In the Sacred Memory of

ANANDA KENTISH COOMARA SWAMY
Pioneer of Comparative Studies in Eastern and Western Aesthetics
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In India Comparative Literature was talked of first in 1907 by Rabindranath Tagore in a lecture at the National Council of Education, Calcutta and was founded as an independent academic discipline by late Professor Budhadev Bose in 1956 at Jadavpur University. Much ink has been spent since then about the nature, function, possibility, practicality, and future etc. of this subject. Drastic criticisms have been made by sceptics; students have been discouraged by professorial harangues, and even its very existence has been sneered at by the traditionalists. But in spite of all this the progress and prosperity of this discipline in the United States, Western Germany and France have been quite amazing during the last few decades, whereas in India it has received no encouraging response. The reason is obvious: even after three decades of our political freedom, we have not been freed from the colonial attitude that attached immense prestige to the study of English literature in exclusion even of our own national and regional literatures. In the recent years, when a decrease in the market-value of English literary studies is realised, stress is shifted to a compensating study of English language through the methods of Applied Linguistics. We do not deny, of course, the importance of English language; we should not be rather fools to ignore a language which is now a window for the thoughts and activities of the whole world. But our submission is — why should language be stressed at the cost of literature? and again, why should English literature be stressed at the cost of other masterpieces of the western world? English was introduced in our universities not because it is the best of all the literatures of the western world, but because it was the language of the rulers and by studying it and by loving it one was to be graced by the ruler. But why should we adore English literature now as we used to do then even knowing that there are much better things all around? Why should we, for example, sacrifice Dante for Pope, or Goethe for Byron, or Tolstoy for Jane Austen? Admitting that problems will arise as to the reading of the texts in original or in translations we may go for the latter because when learning of so many languages will be difficult for a student, translations will not debar him from experiencing the very essence of a poet. And, in fact, persons like Matthew Arnold, Andre Gide, Yeats, Shaw and Thomas Mann could write authentically on Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Tagore and Ibsen without knowing a
single word in Russian, Bengali or Norwegian. We do not say that a knowledge in the originals is unnecessary; it is very much necessary, almost inevitable for a scholar specialising in them. But what urgency of it in case of a sensitive man interested in literature in general?

Comparative Literature, for us, means simply the comparative method of studying literature. "No poet, no artist of any art," to quote T. S. Eliot, "has his complete meaning, alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism." Though Eliot means here the comparison of an individual poet with his own tradition, we can safely expand the meaning of 'own' much beyond English or European or Western to include the entire humanity. World was never perhaps so big as today, and a poet alive or dead, Indian or English, Japanese or African, American or Russian, Oriental or Occidental, has to face this comparison with the tradition of the whole world, of the whole humanity as a nation, to pass successfully the test of poetic excellences. Thus the method is as old as the art of appreciation itself though its scope is widened immensely and rightly.

Further, as there is nothing as 'pure' art or literature, or 'pure' literary criticism or art-criticism, because thoughts and feelings do not obey the academic disciplines by segregation of learning, appreciation of art and literature must get related to its various allied fields, especially metaphysics, morals, religion, linguistics, patterns and history of culture, social behaviour and psychology. One may successfully undergo a course in "pure literature" but any higher thinking or speculation in "pure literature" is certainly meaningless. This was nothing new to an Aristotle or to an Abhinavagupta, neither to a Mammāṭa nor to a Viśvanātha; but we 'discover' it from the century-old ruins of our job-oriented, segregated learning, and a "discovery" like this has led to the foundation of the Vishvanatha Kaviraja Institute. To our knowledge, this is the first Indian institution aiming at interdisciplinary pursuit of knowledge in Humanities or cultural sciences; and we hope, Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics (JCLA), the mirror of this Institute, will reflect its soul honestly.
EAST AND WEST IN COOMARASWAMY'S THEORY OF ART

P. S. SASTRI

Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy's theory of art is the outcome of his commitment to philosophia perennis, a philosophy that draws heavily from the varied religions, mystics, systems of philosophy, cultural traditions and schools of art. A product of two cultures, he was able to present a theory succinctly, though there appear certain minor inconsistencies and contradictions.

Coomaraswamy rejected the word aesthetics, a word coined by Baumgarten from the Greek. The original Greek word refers to the sensations which represent an organism's reactions to the external world. Such reactions are also noticeable in the world of the plants and animals. Since art is "an intellectual virtue", he refused to accept the expression "disinterested aesthetic contemplation". As Plato said, "we cannot give the name of art to anything irrational".1 Art is rational and it is also a ritual in which the body, mind, heart, and soul are fully involved. "Art has to do with cognition", as Aquinas stated. Bonaventura remarked that "it is knowledge that makes the work beautiful". Beauty is intelligibility, and it has claritas.2

Coomaraswamy traces the various stages in the history of a work of art. These are (i) "an aesthetic intuition", (ii) the "internal expression of this intuition", (iii) the "indication of this by external signs for the purpose of communication", and (iv) "the resulting stimulation of the critic or rasika to reproduction of the original intuition, or of some approximation to it". On this view art "is always the externalization of an already completed cycle". Here the critic follows the questionable analysis given by Croce. This is a serious drawback in an otherwise valuable exposition of the nature of art and beauty. The source of the intuition is any aspect of life. The artist intuits in a moment of contemplation. "Creative art is art that
reveals beauty where we should have otherwise overlooked it, or more clearly than we have yet received.” Intuition, *pratibhā* as the Indian aestheticians would say, is a valid phase. *Pratibhā* is a form of wisdom ( *prajñā*) which is revealed in the expression of the newly arising and awakened intuitions. But does art originate merely from intuition? The Indian critics have stressed also the importance of scholarship and practice. Coomaraswamy’s infatuation with Croce’s theory made him ignore these valuable aids. Yet he corrected himself even though he stated: “There is always perfect identity of intuition—expression, soul and body.” This should not lead one to believe that Coomaraswamy was merely following Croce; for he gave new meanings to these terms. “Works of art are reminders; in other words, supports of contemplation”. In this context he used the word intuition to mean an intellection of eternal reasons, a contemplation. By expression he meant a begotten likeness. Without contemplation one is only a skilful workman, not an artist. The practice of art is a form of *Yoga*. The artist is called a *sādhaka*, *mantrin*, or *Yogin*. Art is *Yoga*. “The purpose of *Yoga* is mental concentration” which puts an end to “all distinction between the subject and the object of contemplation”. The artist too has the same kind of concentration. As the *Śukranītisāra* says: let the imager establish images in temples by meditation on the deities who are the objects of his devotion. “For the successful achievement of this *Yoga* the lineaments of the image are described in books...In no other way...is it possible to be so absorbed in contemplation, as thus in the making of images.” Sākara observed that the arrow-maker perceives nothing beyond his work when he is buried in it. In the *Bhāgavata* we read: “I have learned concentration from the marker of arrows”. This is of utmost importance since intuition arises only from an intense moment of concentration—what Kālidāsa termed *samādhi* with reference to the painter. *Agni Purāṇa* asks the maker of images to go through ceremonial purification on the night preceding his work and to pray: “O thou Lord of all the gods, teach me in dreams how to carry out all the work I have in my mind”. This approach is intended to emphasise a valid distinction between art and the work of art: “The thing made is a work of art, made by art but not itself art; the art remains in the artist and is the knowledge by which things are made”. As Kuo Jo Hsu of the twelfth century said, “the secret of art lies in the artist himself”. This is not a return to the biography of the artist, but to the nature and tendency of his abiding, eternal consciousness. “Art is that by which a man works, supposing that he is in possession of his art and has the habit of his art”. Art then is not the end of the
artist’s work. “Art remains in the artist”.10 This is because the work is assumed to be completed before the work of transcription is begun.11 Basing this view on the example of Vālmiki, Coomaraswamy quotes Croce’s statement that the artist “never makes a stroke with his brush without having previously seen it with his imagination”.12 Accordingly Coomaraswamy states that beauty “does not exist apart from the artist himself, and the rasika who enters into his experience”.13

It is debatable whether the artist has a full and complete vision before he begins his work. One can admit that the artist has only a general vision which seems to embody a value. Even in the case of Vālmiki the poet had only an experience of sorrow (soka) when he saw the hunter killing a Kraunca bird. It may be that the story of Rāma, he heard from Nārada, assumed after contemplation a symbolic transformation. Coomaraswamy’s earlier statements betray his predilections towards an aesthetic mysticism which Croce followed even as he brushed it aside. His later pronouncements were in tune with his concept of the impersonality of art and beauty.

The artist employs the symbolic language because symbols are the universal language of art. The Hindu artist was interested in ideal types and symbols; and even individuals are “symbols of general ideas”. The content of the symbol always refers to the metaphysical. Thus Dance is “the manifestation of primal rhythmic energy. Śiva is the Eros Protagonos of Lucian”.14 The symbolic forms have a spiritual significance because they transmit a knowledge of cosmic analogies.15 The symbols come to artist all of a sudden enabling him to discover connections and relations which eluded him till then. Then “art is the involuntary dramatization of subjective experience” which is crystallized in images. The symbolism of a work of art is “the technical language of quest”. It is the supreme quest for freedom, Mokṣa, as the Hindu would say. Art yields spiritual freedom which has to be won again. “The vision of even the original artist may be rather a discovery than a creation. If beauty awaits discovery everywhere, that is to say that waits upon our recollection (in the Sufi sense and in Wordsworth’s): in aesthetic contemplation. ...we momentarily recover the unity of our being released from individuality”. Aesthetic contemplation is thus disinterested and “the spirit is momentarily freed from the entanglement of good and evil”.16 Earlier we noticed his opposition to the expression “disinterested aesthetic contemplation”.

This freedom has a specific characteristic. On the one hand it arises from contemplation, from Yoga. On the other it is determined by the
traditional discipline from which the artist should not or would not escape. “The artist does not choose his own problems: he finds in the canon instruction to make such and such images in such and such a fashion”. The artist has to follow the traditional approach without sacrificing his originality or individuality; and this is to be accepted by every critic. The ten-armed Mahiśasuramardini of Jāvā is not cruel, not angry, but sad with the sadness of those who are wise; and we notice tenderness and peace in the movement of the figure. The death of Hiranyakašipu carved at Ellora, the lay worshippers at a Buddha shrine of Amarāvatī, the Dryad of Sanci, the standing Buddhas of Amarāvatī and Ceylon, the monkey family of Mamallapuram and the like express “by their action their animating passion”.\(^{17}\) This interpretation does not follow the doctrine of empathy blindly. It departs from this theory even though Coomaraswamy subscribed to such a view at one stage; for, as he held, art is a form leading us to the realization of oneness with the Absolute, Brahman, who appears as the God of religion. Absolute Beauty is synonymous with God.\(^{18}\) This is in line with the Hindu view that the Absolute is Sat, cit, Ānanda—Truth, Consciousness and Bliss. “Most of these works of art are about God, whom we never mention in polite society”. The Indian architect was asked to visit heaven through contemplation or in dream and there note the forms which he has to imitate. This cosmic pattern was followed in traditional architecture. Art is “the embodiment in material of a preconceived form”.\(^{19}\) Such a form is presented in the image of Natarāja, “an image of that Energy which science must postulate behind all phenomena”.\(^{20}\) The great artist does not seek hedonism (preyas) but spiritualism (śreyas). The basic problem of art is to give an enduring form to the fleeting visitation of the divine. This approach is nearer to Hegel’s.

