanimously elected Vice-President of Sahitya Akademi (National Academy of Letters), and re-elected for another term in 1973 and I also acted as President towards the end for about 8 months. During this unexpected phase of my active life (1969-78), I was privileged to meet many eminent writers in the several living languages of India (including Sanskrit and English), and it was one of my constant preoccupations to underline the unifying 'Indianness' behind the opulent manifoldness of Indian literature. The symposium, *Indian Literature since Independence*, appeared in 1973 with my 50-page Introduction insinuating my thesis and affirming my faith, and I was also involved in the Akademi's launching the ambitious project, *Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature*,

which is expected to come out in due course in 3 large volumes. It was both enlightening and exhausting to participate in literary seminars convened by the Akademi at different centres, and I felt more and more clearly the unity of Indian literature and culture from the Vedic Age to the present day. It was a matter of unique satisfaction to me that I could take an active part in organising the several Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Seminars during 1972, and I also edited the seminar papers in the comprehensive volume, *Sri Aurobindo : A Centenary Tribute (1947).*

I should add that my membership since 1938 of the P.E.N. All-India Centre (founded by my esteemed friend, Shrimati Sophia Wadia) has also brought me into contact with writers in India and abroad. I attended the Jaipur, Annamalainagar and Baroda sessions of the All-India Writers' Conference, as also of the P.E.N. Congress at Tokyo-Kyoto in 1957. At the PEN-UNESCO Symposium at Tokyo, I was privileged to represent India— Angus Wilson, Alberto Moravia and John Steinbeck representing U.K., Italy and U.S.A. respectively. I spoke at one of the plenary sessions on 'The Meeting of East and West and the Promise of a New Hope for Life and Literature', with the international President, M. Andre Chamson, in the chair. Some years earlier, I had visited the United Kingdom during the 'Festival of Britain' months, and met most of the University Professors of English, including Dover Wilson, Peter Alexander, C.L. Wrenn, Lord David Cecil, Geoffrey Bullough, Una Ellis-Fermor, D. G. James, Basil Willey, Bonamy Dobree, H. B. Charlton, John Butt, Simeon Potter and E.M.W. Tillyard. I spent an evening with E. M. Forster whom I had earlier met at Jaipur, and quite a few Dons took a lively interest in me as the author of the critical study of Lytton Strachey. Likewise, at Oxford I received a ready welcome on account of my book on Hopkins. A partial record of my reactions appeared serially in the *Hindustan Times* and was later issued as *The Mind and Heart of Britain.* But the day-to-day diary I maintained during the tour has so far remained unpublished.

During my subsequent visits to Britain in 1959, 1964, 1965 and 1973, I renewed many old friendships and made new friends like Vivian de Sola Pinto, T. J. B. Spencer, A. N. Jeffares, G. Wilson Knight, Douglas Jefferson, Arnold Kettle and H. O. White. I attended as sole Indian delegate the International Congress of Literary Critics at Rheims in 1972, and the Annual Congress of the International Union of Academies in London in 1973. As Vice-Chancellor, I attended the Commonwealth Universities Congress at Melbourne and Sydney (1968), and as an Aurobindonian, I took part in the 2nd World Congress of Religion and Peace at Leuven in 1974. And, of course, while still an active Professor,

I did my turn as President of the All-India English Teacher's Conference at Jaipur in 1963.

I must confess, however, that with my temperament and food habits I don't quite enter into the spirit of conferences and congresses. At the same time, I cannot deny that the ambience of such meetings has usually a tonic effect upon me. And chance encounters have developed into deeper associations and life-long friendships. In the course of an academic career that began over half-a-century ago in February 1928, I have known many a scholar and teacher of eminence in India, and I remember them with affection and gratitude. Of the seniors, I recall with particular emotion the late N. K. Sidhanta, V. K. Ayappan Pillai, S. C. Deb and J. R. Macphail ; of those happily with us still, K. Swaminathan ; of my nearer contemporaries, V. K. Gokak, G. C. Bannerjee and V. Y. Kantak ; and of those much younger in age, Ramesh Mohan, C. D. Narasimhaiah and M. K. Naik. It is certainly most gratifying that my students have distinguished themselves as Ministers and as Vice-Chancellors, but nothing can give me greater pleasure or pride than the fact that several of my students are themselves University Professors, seasoned teachers and organisers of teaching and research, carving out names for themselves. A still larger number of my students are in professions other than teaching and they too extend the same affection towards me when chance brings us together. They don't usually remember (nor do I) what exactly I tried to teach them in my time, but the human ties remain, defying the vicissitudes of time and age ; and the cleansing and transforming power of this love is an unfading and invaluable blessing which can only be a gift of Grace.

As for my credo, I may say that I too, like Prof. Wellek, believe that what matters most in literary study is "the great work which must have moved us and spoken to us before we ever engaged in the professional study of literature". *Sahrdayatvam*, first ; and only then, the 'business of criticism', in Helen Gardner's phrase. Thus at different times I have been knocked down by classics like the *Ramayana* or the *Odyssey*, *Antigone* or *Medea*, the *Divine Comedy* or *Paradise Lost*, *Hamlet* or *The Tempest*... and, coming to later times, masterpieces like *Anna Kerenina*, *The Brothers Karamazov*, *A Doll's House*, *Moby Dick*, *Madame Bovary*, *The Cherry Orchard*... and, in our own time, *Gitanjali*, *Savitri*, Mauriac's *Therese* or Wole Soyinka's *Madmen and Specialists* ; and, of course, since the ways in which one's pulses respond to different writers and their artistic creations must differ considerably, and we don't have all the facts and hence cannot easily pluck the heart of the creative mystery, there is need for abundant caution and humility in formulating

our conclusions and assessments. Only Christ is the best or true critic, Hopkins wrote to his fellow-poet, Dixon ; and this has been a salutary warning to me in my profession as a literary critic.

In retrospect, I feel that I have been a desultory rather than a wise reader ; and I have written more than I need have. I seem to have read with no pre-conceived plan, and mixed recklessly in my daily diet metaphysics and mystical poetry and sociology and detective fiction. I have done all my 'typing and most of my proof-reading. I have avoided the usual 'enemies of promise' — social life, politics, the lure of 'power' — and I haven't been assailed and enfeebled by too much success. If I have been able to serve literature with diligence and devotion, much of the credit goes to my wife who has been a silent and unfailing help. Perhaps the itch for writing is in the family. And lately my son and my daughter have both graduated as writers, my son as an economist and my daughter as a translator, critic and practitioner of the art of the short story. Rare blessings these, and I feel thankful that my unflagging commitment to literature and the teaching of literature has, at the least, kept me out of the insane rat-race without and the hucksterings of the market-place ; and at its best — however few the occasions and far between — given me almost a sense of sacerdocy, as the Mother has described the teacher's function. To have been enabled to find entry into the elected world of a Shakespeare at one end, and of a Sri Aurobindo at the end, and all the realms between, and just now to be able to lose myself in the Sundara Kanda of the *Ramayana* of Valmiki : where can I find words adequate enough to convey this ineffable Delight of Existence ? As one grows older, problems seem to multiply. Truth seems an elusive mystery. Motives mix, intentions miscarry, the glitter of so-called achievements only gathers rust, and the murmur of frustration tries to ruin the evolving harmony. But *Kāvyānubhava* cannot fail us, and this is the Faith that endures, and — whatever the hazards af age — I hope this Faith will sustain me still.

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EXPRESSIVENESS IN MUSIC

HAROLD OSBORNE

While all music lovers are convinced of the power of music to move them emotionally, our understanding of the expressive and emotional nature of music has been bogged down by a century of controversy which has had no other outcome than to forge more and more rigidly opposing standpoints on questions that have usually been too vaguely formulated for clarification to be possible. Controversy has turned on two main points: (1) Is the expression of emotion by means of music possible ? Is it essential ? Is it a major function of music or a main reason why music is so highly valued ? (2) If music does express emotions, are these the emotions familiar to us in everyday life or are they a special set of emotions experienced only in listening to music ?

The controversy about the expressiveness of music was set on foot in 1854 by Eduard Hanslick's little book *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, which electrified the musical world of his day by describing music as *tönend bewegte Form* (sonorous form in movement) and asserting that it is intrinsically incapable of expression. This was followed in 1880 by Edmund Gurney's monumental work *The Power of Sound*, which took a similar line. In our own century, in exaggerated opposition to the mushy sentimentality which only too easily infects much writing about music in in the Romantic tradition, Igor Stravinsky said in *Chronicles of my Life* (1936): 'I consider that music is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to *express* anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a psychological mood, a phenomenon of nature, etc. Music is given to us with the sole purpose of establishing an order in things .. Its indispensable requirement is construction. Construction once completed, this order has been attained, and there is nothing more to be

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said.' In direct contrast with this line of thought is the much more prevalent conception of music today which is symbolised in the description of it as a 'language of the emotions.' It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a few considerations which may help to prepare the ground for a reconciliation of these views or at least take us a step beyond the bare confrontation of the irreconcilable.

In his influential book *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (1956) Leonard B. Meyer distinguishes between what he calls the 'formalist' and the 'expressionist' theories as follows: 'The formalist would contend that the meaning of music lies in the perception and understanding of the musical relationships set forth in the work of art and that the meaning of music is primarily intellectual, while the expressionist would argue that these same relationships are in some sense capable of exciting feelings and emotion in the listener.' This formulation perpetuates the common mistake of assuming that appreciation of any work of art must be either intellectual understanding or emotional response. On the contrary, artistic appreciation consists in *perceptual* apprehension. Appreciation of music is the auditory apprehension of a sonorous construct as an ordered, emergent unity. Preliminary intellectual analysis may help as a preparation towards non-analytical, synoptic apprehension. But appreciation itself is not the piecemeal awareness of constituent parts which are then related together by understanding, but the subsequent synoptic apprehension of the unitary whole. It is the resultant expansion and enlargement of perceptual consciousness which justifies our calling the experience aesthetic and its object a work of art. True, this perceptual experience may itself be profoundly emotional. But the antithesis between emotional response and intellectual understanding remains a false one : appreciation must be regarded as emotionally coloured perception. The necessity for realising this is apparent in such a book as *The Sense of Music* (1959) by Victor Zuckerkandl, when he asks : 'And where in all this is there a place for *emotion*, which so many believe constitutes the very essence of music—so much so, in fact, that music is quite commonly referred to as the language of the emotions ? There is just no place for emotion in the context of the essential question.' He then adds : 'There is no musical experience without emotion, that is to say, there is no way of grasping a musical context, the motion of tones, otherwise than by partaking in it, by inwardly moving with it — and such inward motion we experience as emotion.' Thus he returns to Hanslick's *tönend bewegte Form* but seems to claim that the apprehension of these forms in auditory perception is an emotional experience.

Let us for a moment forget the formidable elaboration of theory and consider what it is actually like to listen to music. When I am listening to a piece of fine music I am not more than peripherally aware of myself as swept by successive

emotions or wallowing in a warm bath of emotional indulgence. Attention is concentrated on *perceiving* the structure of sound that is being presented. Afterwards, when it is over, I may say that the experience was profoundly emotional or that profound emotion was 'in' the music. During performance the experience was one of concentrated hearing. It is when we listen to melodies, however, or rhythms, or slighter pieces of music that we chiefly tend to hear the emotion 'in' the music.

When we experience music, or indeed any work of art, we attend not only to the physical properties it manifests, but also to its aesthetic or expressive features. These fall into three classes : (1) Aesthetic qualities proper, such as are indicated by the descriptions 'elegant,' 'graceful,' 'majestic,' 'dainty.' (2) emotional or 'mood' qualities such as are indicated by describing a work as 'sad,' 'lugubrious,' 'gay,' 'serene,' etc ; and (3) affective or evocative qualities such as 'moving,' 'charming,' 'exciting,' 'tedious,' etc. It is the second class which have created unsolved problems for aestheticians.

Phenomenologically, we hear the emotion of sadness, gaiety or whatever *in* the music as a feature of the sonorous construct which is the music presented to us. We do not necessarily experience it as an emotion in ourselves. For example, Mendelssohn's *Wedding March* is inappropriate at a wedding because it *sounds* joyful — we hear joyfulness in it — at a time when we are *feeling* sad. Nor do we mean that the emotion we hear 'in' the music is a sign of a similar emotion experienced by the composer or the performer, as we assume that a bodily gesture is a sign of sadness, surprise or delight. We assume that the 'sublime' emotions we hear in the last part of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony or Scriabin's *Poem of Ecstasy* were experienced *at some time* by the composers, but this is an assumption difficult to verify. The emotion we hear is 'in' the music, a feature of the music itself in a way in which sadness, surprise or delight are not features of the gesture which indicates them. Emotions, however, are mental states or events in living creatures. Works of art are not living creatures and the problem posed for aesthetic theory is how emotional qualities can be perceived 'in' them. At least it is clear that the analogy we need is not that of the expressive gesture (Ouch !), but rather the expressive character which cloaks many natural objects — the dolefulness of a weeping willow, the calm tranquillity of an Essex countryside, the violent agitation of a storm at sea or the harsh melancholy of the foghorn.

We speak of 'emotion.' But emotion is a complex mental state consisting of an object or situation apprehended and a tendency to take action in relation to it as

well as a linked feeling tone. It is the affective state alone which is expressible in pure music or non-representational art. What we hear in music are the shades of feeling, the minutiae of mood and affective tone, which we experience in life sometimes embodied in full-blown emotions but sometimes alone. When they occur alone we call them 'moods'. Music may express sadness or dejection but not sorrow or grief, which are states of feeling related to apprehended situations, unless there is an indication of referential context as in opera or song. Anger, sexual jealousy, irritation, despair cannot be expressed in 'pure' music or non-representational art. Noone has ever detected, or could ever detect, an emotion of despair in a piece of pure, non-relational music or non-representational visual art, for despair involves a feeling of very intense dejection specifically directed towards a situation apprehended together with a belief that no action is possible to better the situation. Unless there is non-musical reference accompanying the music, only the feeling tone or mood can be expressed. Busoni understood this when he wrote in *Sketch of a New Esthetic of Music* (1911) : 'To music, indeed, it is given to set in vibration our human moods : Dread (*Leporello*), oppression of the soul, invigoration, lassitude (Beethoven's last Quartets), decision (*Wotan*), hesitation, despondency, encouragement, harshness, tenderness, excitement, tranquillisation, the feeling of surprise or expectancy, and still others ; likewise the inner echo of external occurrences which is bound up in these moods of the soul. But not the moving cause itself of these spiritual affections ; — not the joy over an avoided danger, not the danger itself, or the kind of danger which caused the dread ; an emotional state, yes, but not the psychic species of this emotion, such as envy, or jealousy ; and it is equally futile to attempt the expression, through music, of moral characteristics (vanity, cleverness), or abstract ideas like truth or justice. When this is borne in mind part of the difficulty is reduced. We understand how the music of opera and song, religious music and incidental music in general can be appropriate to the occasion, or not. We have the analogy of expressive sounds in nature which carry an aura of mood and affective tone. By the powers of synaesthesia, just as the painter Arthur Dove could represent the mournful sound of the foghorn by his painting *Fog Horns* and the Futurists Russolo and Boccioni expressed states of mind by their evocative abstractions, so music by its evocation of mood can express the affective aura of things and situations though not the things or situations themselves.

It is still necessary to circumscribe more precisely the logic of 'express' in this context. On the one hand the ancient Chinese and Indian aesthetic traditions have understood better than Western aesthetics of this century that self-revelation for its own sake is not an aesthetic aim. A composer may or may not treat his

music as a sort of emotional autobiography in which to expose the moods and emotions he feels : we are interested in such self-display only to the extent that what is revealed in the music has been endowed with universal, more than passing individual value. The logical difference between self-expression and self-revelation has been interestingly worked out by Nicholas Wolterstorff in *Works and Worlds of Art* (1980), pp. 21-29. It must be added that self-expression so distinguished must nevertheless be subject to further conditions before there can emerge an object appropriate for aesthetic contemplation. On the other hand it is generally agreed in contemporary aesthetics, following Kant (e.g. *Critique of Judgement*, Bk 1, sect. 13), that the arousal of specific emotions is not a proper function in any of the arts. Indeed many would maintain that a work of art which stimulates emotion directly in a hearer is not functioning aesthetically, as art. The aesthetic function of art, including of course music, is not emotional arousal but the *presentation* of feeling and mood. A poem about a spider need not — should not— evoke in the reader the emotions of horror and disgust experienced by a woman who seeing a spider leaps upon the nearest chair. When reading Andreyev's *The Seven That Were Hanged* we do not set ourselves to planning ways of escape. The work of art presents emotional moods in such a way that in contact with the music the hearer non-verbally apprehends them, savours the way they feel and contemplates them as items in the human affective repertory. The extent to which in order to savour and apprehend the feeling tone of emotions in a work of art it is necessary to experience them vestigially in oneself seems to vary from person to person : in general, people experienced in aesthetic contact with the arts find this less necessary. But the central principle is clear : appreciation of music is not emotional response in the way in which the woman responds to the sight of a spider or the heroic lad in the audience leaps on to the stage to rescue the heroine from a fate worse than death. It is emotionally coloured perception demanding the utmost in perceptual concentration and the expansion of awareness to heights beyond the ordinary so that an extremely complex but unified object may be brought to consciousness as a unity in 'synoptic' perception and not put together analytically from discretely heard constituent elements.

While the foregoing exposition falls within the general ambit of contemporary Western aesthetics, it must nevertheless be recognised that even a cursory survey reveals that music is a pretty well universal phenomenon among the peoples of mankind and that throughout the world it has in fact been practised primarily for the evocation of emotion and mood. In primitive times the obsessive and hypnotic effects of musical sound in conjunction with incantatory

chanting have been exploited by shamans and medecine-men from the peoples of northern Europe to Tibet, by tribal priests everywhere, to induce abnormal states of consciousness which were believed to involve direct contact with magical or supernatural powers. One thinks also of the Vedic chanting of ancient India. The deep sonority of the *rag-dungs* (copper tubes up to 15 feet long) descended from the ancient Bon religion of Tibet still exerts a powerful emotional response, as does the resonance of the 6 feet Chilean *trutruca* and other long wooden tube-like instrument played by the natives of South America. The profound emotional powers ascribed to music are reflected in the miraculous legends which attach to famous musicians of antiquity whose names have survived. The Greek poet-musician Orpheus, it was told, could move trees and rocks, hold wild beasts in check, by his music. Similar tales were told of Tan-Sen, the court musician of the emperor Akbar : that he could light a candle or cause the sun to rise an hour early by his music. Throughout history music has everywhere been used in conjunction with ritual and ceremonial to evoke religious or patriotic warlike emotions and for milder emotional titillation in times of leisure.

The philosophers of ancient Greece were deeply convinced of the direct effects of music on human character and emotional disposition. Contrary to current Western belief, the emotional character and influence of the music was attributed not to the individual composition but to the mode in which it was played. This linking of emotional power of music with mode has been taken for granted in most developed musical traditions. It was strong in Europe up to the time of the Baroque. In the sophisticated tradition of Iran it is the mode or *dast-gah* which determines the emotional atmosphere and creates the right state of mind in the listener, giving new reality to the magic of the word, inducing revelation into the mystery of meaning behind the words of the great poetic epics. The Indian musical tradition stands, of course, at the summit of this line of evolution. Emotional atmosphere is embodied in the *rāga* and the *rasa* works directly upon the mind of the hearer. In his book *The Rāgas of Northern Indian Music* (1968) Alain Danielou writes : 'Indian music, like Arabian and Persian, always centres around one particular emotion which it develops, explains and cultivates, upon which it insists, and which it exalts until an impression is created on the listener which is almost impossible to resist. The musician can then, if his skill be sufficient, lead his audience through the magic of sound to a depth and intensity of feeling undreamt of in other systems.

From the time of Jazz with its debts to African folk songs and African rhythms, much popular music in North America and Europe has made the direct

arousal of emotion a deliberate aim, culminating in hysterical swooning and emotional ejaculation among audiences of fans. It became the music of the young. But the more serious exponents of Pop music have made careful studies of the music of India and the Far East. What they were in search of was a music which could induce the sort of expansion of consciousness and extension of awareness which the younger generation sought in too superficial addiction to Yoga disciplines, Zen contemplation or psychedelic drugs. Since Indian classical music became more generally familiar in America and Europe during the 1950s through such figures as Ravi Shankar, Ali Akbar Khan and the brothers Imrat and Vilayat Khan it began to be believed that this was the goal of which they had been in search. It was even believed by the ignorant that this music could 'send one on a trip' without drugs. This is, of course, a distortion of fact. But the aim is far from sheer emotionalism. It is a form of 'magic consciousness' which the religious mystic of all ages seeks through the contemplation of God and describes as ineffable union with the divine. It has been described as a 'transparent' mode of perception free from the bounds of space and time, but one which is not always or necessarily religious in origin. The hallucinogenic drugs induce an analogous state without providing the perceptual material with which it can be satisfied. The aim of the arts, I have elsewhere maintained, is, centrally, to create such an intensification of perceptual awareness, opening the doors of consciousness, while offering perceptual material of complex organic unities adequate and more to maintain such a state active and alert.

This conception, which may be extended to the other arts besides music, does justice to the emotional power of music while recognising the 'aesthetic distance' which Western philosophy rightly, if sometimes exaggeratedly, maintains is an essential condition of the aesthetic attitude of attention.

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ON FIRST READING EMPSON'S "LETTER II" : NOTES ON POEM AS STRUCTURE

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By virtue of *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, *Some Versions of Pastoral*, and *The Structure of Complex Words*, William Empson has long been recognized as one of the cornerstones of the New Criticism of England and America. Much less attention has been paid to his poetry though his *Collected Poems* has been in print for over thirty years. [1] This relative indifference is more than a little regrettable, for some of his poems are heartbreakingly beautiful and all are informed by a high intelligence which frequently works through a sustained and dazzling sense of verbal play. In this regard, "Letter II" is particularly representative of the subtle fineness of its author's perceptions and his profound sensitivity to the implicative range of language. Understandably these traits make for "difficult" poems, but in this connection it is worth recalling R. P. Blackmur's remark about Hart Crane. Of him, Blackmur observed : "it is syntax rather than grammar that is obscure." [2] The same can be said of Empson : his vocabulary is generally simple, though extremely wide in range, with words being drawn from mathematics, theoretical physics, psychology, anthropology, and mythology. It is the use to which these words are put that demands concentrated attention ; their contexts are invariably multiple and ambivalent. Indeed, Empson himself has remarked : "the process of getting to understand a poet is precisely that of constructing his poems in one's own mind." [3] By attending closely to the syntactic and semantic structures of "Letter II" we may start to construct the poem in our heads and thereby to commence the process of understanding.

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Stanza 1 presents the situation whose ramifications the poem as a whole contemplates :

> Searching the cave gallery of your face
> My torch meets fresco after fresco ravishes
> Rebegets me ; it crumbles each ; no trace
> Stays to remind me what each heaven lavishes.[4]

The situation is twofold, for on the major level the stanza presents the image of an explorer examining primitive paintings in a cave. On the minor level, the image is that of a lover contemplating the face of his beloved. The power and significance of the poem depends on the symbolic action which enacts the mental growth of poet and reader alike from the limited situation mentioned above to the complexly inclusive theme of the recognition of the fundamental human situation which is what the poem is about as well as what it does. The poem is concerned with the gradual realization of the impossibility of going fully backward or forward in time, of the pity of not knowing all culture but only a residue of past humanity, and of the terror of not being able to carry one's whole culture into the future. It is the enactment of this symbolic action which I shall now trace in terms of the linguistic interactions.

Semantic multiplicities appear in the very first line, for three contexts are presented. *Cave* provides the pattern of time past, primitive man and early culture, while *face* provides the pattern of time present on both natural and human levels. On the former level the reference is to the rock surface of the cave which relates to the primitive aspect but with the difference that it is viewed from the standpoint of the present and the explorer. On the latter level the word refers to the personal aspect which is embodied in the human face of the beloved. *Gallery* has a multiple function in mediating between these ideas and thereby constructing the third context which is the total one of the poem. The word my have the sense of "long, dark tunnel" which throws added weight on *face*, particularly in the human sense, by emphasizing *searching*. In this sense the whole line has an adjectival or modificatory relation to *face* ; it is made the focus of attention.

Another sense of *gallery* which is of equal importance is that of "a place for the exhibition of art" which looks forward to *fresco* of line 2. This sense of cultural records being on view is carefully built up throughout the poem in such references as *fresco*, *sketchbook*, *canvas*, *frame* and *portraits*. The fact that the spectator in stanza 1 is the explorer fuses these two themes from the beginning. That is, the notion that the spectatorial attitude toward art is an act of dynamic participation emerges from the ability to apprehend the bifocal vision that all men are explorers

and that the explorer is fundamentally a spectator. Man subsumes his twin roles of spectator and explorer which are subtly interrelated. Used in this sense, there is also an implicit contrast suggested between "cave gallery", and "art gallery" that is, between past and present in terms of housing culture. The art of the past existed in caves which, though galleries or showplaces, were also well-integrated backgrounds for the art works. The use of *fresco* is significant here, for it stresses the relation between the raw material and the artist's material. But today the art galleries have become caves, catacombs, repositories of the past and its reminiscences and consequently do not constitute an integrated context for their focal objects.

This contrast is presented more clearly by line 4, stanza 2 and line 4, stanza 4 :

Bare canvas the gold frame disdains ?

... ...

The new is an emptier darkness than the old.

Each is capable of two different readings. The former may mean either "the bare canvas disdains the gold frame" or "the gold frame disdains the bare canvas". The first reading implies that we treat *when* as a subordinate conjunction applicable to both the clauses of lines 2 and 3 and of line 4 :

How judge their triumph, these primeval stocks,
When to the sketchbook nought but this remains
A gleam where jelly fish have died on rocks,
Bare canvas the gold frame disdains ?

This makes the stanza raise a question based on two factors — the paucity of informative data (1, 2-3) and the positive rejection of the present, civilized, sophisticated culture (*gold frame*) by the raw, primitive culture (*bare canvas*). The second reading is even more involved for it can accept the syntactic pattern of the first reading while adding its own alternative. This last consists in regarding line 4 as in apposition to line 3 and hence presumes the whole of line 2 and not merely the initial conjunction. If read this way, the major meaning rests on *bare canvas* referring to *this* thereby establishing a parallel structure with *a gleam*, and on "which" being understood after *canvas*. This completely reverses the meaning of the line, for now it is the modern age of the gold frame which spurns the primitive age of the bare canvas. The resolution of this dichotomy appears through a contemplation of the pejorative sense in *disdains*. The modern age in rejecting the distant past without due consideration reveals its own immaturity and weakness : it motivates its own irony, but since every age has been contemporary at some point in

time, this irony pervades all of human culture. Even apart from the syntactic subtleties by which these various meanings are ordered, they are held together by the semantic implications of *bare* which range from "bleakly empty" to "stripped vigour", thereby encompassing the alternative readings in a single word.

A similar use of language appears in line 4, stanza 4 where *emptier* holds the alternative senses :

> Only walk on ; the greater part have gone ;
> Whom lust, nor cash, nor habit join, are cold ;
> The sands are shifting as you walk ; walk on,
> The new is an emptier darkness than the old.

The line can be taken to mean that the darkness which the explorer is entering is devoid of interesting objects of culture. This is to view the "new-old" contrast as one existing in space. By reading it as also a contrast existing in time, we see it as a comment upon the modern age, the present. In any case, the emphasis is upon the sense of loss, of something missing. At this point Empson's explanatory note holds the ambiguity firm, for when he says that "they have a ground in common only so long as there is something new to find out about each other," we cannot be sure whether he is referring to line 3, line 4, or both. [5] If it is read as referring to line 4, then the meaning could be that the explorer (humanity on the general level) in accordance with the advice "walk on" is doing the correct thing for now that he knows the secrets of this part of the cave, he should push on to different areas. This emphasizes the idea that man's relations are dependent upon a substantial mystery ; man is aware of the various forms of otherness as a result of ignorance. Consequently, *emptier* ceases to be a pejorative term and takes on implications of freedom and the unfettered which provide the proper context for the explorer who is constantly searching for space in which to move around as well as for different experiences and new knowledge.