Clive Bell spoke of “significant form” as the essential characteristic of a work of art. Coomaraswamy modified this expression when he said that the works of art possess significant form in the sense “that they possess that kind of form which reminds us of beauty, and awakens in us aesthetic emotion”. It is “such form as exhibits the inner relations of things; or, after Hsieh Ho ‘which reveals the rhythm of the spirit in the gestures of living things”. The four-armed Natarāja figure reveals the “primal rhythmic energy underlying all phenomenal appearances and activity: here is perpetual movement, perpetually poised the rhythm of the spirit.\(^{21}\) That is, the work of art must be complete in itself and yet it must point to something beyond; it must lead us to a transcendental experience. The Rajput drawings present “a world of imagination and eternity.”\(^{22}\) Here
is a conception of art and beauty based on the hieratic or symbolic art of India. Hegel argued in this fashion and yet he condemned the so-called symbolic art of India and of the far east without understanding its meaning. As Leonardo da Vinci said, "that figure is most worthy of praise which by its action best expresses the passion that animates it". According to Hsieh Ho "the work of art should exhibit the fusion of the rhythm of the spirit with the movement of living things". The work must possess, says Holmes, "in some degree the four qualities of unity, vitality, Infinity, and Repose". Stating these views with approval, Coomaraswamy observes that "a work of art is great in so far as it expresses its own theme in a form at once rhythmic and impassioned: through a definite pattern it must express a motif deeply felt". This rhythmic activity which is a melody is called \textit{Lilā}. Hence Coomaraswamy could reject Hegelian distinctions of art into symbolic, classical, and romantic. All art is one and it shows no progress.

The Indian approach accepted by Coomaraswamy is from the theory of \textit{rasa}. \textit{Rasa} is identified with beauty, \textit{rasāsvādana} is equated with aesthetic emotion. The aesthetic experience, as Viśvanātha explains, is pure, indivisible, self manifested, compounded equally of joy and consciousness, free of admixture with any other perception, the very life of it is super-sensuous wonder. Yet Coomaraswamy argues that the expression \textit{rasāsvādana} is fictitious because \textit{rasāsvādana} is \textit{rasa}, and vice-versa. In the aesthetic contemplation subject and object are identical, and so are cause and effect. Are they? At most there can be a similarity, a correspondence, or a transformation.

Beauty is not an object of knowledge because its perception cannot be separated from its very existence. It has no existence apart from perception. Still this experience is not eternal in time, but it is timeless. It is "supersensuous, hyperphysical (\textit{alaukika}) and the only proof of its reality is to be found in experience". This view is similar to the one expressed by Indian critics who saw a similarity, not an identity, between the aesthetic and the religious experiences. But Coomaraswamy treats similarity as identity. "Religion and art are the names for one and the same experience—an intuition of reality and of identity". This is a view accepted by the Neo-Platonists, Hsieh Ho, Goethe, Blake, Schopenhauer, and Schiller, and it is not refuted by Croce. Here Coomaraswamy quotes Clive Bell according to whom pure form is "form not clogged with unaesthetic matter such as associations".

We differ. The aesthetic experience cannot be the same as the experience of the Absolute. The latter experience has no element of sense, and it is formless, while the former has a concreteness and it does involve the activity of the senses. The Absolute
is not an object of experience for it is said to be one with the subject. On the other hand, the aesthetic experience arises from a given objective existent. To this extent the beauty of the object and the emotion it gives rise to must be inherent in the object. Otherwise we will have a solipsistic theory of art, a theory akin to Croce's; and such a theory cannot insist upon the external existence of a work of art either in the act of composition or in the act of experiencing.

Coomaraswamy, however, accepts the external existence of the work of art since he applies the doctrine of empathy to explain the significance of the work. He even quotes Whitman's lines in defence of his advocacy of empathy:

All architecture is what you do to it when you look upon it...
All music is what awakes in you when you are reminded of it by the instruments.

Elaborating this idea he observes: "In the works called beautiful we recognize a correspondence of theme and expression, content and form.... It is our own activity, in the presence of the work of art, which completes the ideal relation (of identity), and it is in this sense that beauty is what we 'do to' a work of art rather than a quality present in the object...In the stricter sense of completed internal aesthetic activity, however, beauty is absolute and cannot have degrees." This leads him to argue that "the vision of beauty is spontaneous.... It is a state of grace that cannot be achieved by deliberate effort." But if the beauty of a work of art is determined by what we "do to" it, we have to deny objectivity and universality to the experience. Croce and Clive Bell led Coomaraswamy to this solipsistic position whence he could argue that the external signs possess significant form and that this form "reminds us of beauty and awakens in us aesthetic emotion". Elsewhere he referred the signs to the shape, and form to the Idea or Content. This is a serious self-contradiction. Volkelt and Basch spoke of a subconscious, spontaneous, immediate fusion of the percept and the concept. Their theory of sympathetic symbolism would have helped Coomaraswamy in steering clear of the fallacies inherent in Croce's theory.

The problem of sympathetic symbolism in interpreting the concept of beauty is closely related to the general problem of the meaning of art. Indian critics spoke of three main functions of a sign, symbol, or word. These are the primary (abhidhā), inferred or implied (lakṣaṇā), and suggested (dhvani, vyanjanā) meanings. The last was taken to be of utmost importance. Coomaraswamy defends the Indian theory of dhvani or vyanjanā (artistic suggestion) when he argues that it is "an improvement of Croce's definition that "expression is art".
Poetry, as Viśvanātha said, is a sentence ensouled by rasa—Vākyam rasūmakam kāryam. It is a sentence in which one of the nine rasas is suggested or implied. It is “the savouring of this flavour, rasāsvādānta, through empathy, by those possessing the necessary sensibility”. This is the condition of beauty. But empathy in his view makes beauty appear as a subjective state. Then a work of art is beautiful only when we impute beauty to it. In such a situation beauty becomes a quality, not the being of the object. This standpoint runs counter to the entire traditional teaching of India by which Coomaraswamy swears. “The true critic (rasika) perceives beauty of which the artist exhibits the signs.” He “knows without reasoning whether or not the work is beautiful, before the mind begins to question what it is ‘about’”27. Then the critic too must be credited with intuition. In such a case the distinction between the poet and the critic disappears; and this is not borne out in actual experience, particularly with reference to natural beauty. Moreover it rejects any empirical approach. We should rather agree with Volkelt in holding that we must begin with the empirical data, employ whatever methods are fruitful, and then take up a metaphysical stand. Coomaraswamy apparently begins with the metaphysical like the Idealists.

“The concept of beauty originated with the philosopher, not with the artist; he has been ever concerned with saying clearly what has to be said”28. This may be true with reference to the traditional Hindu art where doing well mattered most. The artist seeks to do his job right, while the philosopher brings in the word ‘beautiful’ and lays down its conditions in terms of perfection, harmony, and clarity. Beauty can be said to be the “perfection apprehended as an attractive power”. In the middle ages beauty was said to add “to the good an ordering to the cognitive faculty by which the good is known as such”. Beauty implies cognition, and yet it moves the will, for it is “specifically human”29. Then beauty must be an existent which the artist seeks to reveal to others. It cannot be an adventitious feature of the Good or of the True. Coomaraswamy himself stated: “Beauty is reality as experienced by the artist”. Then does beauty become purely subjective? Coomaraswamy rejects such a view by bringing in a non-cognitive element. “The world of Beauty, like the Absolute, cannot be known objectively ... The mere intention to create beauty is not sufficient; there must exist an object of devotion ... We can no more achieve Beauty than we can find Release by turning our backs on the world ... The artist reveals this beauty wherever the mind attaches itself; and the mind attaches itself, not directly to the Absolute, but to objects of choice”30. Beauty is to be sought in the world in which we
live, even if it were said to be transcendental. It cannot be merely subjective, nor can it be a quality. There appears then to be an inherent contradiction which could have been resolved.

On the nature of beauty again we find some difficulty in understanding the views of Coomaraswamy. Is beauty an intrinsic or an instrumental value? Is it a state of mind or a quality of the object? "The beauty of anything unadorned is not increased by ornament, but made more effective by it. Ornament is characterisation; ornaments are attributes." Here Coomaraswamy evidently follows Kālidāsa's famous lines in Vikramorvaśīyam and Abhijñāna Śākuntalam. The beauty of a work of art depends on the perfection achieved. Then it must be integral to the work. If it is a form of perfection, we cannot speak of one work as being more beautiful or less than another work of art. "There are no degrees of beauty... There cannot be any continuous progression in art." This again is Croce's argument; the second sentence alone is valid. Plato and Aristotle had divergent views regarding the relative artistic values of the epic and the tragic. Even in the process of creation we do notice different levels of complexity. But Coomaraswamy argues from another point of view: "Art is an imitation of that perfect spontaneity—the identity of intuition and expression in those who are of the kingdom of heaven, which is within us. Thus it is that art is nearer to life than any fact can be; and Mr. Yeats has reason when he says that Indian music...is not an art, but life itself." Likewise the Rajput painters knew that their art had to make human life truly and fully significant. Even in the portrait of a "Dying Man" we have the Muslim "reverence for humanity, and humanism attains an intensity of expression which can only be called religious". Rajput paintings, however, reveal "a profound sense of sympathy for all natural life and a sense of fundamental unity of all created things." This art aimed at "leading out man's thought from self into the universal life around him." This approach is largely eclectic and yet it does not deviate from the traditional Indian framework.

Coomaraswamy's account of the Indian theory of beauty was based largely on Sāhitya Darpana, Agni Purāṇo, Vyakti Viveka, Dhanamjaya's Daśa Rūpaka and Sukra Nīti Sāra. This attitude was also influenced by the writings of Aquinas, Lipps, Croce and others, though he differs to some extent because he held that art is cognitive. "Beauty has to do with knowledge and goodness, of which it is precisely the attractive aspect; and since it is by its beauty that we are attracted to a work, its beauty is evidently a means to an end, and not itself the end of art; the purpose of art is always one of effective communication." Then beauty becomes an inevitable accident, an
indeterminate end; for, it is "perfection apprehended as an attractive power". It is inseparable from truth. This position can be held only with reference to hieratic art. "To do well is to do sacred things." A work is beautiful in terms of perfection, of truth and aptitude; for then alone can it be said that it is well and truly made. We read that "Vedic aesthetics consisted essentially in the appreciation of skill". This is an understatement, for he did not analyse some significant statements made by the Vedic seers who were also poets.

Aesthetic emotion or *rasa* "is said to result in the spectator, though it is not effectively caused, through the operation of determinants (*vibhāva*), consequents (*anubhāva*), moods (*bhāva*), and the eight involuntary emotions (*sattvika bhāva*)". This statement is based on Bharata and Dhanamjaya. *Vibhāvas* include the aesthetic problem, plot, theme, hero, characters and the like which are, as Croce would say, the "physical stimulants to aesthetic reproduction". Still the Aesthetic emotion is identical "with that felt when the self perceives the Self". The consequents are the "deliberate manifestations of feeling". The moods include the thirty three emotions and the nine permanent ones (*sthāyi bhāva*). One of the permanent moods must form a master-motif to evoke *rasa*. To this mood are subordinated the expressions of emotion. As Bharata said, the first essential of a work of art is unity. If a transient emotion is the master-motif, the work ceases to have *rasa*. "Pretty art which emphasizes passing feelings and personal emotion is neither beautiful nor true", for it confuses loveliness and beauty. Loveliness refers to the will and emotions, while beauty is intellectual, metaphysical, and intuitive. Beauty as such has a reference to man's awareness of the ultimate metaphysical nature of Reality. It is *rasa*.