Having shown how the ramifications of *gallery* broaden out to control and condition the rest of the poem, we should now consider the use of *your* in stanza 1 and of *you* in stanza 4 from a similar standpoint. In stanza 1 *your* suggests that the explorer is speaking either to himself, to the cave or to some other person (the beloved). In stanza 4 the *you* indicates either that someone, presumably the poet, is speaking to the explorer or that the explorer is speaking to his beloved. This last is, of course, as in stanza 1, operating on a minor level and is only meant to suggest that this personal note is still present. It may also serve as a bridge in the transition of speakers from stanza 1 to stanza 4. Actually the transition begins

in stanza 3 with *glancing, walk on* which is ambiguous. The meaning may be either "I walk on, after glancing" or "after you glance, then walk on." These alternatives involve differences in subject and tense and from these follow differences in structure and tone.

It appears that on one level the poem divides into two parts which are linked by the transitional third stanza. The first part explores the cave with its shut-in atmosphere and contemplates what is limited in scope physically, geographically and imaginatively :

> Searching the cave gallery of your face
> My torch meets fresco after fresco ravishes
> Rebegets me : it crumbles each ; no trace
> Stays to remind me what each heaven lavishes.
>
> How judge their triumph, these primeval stocks,
> When to the sketchbook nought but this remains
> A gleam where jelly fish have died on rocks,
> Bare canvas the gold frame disdains ?

It focusses on past time which is something fixed and incapable of suffering addition or variation. The second part presents the poet speaking to the explorer and suggests that the latter is connected with such notions as "the traveller ; wanderer ; searcher for variety, novelty and increased knowledge ; the free spirit in the tradition of romantic anarchism" :

> Glancing, walk on ; there are portraits yet, untried,
> Unbleached ; the process, do not hope to change.
> Let us mark in general terms, their wealth, how wide
> Their sense of character, their styles, their range.
>
> Only walk on, the greater part have gone ;
> Whom lust, nor cash, nor habit join, are cold ;
> The sands are shifting as you walk, walk on,
> The new is an emptier darkness than the old.
>
> Crossing and doubling, many-fingered, hounded,
> Those desperate stars, those worms dying in flower
> Ashed paper holds, nose-sailing, search their bounded
> Darkness for a last acre to devour.

The concentration on the stars, even if from within the cave, gives a sense of spaciousness by means of which the background shifts from nature (cave) to the cosmos (stars). The tone, however, ironically reverses the notion of spaciousness

as equivalent to freedom which is connected by the star image to the notion of the explorer as the free man. For like the stars, the explorer and humanity are involved in a situation from which there is no escape. Stanzas 3 and 4 suggest that the answer to man's dilemma lies in adopting the role of the explorer, but stanza 5 suggests that even this is futile and that the explorer is an inadequate prototype for humanity. Regret and fear for the past are fused with terror and despair of the future.

The transition of reference involved in *your* (stanza 1) and *you* (stanza 4) is further aided structurally by line 1, stanza 2 and by the variations on *walk on* in stanzas 3 and 4. The phrase *how judge* orders through its understood infinitive form several different aspects of the problem. Its subject is also understood, but there is no sure way of determining a specific one. It could be 'I' in which case the explorer would be regarded as still talking ; or the plural equivalent 'we' could also be employed thereby indicating that the explorer identified himself with the group (either of explorers or of humanity) and drew his strength from this relationship. This last interpretation would naturally place a more than rhetorical emphasis upon *let us* in line 3, stanza 3. Another possibility is assuming 'one' to be the subject. This emphasizes the question of the stanza as an intellectual problem ; the impersonal subject has a neutralizing effect on the notion of being directly and immediately involved. Finally, the subject may be 'you' in which case it refers to the explorer and presents a sharp contrast between the explorer's statement in stanza 1 and the poet's or the impersonal question of stanza 2.

The use of the infinitive holds three different ideas together, each of which demands a different auxiliary verb to be assumed. The first idea is raised by the assumption of 'should' which presents the ethical or moral question of the possibility of judgement stemming from the paucity of data on which to base a judgement. The second idea appears with the notion of 'can' which raises the question of the possibility of judgement itself. This reading provides an element of despair and terror in tone ; there is an implication of the complete impossibility of judgement or of rendering ethical and valuative statements. The suggestion is that here man is confronted by overwhelming, brute facts, a note that is taken up in line 2, stanza 3 and developed more fully in stanzas 4 and 5. The third idea is embodied in "can" and raises the question of practical action by implying that some judgement must be made even though the basis is slight. This slightness might be meant to be called to mind by the phrase *general terms* in stanza 3. With the last of these ideas we are in a world of physical events which contrasts with the

other two ideas which refer to the world of mental events and appeal to the human conscience and consciousness respectively.

Stanza 3 is an answer to the question of the second stanza and consequently it is to be expected that it should continue the syntactic hierarchical structure. Again the subject is understood and may be either 'I', 'you' or 'we'. If 'you', then this relates back to stanza 2's similar use and corroborates the fact that the speaker is the poet and that the verbs are imperative. If the subject is 'we', then the *us* of the following line merely expands and continues the answer of the first two lines. But if the subject is 'I', then *us* may have been used as a rhetorical, impersonal form aimed at circumventing the note of permission which invariably hangs about the more parallel phrase "let me". It may also have been used in conjunction with the imperative and the understood 'you' to indicate that there are other people who *glancing, walk on* and that as a result the 'you' is plural. Back of this notion is the suggestion that the individual who has walked on can carry through his action and complete his answer only with the assistance of other people. In this sense, the last two lines of the stanza are an extension of the answer suggested by *walk on*, for not only should man indulge in motion of a possibly therapeutic nature but also in action on the level of human intelligence.

Stanza 4 continues the syntactic structure while introducing more forcibly and on the major level a note of urgency and vague, undefined, terrifying uncertainty :

> Only walk on ; the greater part have gone ;
> Whom lust, nor cash, nor habit join, are cold ;
> The sands are shifting as you walk ; walk on,
> The new is an emptier darkness than the old.

This is done through the imperative aspect of the verbal structure. It is reinforced by the first word *only* which implies that whatever one does, one must keep moving both as an explorer and as a cultural man. It does, however, contain a note of reassurance also which provides an ambivalent sense. The suggestion is that "if you will only walk on, everything will be all right." The first three lines have three statements separated by semi-colons and preceded and followed by a repetitive imperative form. The statements all emphasize the danger or urgency of the situation by simply recording facts. These are underscored by the second *walk on* which balances the urgency of the first and also contains a note of reassurance which reminds us of the advice of stanza 3 and the non-pejorative sense of *emptier*.

The informative factual nature of the language provides the terror and regret and the advisory, hortatory nature the reassurance. The former is emphasized if

we read *only walk on* as present tense with the subject "I" understood ; the stanza takes on a tone of gentle regret and melancholy. A sub-variation within this occurs which depends on whether we understand "I" as coming before or after *only*. In the former case the emphasis is upon the smallness, the incompleteness of the action and suggests that there is no marking in general terms going on. If the latter is taken, the emphasis is upon the individual's loneliness and isolation. The two sets of implications are mingled in *only* which holds both the notion of "simply" and of "alone".

In lines 1 and 3 the informative aspect is straightforward and connotes terror and apprehension. Both lines rely for their multiple relations on the repeated *walk on* which open and close them respectively. By way of contrast the literal statements of lines 2 and 4 are ambiguous in meaning and tone. The alternatives in line 4 which centre on *emptier* have already been considered. In line 2 the irony is even more explicit, since it revolves around antithetical attitudes to three basic areas of human concern — sex, economics and social pressure. These words have slighting implications in themselves ; for example, it is not 'love' but *lust*. A further depth of irony is gained by counterpointing *lust* against *ravishes* (stanza 1), *cash* against *wealth* (stanza 3), and *habit* against *character* and *styles* (stanza 3). This last is not so sharp, since the poet wishes to maintain an ambivalent tone and he can do so only by breaking the clearcut pattern of antithesis begun by the first two words. Thus it is possible to read the whole statement as an attempt to communicate simply and directly on an essential problem or fact (as in the manner of Hemingway). As a result, the tone is hung between the two poles of sarcastic, slighting irony and of passionate urgency over basic human verities. Here again we note that the literal, informative aspect conveys the note of terror and pity.

This ambivalence is maintained by the two verbal units in the line. Thus *join* may have a notion of forced yoking or ulterior motivation behind it in contrast to the ritualistic celebration embodied in the term as found in the marriage ceremony. Similarly, *are cold* may mean merely sterile or frigid, that is, wilfully inhuman (more like *jelly fish*, line 3, stanza 2), or it may refer to the final tragic act of inhumanity — death. The difference in tone parallels that which exists between the sneering contempt of the malcontent and the piteous magnanimity of the tragic hero.

Stanza 5 returns to the situation (stanza 1) but now it is viewed in the light of the question (stanza 2), its answer (stanza 3) and their ramifications (stanza 4) :

Crossing and doubling, many-fingered, hounded,
Those desperate stars, those worms dying in flower
Ashed paper holds, nose-sailing, search their bounded
Darkness for a last acre to devour.

It is by all odds the most difficult stanza as anyone who has tried to fit *nose-sailing* into the structure will acknowledge. The sense of terror and pity here becomes dominant from the opening line which is daringly constructed wholly of modifiers. This construction heightens the suspense, for the subject is not presented until line 2. The words themselves are plurisignificative and powerfully suggestive, both within the line unit and within the poem as a whole. *Crossing*, for instance brings to mind "those star-crossed lovers" which connects with the personal note of your face (stanza 1) ; the intersection of the paths of the stars which works on the level of direct statement ; and the religious gesture which reinforces the answer *walk on* (stanza 3) by suggesting the necessity of man's accepting the inevitable and incomprehensible. Similarly, *doubling* suggests running at a set pace which corresponds to the normal path followed by the stars ; contorting the body which relates to the human problem seen in terms of the stars ; and changing direction so that one's path bends back upon itself which describes the motion of the stars at present.

These first two words concern themselves with the actions of the subject, while the next, *many-fingered*, presents a characteristic of it, and the final word, *hounded*, deals with the subject's relation to its context and more especially how it is acted upon. Thus they provide three different modes ef insight into *those desperate stars* as well as a climactic hierarchy of modifiers. *Crossing and doubling*, *hounded* and *desperate* work immediately for the impression of frenzied flight and pursuit. And if we think of the fingers as ones of light, then it too takes on a quality of darting uncertainty.

The structural inclusiveness is maintained in line 2 by the possibility that *stars* as well as *worms* is a metaphor. *Worms* obviously refers to the burning embers of the explorer's torch, at least on the immediate level. It may also suggest that human beings die at the peak of their capacity to absorb and diffuse culture and are recorded only on the rapidly consumed pages of history ; man is a worm physically as well as theologically. *Stars* may refer to human beings whose situation in a time-ridden world is analogous to that of astronomical bodies in their space-ridden world. If, finally, we think of the stars as *worms dying in flower*, then

the universe even at its outermost reaches is being consumed in some relentless (if unobservable) fashion. At any rate the astronomical context is linked to the human by the torch light *(ashed paper)*, thereby bringing together the immediate, direct concern with the explorer and the mediate, oblique concern with the cultural problem. The light, whether flame or man's mind, is frantically searching for new areas to illuminate before it is forced to go out. Their darkness is limited *(bounded)* by the time of illumination and also by the power of illumination: this is true for the cultural as well as the physical situation.

The pity of the situation has been emphasized to date, but with the final word *devour* the note of terror is made paramount, thereby maintaining the the ambivalence of tone to the very end. On the immediate level it gives the idea of light as an animal force ravenously consuming the darkness ; this image serves to complete the pattern of rude power inaugurated with the *torch . ravishes* phrase. On the more oblique level it conveys by way of final irony the manner in which a society or civilization indelicately and undiscriminatingly bolts a new aspect of culture. Viewed from this angle, it is just as well that man, the world and culture are limited for it is the only way of avoiding complete despoliation. That this thesis is capable of suffering an ironic reversal, Empson would be the first to admit, but he would also suggest, I think, that this would be matter for another poem.

Notes and References :

1. One sign of a more sustained interest than heretofore is the appearanee of a full-length commentary on the poems by P. Gardner and A. Gardner, *The God Approached* (London : Chatto and Windus, 1978). Significantly enough, however, their bibliography of criticism on Empson's poetry is only a page or so in length. 2. R. P. Blackmur, *The Double Agent* (New York : Arrow Editions, 1935), p. 136. 3. W. Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, 2nd ed. (London : Chatto and Windus, 1947), p. 62. 4. W. Empson, *Collected Poems* (London : Chatto and Windus, 1957). p. 21. 5. Empson, *Collected Poems*, p. 100.

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THREE ASPECTS OF MEANING IN DANCE

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I begin with some comments on exemplification to elucidate what I take some post-modernist dances to be about. The paper then shifts to a discussion of representation and expression, with most of my examples coming from modern dance and ballet.[1]

EXEMPLIFICATION

Writing at the beginning of post-modernism in 1961, Selma Jeanne Cohen mentioned a "new group of choreographers who ..... reject the idea that a 'story,' or even 'content' in the traditional sense, is necessary to a dance work. Instead, they assert the independence of dance as pure movement."[2] More recently, Marcia Siegel speaks of some of this work as " 'abstract' in the sense that it has neither narrative nor descriptive overtones, neither compositional sequence as it's commonly understood nor any intention of being expressive or impressive."[3] Now there certainly are important post-modernist dances, such as Merce Cunningham's *Summerspace*, Yvonne Rainer's *Trio A*, Trisha Brown's *Primary Accumulation*, and Doug Dunn's *Gestures in Red*, that do not give us "meaning" in the traditional senses of that term. These dances are not representations, do not have a narrative structure, and do not employ standard storytelling theatrical devices. Nor does it seem correct to say, in John Martin's words, that they "arouse us to feel a certain emotion," or that they provide "re-created emotion," that is, these dances neither directly express emotion nor represent the expression of emotion.[4] And they certainly do not fulfil Walter Sorell's demand

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that the dance have "meaning in terms of imagery that transcends reality."[5] What, then, can be said about the "meaning" of such dances? Well, they are "about" movement itself, and the best start we have on elucidating this sense of "about" is Nelson Goodman's notion of exemplification.

Goodman claims that artworks "perform one or more among certain referential functions : representation, description, exemplification, expression."[6] Exemplification for Goodman is of labels, primarily predicates, and it is analyzed in terms of denotation and reference. Thus, he claims that something, i.e., an artwork, object, or body, exemplifies a label if and only if the label denotes that thing and the thing refers to the label.[7] For our purposes we can relax Goodman's nominalistic structures and speak of properties as being exemplified. Goodman himself allows this, for he says that a tailor's sample functions as a symbol "exemplfying certain properties," in which case he speaks of exemplification as "possession plus reference."[8] Thus, a thing exemplifies a property if and only if it possesses (or has) the property and the thing refers to that property.

Now the notion of "reference" in this definition seems problematic in the case of dance. David Gordon's *Sleepwalking* is about speed and acceleration ; the dancers' movements literally possess these features and they are emphasized by the dancers who focus on walking, trotting, running, and then running very fast. But Goodman claims that in exemplifying such properties there are "properties possessed and shown forth — *by a symbol*, not merely things the symbol denotes."[9] The notion of "shown forth" seems appropriate ; the dancers are accelerating and showing forth, emphasizing, or calling attention to acceleration, but it seems odd to say this is accomplished "by a symbol." So let us relax Goodman's definition once more, while restricting our focus to dance, and say that a dance performance exemplifies a property if and only if it possesses the property and it emphasizes that property. This will allow us to retain Goodman's claim that a dance does not exemplify all of its properties, while enabling us to avoid one criticism of Goodman, namely, that his notion of reference takes us outside the orbit of the work itself, that is, it will enable us to say that the work is "about" certain features of movement itself, while remaining faithful to the claim of Cohen and Siegel that such post-modernist work does not serve a referential function.[10]

Now let's focus on the notion of emphasis, for that looks to be as vague and inclusive as Goodman's notion of "reference." We can do so via the work of the Effort-Shape analysts who, following Laban, provide a way of describing qualitative changes in movement features in terms of the ways a mover concentrates his actions.[11]

One of the ways in which Effort-Shape theorists analyze movement is in terms of four bipolar "effort" factors : flow, weight, time and space. These are regarded as basic emphasizable movement elements. The flow of a movement ranges on a continuum from free flow, in which a person "goes with the flow," so to speak, the movement is relaxed, easy, and difficult to halt instantaneously, to bound flow, in which the flow is restricted, held back, restrained, and involves an ability and readiness to halt the action at a given moment. The weight factor in movement ranges from firm, characterized by strong muscular tension and a sense of strength spatially projected as a forceful action, to fine, in which the person acts to withdraw, withhold or rarify the weightiness of an act, to actively overcome gravity's force. The time factor ranges between quick and sustained ; the former involves sudden movements that are urgent or condensed, it typically involves speed and a decisive arrival at a new location, whereas a sustained movement is drawn out or indulged in, is typically slow in developing, and involves a gradual change in location. The space factor in movement relates to spatial focus or attention ; in direct movement attention is focused on one object, in indirect movement there are a number of foci of attention.

In addition to these Effort factors, and their various possible combinations, there are different sorts of changes in the Shape of movement, that is, how the body alters shape or adapts itself to space. First, the changes may be internal to the body itself, it may expand or contract, or an arm can be extended or withdrawn. Second, there are various sorts of paths a person can trace out in moving toward an object, for example, walking straight toward it or executing a set of pirouettes in an arc. Third, movement can shape or adapt itself to objects or other bodies in space.

If this system provides us with an inventory of qualitatively emphasizable aspects of movement, in addition to quantitative factors such as speed and acceleration, we can focus on how such features are emphasized, and thereby exemplified, in dance. First, emphasis may be placed on one of the qualitative or quantitative movement factors or on a particular combination of them. We noted the emphasis in David Gordon's *Sleepwalking* on gradual acceleration, from walking to all-out sprinting. Sally Banes notes that Gordon's *The Matter* exemplifies bound or halted movement ; certain dancers abruptly halt, freeze and hold poses while others dance on.[12] Doug Dunn's *Four for Nothing* emphasizes weight and shaping of the body to other bodies : several people lie down on the floor, other people lie on them and all distribute and adjust their weight ; or they stand and lean against each other absorbing and distributing weight.[13] In Dunn's *Lazy Madge* the

emphasis is on indirect spatial focus and shape awareness.[14] Dunn choreographs solos and duets for his performers, but allows them the choice of when to enter and where to perform, thereby causing the dancers' and spectators' attention to shift among a number of foci and adjust to the persons entering and exiting. Yvonne Rainer's *Trio A* exemplifies a rather generous set of movement qualities, as set forth in her minimalist analysis, but in part it emphasizes the flow of movement, as Sally Banes has noted : "Neither weight, nor time, nor space factors are noticeably stylized or emphasized. The one factor that is obviously altered and manipulated is the flow of movement."[15] The contrast of effort factors among distinct dancers may also be emphasized. In Merce Cunningham's *Rebus*, Cunningham's movements are bound, firm, direct and sustained in contrast to the free, fine, indirect, quick movements of the members of his troupe.

A second way of achieving emphasis is by focusing on a range or number of movement elements or combinations. In *Gestures in Red*, Doug Dunn emphasizes, focuses on, takes an interest in, the range of the movement repertoire. Deborah Jowitt and Sally Banes have both commented on this emphasis in the work. Dunn starts by exploring a variety of backward movements — prone and pushing backward with his feet ; rolling, walking and running backward — then inventories the movements of various parts of the body : arms, head, hips, etc., and combinations of parts, and winds up, in Banes' words, by "stuffing as many movements as he can into each fraction of a second."[16]

Third, the sequence or phrasing of movement can also be emphasized. In most ballet and modern dance there is an initiation of a phrase which builds to an emphasized climax and then subsides ; there is a point in the phrase which is emphasized. But the evenness of phrasing may also be emphasized. Rainer says of *Trio A* that "For four and a half minutes a great variety of movement shapes occur, but they are of equal weight and are equally emphasized."[17]

Fourth, since the conclusion of a phrase, typically leads to, or provides a transition to, another phrase, transitions can also be emphasized. Don Mc Donagh speaks of Steve Paxton's *Transit* as juxtaposing "long periods of walking with balletic movements ... The work explored the transitions of movement from fast to slow and back again."[18] On the other hand, the emphasis can be on eliminating phrase transitions ; although Rainer allows there are distinct phrases to *Trio A*, she points out that "there are no pauses between phrases ... the end of each phrase merges immediately into the beginning of the next with no observable accent."[19] Similarly, Trisha Brown says of her *Accumulation* pieces, in which a sequence of movements is repeated and extended by periodically adding move-

ments to the sequence, that, "I put all these movements together without transitions. I do not promote the next movement with a preceding transition and, therefore, I do not build up to something."[20]

Repetition can also serve to reemphasize or call attention to a movement aspect. Rainer notes that it can serve to "enforce the discreteness of a movement, objectify it, make it more objectlike."[21] In many of the dances of Trisha Brown, Lucinda Childs, and Laura Dean, repetition and slight variation of simple movements are used to draw attention to the movements themselves.[22]

Of course there is a lot going on in post-modern dance that falls outside the orbit of our discussion. But the dances we have focused on are primarily about movement itself; they exemplify features or qualities of movement itself.

Now what can we say about a dance like Steve Paxton's *Satisfyin' Lover,* in which the performers simply walk across the stage, stopping at times to just stand or to sit on chairs, and then exit by walking to the other side of the stage ?[23] In one sense we can say that each person has a style of walking, his own idiosyncratic, or natural, style, and perhaps we could develop a refined Effort-Shape theory that would anable us to mark off features characteristic of a person's natural movement style. But it seem[s] odd to say that a performer in Paxton's piece exemplifies those features ; he does not emphasize them but merely walks across the stage. His walk merely has or possesses those features. We should say that the dance exemplifies the different natural walking styles of the performers. This seems to be what Jill Johnston had in mind when she said that what struck her about *Satisfyin' Lover* was "the incredible assortment of bodies, the any old bodies of our any old lives ... walking ... across the gymnasium ... The fat, the skinny, the medium, the slouched and slumped [etc.] ... the you name it, by implication every postural possibility in the postural spectrum."[14] In presenting this array of natural walking styles, the performance calls attention to, emphasizes, and thus exemplifies the range of natural styles.

Of course, style in most dances is a more complex affair than in *Satisfyin' Lover*, which leads us to consider what constitutes style and whether styles can be exemplified. Mary Sirridge and Adina Armelagos draw a useful distinction between a general dance style, "an inventory of movements or sequences of movements,"[25] or what they call a "spatial vocabulary," and personal style, that is, "a dancer's characteristic articulation of a more general spatial vocabulary,"[26] or, as they put it in a later article, "an individual internalization of general style constraints."[27] Thus, they speak of a general style such as classical ballet, with species such as the Royal Ballet style or the Balanchine style, and personal styles

such as those of Farrell or McBride. Now suppose we have something like a fully articulate Effort-Shape system of movement description. We could then say that a general style involves the choice of certain sorts of Effort-Shape elements in characteristic combinations, phrases, and so forth. Classical ballet, for example, is based on the five positions — which link certain sorts of steps, turns and leaps— along with certain postures, such as the open hips and chest, with the latter framed by the arms, and pointed feet that continue the body's line. A personal style (which is what we are presented with in performance) will incorporate or blend a dancer's natural movement style with ; (1) general style characteristics, (2) certain stylistic deviations which may be set by the choreographer and (3) certain characteristics that we might say are optional in the general style but are emphasized by the individual dancer.

All three of these stylistic factors are emphasizable. In *Agon*, for example, the classical ballet steps are emphasized ; Balanchine does not invent a new general style. But he distorts, and extends the steps, while altering and emphasizing other conventions, e.g., feet may be flexed and knees turned in. And, as Marcia Siegel points out, part of the effect of performances of *Agon* featuring Allegra Kent and Jean-Pierre Bonnefous in the pas de deux rests on the dancers' natural styles and those aspects of general style which they emphasize.[28] Since all three aspects of dance style are emphasized in *Agon*, we can say that its style is exemplified or that in one sense the dance is "about" its style.

REPRESENTATION :

What *Agon* or *Trio A* are "about," then, is certain aspects of movement, and, although it may require a complex analysis to say with precision what they are about, movement is all they are about. Dances like Loring's *Billy the Kid* and Humphrey's *The Shakers* are also about movement, but it is also true to say the former is about, or represents, the life of Billy the Kid and that the latter is about, or represents, a Shaker dance. What, then, is dance representation and how do dances represent ?

A story-telling ballet like *Billy the Kid* represents sequences of events and acts in the life of Billy : his witnessing the killing of his mother, his act of killing her killer, how he becomes an outlaw, is then captured, escapes, and is finally killed by Pat Garrett. The representationalism in *Billy the Kid* is largely based on represented actions. We have, to take a simplified example, dancer William Carter representing Sheriff Pat Garrett drawing his pistol to shoot Billy. Although from the spectator's point of view there is only one sequence of movements seen,

logically speaking the representation of an act involves two actions; we have, in this case, William Carter drawing and William Carter representing Sheriff Pat Garrett drawing. In the stringing together of such complex acts the saga of Billy is represented.

The recognition that the performance we are watching is a representation of Billy's life is, in part, based on resemblance, in the sense that resemblance is necessary for representation. If there were no scenes, sequences of events, or actions that resembled the events and actions of Billy's life we would not say that we were presented with a dance that represents Billy's life. But resemblance is not sufficient for representation, for the sequence of actions on the stage may more closely resemble the life and demise of Two-gun Jack, a little known desperado who lies buried in Boot Hill Cemetery. There are, however, other factors, such as the title, program notes, costuming, and scenery, upon which representation may also depend ; program notes are particularly important in establishing the representation of particular individuals.

If representation in dance is based on convention and resemblance, then realism is based on degree of resemblance. *Billy the Kid* is fairly realistic ; there are signature dances for characters, e.g., the riders have bowed legs and spread elbows, there are realistic scenes in which everyone recognizes that guns are being drawn, and the costumes and sets are realistic. But even here we do not find the degree of realism achieved in some theater and mime ; Billy the Kid never danced a pas de deux with his girlfriend. The degree of realism is thinner in most full-evening Romantic ballets, where realism is established at the beginning with mime and character dances as opposed to the white acts which feature pure ballet. In Aston's *Enigma Variations* the resemblances are even more attentuated.[29] The costumes and staging are very realistic and capture Elgar's social milieu, and there are some character dances, but the dancers in the "Nimrod" variation stick strictly to a classical sequence of arabesques, tombés and pas de basque. Perhaps some relationship among the trio is represented, but the reference is unclear. And what should we say of a dance such as Balanchine's *Four Temperments* ? John Percival and Don McDonagh regard it as a sequence of character representations ; Marcia Siegel demurs from a representational reading.[30] This seems to be a borderline case ; if the dance represents it is by vague hints and allusions.

Given that dance representation often occurs via allusions, or hints of resemblance, an understanding of style is important, and sometimes essential, in recognizing resemblances. An example is the pas de deux for a tipsy couple in Christensen's *Filling Station*, as described by Marcia Siegel : "... the couple grab for each other and miss, or contact the wrong body parts. They set themselves up for

a supported pose, calculate wrong, fall free for an instant, then collapse against each other. The girl achieves a perfect line in arabesque and locks herself into it while the man ducks confusedly under her leg and comes up on the other side, still holding her up."[31] The resemblance does not obtain between the movements of a typical drunken couple and the dancers' movements, but between the distortions of natural movements we see in a drunken couple and the distortions in the general ballet style exemplified by the dancers. To see that resemblance one must understand ballet style. Similarly, in *Giselle* the ballerina representing Giselle and the dancer representing Albrecht must be capable of representing a range of emotions in both mime and the classical style. In the waltz scene of the first act their mutual joy is represented by a series of ballonné-chassé-coupé, with a beckoning movement by the raised arm on the ballonné. Yet the same series, repeated by Giselle after she becomes hysterical, and now done a bit tentatively and with some stylistic unevenness, represents her torment and disintegration.[32] In both cases a grasp of the emotional state being represented depends on an understanding of ballet style.

In modern dance, Doris Humphrey's *The Shakers* realistically represents a Shaker dance in terms of floor plan, separation of men and women, and costuming, but it also represents the tensions of Shaker life. the struggle to overcome the gravity of flesh and achieve spiritual communion. Humphrey herself has pointed out that her style, based on the fall and recovery principle, is integral to the representation of this struggle, and Suzanne Youngermanns detailed Effort-Shape analysis elucidates how the tension is depicted.[33] On the one hand, there are movements using combinations of strength and bound flow — with the body narrowed or contracted and the limbs held in, and little attention to the environment — which depict the constrictions of the flesh ; on the other hand, light movements with an emphasis on time qualities and spatial attention are used to represent the Shakers' spiritual yearnings. Similarly, Elizabeth Kagan has pointed out that certain elements of Humphrey's style, a "pattern of rebounding in weight and flow with its corresponding breath fluctuations setting off a spatial reaction," forms the basis of representation in *Water Study*.[34] In sum, then, representation is based on convention and resemblance, but an understanding of style is important in recognizing and articulating resemblances.

The dances discussed in this section give us an indication of the range of representation in dance. Individuals, their actions and sequences of events *(Billy the kid)*, sorts (a Shaker dance in *The Shakers*), and types or stereotypes (the heroic gas station attendant in *Filling Station*) are representable. So are fictional individuals (Oedipus in Graham's *Night Journey*) and sorts with no members (the Lilac

Fairy in *Sleeping Beauty*), for in saying that Bertram Ross looks like or resembles Oedipus we are saying that what we see on stage is what Oedipus would look like if he existed as historically specified ; the resemblance is in a counterfactual context. Processes are also representable : natural processes, such as the movement of water in *Water Study* or the play of light on crystals in Balanchine's *Jewels* ; and psychological processes, such as the process of sexual repression, indulgence, guilt and redemption in Tudor's *Pillar of Fire*. The expression of emotions and moods may also be represented ; Fonteyn portraying Giselle represents Giselle's love for Albrecht.

A dance may also represent by denotational devices. Dance mime exhibits a range of representational devices, from the sign for stop (holding a hand up with the palm out), which resembles an ordinarily used conventional sign for indicating to someone to stop, and which is recognizable to one not acquainted with theatrical conventions, to purely conventional devices based on denotation, not resemblance. In the first act of *Giselle*, for example, when her mother warns Giselle that if she continues to dance she will die and become a Wili, she does so by extending her entwined hands above her head, then clenching her fists, crossing her wrists, lowering her arms in front of her, unclenching her fists, placing her hands at her lower spine and gently fluttering her hands. Here we have conventional mime devices that do not resemble or hint at natural gestures, and the meaning of such movements is not available to one who does not understand the conventions. Since such mime conventions are embedded in the ballet style, an understanding of that style is necessary for grasping their meaning.

Finally, dance representation may occur via representational symbolism in which an action or object represents by resemblance and what is represented is symbolic of a quality or set of qualities.[35] In Ted Shawn's *Labor Symphony* we see the acts of laborers represented by resemblance — scattering seeds, cutting wood, pulling oars, etc. — but the acts themselves are symbolic of the nobility, dignity, and honesty of manual labor. Mary Wigman effectively employed representational symbolism in *Face of Night*, the third dance of her solo *Shifting Landscape*.[36] The dancer works off a rigid representation of a cross — feet together and arms extended ; the pose resembles a cross, which, in part, symbolizes suffering. Wigman's movement variations from the cross-posture themselves resemble agonized suffering and are especially effective in the symbolic context. In many cases the symbolism is not as clear cut. Graham's *Errand into the Maze* features a male dancer who represents the Minotaur by resemblance ; he wears a bull-like mask and his arms are fixed on a yoke that rests on his shoulders. Yet the Minotaur is symbolic of crude force, perhaps, or blind oppression, or sexual

power ; it's hard to unambiguously pin down the meaning. And in certain instances the symbolism seems to be personal or private. At one point in Meredith Monk's *Education of a Girlchild* the dancers assemble carrying certain objects : a little model house, a stuffed lizard, a set of deer antlers and a scythe. The scythe symbolizes death and time, and one feels that the other objects are presented as symbolic, but taken together their symbolism remains unclear to the viewer.

EXPRESSION :

In discussing representation, I briefly mentioned that expressions are representable. Now I want to take up the topic of expression more fully, and then explore certain connections between the concepts of expression and representation.

In certain cases "What is this dance about ?" is a request for an elucidation of what it expresses. Now the concept of expression is used in a very generous way in dance criticism, a reflection, perhaps, of the fact that there is a sense in which everything we do expresses our intentions, feelings, motives, opinions and attitudes. In this sense, all movement would be said to be expressive. But this seems a bit too broad. It is sometimes said that a movement expresses gracefulness or delicacy, but these seem to be regional qualities of the movement itself, not psychological states that are expressed. In fact, such qualities arise or emerge when the effort factors discriminated by Laban are combined and emphasized : fine-sustained-flexible-bound movements are undulatingly graceful, delicately smooth and gently buoyant, whereas firm-sudden-direct movements are vigorous, concentrated and powerful. Such qualities may be used for expressive purposes, but are not intrinsically expressive, as can be seen from such post-modern dances as Cunningham's *Summerspace* and Dean's *Stamping Dance*.

A better approach, then, is to start with dances that clearly are, in some sense, expressive : Wigman's *Death Call*, Graham's *Lamentation*, or those parts of *Giselle* in which she is rapturously happy about Albrecht's love and then hysterically angry at his deceit. These examples are closer to our central use of "expression" in ordinary language. In this use, "expression" marks off a relation between items of behavior and certain states of a person — for example, laughter typically expresses joy and cringing normally expresses fear. But not all behavior is expressive because not all of a person's states are expressible. I shall follow Anthony Kenny and Alan Tormey in holding that expressible states take intentional objects, which (if we set aside those dances containing the linguistic expression of opinions, as in certain Grand Union performances) leaves us with the following sorts of expressibles : emotions, such as fear of a dog that is snarling ; moods, such as

apprehensiveness about the weather ; and attitudes, such as a negative attitude toward fighting.[37]

Now let us focus on an example, a person's expression of fear of a snarling dog, to elucidate the concept of expression. According to Kenny and Tormey, the emotion, fear, is a complex having as constituents inner feelings, sensations, and physiological disturbances, plus the behavioral display. Thus "fear" spans both inner and outer, private and public, and the inference from outer to inner is that of constituent part to complex whole. They also stress the connection between fear and fearful circumstances or contexts. Usually a person expresses fear in certain contexts, as in the presence of the snarling dog, and the context typically makes it clear that he is expressing fear. In such a case we can say that his acts of cringing and withdrawing result from his belief that the context is dangerous ; he has certain beliefs about the dog. Of course, the dog may not snarl and may not be dangerous, but if the person believes a docile dog is dangerous his belief about the context is a basis for saying he expressed fear even if the context does not itself make it clear that he is expressing his fear.

There is a wide variety of controllable or voluntary behavior characteristic of the expression of fear : certain bodily attitudes and gestures, facial expressions, withdrawal and avoidance behavior. Other behavior, such as trembling and stammering, may be involuntary. Since dance activity is controllable and modifiable, however, we can restrict our discussion to controllable behavior. In the normal case of expressive activity, then, we have a psychological state that takes an intentional object, controllable behavior, and an appropriate context ; and use of the concept of "expression" warrants an inference from the behavior that is an expression of an emotional state (feeling or attitude) to the complex state of which it is a constituent.

When we turn to the subject of dance, the question is not whether all dances are expressive in this sense, for Brown's *Primary Accumulation* precludes that claim, but, rather, whether some dances are expressive in this direct sense. Margaret Beals' improvised dances with the Impulses indicate that there are ; she feels her way into the music and shapes a mood or emotion directly in the dance process. In her words : "There are two ways of dancing. One is with set material where you make a statement and repeat it many times. The opposite is improvisation where you express your own emotions through the energy you have now. This takes a person with extremely strong emotions and the ability to articulate them with energy in movement."[38]

The notion of "articulation" here is what Collingwood has in mind when he says that the expression of emotion does not involve its venting, arousal or

betrayal, but, rather, the elucidation of its particularity or individuality.[39] Romantic poetry provides many examples of such emotional articulation. In the *Prelude* Wordsworth rows apprehensively out onto a lake on a silent moon-lit night :

> When, from behind that craggy steep till then
> The horizon's bound, a huge peak, black and huge,
> As if with voluntary power instinct,
> Upreared its head. I struck and struck again,
> And growing still in stature the grim shape
> Towered up between me and the stars, and still,
> For so it seemed, with purpose of its own
> And measured motion like a living thing
> Strode after me.

Wordsworth does not say, or mention, that he is apprehensively in awe of nature, he articulates his emotion largely by his careful characterization of the object of his feeling. Word choice, cadence, and repetition elucidate Wordsworth's awe in the presence of nature's power. A dance that expresses an emotion articulates the behavioral dimension of the emotion ; the dancer, using his natural and personal style, shapes the emotion's display. In Beals' dances the articulated expression of emotion takes us rather far from the behavior ordinarily characteristic of the expression of that emotion. And the improvisational dance context does not itself make it clear exactly what emotion she is expressing. Nevertheless, it seems true to say that Beals offers us an articulated expression of her emotions.

If we can say that a dance in which Beals articulates an expression of her sadness need not feature behavior characteristic of a normal or typically sad expression, it is also true that some people may be said to wear a characteristically sad expression even when they are not expressing their sadness (i.e., when their behavior is not an expression of their sadness). Jack Palance, for example, could be said to have a cruel facial expression even though he may not be expressing cruelty. There are certain behavioral features characteristic of an expression of sadness, e.g., a postural droop and downturned mouth ; but a person may just possess such characteristics without those characteristics being an expression of sadness. Thus, there is no logical link between the notion of a sad expression and the notion of an expression of sadness. The fact that the relationship is contingent, however, leaves open the possibility of their simultaneous exploitation in dance.

Some of the dances of Mary Wigman are a case in point. Throughout her career she reiterated that her work was directly expressive, that, in her words, "Creative art is really quite simple, merely the expression of feelings and emotions

in the way we live."[40] She also had, as Walter Sorrell has noted, "an eerie and enviable, an artistic and personal intimacy with death."[41] Her letters and writings reveal a fascination with death, a certain awe and apprehensiveness about it, and she addressed the issue over and over in her dancing. Of the solo *Death Call* in her dance titled *Sacrifice*, she has said that it expresses an apprehensiveness, "a feeling of 'being called' that came from afar, emerging from deep darkness and relentlessly demanding." In articulating, in expressing, this feeling of "all that was hidden behind life, the first realization of all irrevocabilities, of all finality and extinction," Wigman shaped her apprehensiveness of death in a sequence of "static, monumental poses and hugely conceived movements through space."[42] Her account makes it clear that she was actually expressing her apprehensiveness.

If we consider Wigman, the person, we see a bony, muscular, torsocentered individual, whose natural movement style is weighty and strong, and whose face wears or naturally exhibits a range of sorrowful, resigned, apprehensive expressions. It is not that she exhibits a frozen expression ; there is a range of emotional expressions she naturally exhibits. And, to be sure, Wigman herself expressed the range of emotions, from elation to grief. But, as she notes, "Nature did not cast me for the role of a soubrette... I feel that I can speak with the greatest authority on the serious side of life rather than its gayer aspect, although I have an enormous understanding for and delight in the natural effervescence of happiness."[43] In part, then, her bent as a dancer was fixed by the range of expressions she naturally exhibited.

In discussing *Death Call*, I think it is appropriate to say that it is an expression of Wigman's apprehensiveness of death, and that it blends her naturally worn apprehensive expression with her expression of the apprehensiveness of death. To be sure, the dance does not exactly exhibit behavior that is typical or characteristic of the ordinary expression of apprehensiveness ; it is a shaped or stylized expression. She herself states that "Without ecstacy [or emotion] no dance ! Without form no dance !" And she claims that her dancing "articulate[s] stifled, half-formed emotions."[44] But in Wigman's case her general style, the alternation of tension and relaxation, thrust and contraction, is so closely built upon and welded to her natural movement style that it seems correct to say that she articulates both an expression she naturally exhibits and the expression of her emotion.[45]

The distinction we have been focusing on — between the expression of an emotion (where the person actually has the emotion) and an emotion expressed, exhibited, or naturally worn — is also acknowledged in ballet. Both the character

dancer and the classical dancer have to be able to do the steps, and certain physical features such as height and limb proportions do, in part, differentiate them, but the character dancer also typically has an expressive or "magnetic" personality ; in part this means that he can exhibit a wide range of expressions, not that when he does so he is expressing his emotions. For the character dancer typically exhibits his expressions in mimed action or dramatic representation, and these may not involve the expression of emotion at all.

This brings us to a link between the concepts representation and expression. Suppose I am mimicing your fear of a snarling dog. I cringe and grimace in a way which resembles your expression of fear of the dog. But my behavior is not an expression of fear because I am not afraid ; I simply adopt a certain facial grimace and a cringe-like posture. So here we should say that my action is not an expression of fear, but a representation of your expression of fear. Alan Tormey makes this point in discussing theatrical portrayals. He notes that there is a "surface to expressive behavior" that can be used for representational purposes, and that when an actor is said to be expressing fear this typically means that the actor is representing a character's expression of fear.[46]

This holds true in theatrical dancing as well. In dancing the role of Giselle, Fonteyn represents Giselle's love of Albrecht, but Fonteyn is not necessarily feeling the emotion of love. And Nureyev represents Albrecht's love of Giselle, but does not necessarily express his personal love. In fact, Fonteyn notes that Nureyev actually worked himself into the role of Albrecht by getting angry ; he found it "easier to dance in a rage than in cold blood," and in that context Fonteyn found herself to be a bit afraid.[47] In that case we have Fonteyn expressing (and, we might imagine, trying to repress) fear of Nureyev, while representing Giselle's expression of love for Albrecht.[48]

In a similar vein, Sirridge and Armelagos have argued that in ballet "the expression or projection of personal feeling or emotion has nothing to do with the dancer's expectations of himself or with the focus of the dancer's artistic concentration."[49] Instead, the dancer concentrates on executing movements and being in unison with other dancers. They allow that a dancer may express emotion ; Fonteyn may, for example, express delight in the progress of a performance of *Giselle* and also represent Giselle's delight in Albrecht's love. But the connection here is contingent, and Sirridge and Armelagos regard the dancer's personal expression of emotions to be atypical in ballet and, in many cases, distracting. They have a point, but it requires some qualification. If we distinguish the personal expression of emotion from the representation of expressions, then the

ability to bring off the latter in dance will typically require an expressive performer, that is, one who can assume, and so represent, a wide variety of expressive postures and gestures, even though he may not be feeling an emotion. *Giselle* is a case in point. The principle dancer must be able to do the steps and move in unison with other dancers, and in the second act she must be capable of graceful airiness. But in the first act she must also represent the range of emotions from delirious love to hysterical rage. This requires a naturally expressive person who can mime or represent these emotions even if she is not personally expressing them while dancing.[50]

I also think Sirridge and Armelagos overstate the case a bit against the expression of emotion in theatrical dance. Training, technique, style were important to Martha Graham, but only insofar as they "service the body towards complete expressiveness."[51] In *Appalachian Spring* she represented the slightly nervous, excited, happy Bride, but she *was* a slightly nervous, excited, happy bride. She danced her emotions, directly expressing the feelings she had, while simultaneously representing the Bride's expressions.[52] *Errand into the Maze*, as danced by Graham, not only represents a woman's indignant fear of crude power and sexual oppression, it expresses Graham's indignant fear of crude power and sexual oppression. And the same can be said of many performances in classical ballet. Ted Kivitt says that in *Giselle* "I imagine what it would be like to see someone in my own family go crazy. By the end of the first act I'm exhausted. Sometimes I go offstage crying because I'm so involved. It takes me awhile after a performance to calm down emotionally."[53] In such performances we have more than executing the steps and keeping in unison, and expression is more than an aspect of style.

Expression in dance, then, is a complex affair. In the case of a dancer like Margaret Beals, we have a direct, spontaneous shaping or articulation of the expression of emotions. A dance like Wigman's *Death Call* articulates both an expression Wigman naturally exhibits and the expression of her emotion. In some theatrical dances we have the representation of an expression, with no emotion being actually expressed by the dancer. But, where representation is effective, it typically rests on the use of a dancer who is expressive in the sense that he can exhibit, and thus represent, a range of expressive postures. Finally, we have dancers, such as Graham in *Appalachian Spring*, of whom it can be said that they both express their emotions and represent a portrayed character's expression.

NOTES :

1. I wish to thank George Beiswanger, Carole Knapp and Jack Morris for enjoyable discussions on dance and helpful suggestions on the preparation of this paper. 2. Selma Jeanne Cohen, "Avant-Garde Choreography," in *The Dance has Many Faces*, edited by Walter Sorell, 2nd edition (New York : Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 211. 3. Marcia Siegel, *The Shapes of Change* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1979), p. 326. Siegel is speaking specifically of Merce Cunningham's dances. Sally Banes makes a similar comment in speaking of some post-modernist choreographers : "Originally reacting against the expressionism of modern dance, which anchored movement to a literary idea or musical form, the post-modernists propose (as do Cunningham and Balanchine) that the formal qualities of dance might be reason enough for choreography, and that the purpose of making dances might be simply to make a framework within which we look at movement for its own sake." Sally Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1930), p. 15. 4. John Martin, *Introduction to the Dance* (New York : W.W. Notton Co., 1939), pp. 53, 272. 5. Sorell, "In Defense of the Future" in his *The Danec has Many Faces*, p. 254. 6. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1968), p. 256. 7. *Ibid*., pp. 50-67. 8. *Ibid*., p. 53. 9. *Ibid*., p. 253 (my emphasis) An interesting discussion of exemplification, from which I have benefited, occurs in the following papers : Monroe C. Beardsley, "Semiotic Aesthetics and Aesthetic Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, vol. 9, no. 3 (July, 1975), pp. 5-25 (note the addendum on pp. 25-26, which discusses Goodman's response); Monroe C. Beardsley, "*Languages of Art* and Art Criticism," *Erkenntnis*, vol. 12, no. I (January, 1978), pp. 95-118 : Nelson Goodman, "Reply to Beardsley," *Erkenntnis*, vol. 12, no. 1 (January, 1978), pp. 169-173. 10. For this criticism of Goodman see : Joseph Margolis, "Numerical Identity and Reference in the Arts," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol 12, no. 2 (April, 1970), pp. 138-146 ; Henning Jensen. "Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. XXXII, no. 1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 47-51 ; Monroe C. Beardsley, "Semiotic Aesthetics and Aesthetic Education," *op. cit* , p. 13 ff. 11. Valerie Preston-Dunlop, *A Handbook for Modern Educational Dance* (London : Macdonald and Evans, 1963) ; Rudolf Laban, *Modern Educational Dance*, 3rd edition, revised with additions by Lisa Ullmann (London : Macdonald and Evans, 1975) ; Cecily Day, *A Primer for Movement Description*, 2nd edition (New York : Dance Notation Press, 1977). 12. Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, pp. 102-3. On p. 102, Banes also discusses Gordon's *Sleepwalking*. 13. Discussed in Marcia Siegel's *Watching the Dance Go By* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 298-299. It is interesting to note Dunn's comment on his work : "there is an interest in dance as an area to experiment with movement problems or performance problems as possibilities — as opposed to a vehicle for expressing what you think about the world." Trisha Brown and Doug Dunn, "Dialogue on Dance" in *The Vision of Modern Dance*; edited by Jean Morrison Brown (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton Book Co., 1979), pp. 168-169. 14. Discussed in Siegel, *Watching the Dance Go By*, pp. 290-293 ; Banes. *Terpsichore in Sneakers*. pp. 191-2, 195-8. 15. Yvonne Rainer, "A Quasi Survey of Some 'Minimalist' Tendencies in the Quantitatively Minimal Dance Activity Midst the Plethora, or an Analysis of *Trio A*," in *The Vision of Modern Dance*, edited by Jean Morrison Brown, pp. 141-150 ; Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, p. 47. 16. Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, p. 193 ; Deborah Jowitt, *Dance Beat*, (New York : Marcel Dekker, 1977),

pp. 128-129. 17. Rainer, "A Quasi Survey," p. 147. 18. Don McDonagh, *The Rise and Fall and Rise of Modern Dance* (New York : E.P. Dutton, 1970), p. 125. 19. Rainer, "A Quasi Survey," p. 147. 20. Comment on her work by Trisha Brown in *Contemporary Dance*, edited by Anne Livet (New York : Abbeville Press, 1978), p. 54. 21. Rainer, "A Quasi Survey," p. 149. 22. For discussions of Trisha Brown see : Trisha Brown, "Three Pieces," *The Drama Review*, vol. 19 (March, 1975, pp. 26-32 ; Roger Copeland, "The 'Post-Modern' Choreography of Trisha Brown," *New York Times* (January 4, 1976), part II, p. 1 ; Don McDonagh, "Trisha Brown," *The Complete Guide to Modern Dance* (New York : Doubleday, 1976), pp. 343-347 ; Trisha Brown, "Trisha Brown," in *Contemporary Dance*, edited by Anne Livet, pp. 42-57 ; Trisha Brown and Doug Dunn, "Dialogue on Dance," in *The Vision of Modern Dance*, edited by Jean Morrison Brown, pp. 163-171 ; Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, pp. 77-91. For discussions of Lucinda Childs see : "Lucinda Childs : A Portfolio," *Artforum*, vol. 11 (February, 1973), pp. 50-56 ; Childs, "Lucinda Childs," in *Contemporary Dance*, edited by Anne Livet, pp. 58-81 ; Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, pp. 131-145. For discussions of Laura Dean see : Siegel, *Watching the Dance Go By*, pp. 306-312 ; Rob Baker, "The Song and Dance of Laura Dean," *Dance Magazine*, vol. LI, no. 11 (November, 1977), pp. 40-44 ; Laura Dean, "Laura Dean," in *Contemporary Dance*, edited by Anne Livet, pp. 93-105. 23. *Satisfyin' Lover* is discussed in McDonagh, *The Rise and Fall and Rise of Modern Dance*, pp. 127-8 ; Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, pp. 60. Paxton himself describes the dance in : Steve Paxton, "Satisfyin' Lover," in Banes, *Terpsichore in Sneakers*, pp. 71-74. 24. Jill Johnston "The New American Modern Dance," in *The New American Arts*, edited by Richard Kostelanetz (New York : Collier Books, 1967), p. 166. 25. Mary Sirridge and Adina Armelagos, "The In's and Out's of Dance : Expression as an Aspect of Style," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (Fall, 1977), p. 18. 26 *Ibid.*, p. 19. 27. Adina Armelagos and Mary Sirridge, "The Identity Crisis in Dance," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. XXXVII, no. 2 (Winter, 1978), p. 131. 28. Siegel, *The Shapes of Change*, pp. 227-234, 239. 29. Discussed in David Vaughn, *Frederick Ashton and his Ballets*, (New York : Alfred Knopf, 1977), pp. 356-363 ; Zoe Dominic and John S. Gilbert, *Frederick Ashton : A Choreographer and his Ballets* (London : George G. Harrap, 1971), pp. 213-219. 30. Don McDonagh, *How to Enjoy Ballet* (New York : Doubleday, 1978), p. 72 ; John Percival, *Experimental Dance* (New York : Universe Books, 1971), p. 32 ; Siegel, *The Shapes of Change*, pp. 213-221. 31. Siegel, *The Shapes of Change*, p. 116. 32. Discussed in Cyril W. Beaumont, *The Ballet Called Giselle* (New York : Dance Horizons, 1969), pp. 78-87. 33 Doris Humphrey and Paul Love, "The Dance of Doris Humphrey," in *The Modern Dance*, edited by Virginia Stewart and Merle Armitage (New York : Dance Horizons, 1970), pp. 59-70 ; Suzanne Youngermann, "The Translation of a Culture into Choreography : A Study of Doris Humphrey's *The Shakers*, Based on Labananalysis," in *Essays in Dance Research : Dance Research Annual IX*, edited by Dianne L. Woodruff (New York : Congress on Research in Dance, 1978), pp. 93-110. 34. Elizabeth Kagan, "Towards the Analysis of a Score : A Comparative Study of *Three Epitaphs* by Paul Taylor and *Water Study* by Doris Humphrey, in *Essays in Dance Research : Dance Research Annual IX*, edited by Dianne L. Woodruff, pp. 75-92. 35. Representational symbolism is discussed in Monroe Beardsley, *Aesthetics : Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), pp. 288-293. 36. Discussed in Mary Wigman, *The Language of Dance*, translated by Walter Sorell

(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), pp. 47-50. 37. Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (New York : Humanities Press, 1963) ; Alan Tormey, *The Concept of Expression* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1970). 38. Margaret Beals, private communication. 39. R.G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1938), pp. 105-115 ; 121-124. 40. Walter Sorell, *The Mary Wigman Book* (Middletown, Conn. : Wesleyan University Press, 1973), p. 149. Wigman has also said : "Shock, ecstacy, joy, melancholy, grief, gayety, the dance can express all these emotions. But the expression without the inner experience in the dance is valueless." Published as "The Philosophy of Modern Dance," in *Dance as a Theater Art* edited by Selma Jeanne Cohen (New York : Harper and Row, 1974), p. 152. 41. *Ibid.*, p. 19. 42. Wigman, *The Language of Dance*, p. 18. 43. Sorell, *The Mary Wigman Book*, p. 146. 44. *Ibid.*, pp 88, 53. 45. Speaking of Wigman's approach to dance, John Martin says : "it is fundamental to the Wigman theory that emotion is not put upon the outside of movements already evolved, but that the emotion actually evolves the movements. Thus there is as much stress laid upon emotional training as upon physical, and more, perhaps, upon the production of movement from subjective impulses than upon either element separately." Martin, *Introduction to the Dance*, pp. 233-234. 46. Tormey, *The Concept of Expression*, pp. 51-60 ; 102-108. 47. Margot Fonteyn, *Autobiography* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), p. 223. 48. In *Afterimages* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), Arlene Croce says : "I would much prefer a grouch to the enthusiast who sometime, somewhere, every single season commits to print some variation of the line, 'Fonteyn *is* Juliet !' 'Ulanova *is* Giselle !' I do not know what this means. If intended as a compliment, surely it cannot be much of an accomplishment to become Juliet if you are Juliet. Fonteyn is Fonteyn. Ulanova is Ulanova." (p. 334). Croce's point is well-taken. Ulanova cannot literally become Giselle. It is Ulanova who is acting and representing Giselle forcing Albrecht's sword inso her breast. And it may be that Ulanova is expresing her elation (perhaps at the performance's success) and representing Giselle's elation over Albrecht's love. But there are two subjects in either case, Ulanova and Giselle. 49. Sirridge and Armelagos, "The In's and Out's of Dance : Expression as an Aspect of Style," p.16. 50. In discussing representation, I argued that an understanding of style may be an important factor in the recognition of resemblances that are necessary for representation. This holds true for the representation of expression, as my previous discussion of the waltz scene in the first act of *Giselle* indicates. 51. Quoted in Walter Sorell's "Two Rebels, Two Giants," in Walter Sorell, editor, *The Dance has Many Faces*, p. 36. Graham has come out rather strongly against unshaped, "self-expression dancing.': See Graham's "A Modern Dancer's Primer for Action," in *Dance as a Theater Art*, edited by Selma Jeanne Cohen, pp. 136-137. But in the same place she states that her "methed..... was secondary" to her shaped, stylized, or articulated expressive aims (p. 136). 52. Discussed in Siegel, *Watching the Dance Go By*, pp. 216-7, 236 ; *The Shapes of Change*, pp. 144-152 ; Edwin Denby, *Looking at the Dance* (New york : Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1949), pp. 318-90. In an earlier work Marcia Siegel stated : "If I had to pick out the one driving preoccupation of Martha Graham's that has had the most widespread and lasting influence on other choreographers, it would be her concern with emotionality. No modern dancer since Graham has been able to avoid dealing with the idea that dancing is always an expression — or a denial — of the dancer's feelings." Siegel, *At the Vanishing Point* (New York : Saturday Review Press, 1968)' p. 277. Also see, Joseph Mazo, *Prime Movers* (New York : William Morrow, 1977), pp- 178-9.