Aesthetic emotion is *rasa*, according to Coomaraswamy. "The tasting of *rasa* — the vision of beauty — is enjoyed, says Viśvanātha, only by those who are competent thereto." Dharmadatta, as quoted by Viśvanātha, held that "those devoid of imagination, in the theatre, are but as the wood-work, the walls and the stones". But "the capacity and genius necessary for appreciation (of poetry) are partly 'ancient' and partly cultivated (contemporary): but cultivation alone is useless, and if the poet is born, so too is the *rasika*, and criticism is akin to genius". This is a return to the method of Pater, and Coomaraswamy rejected the theory of art for art's sake.

The *rasas* accepted by Indian critics are nine. These, says Coomaraswamy are "arbitrary terms of rhetoric". Here again he follows the unfortunate doctrine of Croce, though he could get some support also from Indian
aestheticians and critics. "The external signs — poems, pictures, dances, and so forth— are effective reminders". What do they remind? If they remind something, does the aesthetic value reside in what we are reminded of? There is no answer.

Following etymology Coomaraswamy states that “rasa is tasted— beauty is felt— only by empathy, Einfuehlung (sādhāraṇa); that is to say by entering into feeling, the permanent motif; but it is not the same as the permanent motif itself.” This doctrine of empathy as accepted by the author, denies by implication objectivity to the work of art. If beauty is not present in the object, it must be in the mind. Coomaraswamy’s statement that “Beauty is a state” cannot be accepted because beauty is what is not only felt, but experienced objectively.

The Daśā Rūpakā declares that “beauty is absolutely independent of the sympathetic — Delightful or disgusting, exalted or lowly, cruel or kindly, obscure or refined, (actual) or imaginary; there is no subject that cannot evoke rasa in man”. This is a valid point. But Dhanamjaya follows the doctrine as developed by Bhaṭṭanāyaka who fused the Yoga and Advaita positions. Coomaraswamy appears to be unaware of the developments initiated by Abhinavagupta and perfected by Jagannātha. His interpretation of rasāsvāda is questionable. Moreover Einfuehlung is not the same as sādhāranikaraṇa since the latter is a term expressing universalization brought about by the imaginative activity (bhāvanā vyāpāra) of the artist.

Quoting Daśā Rūpakā, 4. 47, Coomaraswamy observes that “many works which have aimed at the production of aesthetic emotion, that is to say, which were intended to be beautiful, have failed of their purpose”. Why did they fail? It is because they ignored the nature and value of the experience, and held fast to the transient emotion. The emotion as such is neutral because it is in itself neither beautiful nor ugly. Yet Coomaraswamy observes: “The conception of beauty and the adjective ‘beautiful’ belong exclusively to aesthetic and should only be used in aesthetic judgment.” By beautiful objects we generally mean those that are congenial to us either in a practical way or in an ethical way. But many times we judge a work of art as beautiful “if it represents some form or activity of which we heartily approve, or if it attracts us by tenderness or gaiety of its colour, the sweetness of its sounds or the charm of its movement”. In such judgments we should not use the language of pure aesthetics. When we speak aesthetically, we can speak of the presence or absence of beauty, and we can call the work rasavat or otherwise. This approach is not far different from that of
Croce. What should we say about a work which is not ugly and yet not beautiful? Coomaraswamy’s theory does not have a place for such a situation. Yet a work of art is “good or bad with reference to its aesthetic quality; only the subject and the material of the work are entangled in relativity. In other words, to say that a work of art is more or less rasavat, is to define the extent to which it is a work of art, rather than a mere illustration”

Here he is actually supporting the doctrine of the degrees of beauty which, on theoretical grounds, he rejected.

References —


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AESTHETIC PERCEPTION*

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Many writers besides Bernhard Berenson have spoken about the enhancement of vital awareness — a more than usual energising of our perceptual grasp of things — which is, typically, attendant upon successful aesthetic engrossment with a work of fine art. In my own writings I have on various occasions put forward the suggestion that this expansion of awareness is as close as we can come to a key criterion for distinguishing aesthetic commerce from other kinds of preoccupation with the objective world. What I have in mind is a form of cognition characterised as direct apprehension or insight rather than analytical and discursive understanding, though sometimes it may follow from discursive analysis, and distinct from emotional response though sometimes it may be accompanied by or even excited by emotion. In this paper I try to elaborate in greater detail than before the nature of this aesthetic expansion of awareness and incidentally to suggest why I have proposed it as a criterion of aesthetic activity. I shall begin with certain more general consideration and proceed towards the particular.

Everyone, I believe, would accept that the rough and ready distinction between sleeping and waking is too crude to encompass the realities of experience. There are many stages between deepest sleep and full waking alertness. We may sleep profoundly or we may sleep superficially with the senses half-triggered for response to any disturbance or interruption. There are intermediate states between sleeping and waking and sometimes, though awake, our actions are mechanical, our attention diffused rather than concentrated and we behave, as

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it is said, 'as if in a dream.' At other times the senses are alert, the attention is fully focused either externally or internally, and we are keyed for action or keenly in control of a continuing activity. In addition there are rare moments—most people are familiar with them occasionally—when the faculties are raised to an unusual pitch of alertness, when we observe more keenly and rapidly, think more clearly, achieve insights more penetrating than ever before or enjoy enhanced powers of will and decision. It is on occasions such as these that we seem most fully to be alive and life seems most worth-living. These peak experiences are the culmination of life's meaning.

Man is at his best when he is meeting a challenge or engrossed in an activity which has importance and value for him. It is then that his faculties are stimulated to the highest pitch, his energies come most competently into play and he is charged with the fulness of life. When challenge and purpose are lacking the mind is depleted and directionless, a man is disoriented and at odds with himself. Colin Wilson grasped this point when he said: 'The mind is a concentrating machine. That is the purpose for which it was built: to enable us to focus and concentrate on meanings, in order to be able to pursue them consciously and purposively instead of gropingly and blindly. Whenever we use it for this purpose, the effect is rather like clenching your fist; it gains in hardness and weight, and we experience a sense of reality. If it is left "unclenched," unconcentrated, for too long, the result is the feeling of "life failure," of unreality.' The human mind must be harnessed to a purpose in order to function. And purpose is tied up with the sense of value, importance, meaning, which cannot be artificially implanted or supplanted. In primitive societies the paramount needs of survival, material comfort, hunting and food gathering, protection of family and clan, defence of territorial claims, absorb available energies. The values of the individual are closely identified with those of the clan and there is little or no incentive for the development of what civilized men call individual personality. Civilisation means the introduction of techniques and routines, including ever more elaborate techniques of collaborative effort, for satisfying the basic needs with less and less expenditure of energy so that energy is released for the pursuit of other purposes. And when this happens other values become necessary if society is to avoid deterioration. The compensatory values which emerge in advanced civilisations are the values of what we compendiously refer to as 'culture'. It is when these values are not taken seriously that civilized society falls ill. The sicknesses to which civilisation is prone result from boredom and purposelessness, the disorientation of individuals who are given the conditions but denied the
impetus to develop personality. When living becomes routine and no longer demands the concentration of faculties harnessed to the pursuit of accepted values there ensues torpor and depression, a sense of unreality and frustration, what Kierkegaard and Camus called alienation, Sartre called nausea and the uncertainties of personal identity which the characters of Samuel Beckett display.

The values of culture, a logically and practically necessary condition for the successful progress of civilisation, may be seen as emerging when faculties evolved in the interests of survival are diverted to other ends than the basic needs of survival and immediate sensory gratifications. As the urgencies of practical pressures diminish, these faculties are not allowed to fall into abeyance and atrophy but are cultivated deliberately, perfected into skills and exercised for their own sake or rather for the sake of the higher-level satisfactions attendant upon their own perfection and exercise. It is only when these values, which belong to the development and enrichment of personality, are set above more elementary gratifications and needs that civilised society remains in a healthy state. When cultural values are no longer taken in earnest but are regarded as a secondary luxury or a supererogatory refinement then society is eroded by spiritual demoralisation. This affliction has perhaps never been a more serious danger than today when unprecedentedly rapid advances in material technology have effected enormous reductions in the necessary output of energy not only on the part of a favoured minority but for the vast majority of civilised people while at the same time eliminating the satisfactions and pride which used to be attendant on good craftsmanship and when the same technological civilisation has induced a materialistic outlook leading to the devaluation of non-material aims as a pleasant but unnecessary indulgence. There is greater necessity than ever before that educationalists should resolutely counter this attitude and inculcate from conviction the importance of cultural values.

Cultural values, then, are values deriving from the satisfactions attendant on the cultivation and exercise of human faculties for their own sake rather than for ulterior ends of material comfort and gratification. They form one large category of intrinsic values. They may be classified, I think, into two main groups. In one group fall the manifold values which are rooted in the cultivation of our reasoning powers and the exercise of thought for its own sake, culminating in logic, mathematics, theoretical physics, philosophy and metaphysics. Closely akin to these in the same group are values deriving from the cultivation of curiosity and exemplified in such disciplines as history, sociology and the taxonomic sciences. In the other main group are the values stemming
from the cultivation of our perceptive powers and the exercise of percipience for its own sake. It is against this background that I now propose to elaborate on the idea of aesthetic expansion of awareness.

What we perceive and how we perceive it are determined by the nature of the interests which predominate at the time. Perception is a selective and organising process and the principles of selectivity and organisation which it imposes are ordinarily dependent upon habits of attention built up from childhood by the stringencies of practical life. In practical life our predominant habits are dictated by the need to utilise perception as the main source of information about a world of things which are subject to our manipulation and to which we respond. Therefore in everyday life perception is emasculated and jejune; it is an instrument for obtaining clues for action and it is allowed to impinge upon our awareness only to the extent of its serviceability for furnishing these cues. Although—or because—sensory perception is our only direct contact with a world outside ourselves, it is ordinarily channelled and sordid to practical needs. We are not ordinarily interested in dwelling upon and savouring the unexpurgated content and quality of sensory experience. All this has, of course been said many times before. It is mentioned here only to point up the enormous revolution which occurs when perception is attended to, cultivated and enjoyed, not as a practical instrument, but for its own sake. Sometimes, on rare occasions, such a revolution of attitude occurs amid the routines of daily life. Sometimes when we see the clear starry firmament at night or a field of ripening corn blazing with poppies in the sun, when we hear the song of many birds at early morning or the blending of bells in a medieval town at evening, we rejoice. Our attitude changes abruptly. We attend to the experience for itself and not for the information it gives about something other than itself. We experience an upwelling of richer vitality in such perceptive activity and this, I am maintaining, is the paradigm and prototype of aesthetic activity, elementary though it still is. The joy which attends such vital enhancement must be distinguished from the titillation of sensory pleasure. There is a theory which finds the paradigm of aesthetic experience in sensory pleasure such as the pleasant smell of a rose. Following Kant, I have argued — I hope convincingly that this theory leads in a wrong direction and implants a fundamental error at the heart of aesthetic understanding. It is not the physical pleasantness of a smell, a taste or a touch which gives rise to what we call the aesthetic. It is the change of attitude which occurs when, instead of wallowing in the physical pleasure, we turn attention to the nature of the experience itself, savouring and discriminating its intrinsic quale. We can do this as well with
sensation, and when attention is so deflected the impact of its pleasantness or unpleasantness recedes. Our joy has its source in the exercise of perception for its own sake and this is the prototype and paradigm of aesthetic experience.  

This elementary aesthetic stance is capable of development along two distinct paths, which have not hitherto been systematically distinguished. I shall call them the refinement of discriminatory acuteness (what is sometimes more shortly called 'sensibility') and the enlargement of synoptic apprehension.