53. Interview with Ted Kivitt in *Dancers on Dancing*, edited by Cynthia Lyle (New York: Drake Publishers, 1977), p. 82.

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IDENTIFYING WITH CHARACTERS IN LITERATURE

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We understand stories, poems, plays, novels and are moved by them. We say, "I know the play *Oedipus Rex*." What sort of knowing ? We shudder when Oedipus puts his wife-mother' broach to his eyes, and the shudder does not stop when we say "It's only a play, no man is really putting broach to eyes." For it is the thought, the imagination of the thing, that thrills. But what sort of feeling is this that neither rests on beliefs about the world nor leads to desires to be satisfied in it ? We *appreciate* works of literature, and appreciation has both cognitive and affective dimensions. Imagination touches each of them : we entertain them in imagination.

I have an account of the appreciation of literature which begins to answer the questions above. It is not complete but captures what I take to be central, namely, that to be able to fully appreciate a work of literature one must *empathetically identify* with its characters, where the identification is the outcome of an experiment in imagination whose design is the literary work itself. In this paper I will describe the kind of knowledge the identification brings in its stead ; I will not give an account of how feelings occasioned by the identification differ from those occasioned by life but will indicate the direction an account should take.

Empathetic identification with characters, not to be confused with imaginative projection of ourselves into their predicaments, nor with bonds forged by our sympathy for them, yields knowledge of what it is like to be the characters, knowledge of the subjective, the subject's side of things. Knowledge by acquain-

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tance where the acquaintance is made in imagination. Without it, works of art in which there are characters cannot be appreciated. For to know *that* Iago hates Othello for having promoted another over him is to know Iago and his passion from the outside. This is knowledge suited to social science, its object is the outsides of things, under the aspect of general laws. The experience of art, on the other hand, gives us the immediate and the particular, Iago and his passion inseparable.

My account will take the form of a rational reconstruction, not a phenomenological description, of what we do when we respond to literature ; therefore, the remark "But I don't do that sort of thing" does not constitute an objection to it. For whatever we *do* takes place in time, and the steps in the reconstruction are logical, not temporal, steps. The reconstructian is a construction out of certain plausible assumptions about (i) the distinction between characters and real people, (ii) interpretations of literary works, and (iii) points of view and literature's worlds.

What follows is, also, the beginning of the analysis of a kind of knowledge of ourselves and others. We are acquainted with our own experiences by having them, with those of others by *imagining* having them, but the direct acquaintance with our own experiences afforded by merely having them is not sufficient for knowledge. It is necessary that we be able to imagine them at a later time. Experiences are momentary, knowledge is not. Knowledge had only for a moment does not count as knowledge, experiences forgotten as soon as they are had hardly count as experiences of ours. Knowledge of our experiences is, then, I suggest, by way of imagination.

It may be argued that acquaintance with the experiences of others is, in certain circumstances, a requirement of morality, namely, the requirement that we decide our actions in light of knowledge of their effects on others. Not simply the knowledge that the effects will be such and such, but knowledge of *what it is like* to experience such and such. We learn this by empathetically identifying with, in turn, each of those to be affected by each of the actions we are deliberating. The decision about what actually to do depends, for example, on whether utility, equality, or individual's rights is to be valued most highly, and therefore the requirement that we know what it is like for others to suffer the effects of our actions is compatible with a range of moral theories. Its relevance to the present task is that the identification is encountered in its pure form in the appreciation of literature. The appreciation may be seen as propaedeutic to the appreciation of our effects on other people and the account below as a small part of a moral theory.

I

Only some works of literature have characters. In general, novels, short stories, and plays do and poems do not. The *Iliad* is a poem rife with characters and

its author a genius at characterizing them, but such countercases to the general rule and the overlapping problems of genre and style need not worry us. What we call particular works that have characters is of no moment, what is meant by "character" is. I mean by it at least this : whoever is one is not, nor ever was, an inhabitant of the real world. Histories, then, do not have characters, while Shakespeare's historical plays are not about the kings and queens who walked abroad. They are about the characters Shakespeare created. "About" is equivocal here. Histories are about kings and queens in that they refer outside themselves to real people ; plays are about their characters in that the actions and events of the play revolve about them. What is the relation between Henry VI of *Henry VI* and Henry VI of England ? Many of the same things are true of each of them, and the reason Shakespeare endowed the play's Henry with certain characteristics is that the real Henry had them. This hardly constitutes a relation between them, though some may say it does.

Real people *have* characters, i.e. they have personalities, or, at least, charecteristics, and some people have character, i.e. a certain moral fiber. But they, we, *are* not characters. We are, it is true, sometimes said to be characters ; what is meant then is that we are eccentric, strange, that we stand out, not in a good way, as heroes and saints do, but in a way that lends itself to ridicule. People in works of fiction, on the other hand, *are* characters, if they are anything.

Saul Kripke's theory of proper names puts into focus the distinction between real people and "people" in literature. The theory is that proper names are neither logically nor materially equivalent to any set of descriptions of the individuals whose names they are. (Names would be logically equivalent to descriptions which gave their meaning, materially equivalent to descriptions which fixed their reference.) Names are rigid designators, they designate the same individual in any possible world. We can, then, imagine an individual's still being itself even if all of its characteristics were other than they are ; we need suppose only that it is the same kind of thing. In particular, we can imagine *our* still being ourselves even if all of our characteristics were other. We cannot imagine Desdemona's being herself if all or even many of her characteristics were to change, however. She is identical with some subset, if not all, of her descriptions, and she is nothing but them. She is a character and lives, therefore, in a work of art, not in the real world. So it is with all characters. Their names do not rigidly designate and they are not individuals. Individuals are real in our world ; characters are real-in-the worlds posited by the works in which they appear.

The simplest criterion of identity of characters is that one is the *same* as the other, at a given moment in their world, just in case all of their characteristics are

the same, and something *is* a character just in case it has at least one characteristic typically ascribed to human beings. If the characteristic is typically and only ascribed to humans, then the kind of thing that has it need not even be human in order to be a character. Animals and magical creatures qualify, as fairy tales and animal stories attest.

II

So simple a criterion suffices for my purpose, which is to show that the responsive understanding of literature involves an experiment in imagination whose performance consists in empathetically identifying with each of a work's characters, discovering thereby how it feels to be each of them and to be part of the network of relations that constitute their world. The identification, the acquaintance with the character, occurs in imagination, the empathy in one's own affective structure. The knowledge is immediate, therefore. It is corrigible as well. For it rests on an inference and a change in point of view, and if either goes wrong, knowledge of the character's subjective side is not achieved.

What goes on when we respond to characters can be reconstructed as follows. *First*, something is presented to our senses and what is presented is seen as a certain kind of thing or event. The curtain rises on a soldier approaching a lone other standing night watch on a platform before a castle, he identifies himself, two more soldiers enter, the first leaves. *Hamlet* has begun. Art does not traffic in kinds, however. We have seen the castle, the night, the guard's changing, but nothing has happened to us yet. There is at most expectation. What presents itself to eye is recognized by mind for the broad kind of thing it is, but only when heart engages does appreciation begin. "Heart" here does service for imagination and emotions, each standing as some sort of mean between sensation and cognition. And heart is soon engaged. "What! Has this thing appear'd again tonight?" "Tush, tush! 'twill not appear." "Peace! break thee off; look, where it comes again!" Enter ghost of Hamlet's father.

Second, we imagine that we are in the positions of Bernardo and Marcellus, to whom the ghost has twice appeared, and Horatio, who "will not let belief take hold of him." We discover what it is like to be in their positions by imagining that we are in them and discovering how *we* find it. Distinguish now between being in a certain position and having certain characteristics. It cannot be supposed that all people would have the same sorts of experiences were they to be in a particular position, P. But if all who imagined themselves in P imagined also that everything true of the play's character who is in P were true of them,

then it may be supposed that there is a strong family resemblance among the sorts of experiences they have. We imagine this further thing.

What we want to know, of course, is how the *characters* find being in their positions. Is this something to be known ? Is there one and only one set of experiences properly called "Bernardo's experiences ?" Or are his experiences simply whatever one thinks they are ? Neither of these. There is, no doubt, always more than one possible interpretation of any work, and each interpretation may be said to stipulate a possible world. But for each interpretation there is one and only one set of experiences properly called "Bernardo's experiences." It is those he would have were the world in which he lives actual.

Third, we infer that how we find being in Bernardo's position, imagining all of his characteristics ours, is how *anyone* with his characteristics would find it. We infer, a fortiori, that this is how Bernardo finds it. Because our knowledge of Bernardo's subjective side is the result of an inference, it is corrigible. But the inference is not likely to fail for the reason that many an inference about the subjective side of a real person's experience fails, namely, that the design of the imaginative experiment and hence its outcome is tailored to fit the role and serve the interests of the experimenter. We are, perforce, impartial and disinterested in identifying with the characters. For the world in which our parts are played and interests lie is none of the possible worlds stipulated by different interpretations of the work. Therefore, the temptation to self-tailor the experiment in imagination can hardly arise in the case of the identification with characters in literature. It can fail for other reasons, but that is a story to be told elsewhere.

III

Every work of art that is appreciated at all is experienced under some interpretation or other. By "interpretation" I mean what is made of what is sense-given. "What is made" is the performance of the experiment in imagination. The design of the experiment is the fiction, its world intimated at the beginning, full drawn by the end. The performance is our empathetic identification with the characters who inhabit the imagined world of the fiction ; we project ourselves into the world *as* one or another of its inhabitants. The world shaped by the words is the objective moment of the work, our imaginative identification with its characters, the subjective moment. Interpretation makes a unity of the two. Making something of the first moment involves making out what the words mean and what literary conventions have been used, making something of the second involves becoming, in turn, each of the characters. The meanings of the words and conventions point to what we are to imagine, but until we do

imagine, the words and conventions are not "alive." The feelings attending the imagination give them life.

Feelings aroused by events in our own lives need never and often do not become objective, i.e. objects of reflection. But they cannot fail to be subjective; for we have them, and we have them as ourselves, as subjects of our own biographies. Feelings aroused by characters in literature, on the other hand, cannot fail to be objective. For we have them not as ourselves but as one or another of the characters, external to us, themselves objects of reflection. Feeling responses to literature are tied to the subject of the response, of course. But to what in the subject? Not to its full particularity, its uniqueness. If works of art create their own worlds and are, therefore, to be appreciated for themselves, then to appreciate them we must lay aside what is particular about us, what marries us to our own world. What remains is the structure of the kinds of creatures we are. We do not, however, consider ourselves as "man in general," forgetting our "individual being" and "peculiar circumstances," as David Hume says the literary critic must. For we cannot imagine being "a man in general;" we can imagine only what is particular.

We are able to lay aside what is particular about us and adopt the characters' particularities precisely because we are not identical with what our descriptions name. Since characters are no more than their descriptions, when we imagine their descriptions applying to us and infer that the character finds its predicament as we find it, what the inference yields cannot be wrong for the reason that the character really finds its predicament another way. Characters are not only the descriptions given by the author. What interpretation can do is to elaborate the characters: "Hamlet could not kill Claudius because Claudius and Gertrude were one flesh, to kill him would be to 'kill' her. *This* Hamlet could not do." So one might say, and say fairly if what Shakespeare said was compatible with or, better, illuminated by this further description of Hamlet. If, however, the character's elaboration is not compatible with Shakespeare's text, then an inference based on the assumption of this further description's applying fails.

Although we cease to be ourselves in the empathetic identification, we do not become incapable of responding, as ourselves, *to* the work in which they appear. This sort of response is informed by awareness that its object is an artwork and that the response itself comes from outside the work, and it is uninformed if not based on empathetic response to the work's world from within that world. The sorts of feelings and thoughts we have, as the various characters, are occasioned by and directed toward events and other characters within the artwork.

What underlies our feeling response to literature, the identification with its characters, is, then, not subjective in the familiar sense. Nor is it objective in the sense that it regards the characters as objects rather than as subjects, centers of consciousness. In the identification, giving up our particularity and adopting theirs, we invest the characters with our subjectivity ; they are not mere objects to us. In imagination, we have their feelings and thoughts.

IV

There is no logical difference between identifying with characters and with real people. Pieces of fine journalism point to this conclusion. Frances Fitzgerald, in *A Fire in the Lake*, captures the people and place of Vietnam in such a way that the work would hold us even if there were no place of green rice fields and delicate-boned people. She has so combined history, geography, culture and politics as to create as well as capture a world, giving back most of what the Pentagon's dessicated bodycount left out. In creating the reality of Vietnam, she forces recognition of the reality of the people whose land lies by Cambodia and Laos. The book has an ultimate moral purpose and a penultimate artistic one : to be itself a world. Shorn of its moral purpose, it stands as art because its "truth" lies not only in the faithfulness of its report on a real people but also in the coherence of its parts into a whole independent of the people whose story it is. It tells their story and would itself be a story if only there were no Vietnam. In reading it, one empathetically identifies with one who is Vietnamese and gains knowledge of what it would be like to be Vietnamese in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Since we can know what it would be like for all sorts of things to be true that are not, we can know what it would be like to be one of such a people, whether or not there are any.

We can, then, empathetically identify, impartially and disinterestedly, with real people met in literature, as well as with characters. (Not all literature is fiction.) And, what is important for morality, we can do the same with real people *not* met in literature. Morality may require both objectivity in our assessments of the effects of our actions, policies, and principles on others and a lively appreciation of the subjective side of others' experiences. We gain this appreciation by describing the probable effects of our decisions and then imagining ourselves in the place of those to be affected by them, with their characteristics, if they are known. Our experiencing in imagination what we are apt to cause in reality becomes part of our motive to perform or desist from the actions being deliberated. The more detailed our knowledge of the people to be affected or of the positions we will have put them in, the more lively our appreciation of our actions' effects and the less likely our inclination to treat people as objects. For we

are, in empathetically identifying with them, treating them as subjects of experiences.

To empathize with people, real or fictional, is to imagine having whatever feelings we suppose them to have as the result of our having imagined ourselves in their predicaments with their characteristics. To sympathize with them is to have one sort of feeling *toward* them ; the feeling is, of course, sympathy and those who are inclined to it are said to be sympathetic. We often feel sympathy for those whose pain we imagine, and sympathy plays a role in moral motivation but is peculiarly out of place in the identification with characters in literature. For us to have feelings toward Iago is as wrong headed as it would be for us to leap up on stage to inform Othello that Desdemona is faithful. Not only need we not feel sympathy toward those with whom we empathize, we hardly can sympathize with those whose pleasures we imagine ourselves having.

V

Fourth, we adopt Bernardo's point of view. In the first step of the reconstruction, our senses and mind are engaged, and in the second, our imaginations : we imagine being in the characters' positions and having their characteristics. In the third, we infer that the characters find their predicaments as we, in imagination, found them ; in this penultimate step, we abandon our own points of view and adopt the characters'. Points of view are not only "the essense of the internal world," they are also views *onto* a world, points from which the world is viewed. Suppose, now, that a particular character C has characteristics x, y, and z and is an inhabitant of world W. C is identical with x, y, z and is describable as "one who has x, y, z." But C is a unique point of view on W as well, and the experience of being the point of view on W of one who has x, y, z is *not* describable. This is why we can *imagine* having x, y, z, but we cannot imagine adopting C's point of view on W. We simply *adopt* it.

I have claimed that by empathetically identifying with Bernardo we can learn what it is like to be him. He is real-in-*Hamlet*, and what it is like to be him is a fact-in-*Hamlet* to which we are privy just in case we can enter the world posited by the play. And we can, if only we can adopt the various points of view of the characters there, where each *is* a different point of view on the same world. What must be the case for us to be able to do this ?

Thomas Negel, in "What Is It Like to Be a Bat ?" suggests that we must be "sufficiently similar" to the kind of being whose point of view we hope to take in order to be able to take it.[8] Bernardo, Marcellus, and Horatio are human-beings-in-*Hamlet*. Their kind is no different from ours. What about the ghost ? It

is the ghost of a human being. Its mode of being is different from that of the other characters in the play as theirs is different from ours. This is no difference in kind. If, however, it is argued that being solid is part of being human, that is all right. The ghost is sufficiently similar to our kind to enable us to adopt its point of view nonetheless. But how *do* we know that something is like enough for us to know what it is like to be that thing?

When we adopt Nagel's suggestion to fictional characters, it turns itself around. A character is similar enough to us for us to adopt its point of view if we *are able* to adopt it. A necessary condition for sufficient similarity was given by the second part of the criterion of identify for characters, namely, something is a character just in case it has at least one characteristic typically ascribed to human beings. If something does not have such a characteristic, it is not a character; if it is a character, we can identify with it under the description "one who has such and such a characteristic typically ascribed to human beings."

I can imagine that I am on nightwatch at the castle where the ghost of the newly dead king has appeared and that I am a soldier in the service of the new king of Denmark. In neither case am I imagining that I am not myself but am Bernardo, Danish soldier friend of Hamlet. If I take the further step, it is not to imagine being Bernardo but to adopt his point of view. For there is nothing describable as being Bernardo, and we can imagine only what we can describe or what we have already experienced. There is, I have claimed, something appropriately called "Bernardo's experiences," those he would have were he real, and being Bernardo just is having his experiences. His experiences, as his, refer back to him as to a point from which the world is viewed. To be him is to adopt this point of view. How do we know if we are able to adopt his point of view? By adopting it. How do we know when we have done this? When *Hamlet's* world is ours.[9]

VI

When *Hamlet's* world is ours, it can be grasped whole, as the real world cannot. For the real world intersects with history and will be complete only when time ends, whereas the artwork is complete when its artist pronounces it finished and we have interpreted it, performing the imaginative experiment which ends in the adoption, in turn, of the points of view of those who present themselves as the work unfolds. Then, we stand outside the work to survey and judge what we have made of what Shakespeare has given. This is the *fifth* and last step of the reconstruction: the response *to* the work experienced whole. The fact that the possible world of the work can be experienced as a whole does not, of course, mean that it can be perfectly understood. Only what is rational, what has

measure, can be understood. And what has measure can be measured, can be subjected to rule. Were the world of the artwork rule-ridden, the work would be showing what could as well be told, expressed in a general way, in a rule. Doubtless some works of art do no more than this.

Art that aspires to greatness must do more, however. It must show the incommensurabilities that lie at the bottom of things, the logical spaces that lie, for example, between the reasons for an action and the action, between the evidence for a belief and the belief. The artwork's world is not to be understood. It is to be appreciated. And it is to be appreciated in imagination, of which we can say what St. Augustine says of memory..."there I have in readiness even the heavens and the earth and the sea...there also I meet with myself." (*Confessions* X).

POSTSCRIPT

Feelings given rise by empathetic identification with characters in literature are Desdemona's, Othello's, Ophelia's "real" feelings and our imagined feelings. How are they different from our real feelings ? In their causes and objects, which are real only in the world of the artwork. The causes operate on us when we enter that world, the objects affect us as one of the world's inhabitants, not as ourselves.

Why are emotions unpleasant in life *not* unpleasant in art ? Because the believed threat to one's well-being which makes them unpleasant in life is not present in art. There is nothing in the world of the work of literature that can harm *or* help one. The objects of imagined fear, jealousy, hatred threaten imagined harm, and the fact that imagined harm is not avoided, as real harm is, testifies to our living our lives not in imagination but in reality. Why call imagined fear "fear ?" Because the kinds of things that serve as its causes and its objects are the same for imagined and for real fear. Too brief answers. No good theory of aesthetic emotions will be forthcoming, I believe, until we have a good theory of the emotions.

FOOTNOTES :

1. I would like to thank Peter Kivy for comments on an earlier version of this paper, which is sequel to my "Empathetic Identification" *American Philosophical Quarterly* XV, 2 (April 1978) 107-115. 2. This is the subject of Kendall L. Walton's provocative "Fearing Fictions," *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXV, 1 (January 1978) 5-27. 3. I consider in this paper the simplest case, literary works in which there are particular characters. There are other cases, for example, poems expressive of certain moods or states are appreciated when the reader identifies with one who is in the expressed mood or state. In some works, one identifies with the narrator, if there is one and there are no characters, or with some one of the people if none are singled out, or again with some one who is of the country if there are no people in the work, only place. 4. Thomas G. Pavel, "'Possible Worlds' in Literary Semantics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* XXXIV, 2 (Winter 1975) 165-176, shows the precise sense in which literary works can be said to be autonomous. 5. Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," *Semantics of Natural Language*, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (2d ed.; Dordrect, 1972) 252-356. 6. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 1757. 7. Frances Fitzgerald, *A Fire in the Lake* (New York : Random House, 1973). 8. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat ?" *The Philosophical Review* LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974) p. 442. 9. Pavel, in the work cited, says that each literary work contains its own ontological perspective and that the readers adopt the work's perspective when they consider true propositions which are true-in-the work and possible *de re* propositions which are possible-*de re*-in-the work.

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UNDERSTANDING ART :

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Some of us understand Picasso's work ; some of us don't. Marcel Duchamp aficionados are likely to claim an understanding of Duchamp's work. Practitioners of Punk Rock accuse music critics of not understanding their work, and thus, perhaps, of not being in any responsible position to *criticise* their work.

Such talk is familiar enough. What does it mean ? What exactly *is* it to understand a work of art ? What must I be able to do, or say, or feel, or what must I know, in order to qualify as understanding, say, the work of John Cage ? Is understanding Cage's work anything like understanding a foreign language ? Or is it like what goes on when a physicist understands the data ? Or perhaps it's like what happens when a person understands another person ? Perhaps we have several concepts of understanding at work here, and may be artistic understanding should be put inro a category of its own. Or perhaps all these concepts of understanding (linguistic, scientific, psychological, artistic) collapse into one. In such a case, reflections on artistic understanding may bear fruits even outside of aesthetic theory.

My immediate goal here is to survey two attempts to define "artistic understanding". The first attempt, which turns on the notion of *artist's intention*, I dismiss — my arguments here are quite distinct from those often presented against "intentionalist critics". The second attempt, which defines "artistic understanding" in terms of the concept of *translation*, I explore more fully.

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Preliminaries : Thought and Language :

Art historians frequently speak of artistic genres as though they were kinds of languages : thus, "Cezanne's contributions to Cubist vocabulary", "the Impressionists' language of broken colour," and the like. Such talk might best be construed as metaphor ; surely not all rule governed activity qualified as language activity. Art activity is perhaps better viewed as an attempt to solve certain kinds of problems within specific rule frameworks. We best understand Mondrian's painting, for example, by learning that he was attempting to make various colors lie on a common picture plane. I make no attempt here to survey the respective merits of the 'art as language' and the 'art as problem solving' paradigms. If, however, we do take the "art as language" paradigm seriously, then the relation between art object and artist's intention emerges as interestingly parallel to the relation between verbal aciivity and speaker's intention.

The relation between verbal behavior and speaker's intention has been characterized in various ways. Some claim that understanding a speaker's utterances consists of grasping the thoughts or intentions which "lie behind", or stand in some specified causal relation to, the utterances. Those influenced by Chisholm or Grice are likely to hold such a view — thus, language is meaningful because it expresses thoughts which are themselves the source or locus of meaning ; understanding sentences or other language episodes is a function of grasping the corresponding thought episodes. In marked contrast, there are analyses of meaning which involve no reference whatever to anything mentalistic (thoughts, intentions, ideas, etc.) on the part of the language users. Sellars and Quine are the most prominent advocates of such an aporoach. Neither would deny that speakers often have thoughts, beliefs, or intentions ; the claim is rather that language meaning can be explicated non-mentalistically. Moreover, and more to the point, the ascription of thoughts and intentions is to be itself explicated in terms of a non-mentalistic notion of language meaning.

Sellars has for many years maintained that the ascription of intentions and thoughts is posterior to, or an analogical extension of, the ascription of meaning to overt verbal behavior. He says

> ... the categories of intentionality are nothing more or less than the metalinguistic categories in terms of which we talk epistemically about overt speech ... [1]

The basic idea is straigthforward : talk of mental states and their objects is in some way derivative, or dependent upon, or an analogical extension of, talk about the overt behavior of bits of language. Such a thesis can be tremendously important for the theory of art. It may enable us to make sense of the prevalent view that painters "think in colors and angularities" or that musicians "think in tones". The strategy would be this : construe thoughts or intentions on the model of "inner speech"; that is, construe them as inner states which play roles similar to those played by bits of overt verbal behavior. To 'think in numbers', then, is to engage in inner activity functionally equivalent to arithmetic discourse, which is a kind of overt activity. Analogously, the avant garde jazz musician is, when performing, engaged in a kind of thought process structurally isomorphic to his overt musical activity. His music might be difficult to understand; there might be intentions "lying behind" the music. But the intentions are themselves musical structure. Grasping his intentions would thus be of little value in coming to understand his work — for his intentions are themselves to be construed on the model of his overt musical activity, an activity which; *ex hypothesi*, we do not understand. It is the dynamics of this process, the process of coming to understand an artistic genre or a specific work, which, after suitable preparation, will be explored in section 111.

Artist's Intention : Sentence Meaning and the Museum Myth

The first tentative analysis of "artistic understanding" to be considered is :

(1) Understanding a painting (a piece of music, etc.) consists in knowing the intentions of the artist ("grasping the artist's intent", etc.)

Here we have a claim that an art object is to be understood in terms of the intentions in a mind of its creator. When Picasso painted *Guernica*, something went on in his head like "Ah, let me now convey some propaganda, let me represent brutality with a bull, let me speak of the masses with a horse,....." One understands *Guernica* if one knows what went on in Picasso's head when he painted it.

None of this is very helpful, of course, unless we have an independent grip on the concept of an *intention*, a grip which does not in turn presuppose the concept of understanding the artist's work. Unfortunately, we do not have this. (1) looks helpful only as long as we treat the notion of an *intention* as unproblematic, only as long as we do not puzzle about this talk of "what goes on in the artist's mind".

But when once we take the qualms of the philosopher of mind seriously and ask about the meaning of, say,

(2) Picasso had an intention to represent the fact that brutality is awful.

(1) falls apart in our hands. Or so I will argue.

An intention is a kind of mental act, or psychological episode. It is a variety of thought. Our Philosopher of Mind (let us call him Karl) puzzles about such things. He wants to know what (2) means.

Suppose for a moment that Karl subscribes to some form of logical behaviorism. He begins by offering us the following analysis of (2) :

(2.1) (while *Guernica* was being created) Picasso had a disposition to utter "Brutality is awful".

Aside from the usual problems and puzzles infecting behavioristic analyses, we are quick to note that (2.1) connot possible be true, for the simple reason that Picasso spoke no English (or so we may suppose for the present). He would not have had the disposition to utter an English sentence like "Brutality is awful". Karl, a reasonable philosopher, retrenches and offers us

(2.2) (while *Guernica* was being created) Picosso had a disposition to utter "La brutalidad es mal".

We now ask Karl why the presence of *that* particular disposition constitutes Picasso's intention. Why shouldn't (2) be analyzed in terms of Picasso's disposition to utter "La vida es sueno" ? Karl tells us the following :

(3) The disposition to utter the Spanish sentence *S* constitutes an intention to convey the fact that P if and only if 'P' is the appropriate translation of *S* into English.

This seems fair enough (though in another context we might chide Karl for confusing use and mention). Karl's behavioristic analysis of *artist's intention* thus rests upon the concept of *appropriate translation.* Can Karl offer us a satisfactory analysis of this latter concept ? He makes an uncautious start :

(4) Picasso's utterance *S* has as its appropriate English translation the sentence *T* if and only if the intentions which Picasso expresses by using *S* are the same as those intentions which the ordinary English speaker expresses by using *T*.