1. In his essay 'Of the Standard of Taste' David Hume uses the term 'delicacy of taste' with the meaning of discriminatory acuity, saying: 'Where the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition, this we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense.' He illustrates this with a story from Don Quixote about kinsmen of Sancho Panza with a hereditary judgment of wine so sensitive that they could detect the presence of an iron key on a leather thong at the bottom of a hogshead of wine. Such refinement of discriminatory acuteness may be cultivated in particular fields by such persons as professional wine-tasters, those who savour, pronounce on and invent a descriptive vocabulary for perfumes, gourmets and connoisseurs of food, and so on. Skilled craftsmen could often judge the qualities of their materials by touch and taste. When such refinements of sensibility are cultivated and exercised for their own sake the attendant enjoyment is aesthetic, as with the delicate fingerling of jade practised by Chinese connoisseurs. Finely discriminating sensitivity is an necessary contributory factor to cultivated appreciation in all the arts, for it is notorious that differences so minute as to be barely perceptible in themselves may have major effects on the balance and unity of complex works of art. Indeed it may often be the case that some defect or felicity in the organisation of the whole work first impinges on our awareness and through that awareness we come to detect the point of detail. Although he did not draw appropriate conclusions from it, Wittgenstein among many others liked to call attention to the surprisingly massive consequences of very small errors of proportion in architecture or wrong balance of volume in music. In painting and sculpture very small differences of colour, shape, size, texture, etc. can have consequences for the artistic organisation as a whole which far outweigh in importance the more massive changes caused by major accidental damage, the fading of colours through time, and all the injuries due to wear and tear. In music very small differences of pitch may ruin a performance, causing us to condemn it as 'out of tune', although certain folk melodies and some performances on stringed instruments gain emotional colour precisely by small departures from the scale of equal temperament.
In the appreciation of literary art finely honed sensibility to the sound and rhythm of words, and to nice shades of meaning, is a *sine qua non* which the literary artist not only assumes but makes it his business to galvanise and extend in his readers. Without the power to make exceptionally fine discriminations appreciation is crammed and inhibited in any of the arts.

2. A work of art is a construct existing for the express purpose of exercising and extending percipline when the faculty of perception is activated towards it without ulterior purpose. A work of art is judged to be successful aesthetically in the degree that it fulfils this function of extending and satisfying perception. The satisfaction and the joy which we experience is no recondite sensory pleasure but the satisfaction experienced in the exercise of a skilled faculty for its own sake. This is why we can properly speak of aesthetic satisfactions as cultural values. And this is why they carry an accrual of spiritual vitality.

The refinement of discriminative acuity is only a part, though a necessary part, of the expansion of perception brought into play in the appreciation of art objects. More important still is the massive increase in the volume and depth of content. In practical life we habitually operate with relatively small perceptual units, combining these intellectually in the manner of clues. But works of art, even those which seem superficially simple, are extremely complex organisational wholes, which must be apprehended directly in perception as wholes simultaneously with the apprehension of their parts. The elements of a work of art contribute to the composition of the whole as an organic unity in such a way that the whole is not constructed intellectually and analytically from its parts but is present no less directly to perception than the parts. There is, moreover, in most cases a complex organisation of parts within parts at different hierarchical levels. Each whole at each level of containment manifests perceptual properties which are not present in the parts of which it is composed and which cannot be intellectually inferred from the properties of its parts and the relations in which they stand to each other. These are the properties which we call ‘aesthetic’—elegance, gracefulness, and a thousand for which there are no names. Indeed the aesthetic properties of every work of art are original and unique to it, even when they can be brought roughly within some named category. The art of the critic consists in conveying an impression of these properties through the medium of language which lacks the means to describe them. It is in the apprehension of artistic wholes that high-level aesthetic perception departs most notably from the practical awareness which operates in everyday life and it is for this that the cultivation of a special perceptive skill is most necessary.
The analogy of Gestalt perception is sometimes adduced in order to explain artistic apprehension, and provided that it is treated as an analogy only — and an imperfect one at that — there is nothing against it. We do indeed in ordinary life perceive certain fairly simple configurations as immediately as we perceive the elements from which they are composed. We see a triangle as directly as we see the three lines which compose it. We do not first notice three lines, then notice the relations in which they stand to each other and then make a rapid intellectual inference: 'This must be a triangle.' We see the triangle directly. Similarly we perceive an artistic configuration directly and simultaneously with its constituent parts: we do not apprehend it by inference from the parts. An artistic configuration has (aesthetic) properties which are not present in and cannot be inferred from the parts and their relations. But the differences are still more important than the similarities. Not only are artistic configurations immeasurably more complex even in the simplest works of art than the Gestalten with which ordinary perception operates: artistic configurations have the uniqueness of particularity whereas the Gestalten of ordinary perception are essentially generalisations. We are confronted with a near-square and we see a square, with a near circle and we see a circle-Gestalt, and so on. To see a Gestalt is to reduce to generality. In perception the Gestalt is akin to the concept in thought processes. But a large part of the essential vitality of aesthetic perception derives from its avoidance of this generalising tendency. Moreover, as many psychologists have demonstrated, in ordinary practical perception there is an active tendency to complete open or imperfect Gestalten, perceiving what we do not see. In cultivating the perceptive skills required for the appreciation of the arts one of the most difficult tasks is to accustom oneself to perceive precisely and exactly what is there — without, of course, remaining blind to incomplete Gestalten when these are introduced as a feature of the total composition — as, for example, in music piquancy may result from a withheld resolution and in the work of Leon Polk Smith, Ellsworth Kelly and other Hard Edge painters a special feature was often made of incomplete shapes suggesting completion outside the canvas.

It is the apprehension of richly and tensely organised perceptual material, without practical implications that extends the perceptual faculties and brings about that expansion of awareness which, we have claimed, is the hallmark of aesthetic activity.

It is sometimes profitable to illustrate a point by contrast and with this in view it may be opportune to say a few words about so-called children's art. The drawings of young children generally reveal a fresh and lively,
delight in colours and shapes. They are spontaneous and uninhibited, often manifesting what in an adult would be called a too glib facility. Their colours are strong but crude, with little or no interest in subtle contrasts or blenldings, without finer discriminations. Shapes too are vigorous but unsubtle. These drawings are concerned with representation, but with representation by means of standard configurations or Gestalten. They represent a world of things by means of visual conceptualisations with barely the most elementary attempts at individual discrimination. A house is a house; and a man is a man—walking or standing or speaking. In his drawings the child is repeating what he is learning in ordinary life, training and evolving practical habits of perception destined to facilitate finding his way about a world of things by the application of stock configurations. The child’s picture may tell a rudimentary story—the man (papa) rides up to the house on a horse while the child (me!) shows joy and the woman (mama) stands watching. But beyond the needs of the story there is, except in the rarest instances, no attempt to compose or organise forms in such a way as to invite or make possible unified perception of the picture as a composition. Up to the age of ten or twelve the child is discovering the rules and forming the habits of practical perception; there is lacking the powers of concentration as well as the deflection of practical interests which make possible an aesthetic approach. From this point of view—and what other point of view is there?—children’s drawings are not art. In general it is not until puberty that they need artistic guidance. Until then their work is not bad or indifferent art. It is without even the rudiments of that aesthetic interest which could warrant a drawing’s being judged as good art or bad. This does not mean, of course, that children’s drawings are without value or interest. But whatever value they have is not an aesthetic value.

References:

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HUMANITY'S RELATION TO NATURE:
IN BUDDHIST THOUGHT

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The principal distinguishing characteristic of the Buddhist view of man was seen by non-Buddhists in ancient India to be the denial of any permanent ego or eternal 'soul' among the basic constituents of personality. The early Buddhists were regarded as anatmanavadin: those who deny the existence of an atman impervious to change as the basis of the human individual. The first mark of all existing beings, according to the Buddha, is non-permanence (anicca). A human being comes into existence and passes out of existence and can be observed at all intervening stages as a flux of physical and mental events. More precisely, a human being is a complex entity which can be analytically resolved into five skandhas or groups of constituent elements. One of these, rūpa (the body) comprises all the physical constituents. The other four, which together constitute nāma are the mental aspects of individuality: sensations, perceptions, volitions and consciousness.

The Buddhist understanding of the whole phenomenal world can be summed up as (a) analytical, and (b) relational. This twofold approach is pursued in the Abhidharma literature. In order to understand relationships between 'phenomena' it is necessary to look below the level of what appears to be the case, and see the constituent elements in each phenomenon, so that a more refined appreciation of the relationship is obtained. First there has to be a rigorous analysis of both the physical and the mental complexes. This kind of analysis constitutes the first part of Abhidharma, and in its more advanced forms it identifies large numbers of dharmān or elements of physical and psychical existence.
The second part of Abhidharma consists in the examination of the various possibilities of relationship which exist between them. For the Theravādin and the Sarvāstivādin schools these elements were fundamental and unvarying, and constituted the ultimate 'atoms' of physical and mental life. For the Sarvāstivādins in particular all these elements which they had identified were real, and always exist; hence the name of this school: those who affirm (vādin) that all (Sarva) elements always exist (asti).

The Sarvāstivādins thus appear to have reached the position where they regarded as absolute and unconditioned those elements into which it could be shown that the human 'person' could be analysed. This position is open to criticism in that having begun by adopting the Buddhist method of denying absoluteness to any element in human individual personality they later on abandoned this rigorous method of continual analysis of elements into further, finer elements. They had abandoned it, it seemed, at a quite arbitrary stage, ascribing a supposed absoluteness to the categories they had then reached. The critique of the supposed absoluteness of the human self had itself finished up by ascribing unconditioned and absolute status to the plurality of elements; (dharmāh) and a dogmatism about them which in principle was open to the same objections as had been the idea of the absolute human individual self.

The Sarvāstivādins base their pluralism on the separateness of names and argue from their meaningfulness to the reality of the entities they stand for... [The Mahā Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra] points out that the presence of a name need not mean the actuality of the thing named, and the existence of the name does not mean at all the reality of the self being of the thing named1.

Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school, from their critique of the incompleteness of the Sarvāstivādin analysis, took the Buddhist method of analysis beyond this arbitrary stopping place and argued for a more thorough and complete analysis. The Mādhyamika position has been described as consisting 'in the recognition that the complex system of personality is not absolute, that there is no element in it which for ever remains the same as well as that no element in the system of personal life ever perishes totally'.2

While denying any unconditioned and absolute nature to the individual person they, like Buddha, also affirmed that there was an 'eternal soul' beyond human individuality, that which is referred to by the Buddha in the words of Udāna VIII.3:

'Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded.
Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, there would be apparently no escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded.'

Nevertheless, distinct from this unconditioned reality the Mādhyamikas affirm the relative and conditioned but nonetheless recognisable existence of the human person, even although it is a temporary existence. Venkata Ramanan in his exposition of Nāgārjuna puts it thus: the person is the self-conscious, self-determining principle. He works out a career for himself under the stress of the sense of the unconditioned. He is conditioned by the forces dormant in him. He confronts an objective reality which he perceives, understands and interprets. He works out for himself an organic system of events which is to give expression to the basic urge in him and he identifies himself with it. As identical with it, the person is an organism, and personality is an organisation, a way of being'.

The position of the Mādhyamikas was seen by T. R. V. Murti as completing a dialectical process within Buddhist philosophy. It can also be seen as the restoration of that original analytical method which is clearly demonstrated in the Suttas and the Abhidhamma literature of the Pali canon.

In this central philosophical development of Buddhist thought the human individual is seen as a combination of rūpa and nāma, the physical elements and the mental elements. The physical elements are, in the philosophy of the Middle Way, analysable down to the minutest atoms. The demonstration by modern physicists of the nature of the atom, and its further breakdown into sub-atomic forms is a progression of analysis which is wholly in keeping with the Mādhyamika view.

So far as the non-human natural world is concerned the first stage of a analysis of physical nature was the identifying of four elements: earth, fire, air and water. It was recognised these four elements, or groups of atoms, were all present in different proportions in different physical entities. For example, in fire there is also something of earth, and air, and water. Fire depends for its existence on the object that it burns, and without this object of burning there is no fire. It is not an ultimate element. 'Fire is only a derived name and the thing designated is only a conditioned entity'.

There is thus an inter-relation and interconnectedness of physical elements of all kinds across the whole of the physical world. In that the human individual is a combination of rūpa and nāma he is, with regard to rūpa, interconnected with all other physical elements. The Middle Way recognises the complex nature of human personality. The individual person is not merely a flux of mental and physical events. As the Mahāprajñā pāramitā Śāstra puts
it, 'the person is the self-conscious, self-determining principle ..... He works out for himself an organic system of events which is to give expression to the basic urge in him, and he identifies himself with it. As identical with it, the person is an organism, and personality is an organisation, a way of being'. An organisation can be formed, it can be maintained, and eventually it can be dissolved. No single element in an organisation need be regarded as eternal and absolute, as though without it the organisation could not exist at all, although, without it, it would be a different organisation.

The difference between the Buddhist view of the self, therefore, and some non-Buddhist views is that the former is *organismic*, whereas the latter are *substantialist*. The latter are those who hold to the notion of a *separate*, substantial, eternal entity within the individual called 'soul' as the ground of self. In this view the separateness of each soul applies both to its relations with other souls and also to the complex of mental and physical events with which it is thought to be somehow associated. Nevertheless it has also to be regarded, as (in some unexplained way) able to be the subject of action, and the experiencer of pleasure, pain and transmigration. The opposite view, however, the total rejection of any personal principle within the individual leads to what in Buddhist thought is also an error, namely that of negativism or nihilism. The Middle Way entails the recognition of the sense of personal being and of principle of self-determination, but does not allow that this is unconditioned, substantial and eternal. There is, in the Buddhist view, a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded, but clearly this is not the individual human person, or any other compounded and conditioned entity.

The relationship of humanity to nature according to the Middle Way can now be explored. The first point to be made is that the *Mādhyamika* view excludes the possibility of any absolutely dogmatic and eternalist statement concerning relationships between conditioned entities, such as human beings and the natural world. The latter is not seen as an alien realm, perennially hostile to man, and which it is his to conquer and subjugate, according to some eternal principle or right. Man recognises himself as continuous with the world of nature, both the human and non-human worlds being subject to the same conditioning and natural law.

The relationships between self-conscious living beings, and between these and non-selfconscious living beings are seen within the context of the interrelatedness of all the entities which constitute the universe. It has to be emphasised that the most important affirmation of the Middle Way is that undivided being is ultimate reality, eternal and unconditioned. But immediate,
conditioned inter-relatedness in Samsāra is understood in terms of the mundane truth of pratitya samutpāda (conditioned or dependent origination). There is thus in the Middle Way a vision of the entire world as a grand system where all specific entities are inter-related, and where also it is possible to be aware of being in one’s ultimate nature not divided from the Undivided. This requires that understanding and practice go hand in hand, and reinforce each other. The Middle Way is concerned to emphasise the harmony of Wisdom (Prajñā) and Compassion (karunā). These are the positive qualities of which ignorance (moha) and greed and hate (lobha-dosa) are, respectively, the negatives. Compassion, as the practical expression of wisdom, has to receive as much emphasis as wisdom; compassion will be informed by wisdom, and wisdom will be enhanced by compassion, according to the Madhyamikas.

Thus, to return to what has been said concerning the essential inter-relatedness of all the entities or ‘organisations’ which constitute the entire universe, the practical outcome of this vision is that seeing things in this light, the wayfarer will recognise that each should be allowed to exist as it is, without impairment or violence or injury to its nature or growth. Whatever diminishes, by however little, the awareness that every entity’s ultimate nature is not divided from the Undivided is to be avoided. It is important, that is to say, not to try to live at the cost of others in such a way that alienation will be strengthened. It is important not to try to extinguish the other in order to live oneself. Allowing others to live, we ourselves also live more fully. To cherish fully the claims of compassion and to cherish fully the sense of the limitless are one and the same.

The aim of Buddhist life is, therefore, to live in the fulness of being, to share increasingly in the larger whole, assessing adequately the mysterious nature of the forces within one’s self and in the world around. It is not a solitary life, where one tears oneself off from the rest of the world, but rather the opposite. It is life as sharing, and sharing by understanding the nature of things. It is based on the affirmation that no entity is self-contained, a suabhava completely unrelated to the rest. And this is certainly affirmed of human nature. There is, therefore no special need to relate human nature to non-human nature (that is, the ‘natural world’ of Western terminology) since the whole system of thought and practice is one of universal inter-relatedness.

By way of a brief footnote to the body of this paper it may be added that abundant illustrations of this sense of the inter-relatedness of humanity and the non-human world can be found in the Sutta Pitaka of the Pali canon, especially in the Jātakas, as well as in the Sanskrit Prajñāpāramitā
texts. In the Kūṭadanta Sutta the Buddha deprecates a system of sacrifice which entails large scale destruction of vegetation and animal life (D. I. 127-141); he commends the non-violence of the bee ('like roving bee its honey gathering and hurting naught' D III. 188); he speaks of the immorality of destroying the branches of a tree under whose shade one has been sitting (Jat. V. 240 f.), and so on, and so on, such examples being too numerous to be cited.

Notes —

1. K. Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy, Indian Edition 1971, p. 80 2. Ramanan, Op. cit. p. 226. 3. Op. cit. p. 231 4. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 1955. Although like many scholars in this field I owe much to Murti's book I do not find his 'dialectical' interpretation convincing: on p. 58, however, he recognises that the 'earlier phase of Buddhism, with its rejection of substance and uncritical erection of a theory of elements was clearly a preparation [emphasis added] for the fully critical and self-conscious dialectic of Nagarjuna'. This second, fully critical stage is characterised as nairātmya, the denial of all categories and doctrines, ātmā as well as anātmā. Ramanan uses Chinese material which was not available to Murti. 5. Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra, 358. 6. Ramanan, Op. cit. p. 231 7. The paragraphs that follow owe much to personal discussion between the author and Professor Venkata Ramanan. This paper could justifiably be presented as having a joint authorship, but for the fact that I cannot ascribe to my colleague the deficiencies which this paper also undoubtedly exhibits.

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ART AND MORALITY

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What is the relation of art to morality? We could spend a great deal of time at the outset trying to define the words “art” and “morality.” Instead, however, we shall evade these trying questions, and assume that we already attach some common meaning to these terms. Paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, poems, plays, and novels can all be works of art; we shall not stop to argue which works in these media succeed in being works of art. We shall be concerned to discover what the effect of these works is on the moral conduct of the persons who see, hear, or read them—whether, for example, it leads them to violate any of the Ten Commandments or other rules that would generally be called moral; and what is to be done when aesthetic values, which we experience primarily through works of art, conflict with moral values.

I

Let us consider first the most prevalent conception of the relation between art and morality—what we may call the moralistic conception. According to this, art is, at least, a harmless interlude in the serious business of life, and at worst, a menace to society and morality. Art is so considered because it gives people unorthodox ideas; it disturbs them; it emphasizes individuality rather than conformity; and it may be dangerous in undermining beliefs on which (it is thought) our society rests. Art is a kind of gadfly stinging at the body of established beliefs, often at precisely those places where custom does not wish to be disturbed; art is always at work, breeding discontent, rebellion, individual difference, conformism—and it seems as if art is always being directed against the established mores of the day, never in their favor. Witness the complaints of Life magazine and others about twentieth-century American writers, who for the most part make heroes out of rebels and emotionally "maladjusted"
people, and refuse to sing the praises of the solid citizens without whom industry and technology could not progress. Because of this, art is looked upon with suspicion by the Guardians of Custom. When art does not affect people much, it is considered a harmless pleasure, an escape, a luxury, something which is unfortunately there and has to be put up with because some people seem to want it — but which may become, at any moment, insidious and dangerous, gnawing at the substructure of our most cherished beliefs and attitudes.

The most famous historical representatives of this view were Plato and Tolstoy; and this is the more surprising since both of them were great artists. Plato was no moralist in his less famous works in which he discussed art — in the Ion, the Symposium, the Phaedrus. But in his most renowned work, the Republic, Plato takes a highly moralistic view of art. There he is concerned to set up an ideal state, or republic. Everything hinges on the kind of ruler that is at the helm of the ship of state, for the rulers are all-powerful and not subject to popular vote. Plato spends many pages describing in detail the training of these rulers-to-be. If their morality is to be pure and undefiled, they must be kept away from all undermining influences, however subtle. They must not be permitted to listen to sensuous music, or to witness stage presentations in which bad people triumph, or in any way exposed to art which would loosen the moral fiber of the impressionably growing child or cause him to swerve from the path of austerity which must be his if he is to remain incorruptible in his future position of state. We could spend considerable time, if we had it, debating whether or not Plato’s stricture upon art, in the interests of the future rulers of state, would (if adopted) make the rulers more capable or less so than they would otherwise have been. Personally I find this extremely dubious: a ruler-to-be should know the full facts of life as early as possible; and it would seem that the only way to combat evil is first to know something about it. But whatever we may decide about this, we should note that all these strictures are imposed for a reason; the delights of art are sacrificed, reluctantly but firmly, not because Plato had no respect or love for art, but because he was convinced that the most important thing of all, even more than art, was the welfare of the entire state — a state in utter chaos or corruption could produce nothing, including art itself. Where the welfare of the state was involved, even so great a price as that of art was not too great a one to pay. For no lesser reason would so great a thing be sacrificed. And for the masses of humanity, where the education of future rulers was not concerned, there was to be no limitation of art at all.
Tolstoy’s condemnation of art was more sweeping. After he had written *War and Peace*, *Anna Karenina*, and almost all of his great fictions, he underwent a religious conversion which caused him to condemn all art except that which, as he put it, “tends to deepen the religious perceptions of the people”. Art which did not have a religious theme was still acceptable as long as it tended to unite mankind into one great Christian community. But art which concerned itself with the political squabbles of a particular time or place, or sexual conflicts and disturbances, or with the life of the upper classes and its ensuring triviality and boredom, all this Tolstoy condemned without further ado. Even more sweeping, all art which was not simple enough to be understood and enjoyed at once by all people, even the simplest peasant, was given the axe. Thus Shakespeare, Milton, Beethoven, Wagner, and countless others, together with almost the entire corpus of nineteenth century literature including Tolstoy’s own great novels, were all, at one stroke, thrown into the trash heap. One cannot accuse Tolstoy on inconsistency, or of shrinking from the task of applying his own principles. One can, however, question the principles that implied such a wholesale condemnation as this. But to do so here would require a detailed critique of that form of early and rather primitive Christianity which Tolstoy embraces at this period of his life; and that is far removed from our subject here. Tolstoy, like Plato, condemned art for reasons of morality, being convinced that when it comes to a conflict between them, it is art that must go. From the point of view of morality, art is The Enemy, and this enemy must be utterly squelched. For Tolstoy, art is not merely the harmless pleasure of an idle moment — art (most art, at any rate) is a disturber and uprooter of the True Morality. Art, in order to be permissible at all, must be used completely and utterly in the service of morality.