This, of course, is of no value to Karl, he began by attempting to analyze the concept of *intention*. He had better not use the concept in his explication of *translation*. He needs a concept of translation which is itself behavioristically acceptable, and in terms of which artist's intention can be explicated. Taking his clue from Quine and Sellars, Karl tries again, this time with the following story.[2]

(5) *T* (in English) is an appropriate translation of *S* (in Spanish) if and only if the *role* which *S* plays in the total behavioral repertoire of the Spanish speaker is the same as the role which *T* plays in the total behavioral repertoire of the English speaker.

This looks more promising ; we ask Karl to tell us about this idea of *roles* played by sentences, and *sameness* of such roles. He tells us that *S* and *T* may stand in the following relations :

(a) the non-verbal stimuli which prompt the Spaniard's assent to *S* are the same as those which prompt an English speaker's assent to *T*. Put another way, states of the non-linguistic environment which cause the Spaniard to utter *S* are the same states which cause English speakers to utter *T*.

(b) Spanish speakers respond to an utterance of *S* (they cry, they flee, or whatever) in much the same way that English speakers respond to an utterance of *T*.

There's much more that Karl wants to say here ; but this suffices to show us what he is about. He is doing what may be called "behavioristic semantics". It is not that he shuns all talk of intentions, beliefs, and thoughts. It is rather that the only sense he can make of such talk is in terms of overt behavior and dispositions to overt behavior. Specifically, he wants to talk about overt behavior like utterances and gestures, as being *functionally equivalent* (same typical causes, same typical effects) to overt behavior of ours. Thus, according to Karl's conceptual hierarchy, the concept of artist's intention rests upon the concept of translation, which in turn rests upon the concept of *sameness of behavioral role*. Perhaps we have a glimpse, then, of why Karl regards analysis (1) as getting things exactly backwards.

As it turns out, Karl is not a behaviorist ; yet his analysis of intention in terms of translation remains. For now Karl tells us that (2) (the statement of Picasso's intention) is to be analyzed as

(6) Pi so was in an internal state which is itself functionally equivalent to those of Picasso's utterances which are best translated as English utterances of "Brutality is awful".

Karl is thus suggesting that *not only* bits of overt behavior, like Spanish utterances and English utterances, can have the same typical causes and effects, but moreover *inner events* (whether neural firings or pulsations in the ectoplasm) can have the same typical causes and effects as certain kinds of overt behavior. The typical causes of Picasso's utterances of "La brutalidad es mal" are $C_1 \ldots C_n$; the typical effects of such an utterance are $E_1 \ldots E_n$. As it turns out, Karl suggests, there is a class K of neural states which Picasso's inner mechanisms can assume, such that each member of K is characteristically brought on by $C_1 \ldots C_n$, and, moreover, characteristically results in $E_1 \ldots E_n$. Picasso's intention to represent the fact that brutality is awful comes to neither more nor less than Picasso's being in an inner state which is a member of K.

Karl need not be a "materialist" to talk this way. He can remain uncommitted about Picasso's inner constitution. Even a Cartesian, at least a responsible one, can speak of internal states (of the "psychological stuff") which play certain roles, the roles played by certain bits of overt behavior. Karl is simply suggesting that talk of Picasso's intentions itself presupposes our ability to "translate" Picasso's overt behavior into our own behavior (whether our verbal activity or some other kind of behavior). So why not forget about intentions, Karl asks, and try to analyze artistic understanding directly in terms of the concept of *translation* ? Why not say that we understand *Guernica* if we can translate it ?

But translate it into *what* ?

Art and Translation :

The present analysis of "artistic understanding" is

(7) Understanding a painting (a piece of music, etc.) consists in the ability to translate the work into one's background language.

This analysis is initially suspect. Poetry, it is often said, is something which "evaporates from all translation". Had *Guernica* had a sentential equivalent, it would not have been necessary to paint it — the corresponding sentence could have sufficed. Translating the first few bars of a Schönberg piece seems futile — what could we possibly offer as the English equivalent of a tonal sequence constructed on a Pentatonic scale.

Such considerations may be quite beside the point, depending upon the notion of translation which we embrace. We must first say how much of one's total behavioral repertoire is to qualify as one's background language. We must also specify the constraints on an adequate translation.

Consider Picasso's *The Studio* (1928). Walter, a well meaning art enthusiast, looks at it. He claims not to understand it (though he finds it quite attractive). We summon our resident "expert", who tells Walter something like this : "the grey oval on the left is the painter's head. The small grey circle is the thumb hole in the artist's palette. The two triangles are a fruit bowl which the artist is working from. The diagonal line to the lower right of the painter's head is his brush."[3] etc. Walter now claims to have a better *understanding* of the painting than he did before the expert talked to him. The expert, we might say, explained the picture to Walter. But this is simply to say that he helped Walter to understand it. What does any of this have to do with translation ?

Our philosopher Karl suggested earlier that an item in one language is the translation of an item in another language if the items play, in their respective languages, the same behavioral role. Our Picasso expert knows enough about the Picasso of the 1920's to be able to say that large grey elliptical ovals, especially those perched upon triangles, play much the same role in Picasso's "painting behavior" which utterances of the expression "artist's head" play in our own verbal behavior. The expert's "explanation" can thus be viewed as a kind of *translation* of the marks which Picasso produced in 1928 into the marks or noises which we produce these days. This activity makes no reference to Picasso's intentions or thoughts — it does, however, place Picasso's pictorial behavior (the upshot of which is the object of Walter's present concern) within the frame work of Walter's own behavior, and thus requires a good deal of data about Picasso's environment, his other behavior, his interaction with other people, his overt (perhaps verbal) responses to his own work, and the like. This is the kind of information which, if we are lucky, the Art Historian makes available to us.

This seems plausible. (7) looks like a good beginning to an analysis of artistic understanding. How might it be faulted ?

One might object as follows : Picasso presumably understood his own work. Yet it is not clear that he had the ability to "translate" it into his background language (Spanish). In fact, very little (if any) of his Spanish-uttering behavior

was functionally equivalent to any of his painting behavior (in the sense of its having the same typical causes and the same typical effects). Since he couldn't "translate", he didn't understand his own work.

The objection is misguided; it turns on too narrow a construal of "translation", or, perhaps, on too narrow a delineation of Picasso's *background language.* We can save analysis (7) by recalling that there are at least two ways to qualify as understanding a language: one can have the ability to translate it into one's background language, or one can simply have the ability to speak it, to engage in fluent dialogue with other members of the relevant community. Broadly construed, the Spanish speaker does have the capacity to translate Spanish utterances into his background language; he simply uses a "homophonic translation manual", an identity map which pairs utterances up with themselves. Our Spanish speaker's understanding of his own home language can thus be brought under the translational rubric, as the limiting case of translational ability. Maximal understanding of Spanish, we might say, consists in the ability to speak it.

Picasso's "background language" includes not only his Spanish utterances but also his painting behavior. His understanding of Cubism consists in his ability to work within its constraints; painting Cubistically is thus on a par with speaking Spanish. His behavior is in each case sanctioned by the rules, either those of Spanish or those of Cubist colour manipulation. (Of course, Picasso introduced many of the rules himself, but that is quite another matter.) Functional equivalences between Spanish utterances and Cubist painting behavior are not required by (7).

This broadening of Picasso's "language base" (the range of his behavior to which we are willing to apply translational concepts) has a very important consequence for the theory of artists' intentions, and, more specifically, for our very capacity to understand Picasso himself. Karl pointed out earlier that ascriptions of intention to Picasso involve the ascription of states which are functionally equivalent to Picasso's overt episodes. We begin to understand Picasso's intentions by translating Picasso's sentences into our own, and then using the items in our background language (e.g., the sentence "Brutality is awful") in terms of which to describe Picasso's mental states. Thus we understand Picasso's intentions in terms of his overt behavior, specifically his language activity, which we in turn understand by translating it into our own English-utterance behavior. It is clear, however, that much of Picasso's overt behavior does not admit of any precise

functional equivalent in English — his painting behavior, for example. There is perhaps *some* similarity between his use of grey ovals perched upon triangles, and our use of the expression "artist's head". But the fit is not precise. There are similarities of role, but there are also differences. If our "home language" is exhausted by English, then we have found the closest fit we can get. There is no item in our own English behavioral repertoire (we may suppose) which comes any closer, in terms of typical causes and typical effects of utterance, than does the expression "artist's head". So if our own ascription of intentions (or thoughts in general) is as intimately tied to translation as Karl has suggested, Picasso's intentions do not admit of any ready formulation in English. We cannot say what they are, without fitting them to the Procrustean bed of our own background language.

Perhaps we cannot *say* what they are, but we can *show* what they are. Picasso showed them to us, in the overt activity which culminated in his paintings. The way to understand Picasso, then, is to understand his work, and perhaps the best way to do that is to learn to paint as he did, thus extending our own background language. This is merely regulative ideal, a point at which we could properly claim "total" understanding of Picasso's work in much the way we might claim a total understanding of our own English utterances. The ideal translator of Spanish into English can, when the mood seizes him, go bilingual. The further he gets from that mark, and the further we get from the capacity to paint like Picasso, compose like Schonberg, or play like Keith Jarrett, the further we get from a total understanding of the work. This need not disturb us. We can, and do, settle for partial understanding.

Conclusion :

The point of this discussion has not been to argue the irrelevance of artist's intention to an understanding of the artist's work. It is undeniable that a failure to understand certain artwork often consists of a failure to grasp the relevant intentions of the artist. The student who construes *Moby Dick* as a parable addressed to the insurgence of Communism is quite properly advised that Melville neither knew nor cared about Communism. Schonberg intended certain of his pieces to be examples of serial music ; Boccioni intended his paintings to picture the motion and dynamic sensation of urban life. Knowledge of such facts is often helpful and relevant.

The point has been, rather, that the *analysis* or *definition* of artistic meaning and artistic understanding should not be in terms of artist's intention. Reference to thoughts and intentions itself presupposes reference to the roles played by overt verbal episodes and there is no reason, in the course of artistic inquiry, to give primacy to the artist's verbal episodes. It is in becoming familiar with the roles played by bits of overt artistic behavior — whether the use of specific word sequences in poetry or the use of specific optical mixtures of color in painting — that artistic understanding is achieved.

Imagine a Galactic traveler who brings us the products of his artistic labors. His works mystify us ; his words mystify us ; his attitudes, including his intentions, mystify us. An attempt to relate his behavior, words, works, and all, to our own, is not an attempt to discover determinate mental processes which lie behind the behavior. It is rather an attempt to explain and predict the traveler's behavior by relating it to our own by way of functional similarities. This much has been stressed for years by Quine. Yet the sentiment has been conspicuously lacking from discussions in aesthetic theory. The process of coming to understand the traveler's artworks is not significantly different from the process of translating his language. Occasionally, one of his pictures might work much the way one of his sentences does. Let *p* be such a picture, and let S be its sentential correlate. If S is best translated as "The planetary citizens are restless", they would be leverage for claiming.

(8) *p* was intended to convey the fact that the planetary citizens are restless.

This would be helpful. But notice that the explanation in terms of intention is dependent upon a synonymy relation, or functional equivalence, between the painting and a bit of non-pictorial language. When we observe that

(9) de Chirico's *Nostalgia of the Infinite* was intended to disclose a mysterious metaphysical reality.

we are saying something informative and true. I have suggested that a further analysis of (9) would, however, yield something on the order of

(10) de Chirico's *Nostalgia of the infinite* had a function which was relevantly similar to sentences which are about a mysterious metaphysical reality.

Thus the explanation of meaning in terms of intention amounts to an explanation of the meaning of certain linguistic items in terms of the meaning of other linguistic items. Such explanation is surely legitimate. But this should not blind us to the fact that artistic meaning is to be found, not in the artist's mind, but in the work itself. Any attempt to naturalize aesthetic theory, specifically the theory of artistic understanding, will have to take this into account.[4]

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1. "Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality," in *Minnesota Studies in The Philosophy of Science, Volume II*, ed. Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell (University of Minnesota Press : Minneapolis, 1957) : p. 522. 2. See e.g., W.V. Quine *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1960), Ch.2 ; Wilfrid Sellars, "Language as Thought and as Communication", in his *Essays in Philosophy and Its History* (Dordrecht : D. Reidel, 1974) : pp. 93-117. 3. Our resident expert is John Canaday ; see his *Metropolitan Seminars in Art-Portfolio 4 : Abstraction* (The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1958) : p. 9. 4. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics. I am indebted to Lee Brown, Robert Howell, Bill Lycan, and Jim Rubino for criticism and discussion which led to improvements.

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THE ARTIFACTUALITY OF ART : *

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It is a commonplace among aestheticians that a work of art is an artifact and that any attempt to define the expression "work of art" presupposes the notion of artifactuality. A comparatively recent statement of this view is to be found in George *Dickie's Art and the Aesthetic.*[1] Dickie, rebutting Morris Weitz's contention that an artwork need not be an artifact, maintains that artifactuality is a defining condition of art.[2] In fact, Dickie proposes a definition of art which contains artifactuality as its genus, although he does not attempt to clarify this idea. In what follows I will argue that the conception of artifactuality, upon close inspection, is complex in nature and that the identification of artworks with artifacts, as maintained by Dickie, Margolis and others, is open to question. At the very least the notion of artifactuality deserves a more detailed analysis than it has commonly been afforded in the literature.

Before investigating the concept of artifactuality, it may be useful to distinguish between two important senses of the term "work of art" ; these according to Dickie, are the classificatory and the evaluative senses.[3] In everyday talk about art the evaluative sense prevails, for in referring to something as a work of art we ordinarily mean to praise it. Thus, the judgment that Picasso's *Guernica* is a "work of art" most likely intends to ascribe artistic value to this painting. On the other

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hand we may use the expression "work of art" merely to identify an object which is *purported* to have artistic value. In referring to Jim Dine's *Shovel* as a 'work of art' we may intend only to identify it as such without thereby raising the question of its artistic merits. Thus, a work may be considered art in the classificatory sense whether or not it possesses artistic value. It would appear then that artifactuality may be advanced as the genus of the definition of "work of art" when this expression is understood in either of the two senses. For example, it is in the descriptive or classificatory sense that Dickie defines a work of art as an artifact upon which an agent, acting on behalf of the art world, has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation.[4] Similarly, however, art in the evaluative sense could be defined in terms of a theory of artistic value which applies to a certain class of "objects", i. e., artifacts. In either case, artifactuality is being proposed as a defining condition of the term "work of art".[5] In what follows I will argue that artifactuality is neither necessary nor sufficient for certain groups of artworks, and therefore cannot be a defining characteristic of art. This will require, first, an account of the conditions under which it is appropriate to consider anything an artifact and second, a classification of the arts which helps to clarify the different and complex ways in which artworks stand to artifacts.

The Artifact as a Product of Craftsmanship :

Historically, the notion of artifactulity has been tied to the idea of craft or technical skill.[6] The existence of a craft or body of related technical skills presupposes the existence of an agent whose conscious activity is directed toward the production of an artifact. Thus, Aristotle defines craft or art (*techné*) as a habit or "state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning".[7] Notice that Aristotle is not speaking of what in later centuries were called the "fine arts" ; for him, no distinction exists between the fine and practical arts. The artist is conceived simply as a craftsman and the arts as species of craft. Because an art or craft is concerned with making, it can be defined in terms of the utilization of a set of skills operating on a pre-given material. Because art involves a "true course of reasoning", its existence presupposes an ability on the agent's part to reach a deliberate, reasoned conclusion about the product of his activity. An artifact, therefore, may be provisionally characterized as the result of an agent's reasoned, productive activity. There are four conditions required for the existence of craft and, therefore, for the production of artifacts. These

conditions can be clarified in terms of a corresponding set of logical distinctions which apply to them.[8]

(1) The distinction between means and ends : the means consist of operations which are traversed in order to reach the end and which are left behind when the end is reached. These operations consist of a set of logically ordered actions which bring the end into being ;

(2) The distinction between planning and execution which parallels that between means and ends : the employment of craft involves the maker's foreknowledge of the results to be obtained. Without such planning, the production of an artifact would be a mere accident ;

(3) The distinction in works of craft between raw materials and finished product : in order to exist, a craft requires raw or ready-made materials which are worked upon and transformed into something different — the artifact or finished product ;

(4) a distinction between form and matter, as applied to the object produced or made : matter is what is identical both in the pre-given material and in the finished product, while form is that which the exercise of the craft changes. Form is what is different, what has been altered in the selfsame material.

It is not claimed that these four conditions exhaust the notion of *techné* or craft. It seems, however, that together they constitute a set of necessary conditions for its existence. These conditions are of two kinds : conditions (1) and (2) apply to the agent who practices the craft : it is the *craftsman* who as efficient cause is responsible for planning and executing the ordered series of operations which bring about the production of an artifact. Conditions (3) and (4), on the other hand, pertain to the 'object' : it is the artifact which has been transformed from raw material to finished product by the craftsman's exercise of *techné* ; it is the artifact which results from the imposition of form upon pre-given material.

This account of the production of artifacts can, I believe, be applied to our understanding of the major arts with the aim determining whether they meet the essential conditions of artifactuality. This task will be facilitated by a classification of the arts into three groups which is intended to clarify the sense in which works of art may be artifacts. In the course of the discussion, we will suggest

certain qualifications of our account of artifactuality which accord better with our understanding of differences among the arts. Finally, George Dickie's claim that artifactuality can be *conferred* upon natural "object" will be examined. I will argue that Dickie's view conflicts sharply in at least one important respect with the traditional account of artifactuality.

A Classification of the Arts :

The intent of our classification of the arts is to clarify the sense or senses in which works of art can be considered artifactual, according to our previous characterization. The arts can be seen to fall within three broad groups.[9]

First, here are the "plastic arts", including painting, sculpture and architecture. These arts are distinctive insofar as their pursuit terminates in the production of an artifact, narrowly conceived as a material object. This artifact or material object is not synonymous with the artistic object, but is distinguishable from it as its material substrate. It is, as its material embodiment, an indispensable condition of the artwork's existence. Thus, there is only one *Mona Lisa* : if the original painting is damaged or destroyed. The plastic arts clearly fit our earlier description of craft or *techné*. They presuppose a human agent who is literally a craftsman or producer.[10] As a craftsman, the artist engages in a processs of making whose *terminus ad quem* is a picture, statue, building, etc. We will refer to artworks which are thus embodied in material objects as A-works.

Second, there is a class of artwork which are not strictly artifactual, although they may sometimes appear to be so. This class, referred to here as C-works, includes such 'compositions' as poems, novels, and stories. A C-work exists when it is read, heard, remembered, recited or even composed in the artist's mind. The book or manuscript in which a C-work is recorded is merely a vehicle by which the 'composition, can be reconstructed. It is not itself an artifact in the strict sense for even if all copies of a certain poem were lost or destroyed, the poem itself would not of necessity cease to exist. At the same time, the manuscript may exist, but give no access to the 'composition', since the tools for reconstructing it are lost. An example of this would be undeciphered hieroglyphics. Thus, the criteria for the existence of C-works differ from A-works, since C-works can exist without the existence of a single artifact or group of artifacts with which they can be

identified. Moreover, as we have seen, the existence of an artifact does not insure the existence of the artwork which it "supports".

Finally, a third class of artworks, which we will designate as P-works, are distinguishable from both A-works and C-works. Although the arts which comprise this third type are quite heterogeneous, all are performance of "interpretative" arts. Further, these arts are essentially temporal ; a performance is an event in time, a temporal whole. Music, the dance, and theatre are the primary arts which fall into this group. Each of these arts requires an interpretive artist who seeks to realize the conception of the composer, choreographer, playwright, or filmscript writer. Consequently, the performing arts require both an artist-creator and an artist-performer in order to fully exist. The criterion for the existence of P-works is the performance itself which must adhere to certain basic requirements in the case of each specific art.

How does the notion of artifactuality, considered in relationship to craft, apply to the three types of artworks which we have distinguished ? As we have seen, the traditional notion of artifactuality is clearest in its application to A-works, for such works presuppose the existence of pre-given materials upon which the artist acts in order to construct an artifact. All four of the conditions of craft are present in the plastic arts, those which apply to the artist as well as those which apply to his work. In the case of C-works, the requirement that the artwork be literally 'embodied' does not hold. A poem or story may, of course, be written or otherwise expressed in material form, but this does not appear to be essential to its existence as a work of art. This point can be supported merely by appealing to the oral traditions of both primitive and civilized societies. A considerable body of myth, legend, etc. exists without the societies in which it is created being able to cast it in any written form. Aside from this fact, we have rejected any attempt to identify C-works with their embodiments in material form. A novel is not identical with the volumes in which it is recorded ; a poem is not identical with the marks on paper which constitute the means by which we are able to reconstruct it. Quite simply, a poem or story becomes a work of art only when it is perceived as such ; otherwise it is aesthetically dumb. If, however, our account of craft is modified in certain respects, it is possible to view C-works as artifacts. A poet or novelist who has mastered the art of writing will have created a work in which style, sense of form, mastery of language, etc. reveal his technical skill. Thus, the

condition pertaining to the craftsman under (2) above applies to the creation of C-work, for the poet or novelist may execute a preconceived plan. Still, the poet or story-teller does not traverse anything like a logically ordered series of actions which constitute means to the actualization of the artwork as an end. Our conclusion, then, is that the first condition of craft *a parte objecti*, involving the relation of means to ends, need not be realized in the case of C-works and that only the second condition *a parte subjecti* involving planning and execution applies generally to them. Even here, a poem or (possibly) story which has been composed without the benefit of forethought or deliberation constitutes an exception to this second condition of craft.

When we turn to the character of the performing arts (P-works), the notion of artifactuality again becomes problematic. What artifact or artifacts can be identified with a ballet or symphony ? Clearly, the artifact must be equated with the performance itself, considered as an event or occurrence of a specific kind. What is required is an extension of the concept of artifactuality from the case of material "objects" in the plastic arts to performances of a certain duration in the performing arts. If this extension is permitted, P-works can be subsumed under the traditional notion of craft. For the performer utilizes his technical skill as a means to the production of a "bodily work of art" ; he carries out a logical sequence of actions which constitute means to the end of performance, and which ordinarily require planning. In addition, the art of interpretation presupposes mastery by the artist of a certain "instrument" according to the requirements of his individual craft.[11] The situation with respect to P-works is further complicated by the division of labor in the performance arts between creative-artist and performer. While the performer commonly meets the two conditions *a parte subjecti* in our characterization of craft, the two conditions *a parte objecti* do not properly apply. When we consider the artist-creator of P-works, the same difficulties arise as in the case of C-works. The composer, playwright, or choreographer does not make a specific material product as the result of his labors, nor need he engage in a series of ordered actions which constitute means toward the realization of that end which is the play, dance, or musical work. Moreover, a tune, like a poem, may be composed not only without the use of certain materials (pen, paper, etc.) but also without any conscious plan of design. Certainly, any large scale work of art requires planning, but this need not be the case at all for works of a very modest character. As a result, we

are obliged to conclude that non of the four conditions of artifactuality apply unequivocally to the artist-creator in the performing arts.

Can Artifactuality Be Conferred ?

George Dickie has proposed that the status of artifactuality, like that of candidacy for appreciation, can be *conferred* upon natural objects as well as products of human making. [2] According to him, a work of art is an artifact upon which has been conferred the status of "candidate for appreciation" by an agent or agents acting on behalf of the artworld. Dickie claims that artifactuality and candidacy for appreciation may both be conferred in one and the same action. As an example, he cites the case of a piece of driftwood lying on the shore.[13] The driftwood may be appreciated either in its natural environment or moved to a place where it can be exhibited, such as a home or art gallery. Clearly, the driftwood becomes an aesthetic object in virtue of its being exhibited for the purpose of appreciation, but it is no less an aesthetic object when viewed in its natural setting. Up to this point, we have no quarrel with Dickie : the driftwood in either a natural or artificial setting is constituted as an aesthetic object simply through our appreciation of it. However, it does not follow from this fact that it is thereby an artifact or that artifactuality is conferred upon it in the act of appreciation. The driftwood remains a natural object whether or not it is removed from its environment. Neither its material composition nor its form is changed from its natural state through the actions of a maker or craftsman. The same principle holds for natural phenomena like rainbows or sunsets. The conferral of the status of candidacy for appreciation does not transform them into artifacts, if we understand by artifactuality the product of some kind of human making.

What are we to say of animal paintings ? Under Dickie's schema, the paintings of chimpanzees may be allowable as artworks, at least if they are exhibited in art galleries as opposed to museums of natural history. But are they also artifacts ? The answer, I maintain, is 'no', for they have not been produced under the concept of artifactuality. The efficient cause or agency responsible for their production did not engage in a conscious activity involving any of the four conditions stated earlier. Dickie, I believe, has confused the notion of an aesthetic object with that of a work of art. If every aesthetic object were a work of art, any natural object would be transformable into an artwork by the simple expedient of regarding it appreciatively. Dickie has in effect fastened upon a crucial feature of

aesthetic experience : its capacity to create values where none existed previously. He has then extended the notion of creating artistic value through a kind of performance (conferring the status of candidate for appreciation) to include the possibility of conferring artifactuality itself upon things. But is the creative element in aesthetic experience alone sufficient to give birth to an artifact, as well as to a new artistic creation ? Clearly not, for the following reasons : (1) Artifactuality as such cannot be conferred because an artifact is a product of making which requires work or labour on the part of the maker. Artifacts are produced by transforming a raw material, and not merely by appreciating an object from a distance or even by moving it from one place to another. (2) What distinguishes works of art which are artifacts from artifacts in general is the creative dimension which pertains to art proper. An artifact can be mass-produced while an artwork cannot, because mass-production is the antithesis of creativity. Even a painstaking copy of the *Mona Lisa*, distinguishable from the original only by experts, is rejected as a work of art. (3) Our discussion of artifactuality, as it pertains to the three classes of artworks, has shown that an artwork may, of course, be an artifact, as in the case of A-works, but that art is not *per se* artifactual. Thus there is no necessity for the conferral of artifactuality on an object before it can be granted the status of an artwork, and the rational for Dickie's position no longer holds.