Not all of us would go along with the special twists given the moralistic theory by Plato and Tolstoy, but many people, including perhaps the majority of Americans, tend to accept the general position of Moralism. They may not think that art and morality conflict as readily or as often as Plato and Tolstoy believed but they think that art is a servant of morality, and that in cases of conflict between art and morality it should always be morality that is the victor.

II

Let us, however, turn to an exactly opposite kind of view, which often goes by the name of aestheticism. According to this view, art is above all other things of significance in this world and nothing should interfere with
its freedom to do whatever it pleases. If morality disagrees, so much the worse for morality. If the masses fail to understand art or to appreciate its enormous power to receive the sublime experiences it can give, at least to the select few, well then, so much the worse for the masses. As an extreme example of this, let us listen to the poet George Moore:

"What care I that some millions of wretched Israelites died under Pharaoh’s lash or Egypt’s sun? It was well that they died that I might have the pyramid to look on, or to fill a musing hour with wonderment. Is there one among us who would exchange them for the lives of the ignominious slaves that died? What care I that the virtue of some 16 year-old maid was the price paid for Ingres’ La Source? That the model died of drink and disease in the hospital is nothing when compared with the essential that I should have La Source, that exquisite dream of innocence....."

We may also remember Mussolini’s son-in-law waxing lyrical in his description of a bomb exploding among a crowd of unarmed Ethiopians.

Most of us would feel revolted at such an extreme version of the Aestheticist’s hypothesis. And, of course, we need not go so far. But before attempting to dilute the force of such remarks as those of George Moore, let us see wherein lies the power and the peculiar force of the Aesthetician’s position. What is the goal of life, the Aestheticist asks, if it is not be as fully, as richly, as intensely alive as we can possibly become — or in Walter Pater’s words, “to burn with a hard gemlike flame”? or

"to choose one crowded hour of glorious life, to seize experience at its greatest magnitude? And this is precisely our experience of art; it is living in the best way we know how. Far from being a handmaiden to other goals, art gives us immediately, and richly, the best there is in life, intense awareness — it gives us what life itself aims at becoming, but seldom achieves outside of art."

( Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, p, 563.)

So if there are any morally undesirable side-effects of art, they do not really matter beside this all-important experience that art can give us and nothing else can. Art and art alone can make us really alive; art and art alone can give us an experience of unmatched richness, unity, intensity, complexity — all at the same time. Art and art alone can give us in miniature, in capsule form, the characteristic values of existence, all concentrated in one aesthetic object, it can draw all the loose and varied strands of human experience into a sharp and vivid focus. Great works of art alone are capable of giving us
this experience, which can be at once sublime and ecstatic in its beauty and shattering in its intensity. Only in art do we really come alive; in all the rest of life the waters of experience run sluggishly and turgidly, but in art we find them pure and distilled. What can compare with the value of this experience? What is even fit to be mentioned in the same breath with it?

I think we can shorten our discussion by granting everything that the Aestheticist claims here about the nature of the aesthetic experience and the value of the aesthetic object, except the last sentence. Aesthetic experiences are very worth-while indeed, as only those who have had them can know; perhaps they are the most worth-while of all experiences in this neither world, but they are not the only experiences there are. Even though the skyscrapers of New York are the tallest buildings in the world, they are not the only buildings in the world, and we do have to consider the others. Aesthetic values, though far greater than most people are aware, are still just a few among many. This being the case, we can hardly behave as if the others did not exist. We must examine the relation of the aesthetic values in life to all the other values that life has to offer.

III

So let us turn to a third possible position — not that art is the servant of morality, or that morality is the servant of art, but that the two are co-inhabitants of the same world, each with its specific function in that world, but neither fulfilling its function in independence of the other. We must try to see what the relation is between them, and this will take us to the heart of our problem.

Morality is not, on the whole, particularly enjoyable. Moral codes are devised in order that people may be able to live in peace and security with one another. Morality is required because people often trespass upon one another's rights. As for art, it has a different role to play; it has much more to do with pleasure and enjoyment — that very which civilized life (indispensable without a certain degree of morality) makes possible. But "pleasure" and "enjoyment" are pallid words; I would prefer to say that art gives us (in accordance with our description of a while ago) in a highly concentrated form an experience of great richness and intensity — an experience which we may well enjoy but which may also simply move us, or prick us, or shock us, or change our whole outlook upon the world around us; it may simply please us, or it may shatter us by its power. This great potency of art is felt because art does not deal merely with a fantasy-world, it is not simply an amusement to while away an idle hour: it deals with the world of everyday experience,
the same world over which morality legislates. The very experience which we treasure in art draws its significance from the world and life outside of art. Thus already we see that they are related. We shall try now to examine some of the strands of that relation.

1. First, then, art sometimes does teach us lessons that we need to learn if life is to be nobly, or even tolerably, lived; and thus it may enter directly, at times, into the service of morality. Art can sometimes be didactic; even great art can be didactic, as Dante’s *Inferno* and Milton’s *Areopagetica* will show.

I do not wish to deny this value to art; it undoubtedly exists. Sir Philip Sidney devoted a long essay to extolling this value of art. But I fear that it is all too easy to overemphasize it; and those who place much emphasis upon it are apt to be those who do not see the other things which art is in a far better position to give us — even to morality itself. Those who praise art because it teaches or preaches or edifies by its message, or because works of art sometimes have a moral or a lesson, do not speak falsely, but if this is all they have to say about the value of art for morality, they are using art for far less than it is able to give. To use a figure that Clive Bell employed in another connection, the didacticists in art are like people who use a telescope for reading the news, or who try to chop blocks with a razor. A telescope can, with some difficulty, be used for reading the news, but this is not what a telescope is built for, and if they use it for this purpose alone they are using it to do jobs that far less subtle and valuable things could do much better. High School teachers of Shakespeare who tell their pupils that Shakespeare wrote *Macbeth* to prove that crime doesn’t pay, are unwittingly putting Macbeth on the same level with the most ordinary cops-and-robbers movie. It is no wonder that after a year or two of literature courses taught in this way, the pupils come to hate Shakespeare for life, and would almost rather perish than approach his works again.

Art does teach us, but not by explicit preachment. As John Dewey once put it, art teaches as friends and life teach — not by preaching but simply by being. The variety of situations presented, the human characterizations, the crises and struggles and other experiences through which these characters pass, these alone, when set before us by the writer, are sufficient to produce a moral effect. Why do we need preachment as well, a moral tagged on at the end? If the tag were all that was needed, the author might have done better to write an essay or a tract instead.

2. But how then does art achieve a moral effect, if it does not state its moral? Literature, at least, does so by presenting us with characters in situations, usually
situations of moral conflict or moral crisis, in which we can enrich our own moral perspectives by deliberating on their problems and conflicts, which usually have a complexity and a richness which our own moral situations seldom possess. We can learn from them, in the school of experience, without ourselves having to undergo in our personal lives all the moral conflicts, or make the moral decisions, which they (the characters) must do; for we can view their situations with a detachment which we can seldom achieve in daily life, when we are immersed in the stream of action. And by viewing these situations and reflecting on them, we are enabled to make our own moral decisions more wisely when Life calls upon us in turn to make them.

It is difficult, for example, to see how one could read Shakespeare's *Hamlet* or *Othello* or *Macbeth* without the exercise of his own powers of moral reflection. We see these characters in situations of moral crisis in which they must make important and often agonizing decisions; and we can hardly follow their careers without ourselves going through some of the processes of moral reflection which are required of them. And in doing this we surely grow ourselves in moral insight. It happens when we follow Raskolnikov in Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, or Anna Karenina in Tolstoy's novel or Dorothea in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, to name but a few. Literature is often a stimulus to moral reflection, and one not equalled by any other, for it presents the moral situation in its total context, with nothing of relevance omitted and nothing less than this is required, of course, in making a moral decision.

3. We have already expanded our notion of the moral impact of literature considerably beyond the rather crude didacticism with which we begin. But we can go still further. I want to bring out an aspect of art and morality that we have not yet touched upon, though perhaps it is implicit in which has already been said. The chief moral effect of art, I would like to say, lies in its unique power to stimulate and develop that most important human faculty, the imagination. This answer to the problem of the moral potency of art was given more than a hundred years ago by Shelley in his essay, "A Defense of Poesy", and it stands unchallenged to this day. Shelley said, "The imagination is the great instrument of moral good, and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the causes." Through great literature we are carried far beyond the confines of our narrow provincial world of daily life, into a world of thought and feeling more profound, more varied, than our own, and in which we can enter directly the experiences, the thoughts, and feelings, of people far removed from us in space and time, and we are enabled to share these feelings in a
way that no other medium enables us to do. It is not science, but art, that engenders in us a universal human sympathy and understanding for it enables us to enter directly into the affective processes of other human beings, often with mores and cultures far different from our own. Once having lived in the world of Dostoyevsky’s characters, we can no longer condemn or dismiss in toto a large segment of humanity as foreigners or strangers who are therefore wicked or beneath us; we can no longer use the customary slogan-thinking on them and treat “Russians” or “wastrels” simply as a mass, for they live before us now as individuals, animated by the same passions as we are, facing the same conflicts, and tried in the same crucible of bitter experience. Through such an exercise of sympathetic imagination, art draws all men together in mutual respect and togetherness. Far more than preachment or moralizing, even more than descriptive and scientific discourses of psychology and sociology, art tends to unite mankind and reveals the common human nature which exists in all of us behind the facade of our divisive doctrines, political ideologies, and religious beliefs. We realize that to condemn those depicted in novels is to condemn ourselves also. And from this, if nothing else, we learn the lesson of tolerance.

This is not to say, of course, that those who read great works of literature are always tolerant or sympathetic human beings. Reading literature alone is not a cure for human ills, and people who are neurotically grasping or selfish in their private lives will hardly cease to be so as a result of reading works of literature. Still, there is an undeniable effect of a wide and serious reading of literature: people who do it, no matter what their other characteristics may be, are more understanding of other people’s conflicts, have more sympathy with their problems, can empathize more with them as human beings, than people who have never broadened their horizons by reading literature at all. No one who has read great literature widely and for a considerable period, so as to make it an integral part of his life, can any longer share the same provincialism, and be dominated by the same stupid prejudices which unfortunately seem to characterize most people most of the time. Literature, more than anything else, is a leavening influence on the bread of morality. It loosens us from the bonds of our own position in space and time, it releases us from exclusive involvement with our struggles from day to day, it enables us to see our own local problems and trials (in Spinoza’s phrase) under the aspect of eternity; we can now view it all as if from afar off, or from an enormous height. And through this exercise of the imagination, art enables us to do these things more than anything else does.
To have moral effects, it is not necessary that a work of art presents us with a system of morality, much less a true system of morality. It need not present us with any system at all; in fact its moral potency is greatest when it presents us, not with systems, but with people and situations, preferably those quite different from our own, so that through the imagination we can see our own customs and philosophies as we see theirs, as one among many of the endless proliferations of adjustments and solutions to human problems which varying circumstances and our endlessly varied and resourceful human nature have produced.