Recent developments in the arts themselves appear to lend support to this conclusion. Such recent developments as minimal art, junk art, found art, etc. have undermined the traditional conception of the artist as a kind of craftsman. Technical proficiency is not required in these new art forms, for a piece of junk can be removed from a junkyard and exhibited as a work of art without any technical skill whatsoever being demanded of the "artist". The four conditions of artifactuality discussed earlier are invalidated : there is no pattern of actions whereby an agent traverses certain means in order to realize an end ; there need be no execution of a preconceived plan on the artist's part ; there is no transformation of a raw material into a finished product and no imposition of form upon a pre-given matter. What is new in much recent art is the emergence of a concept of art presupposing a certain view of creativity without craftsmanship. In this regard the concept of art has undergone a significant transformation while the concept of artifactuality has not. The technical theory of art has been superseded by a novel account of artistic creativity which dispenses with the idea of art as craft. On this view, there need be no process of making or

fabricating on the part of the artist which terminates in the production of an artifact. The artwork is thus *a factum* because it is the result of a constructive human activity, but is not an *artifactum* because no labor has been undertaken in its creation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES :

1. *Art and the Aesthetic* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1974.) 2. "It is now clear that artifactuality is a necessary condition (call it the genus) of the primary sense of art." *Ibid*, p.27. Dickie's definition of the classificatory sense of art is governed by his conception of the necessary and sufficient conditions of art. However, as one critic of Dickie points out, a definition which satisfies the requirement of stating features of art which are necessary and sufficient may yet fail to capture "philosophically rewarding" characteristics of its subject. Without an in-depth analysis of the concept of artifactuality, however, it is impossible to determine whether Dickie's definition produces insight into the concept of art. Cf. Timothy W. Bartel, "Appreciation and Dickie's Definition of Art", *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, (Winter, 1979), p.52. A useful discussion of the problem of defining art is T. J. Diffey's "On Defining Art" in the same issue of *BJA*, pp. 15-24. 3. *Art and the Aesthetic*, Chapter I. Cf. also George Dickie, *aesthetics : An Introduction* (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 105-113. 4. *Art and the Aesthetic*, pp. 33 ff. According to Dickie, "A theory of art must preserve certain central features of the way in which we talk about art" *Ibid*, p. 40. Apparently Dickie is not offering a mere stipulative definition of art, but it is unclear whether his definition is meant to be a real or essential definition or merely an elucidation of certain important aspects of the way in which the concept of art is used in every day speech. 5. The question will not be raised in this paper whether there is indeed a descriptive function for the expression "work of art" which is not parasitic on its evaluative function. 6. "The idea (of craft) is just that of an organized body of knowledge and skills directed to the production of some work that may be judged by definite technical and non-moral standards." Francis Sparshott, *The Concept of Criticism* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 22. The context of Sparshott's statement is a discussion of the work of literary criticism as artifact. 7. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI.3.1139b14. 8. This account of the logical conditions of craft is based upon R.G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 15-41, Collingwood discusses a further characteristic of craft which will not be dealt with here : the hierarchial relation among the various crafts. 9. This threefold classification of the arts differs in certain respects from that of Harold Osborne in his book *The Art of Appreciation* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 167-9. 10. There may be, of course, a division of labour between the artistcreator and the agency responsible for executing his

design or plan. This occurs frequently in the plastic arts. 11. For a fuller discussion of the role of the "instrument" as a medium in the performing arts, cf. Ronald Roblin, "On Media and Materials in Art", *International Studies in Philosophy*, IX (1977), pp. 121-5. 12. *art and the aesthetic*, pp. 22-27. Cf. also *aesthetics : an introduction*, pp. 98-101. Also relevant are the critical comments on this question by Joseph Margolis in his review of *art and the aesthetic* in the *Journal of aesthetics and art criticism* (Spring 1975), pp. 341-5 and Dickie's reply in the Winter 1975 issue, pp. 229-30. Dickie here admits that his centention that artifactuality can be conferred upon found objects is "tentative" and that the use of "tools" may be a necessary condition of artifactuality. But he does not retract his earlier claim that artifactuality is the genus of a definition of art. 13. *art and the aesthetic*, pp. 22-27. *aesthetics : an Introduction*, pp. 97-101. The example is borrowed from Morris Weitz's well known paper, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," *Journal of aesthetics and art criticism* (Fall 1956), pp. 27-35.

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NOTES TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POETICS OF THE ENGLISH CLASS *

KEITH KEATING

> I am simply calling attention to the fact that fine art is the only teacher except torture.
>
> George Bernard Shaw
> Preface to *Misalliance*

> Human consciousness is in perpetual pursuit of a language and a style. To assume consciousness is at once to assume form. Even at levels far below the zone of definition and clarity, forms, measures, and relationship exist. The chief charactistic of the mind is to be constantly describing *itself*. The mind is a design that is in a state of ceaseless flux, of ceaseless weaving and then unweaving, and its activity, in this sense, is an artistic activity. Like the artist, the mind works upon nature.
>
> Henri Focillon
> *The Life of Forms in Art*

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I am indebted to my years as a teacher for the assumptions and the approach of this paper. The frame of reference is teaching literature through other disciplines. I do not however pretend to assume the position of pedagogue to those of my own ilk. The concepts which the paper advances, like other knowledge, are old wine. If the bottles are new, the concepts ought not on that account to be discarded. The perspective represents an assimilated body of scholarship and numerous presentations in varying contexts. The references to other fields outside literature are not there for the purpose of supporting a *how to* philosophy so much as to explain the *why* of one ratiocinative course and its resultant *modus operandi*.

The teaching of English has not developed any final or ultimate system of poetics. The best we can hope for are a continuing dialectic and committed idiosyncratic stabs in the dark. So long as these stabs are also probes designed to develop meaning and purpose, to that extent they can be successful, however modestly, in accomplishing the goal of learning which is what teaching is about. Teaching is at once difficult and personal. Its significance could lie less in *what* it claims to do than in *how* it goes about fulfilling those claims. There is no pretense that what is proffered here is definitive or conclusive, only, perhaps, with a little bit of luck, an item or two of a provocative nature.

In a lecture on the British Broadcasting System in the 1930's,[1] George Bernard Shaw, then octogenarian, said that, to him,

> a person who knew nothing of all the great musicians from Palestrina to Edward Elgar nor of the great painters from Giotto to Burne-Jones was a savage and ignoramus, even if he were hung all over with gold medals for school classics.

In reviewing the current status of English, Shaw's warning might be borne in mind. The teacher is not so much disciplinarian as he is *inter* disciplinarian. Shaw may be characterized as an interdisciplinarian. He wrote music criticism that is dramtic and drama criticism that contains music. He was an authority and expert in every area that required unqualified omniscience. His prose style is developed out of rhythmic structures approaching the state of music, although he insisted that "effectiveness of assertion is the alpha and omega of style."[2]

He once wrote :

> With the single exception of Homer, there is no eminent writer, not even Sir Walter Scott, whom I can despise so entirely as I despise Shakespeare when I measure my mind against his. The intensity of my impatience with him occasionally reaches such a pitch, that it would positively be a relief to me to dig him up and throw stones at him, knowing as I do how incapable he and his worshippers are of understanding any less obvious form of indignity.[3]

The statement is rich in literary allusion. Analysis of its implications requires a grasp of literary history and the history of Shakespeare criticism. Disembodied of these associations, it contains a series of visual and sonar elements that ally it with painting and music and could distract attention from content. Shaw insisted that his plays were best understood if they were regarded as grand opera, especially Mozart and Verdi, and that his set speeches are in reality operatic arias.[4] If *Man and Superman* is Shaw's "Don Juan play," as he claims in the prefatory "Epistle Dedicatory" (3,485) it is *a fortiori* his Don Giovanni opera. The "Don Juan in Hell" sequence, Act III, opens where Mozart's opera ends and, as Frederick P. W. McDowell has shown, the act is the play in microcosm.[5] There are pregnant allusions to Mozart's music and to Mozart himself and the characters indulge in singing him. Above all, the dialogue evolves in musical progression, with repetition, variation and modulation among its salient features.

The Devil descants with Juan upon the *motif* of Man's endemic destructiveness in a crescendo of ideas and images to excerpt from which interrupts the logical as well as the musical line :

> .....I tell you that in the arts of life man invents nothing ; but in the arts of death he out-does Nature herself, and produces by chemistry and machinery all the slaughter of plague, pestilence, and famine ..... I could give you a thousand instances ; but they all come to the same thing : the power that governs the earth is not the power of Life but of Death ; and the inner need that has nerved Life to the effort of organizing itself into the human being is not the need for higher life but for a more efficient engine of destruction. The plague, the famine, the earthquake, the tempest were too spasmodic in their action ; the tiger and crocodile were too easily satiated and not cruel enough : something more constantly, more ruthlessly, more ingeniously destructive was needed ; and that something was Man, the inventor of the

rack, the stake, the gallows, the electric chair ; of sword and gun and poison gas : above all, of justice, duty, patriotism, and all the other isms by which even those who are clever enough to be humanely disposed are persuaded to become the most destructive of all the destroyers. (3,619-621)

Shaw insisted that his work is entirely a development of ideas. However, his music is pervasive and quite "unfailing," as he says of Shakespeare.[6] Saint Joan retracts her recantation in images that are at once alliterative and evocative :

But to shut me from the light of the sky and the sight of the fields and flowers ; to chain my feet so that I can never again ride with the soldiers nor climb the hills ; ..... all this is worse than the furnace in the Bible ..... if only I could still hear the wind in the trees, the lark in the sunshine, the young lambs crying through the healthy frost ... (2,291-292)

Shakespeare's Polonius anticipated the 20th century academic dilemma when he took Hamlet's Rorschach inkblot test :

Hamlet. Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a Camel ?
Polonius. By th' mass and, 'tis, like a camel indeed.
Hamlet. Me thinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius. It is back'd like a weasel.
Hamlet. Or like a whale.
Polonius. Very like a whale. (III.ii. 376-382)[7]

To specialize or not to specialize is our ultimate question.

Polonius is the prototype of the teacher as decoder-translator in every walk of life. He is expert in all matters that turn upon human thought and human action : political science (II. ii. 153-154), philosophy (II. iii. 58-80), psychology (II. ii. 86-105), human relations (I. iii. 88-135 ; II. i. 1-69), art. He knows when a speech is too long and when an image is effective (II. ii. 88-135). At home he is in *loco magistralis* (II. i. 73-116) and stage director (III. i. 43-48). In his spare time he is an actor and accounted a good one, and the part he plays is in character : he did enact Julius Caesar the tyrant i' the university (III. ii. 97-103). As literary critic, he is too sophisticated to settle for easy definitions. The versatility of the actors who come to Elsinore are striking to Polonius, partially perhaps because they project his own fancied versatility.

As he percieves them, they are :

> The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, (tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral,) scene individable, or poem unlimited ; Seneca cannot be too heavy, nor Plautus too light, for the law of writ and the liberty : these are the only men. (II. ii. 396-402)

But Polonius may be only a parodic instance of the hero of the play in a different set of situations ; for Hamlet's dexterity extends to composing poems (II. ii. 116-122), writing plays (II. ii. 535-544), directing and producing them (III. ii. 1-45), acting on and off stage, and above all to teaching by parabolic example (III. ii. 345-372 ; IV.ii ; IV, iii. 16-37). Contemplating a skull in a graveyard, the student of Wittenberg can trace in imagination the noble dust of Alexander till 'a find it stopping a bunghole. History, metaphysics, logic, philosophy drama and art combine with personality in that emblematic scene, set to the incidental accompaniment of the gravedigger's didactic song about the inevitability of death and Hamlet's own "imperious Caesar dead and turned to clay" melody, to pronounce upon the most fundamental and ultimate things : the lesson of life and death and "to what base uses we may return" (V.i.57-203).

Shakespeare's works are themselves interdisciplinary, in the sense that they contain an extraordinary measure of functional imagery that is highly sensual as well as associative on aural and visual levels.[8] We are continuously bombarded by scene and sound, situation and music, that are inclusive and simultaneous and conjure a high sense of personal involvement. There is adolescent isolation and parental misconduct in Hamlet where the young prince is dressed in black and speaks in striking alliteratives and is haunted by his father's ghost of the past whose music words admonish murder and revenge :

> I am thy father's spirit,
> Doom'd for a certain term to walk the night,
> And for the day confin'd to fast in fires,
> Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
> Are burnt and purg'd away. But that I am forbid
> To tell the secrets of my prison-house,
> I could a tale unfold whose lightest word
> Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood,

Make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres,
Thy knotted and combined lock to part,
And each particular hair to stand an end,
Like quills upon the fearful porpentine.
But this eternal blazon must not be
To ears of flesh and blood. List, list, O, list :
If thou didst ever thy dear father love —
... ...
Revenge his foul and most unnatural murther. (I. v. 9-25)

There is parental tyranny in *Romeo and Juliet* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and paternal folly in *King Lear*. We are privy to actions that are accompanied by word music, often by off-stage sound effects and on-stage song ; and together what we see and what we hear combine architectonically to further action and to point theme.

A recent article in the *New York Times* expressed alarm over the direction education is taking. In interviews with the administrators of the Universities of Princeton, Pennsylvania and Dartmouth the consensus emerged that information was accumulating at so rapid a pace that "facts" were getting in the way of true knowledge and that " ... the greatest need is ... for breadth of education ... true interdisciplinary linkages are essential ... [and] Interesting ideas spring up at the boundaries between disciplines where people can work on the same thing from different points of views.[9] Specialization is attenuating our capacity for intellectual discovery and eroding the education process. Perhaps not enough is known to determine the extent to which there is any causal relationship between this and declining enrollments, particularly in the liberal arts. What is certain is that the phenomenon has taken root and all but precludes abatement. And who knows to what base uses we may return !

But there is cause for celebration. It is equally evident that we live in a highly visual and performance conscious time. The television image dominates our lives, modifies our habits and conditions our view of the world, bringing us the visual/plastic arts, music, dance, in quantities far in excess of our capacities to absorb. And the fare is "comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral" in the Polonius vein. What is disconcerting is that the plethora of cultural vitality has

rendered the classroom superannuated. Perhaps the influx has come on too strongly and too suddenly and within too unmanageable and impressive proportions. As a consequence of which we have not quite gotten around to adapting what's there to pedagogic needs, to the cause of learning, to the pragmatic necessity of bringing into school from the external world forms and habits for emulation and use.

If there is something learning cannot ignore, it is that knowledge and experience are inextricably entwined. Education, like Art, is underwritten by experience ; and it is difficult to argue with experience. Unless we grant that basically "there is 'something there' to be understood," in the absence of that trust, we confront the vacuum which knowledge as well as nature abhors. On the other hand, with the assurance of trust (so long as there is 'something there'), there is the external world to translate into our own symbolic terms. In this sense, translation is understanding and also its *sine qua non*. There can be no meaning unless there is a set "of relations in which 'this' can stand for 'that'.[10] The classroom is the symbol of the process of absorption and accretion and apperception that occur in the external world. It is that place where an integrated mode of substitute experience and an elaboration of feelings and perceptions are developed. The classroom is at once the place for symbolic acting out of the process of living and preparation for living as well as the model *par excellence* for imparting and providing the basis for interpreting experience. This is the essential function of Art. The creative process is a way of reaching back to life, establishing order out of the chaos of experience. A work of art is a translation of experience into a structure which we call a symbol, as in the case of a word, which is not merely an articulated sound but the significant form which a feeling or idea about an experience has taken.[11] We say *ancestor* when we wish to convey the idea of a walking (Latin *cess* : walk) before (Latin : *ante* : before).[12] An *arrival* harks back to the primitive necessity, which is also modern, of living on the banks of rivers (Latin : *riva* and *ripa*) where those who come to (Latin *ad* : towards) where we are *arrive* and could compete for river rights (*riparian*), making themselves *rivals*. The universal cross-cultural translation of the experience mother and father into phonetic structure *mama* and *papa*, or some other similar or reversed form, such as *abba* and *ema*, is an even more fundamental case in point. Until *ma* and *pa* lose their pure diacriticality, they are mere combinations of vocalic /a/ and primal interchangeable voiceless labial stops /p/ and /b/ in the primal utterance /pa/ and /ba/

or /a/ with bilabial /m/ in /ma/.[13] By extension, the creative process translates the experience of the suckling whose capacity to vocalize is limited to repeated sequences of syllables such as *ba, ba, ba* and *pa, pa, pa* into *baby* (cf. Indian *papoose*) and the vocal activity into *babble* which is later transmuted into *Babel*, the tower of linguistic confusion and Hebrew Gate of God, and *Babylon*, Greek Gate of Tears. On deeper psychoanalytical levels, phonemic preferential development may be charted on the basis of emotional values.[14] Because these values are associated with mother and father in infantile experience, their essences linger in later adult forms. *Ma* develops a progeny which includes Latin *mater*, hence *material*, *matter*, *matron*, *maternal*, *matriculate*, *matriarch*, *matrix* ; Greek *meter*, *Demeter*, *metropolis* ; Romance *madre* ; Germanic *modor* ; and the multiplicity of forms that derive therefrom. *Pa* produces Latin and Greek *pater*, *paternal*, *patriotic* and *patronymic* ; Spanish, Portuguese and Italian *padre* ; and such diverse familiar forms as *patron*, *expatriate*, *patriarch* ; *papa* for Pope, whence *papacy* and other variations. These forms are attenuations of the primal experience-substitute *mama* and *papa* whose ghosts possess their structurality. They are mirror reflections of the artistic process and signify the human propensity to harness reality for transmission by way of symbols. Language is an index of the need to create metaphor, to express one thing in terms of another. The translation of reality into form is at the base of the process we call learning and of the activity we call teaching.

Joining /a/ to /b/ is the source from which *alpha beta* derives. The effort inherent in making the connection *ab* is the image of initial translation from a *this* into a *that* to communicate something about *this*. Curiously, Greek *alpha* means *ox* associated with food → eating → ploughing → survival and *beta* is associated with *shelter* → security from the wilds → companionship → survival. *Alphabet* symbolizes the two basic ingredients of survival : food and shelter. Uppercased, they are Alpha joined to Beta which were originally derivative developments of the scratches forming ∀ which is inverted A and attempts to body forth the *picture* of oxen yoked together[15] at the horns (⋁) and ⊡, the crude stab at representing the two-story house that became shelter that became home. Joining /a/ to /b/ is analogous to the linkage of ⋁ (horns) and — (yoke). The juxtaposition and the pre-eminent place AB occupies is interesting. In *OE* the form *writan* signifies *scratch* or *carve* (in Swedish *rita* still means *draw*), thus betraying linkages among the graphic arts. Words are not only representational

and reproductive ; they contribute new existences to the stock of existences in nature.[16] Creativity at once implies and illustrates the problem of translation and transformation. The pictological approach to the problem does not seek to authenticate but to *re-create*. Creativity is so interconnected with the reality of the outside world and yet so dependent upon its own symbolization of the outside world that we use language mimetically as well as ideationally : so that Greek echoic *barbaroi*, simulating the stammering of unintelligible non-Greeks, evolved into Latin *barbarus*, whence *barbarous*, *barbarity*, *barbaric*, *barbarian* and, by aesthetic elaboration, Bela Bartok's *allegro barbaro* composed out of ethnomusicological folk elements. The perception of unintelligible speech patterns produces abstract concepts far removed from their original source through the mirror of language. Linguistic forms create new experiences and other new linguistic forms. Hence *barbarize*, and even *barbara* (Latin feminine form) ultimately becomes *Barbara*, the personification of innocence. According to *OED*, the mnemonics of the three a's indicate a universal proposition and symbolize the quintessence of syllogistic reasoning.

Thus language begets language. Our dealing with reality is oblique since all commerce with outside world is conducted through *symbols* (throwing together) and *symbolization* (conceptualization of the throwing together process). And for all that, contacts with reality are dependent upon and limited by the symbols that derive from those contacts. Mind leaves behind but is inextricably tied to /m/ and /a/, initially associated with suckling (*lang* = tongue) but is invariably conditioned by it. The progressive development from *ma* to *mama* to *mamma* (Latin : breast) forms the fabric out of which emerges *mammal* and the later abstract concept *mammalian* and *mamillation*.[17] The concept is an evolving movement *away from* initial experience and towards the more and more shadowy realm of transumption where meaning is less tangible because more expansive and therefore more *expressive*. The myth of *Oedipus* captures the primordial reality of human blindness and misplaced arrogance. Both Sophocles' drama and the tradition on which it is founded are expanded mataphors of the process of human discovery of self. The drama emphasizes, through a retrospective unravelling of carefully contrived significant instances, the working out of the idea that life is lived forwards but understood backwards. Oedipus' name is charactonym that contains the destiny of man which is Greek *Oida* to know, combined with *pou* : foot, and the details of his story are the architectonic devices by which the reality he

represents, the inability to see farther than the foot, is transmuted into art and shaped in accordance with the aesthetic principles of parsimony. Oedipus is not a person ; he is a *persona*. He is a symbol, not a man : and not man only, but Man. Like his blindness to the most elementary things, the *fiction* surrounding his solution of the riddle of life in adolescence, in the form of answering the Sphinx, images forth the *facts* of life but is not equated with those facts. Moreover, Oedipus' story is not entirely his own and does not end with him. He will have children who will suffer on his account, as he suffers on his father's account. Greek *Laios* is awkward, for which Latin *sinister* (left-handed) is the equivalent. "The Oedipus tragedy is the outcome of the fate of the left-handed father."[18] Oedipus' destiny is also the child's destiny, which rests in the fact of ancestral inheritance and the fate of parental abandonment. Man is born into a hostile and mysterious environment where the resolution of the puzzle of existence reveals the arcane conflict in the relationship between parent and child and inherent universal congenital blindness.

Myth (Greek *muthos* : word as well as plot), like language, is autochthonous and economical. It is also anthropomorphic and conceals an unconscious grammer of experience, representative but also *expressive*. Therein lies a difficulty : under examination, the mythico-transformation process is a signed confession of imperfection and a recognition of inadequacy. The creation of symbolic forms is an effort to overcome and to control the limitation of dependency upon reality and to place reality in a teleological perspective. Creativity is hence a conversion of an endemic weakness into a communicative strength. This parenthetically may not be a weakness that animals share with man. The animal is part of reality and is identified with raw experience. Humanization is a process of removal from experience and separation by way of concept and ideas, in the manner in which the child is in egocentered obliviousness of externality, which is to say, of where environment begins and individuality ends. As the child incorporates the concept of self, he becomes detached from reality by immersion in symbols. Humanization defines and delineates the difference between *is* and *in terms of* : merely being *versus* the awareness of being, like Bernard Shaw's superman whose contemplative energies constitute the distinction between man and animal, and specifically the contemplation of life itself.

> What made this brain of mine, do you think ? Not the need to move my limbs ; for a rat with half my brains moves as well as I. Not merely the need

to do, but the need to know what I do, lest in my blind efforts to live I should be slaying myself. (3,618)

That "rat" is a reverberating echo of Lear's rejection of the notion that his daughter, Cordelia, is in death less than the lowest of animals. The monumental pieta with which *King Lear* ends proves that life is not cheap as beast's. And yet the question persists,

Why should a dog, a horse, a rat, have life,
And thou no breath at all ? Thou'lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never. (V.iii. 306-308)

in the midst of pentameter music, divided among expressive monosyllabic feet and iambs, and the doleful finality in the falling trochees of the monotonous repetitive "never". Cordelia will come no more. Life is a matter of *coming* and thus death *means* coming no more. She is *gone* forever.

The more ways we have of expressing a reality, the more potent the conceptualization of that reality. Metaphor is not only a means of expression ; it is the expression of a means of knowing. Intellection arrives with the awareness of the thatness about this and the thisness about that. The use of metaphor enables us to remove ourselves from gross reality and to reflect upon it while re-creating it. To this extent, language is itself an item of experience. There could be a high positive correlation between multiple ways of knowing and reinforcement of knowledge. Picasso's *Baboon add Young* (Museum of Modern Art, New York) is a this which is a that. The metallic structure does not pretend to be a real baboon holding its young but an ambiguously suggestive anthropomorphic sculptural representation. Like Michael Angelo's Florentine *Pieta* (Florence Cathedral, Italy) it is not more symbolic than *mama* and *baby*, only more complex because more remote from origin, as the *Guernica* of Picasso (Museum of Modern Art, New York) is more complex than Spanish and Italian *Guerra* and French *Guerre* (war) because it is not the real horror of war but an image of that horror.

Elaboration and interpretation, not authenticity and loyalty to source, are the true progenitors of the cause of Art. From this perspective, Art is not only concept but *fact*, in the sense of Greek *tithenai* : deed, and Latin *fectum* : done or made : *factitive* as well as *fectitious*, in the best sense of the word. *Poesis* is Greek for creativity and *poem* is something made or shaped. The OE equivalent for poet is *scop* whose preterite is *scieppan*, related to *scieppena*, shaper, God. *Makar*

is old Scot for poet.[19] The aesthetic solution is not only to make but to *make over, in terms of* color, sound, action, from Latin *fingere* : fiction, to mold. The genesis of the *Mother with Child* of Kathe Kollwitz (Private Collection) or *Brot* (Philadelphia Museum of Aart) or of Rubens' *The Consequences of War* (The Prado, Madrid) is a life situation. The solution of the artistic problem lies in the painter's color box, the poet's ink bottle, the actor's interpretative and mimetic presences.[20] Intellection moves away from exact correspondences and towards suggestive ones. It is not at home with *equations* but with *equivalences*, with virtual experiences, not with actual ones. In painting and music, virtual space and virtual time replace actual space and actual time.[21] Their allusive qualities are the shorthand that forges the links in the chain we call tradition and convention and demonstrates the significant commonplace that art copies, not so much nature, but art itself. *Guernica* is joined in idea and structure to *The Consequences of War* by the same principle of allusion that connects Masaccio's *The Expulsion from Paradise* (Branacci Chapel, Sta, Maria del Carmine, Florence) and Rodin's *Sorrow* (The Art Institute of Chicago), or the *Dies Irae* motif from the Requiem Mass and the *Totentanz*, for Piano and Orchestra, of Franz Liszt, the *Symphonie fantastique*, Op. 14, of Hector Berlioz and Rachmaninoff's *Rhapsody on a Theme of Paganini*, Op. 43 ; or *dies* and *deus* ; *chorus*, choreography and Terpsichore ; *papyrus* and paper ; *folio* and foliage. Similarly Richard Strauss's *Metamorphosen*, study for 23 Solo Strings, evokes the elegiac qualities of Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E, Op. 55, "Eroica," of the funereal second movement of which its dirge-like tone, allusive quotations and trochaic descents are reminiscent and through which it makes its mournful politico-philosophical point. No doubt there is some reason why the mistrust of appearance plays a major part in Shakespeare. The concept which is also an image recurs like an *idee fixe* within and across the plays.[22] In his development as an artist, history is turned into comedy as well as incorporated by it, as tragedy succeeds comedy and comprehends it. His most fully developed comic character, Falstaff, appears in his greatest chronicle, *1 and 2 Henry IV*, and dominates the action, allowing for the inference that not much separates history from comedy. Comedy is a commentary upon history, the way Gadshill and the Boar's Head Tavern are a commentary upon the Wars of the Roses. King and Fool in counterpoint : that is the substance of the gigantic mural that is Shakespeare's conception of History. Its plot is the writing of sorrow on the bosom of the earth and the death of both king (*Richard II*. III. ii. 145-177) and commoner

(*1 Henry IV.* IV. i. 128-130) and the massacre of innocents who do not die well in battle (*Henry V.* IV. i. 134-146). Their analogues are *The Triumph of Death* by Bruegel (The Prado, Madrid), Guido Reni's *Massacre of the Innocents* (Museum of Bologna), Altdorfer's *Battle of Alexander* (The Pinakothek, Munich).

History, whose etymology reveals the element of narrative, conceals the *story* of human folly which Shakespeare's Chronicles reveal, amidst loud guffaws, martial verbal music and off-stage musical sound effects, spectacle, wisdom from fools not wise enough to know they are wise, like Fluellen (*Henry V.* IV. i. 64-80), whose examination of the wars of Pompey the Great discovers no "pibble babble." A detail on the sweeping canvas on which civil war is painted in *3 Henry VI* contains these directions : *Alarum, Enter a Son that hath kill'd his Father, at one door, (dragging in the dead body)* (II.v.). Another detail (*ibid*) reveals a *Father that hath kill'd his Son, at another door, bearing of his son.* The music that accompanies these frames is solemn and sad and King Henry sits literally and symbolically alone on a hill impotently observing the melancholy scene, as though he were sitting at a play, and contemplating his solitary detachment in an aria composed in a minor key :

O god ! methinks it were a happy life
To be no better than a homely swain,
To sit upon a hill, as I do now,
To carve out dials quaintly, point by point,
Thereby to see the minutes how they run :
How many makes the hour full complete,
How many hours brings about the day,
How many days will finish up the year,
How many years a mortal man may live.
When this is known, then to divide the times :
So many hours must I tend my flock,
So many hours must I take my rest,
So many hours must I contemplate,
So many hours must I sport myself,
So many days my ewes have been with young,
So many weeks ere the poor fools will ean,
So many years ere I shall shear the fleece :
So minutes, hours, days, months, and years,

Pass'd over to the end they were created,
Would bring white hairs unto a quiet grave.
(II.v.21-40)

King Henry's reaction is both objective and idiosyncratic. "What is in this world but grief and woe" (II.v.20), he sighs, before he is struck by the dismal spectacle of the total anonymity of war and joins in the triadic antiphonal that follows the dreadful pair of peripeteias.