Works of art, then, develop more than anything else the human faculty of the imagination. And, as Shelly says, the Imagination is the greatest single instrument of moral good. Perhaps this sounds like an absurd overstatement. But let us consider. Consider what morality is like without the imagination. Consider the average morality of a small community, relatively isolated from centers of culture and unacquainted with any artistic tradition. Their morality is rigid and circumscribed; the details of a person's life are hedged about with constant tiny annoyances, and everyone's life is open to the prying eyes of the others who are unfailingly quick to judge with or without evidence. Outsiders are looked upon askance; people of a different religion, a different race, or different culture are looked upon with suspicion and distrust; and anyone who does not subscribe to the last details of whatever moral code and religious beliefs, dominant in the particular community is condemned and ostracized. No doubt these people are all very sincere; they are dreadfully sincere, deadly sincere, killingly sincere. That is just the trouble; sincerity without enlightenment can be as bad as intelligence without wisdom by political leaders playing around with hydrogen bombs. These people have not known the leavening influence of art. Their morality is rigid, cramped, and arid. What is needed in their lives is not more morality and more religion — they are surfeited with that already — but the fresh breath of art. If these same people had been exposed from early youth, in the right way, to great masterpieces of human literature, and learned through them to appreciate the tremendous diversity of human mores and human beliefs that go along with the same degree of sincerity that they possess, plus the complex workings of the inner heart as portrayed by a Tolstoy or a Henry James, they surely could not find it in them to be as harsh, as intolerant, and as ungiving as they are.

Such is the nature of morality without art. Art alone my seem like a meager influence — that we are making too much of it in the moral life.
But I do not think so. I don't mean to say that if you read Shakespeare you will then go out and do good deeds for your fellow men; the influence is not as direct as that. It is a slow steady influence, like the continuous rain that falls into the ground and all of it is absorbed; it cannot be absorbed in a few fitful cloudbursts. It leavens the whole personality, but it is not traceable to the influence of any one artist or to any one encounter with art in their lives. To illustrate this, let us try to imagine what human life today would be like without art. Imagine the world without Shakespeare, without Shelly, without Beethoven, without DaVinci, without any of the (say) hundred major figures of the world's art. I do not mean without just one of them — I mean without any of them. Try to think of the enormous influence which these men have made, not only on other artists, but upon the great mass of men, one generation after another, filtering down into the life of everyday humanity, even when the people themselves do not realize where the wisdom (or even just the quotations) they are using comes from. Try to imagine, I say, a world without art, and you have a scene of such barren and awful desolation and sterility that it would not be too much to say that life would hardly be worth living. At least, if I had to choose between life without any of the great works of art of the last three thousand years, and life without any of the great advances of science in that same period, I would reluctantly but unhesitatingly choose a world without science. Without modern bathrooms and finned automobiles and heated swimming pools we could still get along; but without the great art of the ages, we would surely die of poverty of the spirit.

People are far too inclined to separate art and morality into two hermetically sealed compartments. People talk as if Morality were already complete and self-sufficient without Art, and that Art, if it is to be tolerated at all, can grudgingly be admitted provided that it conforms to the moral customs of the time and place of those judging it. But this is surely to conceive the relation between Art and Morality in far too one-sided a manner. If Art must take cognizance of Morality, then equally Morality must take cognizance of Art. Indeed, almost everything that is alive and imaginative about morality comes from the leavening influence of Art. Take our examples from Greece alone, what would morality be today without the influence of Aeschylus and Sophocles, without Socrates as described in Plato's dialogues, without even Herodotus and Thucydides with their quiet humor and gentle prodding scepticism and tolerance for other customs and other views? It is through great works of art that we get our greatest vision of the moral life itself.
What is about other times and other places that we most remember? Is it their political squabbles, their wars, their economic upheavals? These are known in general to intelligent people and in detail by historians, but even then they do not usually make the dent on our personal lives that art does. What is alive today about ancient Egypt is its sculpture and its pyramids; what is alive today about the Elizabethan period, even more than the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the reign of Queen Elizabeth, is its poetic drama with its rich and vivid characterization and boundless energy. Other civilizations and other cultures may be sources of facts and theories which may fill our heads; but what makes us feel within ourselves the same vibrant life they felt, is not their politics, not even their religion, but their art. Art alone is never out of date; science is cumulative, and the science textbooks of even ten years ago are now out of date: we study of the science of the Greek and the Elizabethans only as historical curiosities; as facts, they have long since gone out of date. It is only their art that is not dated; it can still present to us its full impact, undiminished by time. Shakespeare will never be out of date as long as human beings continue to feel love, jealously, conflict in a cruel and troubled world. It is the art of a nation that is timeless. To paraphrase a saying in the Gospels and apply it to past cultures, we can say "By their arts shall ye know them." The artists whose works we now revere may have died unsung, and most of them even if appreciated in their lifetime, were considered far less important than the latest naval victories or the accession of the current king, and yet today these things have all passed into history, but their art alone survives and stands with undiminished vigor. The art of the past moulds in countless ways the attitudes, responses, dispositions of our daily lives, including our moral ones. This is how art injects life into morality, and it is because of this that a morality that has lost contact with art is dead and sterile. And yet people tell us that Art is the slave of Morality!

IV

Thus far, in tracing the relation between art and morality, we have considered the moral effects of the characters and situations upon our own moral lives, through the imagination. And perhaps this is the most important moral function of art. But it is not the only one. If it were, we would have to conclude that literature, virtually alone among the arts, has a moral effect. Indeed, some writers are convinced that this is so. And it may well be that literature has a more marked moral effect than any of the other arts, since it deals with human beings in action in a way that the other arts cannot do.
Still, it is not literature alone that has relevance for morality. Let me list briefly some of the ways in which all the arts can be said to bear upon morality.

1. First, there is an effect upon the artist himself. The creation of a work of art of individuality and complexity must necessarily occupy a considerable portion of an artist's waking hours; as such, it imposes upon him a self-discipline which can well be used in other areas of his life. Even if it isn't, the self-discipline in itself is a considerable moral influence. Not only must the creative artist discipline himself in submitting his will to the difficult requirements of his artistic medium; he must also use that medium to express feelings and ideas from life—and to do this he must appreciate these values in life, whatever values he is expressing in his art. This activity, which is so easy to state but so difficult to do, must exercise upon the artist a profound moral influence.

At first this may seem to be refuted by the fact that many artists lead immoral lives. But I do not really think that this proves what it is supposed to:

a. It is true that many artists do not lead moral lives, if by morality we mean conformity to the moral codes of the local time and place. Being citizens of the universe and spectators of all mankind rather than of a particular nation or community, artists tend to ignore or even trample upon some of the moral ideas and institutions that are held sacred in their particular time and place, even though they may be exonerated in the court of morality by their descendants.

b. Besides, the charge of immorality against artists, even by standards of conventional morality, applies not to art as such but only to some individual artists, just as it probably does to some engineers and some ditchdiggers. Many people, especially those who do not have real artistic ability, like to live what they romantically think of as the life of artists while not giving society in return the works of a real artist. This bohemian kind of existence is, more than anything else, a pose—not integral to art as such but put on by certain artists or would-be artists who are greatly influenced by the Romantic tradition. "Since society won't recognize me as an artist unless I live like one, I'll live profligate life and pull my hair and in general play the role of the mad artist, and may be they'll think I really am one"—this seems to be the formula. Now some genuine artists such as Wagner doubtless fulfilled rather well in their own lives this ideal of the artist. But prior to the Romantic era this was not at all characteristic of artists. Think of Bach, a hard-working organist and choirmaster who lived a conventional life, almost a dull life, with his wife and
large family, a solid citizen of his community, who declared with too much modesty that anyone who worked as hard as he did would be able to write music as good as his. Or think of Haydn, employed throughout most of his life in the palace of the Esterhazys, who considered himself an artisan among other artisans, in no way different from his peers except that he was playing a different trade, and who fell on his knees each morning and prayed sincerely to his Maker for strength to create fine music during the course of the day. No Romantic pose for these artists.

c. Even those who did in their personal lives embody the Romantic conception of the artist, however “immoral” they may have been in other aspects of their lives, were not so in the creation of their art. Whatever the personal life of Byron may have been like, and it was full of Romantic posturing and overdramatization, when it came to his poetry there was not a whit of dishonesty or charlatanism about him. He labored for exactly the right words and exactly the right effects, as every true artist does, and he never allowed a line to be published if it was less perfect than he was able to make it.

In any case, when we weigh whatever immorality an artist possesses in his personal life against the great value of his work for his age and for generation to come, surely there is no doubt that the latter weighs far more heavily in the total balance. What if Wagner was unfaithful to several women, hypocritical, domineering, and generally unpleasant to live with? This occurred, but it has long since passed. Wagner was intent upon creating music whose fame and value (at least at first) were unknown and unsuspected by those who were around him; and we can only be thankful that he did compose and complete it, even if the achievement of this prodigious creative effort meant some distress to the persons around him. Those whom he injured are long since dead and gone, but his music lives in undiminished splendor.

One more word about the morality of artists. It is usual to think of art as selfish, egotistical, demanding, and insensitive to the feelings of those around them. I have tried to show that for the most part this picture of the artist is false, but even if it were always true, we could still reply: so what? Some artists are selfish and egotistical—very well, but most of the people in the world who are selfish and egotistical are not artists—in fact they contribute nothing to the world’s culture or the world’s productivity. They are simply selfish people, and that’s all. If anybody is to be condemned, why pick on the artists? The artists, at any rate, are adding something to the world’s worth by their existence, something that far outweighs the consequences of their own personal idiosyncracies.
Psychoanalysts tell us that artists are products of undigested infantile conflicts having to do with exhibitionism, voyeurism, and misdirected libido. This may well be so. But even if certain emotional and temperamental character-traits that we may consider undesirable occur in artists more frequently than they do in ordinary people, it does not follow that the undesirable character-traits occur because they are artists. This is a popular superstition which we should do everything in our power to squelch. The truth is rather that their being artists and their having certain temperamental characteristics (which are held, at any rate, to be undesirable by the uncreative middle class) are both effects of a common cause, namely certain unconscious predilections which were developed in the first two or three years in their lives. It is not true that their emotional instability and other personal characteristics were caused by their being artists. If they were, then if these people ceased to be artists they would no longer be selfish, emotionally unstable, and so on. But this of course is not true. If they stopped writing or painting or composing, they would still have the same character-traits as before, only now they would have no works of art to show the world to compensate for the traits of character which are found so annoying to some of the people around them.

2. So much for the morality of artists. We should also mention the moral effects of art upon the secondary artist, that is, not the original creator of the work but the performer. There was a violin teacher I knew as a child who told his pupil, “Keep up your violin playing, no matter what else you do it is the best moral influence you could have.” Perhaps he was exaggerating; certainly very few people who undertake the violin do so in order to improve their morality. Still the music teacher was not quite talking up his sleeve. The moral influence may have been subtle, and a sociologist compiling statistics on the student’s subsequent moral life might have been quite unable to distinguish him from non-musical performers in the number of times he violated one of the Ten Commandments. Yet I am sure that a moral influence was there, subtle but pervasive; and that the coming to grips with the works of creative genius, together with the constant training and discipline required to master and perform expressively the works of that genius, cannot be without effects upon the subsequent temper of his existence (“the fibers on his soul!”) which in a broad sense, can be called moral. At least, it is the doing of what is both difficult to do and greatly worth-doing — and this can hardly help having some effects.

3. So much for the moral effects of art upon the creating artist and upon the performing artist. Now what about its effects upon the consumer, the
person who reads or listens to or views the work of art, and for whom it was created in the first place?

Historically the most famous theory about the moral effect of art upon the audience is Aristotle’s Theory of Catharsis. According to Aristotle, tragedy in particular — though it has often been extended to art in general — acts as an emotional cathartic, a purgation of the emotions. Specifically, certain emotions — which need not be limited to Aristotle’s examples of pity and fear — are generated during the course of daily life which we would be better off without and which we should try therefore to expel from our system. Art is the principal agency that helps us to do this. By witnessing a powerful drama or reading a novel or hearing a symphony, we can work off these emotions instead of letting them fester inside of us or taking them out in unpleasant ways on our fellow men. “Music hath charms to ease the jaded soul” — especially the soul that is so full of pent-up inner disturbances that it must find some channel for their release. Art effects this release, and herein lies a moral value — not the positive production of anything, but the negative value of siphoning off undesirable inner states and working them off innocently through the experience of art, rather than letting them grow rancid within us or venting them destructively on our families or friends.