Son. How will my mother for a father's death
Take on with me, and ne'er be satisfied !
Father. How will my wife for slaughter of my son
Shed seas of tears, and ne'er be satisfied !
King Henry. How will the country for these woeful chances
Misthink the King, and not be satisfied !
Son. Was ever son so ru'd a father's death ?
Father. Was ever father so bemoan'd his son ?
King Henery. Was ever king so griev'd for subjects' woe ?
(II.v.103-111)

War is blind and callous and causes irremediable tragedy that, in Art, reaches our comprehension by way of form. The artist arranges his materials into syntactic frames of reference which are not separable from their semantic markings and with which we identify on both objective and subjective planes. The symbol he creates is understood when the idea it represents is understood. The effective symbol is one that, heuristically approached, forms a purposive nexus with 'something there' to be understood which has been transformed teleologically into an equivalent or an aesthetic substitute.[23] One of the lessons Shakespeare teaches is that both Art and knowledge are various, but not at variance. A Shakespeare play functions on a multiplicity of levels at once (alarums and excursions and sennets are the incidental music that accompanies the frames that make up the Histories), each level moving purposively in the same direction as all the others, until seam blurs into seam and the totality is organic. How can we tell the dancer from the dance ? To Shakespearize experience is to appreciate the reconciliation of its unity and diversity and to personalize it, the way Shakespeare personalized Holinshed and Saxo Grammaticus and his other sources and translated them *in terms of* the character of his time.

The 20th century is given to theatricalism and to acoustic and visual display and personality. If all the world's a stage (*As You Like It.* II.vii. 139), so is all the world of learning a stage. As the theatre is the world in microcosm, the school is reality miniaturized and metabolized into qualities that bear no direct relation or resemblance to their source. Henry VI's hill recalls royal position and the perspective concomitant with it, like the dark in *Hamlet* which is an embodied imminence of perplexity and evil. The scene is not only visual but existential and referential. Accordingly, teaching English involves the translation of concrete experience into models which are themselves the origination of dramatic frames of reference at the centre of which is the personality of the teacher. This is a point upon which too great emphasis cannot be bestowed, since it is by means of a person that both the experience and its refinement are filtered. This is the cause for celebration mentioned earlier. The reality of the outside world is now confirming the dramatic characteristics that traditionally inhere in teaching, so that to keep up with the world in order to reflect it is simultaneously to remain *sui generis*. The function of the teacher is to absorb and shape his material in his own image the way the artist or actor does, to become the thing he teaches, and to be the irreducible symbol of it. He is the embodiment of an idea as well as a character in its dramatic working out in the interchange between play and audience.[24] It is through this dialectic interchange that learning happens and is perpetuated. For the English teacher, this circumstance is especially congenial. *English* is eclectic and more inquisitive than final. The word itself is an index to a confusion of forms. Hence there isn't the danger of thinking too precisely on the event. Like Richard III's Buckingham, the English teacher "can counterfeit the deep tragedian,/Speak and look back, and pry on every side" (III.v.5-6), and in himself present the world as "comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral".

The teacher-learner transaction is prescribed and circumscribed by a communicative situation which contains the essential elements of drama, with the teacher-as-embodiment as focal point and the class as active participant/spectator/audience in the theatre of learning. *Drama* is the Greek symbol substitute for the experience of psychological action that is also conflict. The English classroom is a theatre where the teacher creates the situation in which ideas collide in the manner of the *agon* of ancient ritual metaphorically attenuated. The concept of *protagonist* versus *antagonist* arises from these origins and forms

the warp and woof of the Platonic-Hegelian dialectic constituted of *thesis*, *antithesis* and *synthesis*.[25] In Piagetian terms, the dramatico-dialectic function is the equilibration of cognitive structures which forms the basis of thought development. Equilibration of cognitive structures occurs when conflicting information is assimilated into existing schemata, after various intellectual evaluations.[26] The inference may be drawn that oppositions are thus resolved which thereby produce new conceptualizations and configurations, as in a fugue. Contrapuntal arrangements by their nature undergo a series of explorations, combinations and transformations en route towards tentatively conclusive cadences,[27] like the progressively developmental steps we detect in the dialectic of Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge* in B, Op. 133 for Quartet, and the Finale of Mozart's Symphony No. 41 in C, K. 551, "Jupiter." The teaching-learning polyphony is not a matter of passive reception or even the pouring in of a perception of things. It is rather, and essentially, a *developing* of perceptions out of the process of creation. In this sense, the teacher constitutes a mimetic teleological principle, his salient purpose being the imitation of and transference to the artifice of his stage the multifarious forces of position, opposition and provisional reconciliation in the world and in Art that produce the advancement of learning. In performing his artistic function of mimesis, he takes full advantage of the cunning of the scene to provoke thinking and make connections and provide the continuous reinforcement of stimuli that grows out of the chemical totality of subject, approach and interaction. No relevance attaches to whether his habits of mind are old or new. They will be new to those who have not been previously exposed. Dufay and Brunelleschi are new to those who have not appreciated Dufay and Brunelleschi before. Physical science does not claim essential novelty so much as "new ways of regarding old phenomena," in any case, along with the formulation and articulation of everyday experience already tacitly encapsulated in everyday language. Fire and burn, shortest distance and straight line, are common associations.[28] The deep structures of linguistics are only underlying meaning, and intervallic tensions are a way of talking about rhythmic structures in music, their direction and distance ; and every traveller knows without the benefit of physics that the horizon shifts. Similarly there is nothing extraordinary about iambs and trochees and dactyls, and amphibrachs and anapests, and other prosodic forms, when we come to appreciate them as labels for everyday experience in the external world. We say tŏday and păpoose ; baby and tíck tŏck

without recognizing the musical differentiation. Bàrbărà and súddĕnly are obviously distinct from tŏmorrŏw and mătérnăl as the last line of William Butler Yeats's "A Deep-Sworn Vow"

Súddĕnly // I meet your face

is distinct from the first line of John Keats's "Ode to a Nightingale" :

My heart aches, // and ă drowsy numbness pains
My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,

and as meaningful architectonically as musically.

The transition from semantics to the pure syntactic structures of music produces the opening trochaic cries of Aaron Copland's *Billy the Kid* ballet : / U // / U and the combination of trochees and dactyls in Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 in d, Op. 125, "Choral" :



Stripped down to their syntactic bones, these are like the mouthings of Hamlet's exhortation to the players (III.ii.1-14) and we had as lief the towncrier spoke our lines. In context, however, they are significantly bound up with meaning. The exposition of the Beethoven Symphony No. 9 is a questing and a probing that recurs throughout the four movements of the symphony in a series of metamorphoses, key arrangements and rhythmic patterns, repetitions and contrasts, to an agitated, violent final resolution, after the transposition and evolution into the verbal/choral context of Schiller's "Ode to Joy" and the coda that opens with a progressively rapid succession of trochees :



Something similar occurs in *King Lear* of parallels and contrasts, beginning with the balance between Albany and Cornwall (I.i.1-6). Lear is the dupe of Goneril and Regan (I.i.) and appearance condemns Cordelia ; Gloucester is the dupe of Edmund (II.i) and appearance condemns Edgar. Lear (II.iv) is thrust out of doors ; Gloucester (III. vii) is thrust out of doors. In a lower register, the sycophantic Oswald and the honest Kent (II.ii) reflect the disharmony in Lear's divided Britain. Lear and Gloucester are headed in the same direction and both are blind. The storm develops out of distant thunder (II.iv.287) that gathers momentum in a rising crescendo :

Storme still. Enter Lear, and Foole, [29] in a striking visual counterpoint :

Lear. Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks ! rage, blow !
Your cataracts and hurricanoes, spout
Till you have drench'd our steeples, (drown'd) the cocks !
You sulph'rous and thought-executing fires,
Vaunt-couriers of oak-cleaving thunderbolts,
Singe my white head ! and thou, all-shaking thunder,
Strike flat the thick rotundity o' th' world !
Crack nature's moulds, all germains spill at once
That makes ingratful man ! (III.ii.1-9)

The storm reflects the tempest in Lear's mind (III. iv. 12) and subsides in gradual decrescendoes (III. iv). George Kernodle has pointed out the symphonic nature of *King Lear*, including the staccato use of *need* and the undoing of the button that makes human life superior to animality, and G. Wilson Knight refers to Lear's final lines in his struggle at the end, as coming after the harsh unmusic of madness," [30] when the dead Cordelia may be returninig to life :

Dŏ yŏu sée thís ? // Look ŏn hér ! // Look // hĕr líps,
Look thére, // look thère ! (V. iii. 311-312)

The turbulent irregularity of the first line and the spondaic exclamatory finality of the second combine to form an acoustic and visual equivalent of the broken king's hopeful and wild imagining. Rudolph Stamm has observed the coincidence of aural expression and visual gesture in the scene in *Titus Andronicus* (III. ii. 11-45) where Titus beats his breast in anguish with the one hand left him to the meaning of the diacritical stresses in the appropriately "defective" sounds :

Then thus I thump it down.

His mangled handless daughter Lavinia is to him a "map of woe" that can communicate only through "martyr'd signs." The irregularly accented line

Whĕn thy poor héart // beats with outrageŏus beating.
(III. ii. 13)

evokes sound and picture of the irregular heartbeat,[31] with the opening unstress followed by monosyllabic hammerings, given greater emphasis by the caesura they create, and concludes with the choriambic

beats with ŏutra

composed of trochee and iambus in juxtaposition and the feminine ending that complicates the final iambus completing the line with an amphibrach,

gĕous beating

It is the way Shakespeare works, like a musician who is also a painter : by variation and analogy, filtering life through its myriad of prisms where sound and picture go together *pari passu* and exploit each other for meaning. The Jamesian system of concave and convex mirrors applies here as well, and William Empson's theory of the double plot and complex imagistic structures, since levels confirm as well as extend perspective.[32] If the Ninth Symphony is composed of music that is also verbal, *King Lear* and *Titus Andronicus* are composed of words that are also music. The repetitions and developing cumulativeness of layer upon layer of meaning in the recurring motif of *nothing* in *King Lear* is analogous to the use of the *leitmotif* in Mozart, Beethoven, Berlioz, Wagner and Mahler, which presents us with another area for exploration.

Those explosive energies beneath the surface of artistic structure are stimuli to intellectual involvement in the English class. In *1 Henry IV* the contrast between Hotspur's concept of "honour" (I. iii. 201-209) and Falstaff's (V. i. 134-141)

lies the downfall of aristocracy and the rise of bourgeois ideals. "Honour" is a developmental theme in the Henry IV plays, as it is in *Julius Caesar* where (III. ii) the "noble Brutus" (77-78) turned butcher "is an honorable man" (83) and "sure he is an honorable man" (99) whom Mark Anthony "fears" he will "wrong" (12) for being a traitor and a villain (153-155).

Art is transumptive. That could be the reason why subtilization is so intrinsic a part of its mode. Art necessitates a view similar to that of Kafka's Gregor :[33] fragmented, the way an insect perceives — in the manner of a mosaic. The metaphorical expansion which Art by nature allows for the conclusion that a deciding factor in the appreciation of a play, for example, is the recognition of its diversified nature and the advisability of an approach that regards the fragmentation as the parts of which hermeneutic totalities emerge. In this respect, every play or poem or symphony is metonymic as well as synecdochic, since metaphor involves structure and expresses one thing in terms of another.

The theory of *interdiscipline* is unfriendly to positions that hold knowledge to be divisible and therefore incompatible. In *interdiscipline* there are no incompatibles, only insensitivity to applicabilities, and perhaps self-consciousness. The raw material of all knowledge is symbolic message.[34] Communication is the life-long process of the sending and decoding of messages. They may be visual or auditory or tactile, intellectual or emotional. Perhaps they are all of these at once and separable only for analysis and appreciation, for these are the resultants of transumption. But they are symbiotic as well as symbolic and form the basis of what we call painting and sculpture and architecture as well as music, philosophy, science, religion and all the energies and systems of thought and action by which we live. *Interdiscipline* posits that all knowledge is amenable to translation into messages that form linkages with other messages. Even the facts we take for granted come to us by way of symbolic messages. For the Milky Way — astronomy ; for Timbuktu — geography ; for history — Elizabeth I.

A system which imitates a system which copies life also imitates life : *qui facit per alium facit per se*. We exist in a spacetime continuum where there is concatenation rather than organization and where the medium of communication is not nature but artifice. The details of experience, like events in time, do not become meaningful except when they are made *expressive* through the compression of the symbolization process. Hitler might have been perceptive and much human misery prevented had he recognized the analogy of the eggman in "Humpty

Dumpty", as Spain might have been saved by Picasso's *Guernica*, and Napoleon, by Beethoven's "Eroica" symphony. Meaning is significant formal arrangement. A still life is *expressive* because the position and juxtaposition of fruit on a table convey a sense of purpose through their interrelationships as in a Chardin or Cezanne. As part of nature, Mont Sainte-Victoire is merely a mountain for an adventurer to climb. In Cezanne's *Mont Sainte-Victoire Seen from Bibemus Quarry* (Baltimore Museum of Art), it is a height humanity is destined to scale. It is through the use of compression that Shakespeare's Romeo is a pilgrim beneath a balcony in prayer to a saint who is also the sun (II.ii) ; Hamlet murders the actor Polonius behind an arras (III.iv. 23-30) ; and Lear becomes a king only after he has become a man (IV.vii.59-69). What makes these anagogic structures possible is that they abstracted from experience and arranged into unique frames of reference that organize as well as personalize. They are examples of the change from *thing* to *impression*, from disorder to pattern.

Art is the triumph of symbol over fact. Like life, Art fragments in order to control the way music achieves its effect out of discrete metric units that evolve into totalities, or the way words have bottled up in their syllabified segments whole histories and attitudes towards life. In their forms, *panic* and *cereal* are expressions of human consciousness. When we bifurcate *solid*, it reveals the action of sunshine, the way *Macbeth*, through segmentation and analysis, illustrates the Fifth Commandment. Una Ellis-Fermore maintains that Shakespeare's art is applied to "selecting those fragments of the whole that stiumlate our imagination to an understanding of the essential experience." This is the way in which totalities take shape in the mind. It is through fragmenting into significant frames that we grasp in microcosm the macrocosm of the whole, as Bernard Beckerman avers.[35] Look here on this picture, and on this (Figs. 1-4). Shakespeare exposes us to the frames of reference which, treated as individual units for careful scrutiny, lead to comprehension of the whole. Every frame is an analogy, an *as when*. The fundamental questions of life are *as when* Oedipus confronts the Sphinx or *as when* guardians of the social order timorously hurl interrogatives at one another in the dark, as in *Hamlet* (I.i.1-21) ; or *as when* a mad man leads a blind one in an uphill struggle through a bare landscape to find a convenient spot for suicide in *King Lear* (IV.i) ; or *as when* blind men lead one another diagonally downhill into a ditch in Bruegel's *The Parable of the Blind* (Museo di Capodimonte, Naples). Time is *as when* the aged Chronos destroys his children in Goya's *Saturn Devouring His*

Children (The Prado, Madrid). Happiness is *as when* mother and child are locked in so close an embrace that the charcoal lines that give them shape, identify them as inseparably one (Kathe Kollwitz, *Mother with Child*, Private Collection, Fig. 1). Sorrow is *as when* the musical line descends in a series of drooping notes that resemble Richard Strauss's *Metamorphosen* or in the last movement of Mozart's Piano Concerto No. 20 in d, K466, or *as when* the diacritical accentuations of Constance's lines are combined to produce a mother's gut reaction to the inconsolable anguish over the loss of her child in Shakespeare's *King John* :

Gríef // fílls // thĕ room // úp // ŏf my absĕnt chíld (III. iv. 93)

The opening monosyllabic foot is skillfully set off by the succeeding collision of f's, themselves followed by a series of caesural convulsive gasps. *Mama* is *as when* the physiological needs which the babbling of the *infant* (Greek : no speech) conveys are so intimately associated with the breast and the person providing the relief from discomfiture that the sound and source become identified. Art is the pre-eminent approach to life which is a gorgon whose visage lapidifies those who confront her directly. The conquest of life is by way of obliquity through mirror reflection *as when* Perseus decapitated the Medusa.

Relating analogies within the arts is not new. Poussin took the cue from the Greek modes and composed allegorical landscapes that are also musical ; Tintoretto and Delacroix are literary and dramatic ; and Baudelaire perceives painting as "in some respects related to mathematics and music ;"[36] while Beethoven explored pictographic possibilities in the *Pastorale* Symphony No. 6 in F, Op. 68. His *Tempest* Sonata No. 17 in d, Op. 31, is named after Shakespeare's intensely musical, visual and mythical play. The *Five Tudor Portraits* of Ralph Vaughn Williams uses a pictorial term for a title in the service of a musical idea ; and Gunther Schuller transformed Paul Klee, who parodied the operas of Wagner in color and line, in to *Seven Studies on Themes of Paul Klee*, the way Berlioz and Verdi transmuted Shakespeare and Shaw transformed Mozart and Euripides. The catalogue is endless. *Ballad* and *sonnet* and *ode* have suspiciously curious interdisciplinary resemblances, like *music* and *muse* and *myth*. *Tone poem* is contradictory as well as true, as Alexander Scriabin demonstrates in his attempt to unify sound and color through one keyboard of light, in *Prometheus* : *The Poem of Fire*, Op. 60. Felix Mendelssohn, Hector Berlioz, and Gustav Holst, like Benjamin Britten and Michael Tippett, to name a few, combined artistic forms with not too great regard for their differentiation.[37]

For the theory of interdiscipline, not only is Art one but teaching and learning are a single process, a position amply supported by the Latin etymological linkage of *discere*, to learn, and *docere*, to teach. It is semantically revealing that *learn* and *teach* are often confused in uneducated English usage. *Interdiscipline* regards as given that one area of knowledge confirms another the way one art form confirms another art form. Areas of knowledge are the fragments of experience out of which structured totalities are conceptualized, analogous to the manner in which, within so complex a structure as Rodin's *Burghers of Calais* (Musee Rodin, Paris), the figures are six fragmented variations on a theme, each frame-figure supplying reinforcement to the others. The totality with which one art form accommodates another may be arrived at through the dramatic intrusion of contiguity, similarity and contrast which are the bricks and mortar of analysis of the percepts of everyday experience, as is preeminently the case with language. We cannot conceive of mental depth without the awareness of physical depth, as Rudolph Arnheim has shown. *Profundity* arises out of the percept *fundus* (Latin : bottom). We *sow* seeds in other peeple's minds and *grasp* a *point* someone has made. All learnings assume a point of synthesis or integration. What may be associated with a scene in a play and a movement from a sonata when these are compared evolves into a new concept and a new experience impossible in the absence of either one of the percepts.[36] Eliminate Juliet's balcony from its scene and the relationship between *saint* and *pilgrim* loses its deepest significance, since the gestalt created by the combination of items is incomplete. Robert Schumann's *Faschingsschwank Aus Wien*, Op. 26, is a musical case in point. In spite of its palpability, the item *Marseilles* passes immediate recognition in the context of its notational environment. The illussion to the theme is lost as the mind struggles to organize the frames. The item gains significance in itself, however, as the mind dichotomizes the total impression of the work. The teachr's role is to induce this sort of qualitative analysis in the classroom dialectic by the inviting examination, first of this frame and then of this.

The vocabulary of the theatre is appropriate to describe the activities and functions of the teacher, who is by definition at the centre of the action. Like Beckerman's actor, the teacher

> ... has rehearsed his performance and actually knows what is coming next, he artfully spins out of himself, like spider his web, the shape of his energy. This double engagement with existence makes possible a game with the

audience. By projecting and withholding bursts of energy, the actor satisfies and yet keeps an audience off balance. At his very best, the actor sends forth a stream of living upon which the audience rides through a performance.[39]

As carrier and filter, he selects the knowledges to be imparted, transforms them into the medium of his personality and organizes and shapes them into a unified art object for presentation. But his tyranny stops there. Questions and observations that arise out of a comparision between Bach, Michael Angelo and Milton or between Alban Berg, Edvard Munch and Charles Baudelaire are pivotal in nature and aim at inducing discussion, as in the Platonic Hegelian dialectic, not at pontificating final conclusions. A good interdisciplinary answer is one that raises more questions than it solves. It is process and exploration, not arriving at conclusions that are significant ; for these lead to knowledge developmentally while fixing it permanently through personalization and through forcing the student to go beyond expected limits. An example of developmental learning concerns the situation involving a simple conversation in which an eight-year old boy's ignorance (in the sense of not knowing) of the reciprocity of sibling relationship is developed into a new discovery :[40]

Question : Have you got a brother ?
Answer : Yes.
Question : And your brother, has he got a brother ?
Answer : No.
Question : Are you sure ?
Answer : Yes.
Question : And has your sister got a brother ?
Answer : No.
Question : You have a sister ?
Answer : Yes.
Question : And she has a brother.
Answer : Yes.
Question : How many ?
Answer : No, she hasn't got any.
Question : Is your brother also your sister's brother ?
Answer : No.

Question : How many brothers are there in your family ?
Answer : One.
Question : Then you are not a brother ?
Answer : (he laughs) Yes.
Question : Then your brother has got a brother ?
Answer : Yes.
Question : How many ?
Answer : One.
Question : Who is it ?
Answer : Me.

Interdiscipline has the advantage of bombarding the senses from a multiplicity of angles. It is inaccurate to suppose that this is distracting since intrusions do not interfere but influence resultants. Learning occurs when contradictory elements are resolved, as in actual experience, and is a matter of great psychological complexity. The scholar and teacher has this primary responsibility : "To encourage those habits which will enable the student to grasp the whole without losing the essence, and to become aware of the essential qualities without losing grasp of the whole."[41]

There is a dilemma involved in living in a society in which information multiplies at an incredible and unprecedented rate. The tendency is to absorb special areas to the exclusion of all others. The dilemma is intensified by the propensity on the part of the most informed to control ever more specialized data. Recognizing that the *most* informed are not of necessity the *best* informed, psychologist George Miller protests that

> Interesting ideas spring up at *boundaries between disciplines* where people can work on the same thing from different points of view, without realizing they have common interests. Like when an *engineer* suddenly discovers that all the time he was studying transistors he was really solving a *psychological* problem.[42]

In a word, the thinking process is less hospitable to specialization than generalization. The somatic analogy of the body which rejects an alien blood type might be extreme. According to various developmental linguists, over-generalizing precedes specialization in linguistic if not cognitive development. It would seem

that to specialize is to go against the grain of normal learning processes. To the child *mama* and *papa* refer to every woman and every man before indicating *this* woman and this *man* specifically. *Interdiscipline* thrives on the reality that between one art and another there is a community of structural and thematic elements that engage interest and occupy attention. History testifies to the fact that the danger inherent in specialization is that it leads to extinction.[43] Scholar and teacher must cooperate in recognizing the necessity of incorporating and intergrating knowledge of one discipline into knowledge of another. Human nature is not cyclopean, and the world is multidimensional and multifaceted. Accordingly, *interdiscipline* compresses 'something there' to be understood and elaborated. So long as society becomes more complex, the art of the English teacher must reflect that reality. As the arts of communication become more refined there is greater need for interestitching by which to unify knowledge. Thus, some species of consolidating principle appears inevitable, and the burden falls heavily on the teacher. The wheel has come full circle. Historical complexity which originally made division within Knowledge appear desirable now makes unity necessary. The English class is the forum where this is synergetically possible since the purpose of English is the purpose of Art : to analyze experience as well as to transcend experience, and to seek higher unities and syntheses for common understanding. This is the function of the artist. It is a point which Bernard Shaw would corroborate. In the Preface to *Misalliance* (4, 88), he insists that

> ... you cannot listen to a lesson ... unless ... the teacher is an artist.

NOTES :

1. George Bernard Shaw, "Modern Education," *Bernard Shaw : Some of His Broadcasts*, BBC Radio Enterprises, Westminster Recording Co., Inc., n.d., WBBC--8001. Punctuation mine. 2. Preface to *Man and Superman* in *Bernard Shaw : Complete Plays with Prefaces* (New York : Dodd, Mead & Company, 1963), Vol. 3, p. 514. All further references to Shaw are taken from this text, except where noted, with volume and page number indicated. 3. "Blaming the Bard," review of *Cymbeline*, *The Saturday Review*, September 26, 1896, qnoted in Edwin Wilson, ed., *Shaw on Shakespeare : An Anthology of Bernard Shaw's Writings on the Plays and Productions of Shakespeare* (New York : E. P. Dutton aud Co., Inc., 1961), p. 54.

4. Cf. Frederick Mc Dowell's idea of Shavian dramaturgy as modulation, symmetry and repetition in "Another Look at Bernard Shaw," *Drama Survey* (Spring 1961), p. 44 ; Dan Laurence who characterizes the characters in *Candida* as contralto, tenor, baritone, soprano, etc., in *Musical Critic*, p. xiv, quoted in Charles Loyd Holt, 'Candida' : the Music of Ideas, "*The Shaw Review* IX, No. 1 (Jan. 1966), p. 6. 5. "Heaven, Hell, and turn-of-the-century London : Reflections upon Shaw's *Man and Superman*," *Drama Survey* 2, No. 3 (Feb. 1963), pp, 245-267. 6. In a letter to Ellen Terry dated 28, Aug., 1896. See Christopher St. John, ed., *Ellen Terry and Bernard Shaw : A correspondence* (New York : Putnam's Sons, 1932), pp. 31-35. Shaw uses the term on p. 33 and admonishes Miss Terry to learn Shakespeare "by ear" and never to "read" a "part". Rather, she must "get somebody to read it to you over and over again --- to urge it on you, hurl it at you, until your mere echo faculty forces you to jabber it as a street piano forces you to hum a tune that you positively dislike". 7. *The Riverside Shakespeare*, gen. ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974). All references to the plays are taken from this edition, unless otherwise noted. 8. Enid Welsford, *The Court Masque : A Study in the Relationship Between Poetry and the Revels* (Tampa, Florida : Russell Publications, 1962), pp. 331-332 regards *A Midsummer Night's Dream* as "a kind of figured ballet" in which the lovers quarrel, pursue and are pursued in a pattern of symmetry that applies as well to the fairies and to Theseus and Hippolyta. Cf. C.L. Barber, *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy : A Study of Dramatic Form and Its Relation to Social Custom* (Cleveland, Ohio : Meridian Books, World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 129n, who argues against this view but accepts it in favor of *The Tempest*. See also F.W. Sternfeld, "Shakespeare and Music" in *A New Companion to Shakespeare*, eds., Kenneth Muir and S. Schoenbaum (Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 157-167. Edwerd Naylor, *Shakespeare and Music : With Illustrations From the Music of the 16th and 17th Centuries*, new ed. (New York : Da Capo Press and Benjamin Blom, Inc., 1965), pp. 160-163, provides statistics on the subject. Out of the 37 plays, 36 contain 300 stage directions that have to do with music which, along with song, serves a dramatic function. There are 13 references to *Alarum. Flourish* occurs 68 times in 17 plays, and *Trumpet* 51 times ; *Music* is found 41 times in 22 plays, and Hautbovs 14 times. There are 18 *Marches*, most of them identified with drums, and 8 references to *Sennets* in 9 plays. These do not include the use of such musical forms as the threnody in *Cymbeline* (IV.ii. 258-275), for example. See also Edward T. Dent, "Shakespeare and Music," in *A Companion to Shakespeare Studies*, eds. Harley Granville-Barker and G.B. Harrison (Combridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1934), pp. 137-161. 9. Mitchel Levitas, Edward B. Fiske, Margot Slade, "What Is An Educated Person ? Experts Share Answers," *New York Times*, 18 May 1980, Sec. 4, p. 22E. See also Mark Harris, "What Creative Writing Creates Is Students, "*New York Times Book Review*, July 27, 1980, p. 3. 10. See George Steiner *After Babel : Aspects of Language and Translation* (New York and London : Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), p. 296. See also Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, trans. Susanne K. Langer (USA : Harper & Brother, 1946), pp. 37-38. On pp. 4-8, Cassirer discusses the interconnection between myth and language. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammer of Motives and a Rhetoric of Motives* (Cleveland and New York : Meridian Books. The World Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 503-504, regards metaphor as a device for attaining perspective. 11. See Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (New York : Scribner, 1953),

p. 52. See also Edward Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality : Selected Essays* ed. David G. Mandelbaum (Berkeley and Los Angeles : Univ. of California Press, 1957), p. 3. Cf. John Dewey, *Dewey on Education*, ed. Martin S. Dworkin (New York : Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia Univ., 1959), p. 22 and p. 26 on the classroom as part of the process of living rather than a "preparation" for life. 12. Eric Patridge, *Origins : A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1958). All etymological references are taken from this text unless otherwise indicated. 13. See Roman Jacobson, "Why 'Mama' and 'Papa' ?", *Selected Writings* (The Hague : Mouton, 1962), I, pp. 538-548. Joel Fineman "The Structures of Allegorical Desire", *October*, 12 (1980), pp. 58-59, crrries Jacobson's view into the area of diacriticality. Leonard Bernstein explores this line of thought in musical contexts in *The Unanswered Question : Six Talks at Harvard* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1976), pp. 13-15. 14. Theodore Thass-Thienemann, *The Subconscious Language* (New York : Washington Square Press, 1967), pp. 34-35. 15. Wilfred Funk, *Word Origins and Their Romantic Stories* (New York : Grossett & Dunlap, 1950), pp. 7-8. 16. Etienne Gilson, *Painting and Reality, The A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts* (Cleveland and New York : Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, 1959), p. 159. 17. See *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* 17th Printing, 1971. For orthographic variations, cf. *Webster's Third International Dictionary*, 3rd. ed., 1966. Cf. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (New York : Atheneum, 1966), pp. 96-97. Cf. also George R. Kernodle *From Art to Theatre : Form and Convention in the Renaissance* (Chicago & London : The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1944) for the development of theatre out of visual/plastic art forms. 18. Bernard Knox, "Sophocles' Oedipus", in *Tragic Themes in Western Literature*, ed. Cleanth Brooks (New Haven and London : Yale Univ. Press, 1955), p. 13. Cf. Thass-Thienemann, pp. 85-86. 19. Michael Alexander, trans. *The Earliest English Poems* (Harmondsworth, England : Penguin Books Ltd., 1966) p. 16n. 20. Gilson, p. 340. See also Paul Klee on this subject as quoted in Werner Haftmann, *The Mind and Work of Paul Klee* (New York and Washington : Frederick A. prager, Publishers, 1967), p. 125 ; Owen Barfield, *Poetic Diction* (London : Faber & Gwyer, n.d.), p. 104. 21. Langer, pp. 69-119. 22. See Anne Righter, *Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play* (New York : Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1962). 23. Langer, p. 26 ; Cassirer, p. 39. 24. For this idea in the context of the theatre, Cf. Bernard Berkerman, "Shakespear's Industrious Scenes, "*Shakespeare Quarterly*, 30, No. II (Spring 1979) pp. 138-150 ; Emrys Jones, *Scenic Form in Shakespeare* (Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 5-7. 25. The development of drama is discussed in Francis Fergusson, *Aristotle's Poetics*, trans. S H. Butcher (New York : Hill and Wang, 1961), esp. pp. 38-39. 26. Jean Piaget, *The Development of Thought : Equilibration of Cognitive Structures*, trans. Arnold Rosin (New York : The Viking Press, 1975), pp. 3-43. 27. Willi Apel, *The Harvard Brief Dictionary of Music* (New York : Washington Square Press, 1961). 28. See Stephen Toulmin, *The Philosophy of Science : An Introduction* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 17-19. 29. *The First Folio*. 30. See George R. Kernodle, "The Symphonic Form of *King Lear*", *Elizabethan Sutdies and Other Essays in Honor of George F. Reynolds*, pp. 185-191. Quoted in Helmut Bonheim, ed., *The King Lear Perplex* (Belmont, California : Wedsworth Publishing Company, 1960), p. 80-81, and G. Wilson Knight, *The Shakespearean Tempest : With a Chart of Shakespeare's*

Dramatic Universe (London : Methuen & Company Ltd., 1953), p. 199. 31. "The Alphabet of Speechless Complaint : A study of the Mangled Daughter in Titus Andronicus, "*English Studies : A Journal of English Language and Literature*, 55, No. 4 (Aug. 1974), p. 334. The scansion of the line, "When thy poor heart beats with outrageous beating" is Professor Stamm's. 32. Henry James, *The Scenic Art* (London : Rupert Hart-Davis, 1949) ; William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity : A Study of Its Effects in English Verse* (Cleveland and New York : Meridian Books, 1955). 33. Franz Kafka, *The Metamorphosis*. 34. Kenneth E. Boulding *The Image : Knowledge in Life and Society* (USA : Ann Arbor Paperbacks and The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 173. See also Irwin Edman, *arts and the man : a short Introduction to Aesthetics* (New York : W.W. Norton & Company, 1928) ; Eric Bentley, *The Life of the Drama* (New York : Atheneum, 1964), Chs. 1 and 2. 35. See Una Ellis-Fermore, *Shakespeare the Dramatist*, ed. Kenneth Muir (New York : Barnes & Noble, Inc , 1961), p. 95. Bernard Beckerman, *Dynamics of Drama : Theory and Method of Analysis* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), esp. chps. 1, 2 and 5. ; Emrys Jones, *Scenic Form in Shakespeare* (Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), ch. 1. ; Rudolph Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception : A Psychology of the Creative Eye* (Berkeley and Los Angeles : Univ. of California Press, 1969), p. 45 ; Rudolph Arnheim, *Visual Thinking* (Berkeley and Los Angeles : Univ. of California Press, 1969), p. 234. Cf. Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Univ. Press, 1974), esp. chs. 5 and 13 ; Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, New York : Doubleday, 1959). 36. See Kenneth Clark, *Landscape into Art* (Boston : Beacon Press, 1949), pp. 65-69. The Baudelaire reference appears on p. 104. See also Etienne Gilson, p. 183. 37. See Scriabin. *A Musical Motley*, p. 53. Quoted in Calvin S. Brown, *Music and Literature : A Comparison of the arts* (Athens, Georgia : The Univ. of Georgia Press, 1948), p. 223. I have in mind respectively : *a Midsummer Night's Dream*, Op. 21 and Op. 61 ; *Harold in Italy*, for Viola and Orchestra, Op. 16 ; *Choral Symphony*, Op. 41 ; *Nocturnal* Op. 70 ; *a child of our time*. See also Edward Lockspeiser, *Music and Painting : a Study in Comparative Ideas from Turner to Schoenberg* (New York and Evanston : Icon Editions, Harper & Row, 1973), chs. 6 and 7 for expansive discussion on this subject, p.86 ; Willi Apel, *Harvard Brief Dictionary of Music*. 38. Arnheim, p. 184 and p. 232 ; Doris J. Johnson and Helmer R. Myklebust, *Disabilities : Education Principles and Practices* (New York and San Francisco : Grune & Stratton, 1967), pp. 29-30. See also William James *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1 (New York : Dover, 1950), p. 506, who proposed that : "What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind ;" John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (London : British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin Books, 1972), esp. ch. 1. 39. Beckerman, "Shakespeare's Industrious Scenes", p. 141. See also Jones, pp. 6-7. 40. Jean Piaget, *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*, trans. Marjorie Warden (Paterson, New Jersey : Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959, p. 86. 41. Bernard Beckerman, "Explorations in Shabespeare's Drama," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 29, No. 2 (Springs 1978), p. 136. 42. Levitas, Fiske, Slade, p. 22E. 43. R. Buckminster Fuller, *Synergetics : Exploration*

in the Geometry of Thinking (New York : Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), p. xxvii. See also Philip S. Dale, *Language Development Structure and Function* (New York and Chicago : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 34-36.

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NOTES AND REVIEWS

STANDARDS IN LITERARY CRITICISM

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We have a tongue in our mouths. It tells us if a thing is sweet or sour, bitter or salty. It is unfortunate we do not have a tongue in our minds which can tell us precisely and accurately if a book is sweet or sour, shabby or superb. Every Tom waxes eloquent about Keats or Kalidasa but if a new poem is to be assessed he fumbles, as F. L. Lucas, whose book on Aristotle is a classic, fumbled about *The Waste Land*. A great critic of the old school wondered if Eliot ever wrote two consecutive lines of indisputable poetry. And today we wonder at the imbecility of this critic just as Francis Jeffrey's 'This will never do' against Wordsworth's poetry has become a byword for imperceptiveness. If Milton dismissed the light fantastic toys of the Metaphysicals, Donne became the very God of modern sensibility.

The judgement of anything literary is biased and coloured by subjectivism. One man's meat is another's poison. Many men, many minds. Tastes differ depending on the background and equipment of the individual. Even about Shakespeare there is this astonishing and puzzling variation in opinion. One critic regards one of his sonnets as a pearl; another of equal competence wonders if Shakespeare could ever compose such a poor sonnet. Even about *Hamlet*, one of the finest in Shakespeare's canon, there is the condemnation by Eliot that it is lacking in objective correlative and the condemnation of Eliot by the admirers of Shakespeare's Hamlet. In Shakespeare we have the problem of disintegration. What one textual critic considers the acme of the play-wright's power is considered the very nadir by another. Shakespeare appreciation is the happy hunting ground of maniacs.

If even about Shakespeare opinions could be so varied and varying, opinions about lesser artists could be a legion. As the Latin saying goes, Degustibus non est disputandum.

Not many know the fuller implications of the title of Eliot's collection of critical essays *The Sacred Wood*. The title says a great deal about the role and function of a

critic. The sacred wood is a slaughter house and the priest there is a murderer. This wood is the grove of Nemi described by Frazer in *The Golden Bough*, his monumental work. The priest of the grove prowls about a tree in the grove with a drawn sword. Eliot writes 'He was a priest and a murderer and the man for whom he looked was sooner or later to murder him and hold the priesthood in his stead. A candidate for the priesthood could only succeed to the office by slaying the priest and having slain him he retained office till he was himself slain by a stronger or craftier". In this sense Dryden is slain by Coleridge, Coleridge by Arnold and Arnold by Eliot; thus goes on the succession by sword: a new priest liquidates his predecessor and is in turn liquidated by his successor. This is to say that each age gets its legislator of taste. We look at writings from his point of view. We think his thoughts, speak his speech, write within the curve of his idiom.

No one is a priest for all time. We have to note the dicta of all the priests, past and present. Literary criticism lives by a wise ecclecticism; many roads lead to Xanadu. In the words of Daiches, there is no 'single' right method of handling literary problems, no single approach to works of literary art that will yield all the significant truths about them (p. 391) That is why perhaps some poets are on the rails in every age; they have 'multi-valence' as Shakespeare has. Some poets get derailed in some ages and become favourites again. The saying that familiarity breeds contempt is applicable to poets too.

Some poets lose their strangeness for some time and come into their own again after the familiarity is disfamiliarised. There is need for the 're-barbarisation' of the Word. No poetic style stays strange. The Cambridge critics needled Milton and shook him off the pedestal. Did not Keats say : Milton is death to me ? Croce refuses to consider *The Divine Comedy* a poem; to him it is lyrical extracts sandwiched between pseudo-science. If Croce could say this about Dante who in Eliot's view is greater than Shakespeare, as his *Paradise* passes beyond the Pillars of Hercules in the uncharted waters of poetry, we have to admit that practical criticism is bound to be fragmentary, indirect, approximate. All criticism is tentative, oblique, partial. Literary criticism is an art, not science. Appreciation may be independent of theory though theory may strengthen appreciation. A work of art is greater than its interpreters. *Oedipus Rex* is greater than the *Poetics*. It is said wisdom is in a collection of men. Likewise we may say that appreciation is in a collection of readers and *Hamlet* the play greater than what Shakespeare intended it to be; the New Critics mention Intentional Fallacy as a hurdle. In the field of literary criticism no one is Sir Oracle or Madame Infallibility. Opinions vary and vary irreconcilably. One is amused by reviewers off books or examiners of theses. One says that the contents show admirable research; another says that they need revision on the lines suggested by him as if his suggestions are the ne plus ultra of scholarship. Even when two agree,

they agree with each other for different reasons. One feels sometimes sceptical about examiners or reviewers; they acclaim as original what is borrowed and ignore what is original. The only thing we can say with some certainty is that the opinion of a Bradley on Shakespeare is more valuable than ours. What C.S. Lewis has to say on Spenser or Milton in *The Allegory of Love* or *A Preface to Paradise Lost* demands our attention as he is more competent and better equipped than several others and *A Preface to Paradise Lost* is a deeper examination than, say, Addison's tourist guide appreciation of Milton. Critics devote a whole lifetime to the study of a subject and hence acquire a competence to talk about. Of course, there is the possibility of some one understanding it better if one has greater intuition. One may handle a subject for several years and still remain a dud; it is not a question of mere time. Shakespeare may be a second rate scholar but is a first rate reader. Ben Jonson is a first rate scholar but a second rate reader and hence a lesser poet. There are some who pose as Wordsworth scholars though their acquaintance is only with the Tintern Abbey poem.

In the words of Watson poetry resists interpretation by any single criterion. We make approaches to a work of art ; some are more valuable than others depending on the equipment or intuition of the critic. There cannot be finality, definitiveness, inevitability about anything in literary citicism. No two men think alike as no two men pronounce alike. Think of Dr. Johnson's remark that the genius of Shakespeare flowed into his comedies ; critics laugh at it today ; by that single remark, Dr. Leavis says, Dr. Johnson disqualifies himself as a critic of Shakespeare. Linguists say that the Quinine may be pronounced kwineen, Kwinain, kwainain. Many men, many minds. Let us cultivate the charity or nobility of great critics. The great Anandavardhana points out that finding faults in great poets is miching mallecho, a pettifogging attitude. And Quintilian the great Roman rhetorician after listing errors in usage writes breezily and disarmingly in his classic *The Institution of Oratory* that a reader may find examples of those errors in his own book. As the Hermit says in *Sankuntalam*, anuddhatāh satpuruṣāh samṛddhibhih :

Wellek and Warren point out : "The total meaning of a work of art is the result of a process of accretion ; that is, the history of its criticism by its many readers in many ages. "The work of art should be looked at from the point of view of a third time contemporaneous neither with the author nor with the reader." Perspectivism is a safe guide avoiding the pitfalls of Absolutism and Relativism. So, "Many men, many minds" is not anarchy of taste but the monarchy of appreciation dehiscing from the Reading Publics ; many men, many minds become one Man, One Mind. Let us bear in mind that Criticism is not auto-telic.

A critic is a midwife, not the mother, No statue has ever been put up, says Sibelius, for a critic. The great art of criticism is to get oneself out of the way, wrote Arnold,

and let humanity decide. Quot hominess tot sententiae, as Terence says.

Tennessee Williams writes in his *Memoirs :* "All true work of an artist must be personal, whether directly or obliquely, it must and does reflect the emotional climates of its creator". The interpretation of that work of art is bound to be like-wise personal as it is a commerce between one individual and another who are not just two cakes of soap of the same make. To see the object as in itself it really is the Arnoldian ideal. But no man walks abroad save on his own shadow. The Personal Heresy may be Orthodoxy. The impersonality that Eliot talks about so much is contradicted by his own statement that Dante and Shakespeare created their Epic and Dramatic wealth out of their gigantic personal convulsions, of course universalized. *The Waste Land* itself is said to be a personal whimper or bang Valmiki's grief flowed into verse : Slokatvamāpadtyata yasya sokah. No song is seraphically free from taint of personality. Personality is not a taint but a rich tint that individualizes a poet and marks him off from others. De-personalization is dehydration and is not a useful term in criticism. If all art is personal, the appreciation of that art cannot altogether escape from being personal—personal in terms of equipment and intuition, not in the sense of a wounded psyche As C S. Lewis puts it, we can never get out of our own skins A character in Shakespeare says :

Simply the thing I am
Shall make me live

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RICHARD WOLLHEIM, *ART AND ITS OBJECTS*, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, SECOND EDITION, 1980, 8V O DEMY, PAGES 270 WITH SIX SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS AND REVISED AND ENLARGED BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The publication of Second Edition of Richard Wollheim's *Art and Its Objects* in 1980 is significant not simply because of the addition of six supplementary essays. Even without these essays the relevance of the reissue of the original essay *Art and Its Objects* in the second edition seems to resuscitate with renewed vigour in the context of a far greater multiplicity of approaches and ideas in the field of aesthetics. The second edition is also remarkable in its "changes and additions" in the bibliography. This new bibliography shows Wollheim's acquaintance with a host of recent major contributions. In spite of a considerable comprehensiveness Wollheim's attempt to make good the omissions in the six supplementary essays is indeed commendable !—there remains some uneasy yearnings disturbing a perceptive reader. The most obviously disturbing of such longings is the absence of any reference to that influential school of aestheticians headed by Susanne K. Langer. Though much of the pragmatic observations contained in *Arc and Its Objects* and the six supplementary essays appended to its second edition meanders closely round assumptions similar to Langer school, one feels the presence of a chasm in the arguments that could perhaps have been satisfactorily bridged by allowances made for Langer school of thought. For example, Wollheim's extremely analytical treatment of the 'physical-object hypothesis,' which occupies a sizable portion of the principal essay and the third supplementary essay, could have gained considerable support and depth placed against Susanne Langer's notion of 'virtual life' of a work of art propounded in her *Feeling and Form* and *Mind : An Essay on Human Feeling*. Moreover, though Wollheim incorporates a reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's *The Psychology of Imagination* in his bibliography his essays exhibit hardly any cognizance of Sartre's existentialist position of the 'unreal' status of a work of art.

The chief merit of Richard Wollheim's work lies in the completely unbiased analytical approach to certain crucial controversial issues in aesthetics. Wollheim approaches these issues from a strictly commonsense point of view and presents his arguments in perfectly commonplace language of everyday purlance. His treatment of what he calls the *bricoleur* problem following Levi-Strauss is a typical example. Levy-Strauss draws an analogy between human culture aad the work of a *bricoleur* or a craftsman who improvises useful objects from the old junk. Wollheim seems to suggest that the work of any artist is created out of materials and medium available among the works of earlier artists. This also accounts for the variety and diversity available in the world of art. Wollheim has taken cognizance of Andre Malraux's *The voices of Silence* in his bibliography, but the body of his main argument has not benefitted from Malraux's

contentions Every artist, no doubt, learns the nature and use of his medium from the use made of the medium by his predecessors in the field. Thus the work of an artist seems to be reduced to collage or montage composed by a skilled craftsman. Should these works be described as creative works of art, is a question that obviously remains unanswered. Malraux has suggested a way out in claiming that the artist learns to look at reality distributed in patterns imposed upon it by his predecessors. Consciousness of these patterns enables him also to visualise the possibility of newer patterns. Harold Bloom's two remarkable books *The Anxiety of Influence* and *A Map of Misreading* are brilliant studies of how an artist struggles to wrench from the overpowering influence of some models he takes as his ideal guide. But as Wollheim rightly indicates, this *bricoleur* problem remains a real problem with the primitive artists who presumably might not have got the opportunity of looking into any prior example.

Wollheim's fifth supplementary essay introduces another enigmatic problem in aesthetics : that of the nature of aesthetic perception. Wollheim's real insight lies in considering the issue from the point of view of the recipient, who seems to observe the symbolic representation of something through a particular medium as the thing in itself. His use of the two expressions 'seeing-as' and 'seeing-in' are extremely suggestive. They focus our attention on the vital part played by the capacity to decode the symbolic message in successful aesthetic communication and links the whole issue up with his discussions on the relationships between art and language and code. The vital problem of language and the iconic requirement of an artistic medium has attracted the attention of critics and aestheticians long since; and it has acquired special significance in the hands of the Imagists in the early years of the present century. Ever growing attention paid to the study of imagery is a clear indication of modern preoccupation with these issues. Remarkable insights are contained in the works of I. A. Richards, Sigurd Burckhardt, and a host of other critics. Some remarkable observations are contained in E. Daitz's essay on "The Picture Theory of Meaning' incorporated as Chapter III of *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* edited by Antony Flew in 1956. Daitz distinguished between iconic signs and conventional signs and includes language under conventional signs that are incapable of capturing pictorial effects. Richard Wollheim's work is indeed a timely rejoinder to this large body of significant contributions.

Two other essays appended to the second edition need special mention : 'Criticism as Retrieval' and 'Art and Evaluation'. In the former Wollheim considers the part played by criticism in retrieving the creative process from the finished product. Wollheim seems to suggest that the discovery of the artist's intention from an inquiry into the creative process is an essential part of the proper understanding and appreciation of a

work of art. Yet at the same time he remains fully conscious of the difficulties facing a faithful retrieval of the creative process. Only in rare cases this may be possible; and even in such rare cases whether retrieval is a real help in understanding the finished product, is a question not always easy to answer. In case of a large body of works from pre-historic times down to Renaissance it is imposible to retrieve the creative process for lack of evidence; and this sets a serious limit to criticism as retrieval. Wollheim admits this limitation and cautions us against imposing our own modes of thought on these works of art belonging to ages we know so little of. In 'Art and Evaluation' Wollheim takes up the question of evaluation which he has deliberately avoided discussing in the main body of his *Art and Its Objects*. In his typical analytical way he considers the question of aesthetic value and its application to works of art. The four different approaches to aesthetic value designated as Realism, Objectivism, Relativism, and Subjectivism show Wollheim's capacity for analysis at its best. All these approaches to aesthetic value ultimately lead to the wide variety of criteria that often baffles us.

MANISH CHAKRAVARTY

JOHN FISHER (ED.), *PERCEIVING ARTWORKS*, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS, PHILADELPHIA, 1980, 8VO DEMY, HARDBOUND, PP. IX + 242.

If aesthetic perception is, what Bernhard Berenson, Harold Osborne and many other aestheticians have said, expansion of vital awareness — a form of cognition characterised as direct apprehension or insight rather than a mere sense activity, an emotional response or an analytical or discursive understanding, though sometimes it may follow from discursive analysis and may be accompanied by or even excited by emotion, *Perceiving Artworks* is a misnomer. Without any extension or sophistication of meaning *Perceiving* refers to the activity of visval sense organs only; the art works, therefore, taken for consideration are only visval in character that too limited to painting, especially representational. The root problem is whether our eyes move in the same way, say, when we perceive a flower and a picture of a flower. By empirical and experimental investigations the contributors to this volume have demonstrated with great skill that visval perception is a complicated psycho-philosophical human behaviour and *perceiving* pictorial arts is still more so as it requires the perceptual qualities of art works as well as perceptual process in observers, the special qualities of the objects and the special qualities of our experience which determine our relationship with the artworks. Professer Fisher writes in his introduction to the volume, "The problem of perception in artworks is a problem about (actual, derivative,

imaginary etc.) processes and qualities, about persons and objects, about discourse and objects of discourse, about sense and semiotics. No contemporary aesthetic theory can avoid the problem." (PP. 5-6)

It is in the light of this conviction that he has collected ten essays by some of the most distinguished contemporary philosophers and psychologists who fit together not by agreement in conclusion but by agreement that the perception of visual arts is a complex and significant human activity. The contributors are Peter Machamer, M. W. Wartofsky, Godfrey Vessey, Alan Tormey, Nicholas Wolterstorf, Margaret Hagen, John Kennedy, Rudolf Arnheim, Monroe Beardsley and Joseph Margolis. The first seven authors deal with the issue, more or less, in the light of the most influential contemporary writers such as Gombrich, Goodman, Gibson and Gregory. Machamer believes that a theory of art presupposes a theory of perception and fitting the existing three theories of perception — behaviourist, cognitivists etc. and gestalt — finds them dissatisfactory as the psychological theories themselves are dissatisfactory. Nevertheless, he is hopeful that in future a satisfactory theory of art may emerge out of a satisfactory psychological theory by a harmonious blending of the three theories available. Wartofsky repeats Gombrich in arguing : we see what we paint instead of merely painting what we see treating there by all pictorial representations as optically correct. Hagen very wisely warns the perceptionists for their over emphasis upon the *perception* of painting ignoring its cognitive and affective aspects. Wolterstorf's highly technical paper attempts at an explication of the pictorial concept of looking-like by giving an illocutionary account of pictorial representation. Arnheim discusses the part played by invariants and dynamics in Gestalt Psychology bringing it to bear on the perception of art.

Beardsley and Margolis contribute two different kinds of essay dealing with the conceptual problems of art perception. In his speculation on the interlink of psychology and aesthetics Beardsley shows that the relevance of philosophy of art to the psychology of art justifiees the role of psychological explanation in aesthetics. In aesthetic perception, he demonstrates, psychological factors including 'aesthetic propensities' and 'aesthetic competence' play significant roles. Margolis relates the posibility of a science of aesthetic perception to the possibility of a science of human culture itself and as such it requires a fundamental revision of the very paradigm of science. Although somewhat inconclusive, these two papers are strikingly refreshing in their diversion from the exhaustive and technical elaborations on the visual representations that precede them.

Professor Fisher's collection convinces us that the perception of pictorial arts is a multidisciplinary problem the reflections on which cannot exhaust with either a Gombrich or a Goodman. The book, a representative cluster of contemporary thoughts on perception of artworks, inaugurates new avenues for fresh ideas rather than closed them for ever.

A. C. SUKLA

THOMAS R. MARTLAND, *RELIGION AS ART: AN INTERPRETATION*, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, ALBANY, 1981, OCTAVO DEMY, PAPER BOUND, PP. 221.

This comprehensive study of the common characteristics of art and religion argues its thesis cogently well. In describing art and religion as a happy blend of realistic and idealistic elements he indeed shows the right direction to an otherwise complex subject the meaning of which is difficult to unravel That is the reason why even in jazz and folk music he finds some kind of a compromise and says "even here, when the music is at its hottest, the performer still considers his creativity as only a 'break' or a "riff", that is, an ornamentation to a score. '(p. 37) Hence his assertion : 'Jazz and folk music are not mere exuberance any more than olassical opera is mere repetition.' (p. 38) The religious example of what he calls *tremendum* and *fascinosum* existing together side by side is the classical one of Dionysus and Apollo functioning together in Greek society. The ultimate example of this process of coalescence occurs when Martland says, 'Art and religion not only impose a world ; the world also imposes upon art and religion, and this coalescing process of imposing and being imposed upon is the necessary means to that new world." (p. 100) But this coalescence, argues the author, breaks down when the genuine artistic and religious sentiment abates and, consequently, the dualism of act and purpose reasserts itself. It becomes evident to the public that man acts religiously to attain salvation and the artist creates to understand himself more clearly. But there is absolutely no reason as to why the writer should be so apologetic and defensive about the matter. However unique may be the blend of idealistic and realistic elements in art and religion, after a certain analysis it is likely to get separated. At best its unity is that of a chemical compound and nothing more.

As a corollary of this defensive style of reasoning, there arises a bias. This is a bias against the realistic variety of art which the author conveniently dismisses as decadent. This results in the statement : '... art and religion do not so much express fundamental feelings common to mankind as determine these feelings'. Another similar claim which can not be sustained is that art and religion should not be verified by any preconceived structure of understanding. The evaluator must immerse himself in art or religion to do justice to his job. On verification this sounds like the tenets of 'art for art's sake' movement and in spite of its glamour and persuasiveness leaves one uncomfortable. One need not necessarily immerse himself in the river to fathom the depth of its water.

But the title is misleading. *Religion as Art* does not aim at interpreting religion as a form af art. It shows the ways in which art and religion "present collectively created forms of perception and meaning by which men interpret their experience" (P. 1); "art

and religion are similar and therefore must be doing such and such, rather than that since art and religion do such and such they must be similar" (P. 3). This functional approach to art and religion is intended not for the professional philosophers only, but also for the people who wish to incorporate an understanding of the activities of art and religion 'into a comprehensive world view' (P. 11) and in fulfilling this aim lies the chief merit of the book where the author draws his examples from six world religions— Christianity, Hinduism, Buddism, Judaism Confucianism and Islam and from the five fine arts and the performing arts.

The scale of the work is heroic; and with its masterly interpretations and correlations of the cross-cultural issues in aesthetics and religion the work opens new avenues for those who interlink arts and religion.

B. S. BARAL