As it stands, this view is undoubtedly somewhat crude, especially in the light of modern psychology. We are offered a picture or model of the psyche as a vessel containing an accumulating quantity of liquids which must be drained off if there is not to be an increasing inner turmoil or even an explosion. And undoubtedly the psyche is not a vessel of liquid, and the parallel between emotions and liquids is far from complete. Yet at the same time it is, I think, considerable — notice how far Freudian theory carries out the analogy between emotions and liquids.

We may wish to argue at points with details of the Aristotelian theory of Catharsis. Yet, somewhat restated, I am sure there is something in it. Perhaps we do not work off specifically the emotions of pity and fear when we witness a tragedy; at least, to students who have witnessed many tragedies the Aristotelian theory usually comes as something of a surprise. But let us make the view a bit more general. The experience of reading, viewing, listening to a work of art does give a peculiar relief, a release, a feeling of freedom from inner turbulence and disturbance. It is no accident that many people find succor in listening to music when they are troubled in spirit. The mere act of plunging ourselves, for a few hours, into an entirely different world when we go to see a play, is often enough to help heal our wounds, to renew
our spirits and give us a new lease on life. It is not merely that for a few hours we can forget all our troubles: this is true, but any form of entertainment however worthless, can do this; and in any case alcohol helps many people to do it too. No, the cathartic effect of art is more than this; it does not merely provide a break or interruption in the course of our worried lives, at the end of which they are exactly what they were before — or worse than before, in the case of alcohol. It is that through the aesthetic process itself, in the very act of concentrating our energies on an art-object of unity and complexity, our spiritual state is improved; there is a release from tension, an inner calm, a kind of inner clarification, that was not present before. Professor Monroe Beardsley describes it as follows:

"Suppose you are in a restless frame of mind, faced by several obligations that all seem to demand attention, but no one of which predominates to give you a singleness of purpose. Sometimes, under these circumstances, you may read a story, or fall into the contemplation of a picture, or hear a piece of music, and after a while, when you go back to your problem, you may find yourself in a very different state of mind, clearer and more decisive. This is the exhilaration, the tonic effect, of art."

(Aesthetics, p. 574)

We may extend this concept even further. Taking our cue from William James' essay "The Moral equivalent of war", we can say that human beings harbor within themselves many hostile and aggressive impulses which, if not permitted some release, will lead to destructive activity against other human beings, often in the form of the mass aggression we call war. Now there are some things, but unfortunately a very limited number of them, which enable us to work off those natural impulses of aggression in ways that do not mean distress or destruction to others. One of them is the excitement of the hunt — and in the hunting and fishing stage of man's development, when man's very life depended on the outcome of the chase, this channel for release of energy was probably sufficient. But this source of release is not open to most of us now in the state which we euphemistically call civilization, save only occasionally on a vacation or a long weekend away from the office, when we can set out for the woods and hunt down the innocent creatures of the forest for sport. But most people most of the time must find some other outlet. Competition is one — in sports, in industry, in the professions. This often provides real release, but when unsuccessful it may only increase further the course of our frustrations. The most promising outlet lies in creative endeavor — creative activity particularly in the sciences and the arts. Even if our
paintings, are not very good paintings, they may provide great personal satisfaction. And since it is not competitive, and since it does not carry with it high financial stakes and since we can do it suit our own mood and proceed with it at our own pace, it is not frustrating in the way that business competition may be. Here, then, is one "moral equivalent of war."

4. But perhaps we have bled Aristotle's Theory of Catharsis long enough. In any event, it is not the only moral effect of art. Here is another. Imagine what life would be like if we could constantly be surrounded by beautiful buildings, beautiful streets and avenues of trees, and have our houses filled with beautiful works of furniture and china. Would this not provide a moral uplift to help lighten our daily burdens and see us through many trying situations that confront us from day to day? It would certainly be a moral tonic. The greater part of our daily environment, at least in the city, is just the opposite of the aesthetic ideal just sketched. And what is the result of this? We are more irritable, more borne down by the daily burden of cheerless chores, than we would be if we lived in an environment that was aesthetically pleasing. The presence of pleasant shapes and colors and sounds, in and of themselves, help to soothe and smooth our personalities in such a way that we are better prepared for the daily round of practical activities with which we all have to be more or less continuously concerned.

5. Along the same lines, the experience of giving ourselves to an aesthetic object itself has a moral effect. If we are really concentrating on the details of a work of art, and not just passively letting it play upon our senses, this effect, the heightening of our sensibilities, of refining our capacities for perceptual discrimination, making us more receptive to the world around us, is again a moral effect in the broad sense; it heightens the tone of our daily lives and helps to make the experience of the world we live in richer than it was before.

Most of what passes for the aesthetic appreciation does not begin to do this; but this is only because it is not aesthetic at all — it is a kind of tired reverie rather than an intense absorption in the aesthetic object. Hanslick said that most people, when they hear music, simply allow themselves to be inundated by the sheer flow of sound. Many people automatically turn on the radio as soon as they enter their rooms — not that they ever really listen to the music, but it is there as a background, soothing them and possibly warding off the horrifying experience of being alone with themselves. For most people, music is simply a soothing background. They do not really listen to it, they are not even aware of even the most elementary kinds of ebb and flow that
take place within it; they passively receive it instead of actively participating in it. They do not listen to the music; they only use it as a springboard for indulging in an emotional debauch of their own, or a private reverie for which the music is merely a backdrop—a reverie which has very little to do with the nature of the music itself. Beyond taking in the general mood effect, they are aware of almost nothing that takes place in the music, but only of what takes place in their own psyches. And this of course is not an aesthetic effect; it is more like an anesthetic effect. Santayana’s ironic definition of music is “a drowsy reverie interrupted by nervous thrills.” I am not contending that just hearing the music will have a moral effect (snakes and toads hear it too). I am saying that the aesthetic experience—which involves nothing less than a total concentration on the perceptual details of the aesthetic object—is something which, by heightening our whole consciousness, by toning up our capacity for perceptual awareness and discrimination, by helping us come alive to the beauties in the world around us, has by this very fact a strong moral effect—or at least it is, again, a moral tonic, one avenue to mental health, one toning-up of the psyche, which artists and aesthetically sensitive observers have open to them, whatever else may be their weaknesses and troubles and whatever other vicissitudes may mar or dull the course of their daily lives.

6. But perhaps we have said enough about the instrumental values of art—that is, the good things toward which the appreciation of art is an effective instrument. Aesthetic experience is, first and foremost, not an instrumental value at all, but an intrinsic value. Most of the things we value in life are valuable not in themselves but only for other things that we can get by means of them; so it is with money, with fame and fortune, even with morality itself—for morality is primarily an instrument for the promotion of a happier society. But the value of aesthetic experience is different from most other values in that it is not instrumental but intrinsic. Art provides us with experiences which, whether or not they have further consequences in our daily lives (and as we have just analyzed in detail, they do), are intrinsically valuable—worth having for their own sake, quite apart from the results they may lead to or the goal they may enable us to attain. Like jewels they shine by their own light; they do not depend for their worth upon goals which they help to realize or anything whatever outside themselves to give them value. In all our talk about the moral effects of art; let us not forget that moral values; whether crude or subtle, whether incidental or integral to art, are instrumental values. And in this respect, art goes morality one better: it is
not merely instrumental to the achievement of things which are intrinsically worth attaining, it is itself (or the experience it provides) something of intrinsic worth — perhaps the most intense, concentrated, and worth-while of all the intrinsically worth-while things that exist in this workaday world.

V

We have examined how, in some detail, the positive ways in which aesthetic and moral values are interrelated. But now, in conclusion, I want to examine one final problem concerning the relation between art and morality: what happens when aesthetic values and moral values clash? Granted that the two are related and tend to vitalize one another, may there not be times when the one is absent and the other is nevertheless present in high degree, or when the promotion of the one means (to some extent at least) the destruction of the other? The usual view is that in such cases the work of art should be suppressed or censored. Is this conclusion justified? Let us take some sample cases:

Case 1. For years James Joyce's Ulysses was banned in the United States until, in a famous court decision, Judge Wolsey admitted the book saying that in spite of certain passages the predominant intent was not in any way pornographic and that the book, being primarily an aesthetic object intended for a comparatively small number of sophisticated readers, would work no ill moral effects. However, D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover (in the unexpurgated edition) continued to be banned in this country until recently (it is still banned from the mails).

Case 2. In Los Angeles a few years ago, police raided a performance of Aristophanes' play Lysistrata, demanding the arrest of the author.

Case 3. F. J. Mather in his book Concerning Beauty cites the case of a male student in his elementary art class who complained to him about the erotic quality of the female nudes in some of Botticelli's paintings. The professor smiled and told the student that he'd just better get used to it.

Case 4. When the French motion picture Rififi was shown in Mexico City, it had to be withdrawn by local authorities because there were so many cases of attempted robbery, copied after the robbery scene which takes up almost one-third of the picture. In Paris, however, the showing of the movie had no such bad effects: the Paris police said that by the time the movie appeared this method of robbing department stores was already out of date.

Case 5. Large numbers of adolescent thugs have been asked by the authorities after their capture where they got the ideas for the crimes they
committed, and some of them cited certain television programs and comic books (mostly the latter) in which crimes exactly like these were planned down to the last gruesome detail.

Well, these are a few examples; they could be multiplied indefinitely. Now, what are we to say about them? Should the works in question be banned or censored because they affect some people in a morally adverse way? Or should they be permitted to continue, accompanied by severe tongue-lashings and moral excoriations and expressions of righteous indignation on our part? Or should we simply ignore the conflict entirely and let the aesthetic object proceed on its uncensored way?

I cannot attempt here to examine each individual case of censorship to see whether it is justified; for this we would have to examine a great many more details of each individual situation than we can do here. All I can hope to do is to present a few principles and observations which may help to guide our thinking in this important matter.

The first point I want to make is that it is hard for me to conceive of any really worth-while aesthetic object, certainly any great work of art, as being morally objectionable enough to ban, if one approaches it in the right way — and I mean by 'the right way' the aesthetic way, which is the way the artist intended his work to be taken. If one views the work of art aesthetically, with his full powers of concentration directed upon the work of art to reveal its aesthetically rewarding characteristics, this task already requires so much attention that it tends to cut off all undesirable side-effects. If one views Joyce's *Ulysses* as the work of art that it undoubtedly is, the four-letter words and the passages some readers find indelicate if not indecent shade into insignificance; they are absorbed at once into the total organic unity of the work of art; and even the severest critic of *Ulysses* could not honestly say that the work taken as a whole is morally objectionable. The same is doubtless true of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. Indeed, there are passages in the Bible which could be taken as far more objectionable than any part of these novels — and if these portions of the Bible were to be sent to a publisher today in manuscript form, there are many publishers who would deny them publication for fear of outraging the moral sensibilities of the public.

A great work of art, simply because it does give us an aesthetic experience is practically immune from adverse moral effects; its aesthetic power tends to paralyse any incipient 'immoral' tendencies, The aesthetic way of approaching a work of art is incompatible with wholesale practical effects, such as going out and committing immoral deeds or setting out to change the world.
When someone objects on moral grounds to an admittedly fine work of art, one usually finds that the person is not approaching the work in anything like an aesthetic way — he is using it for some other, and alien, purpose.

The best example that comes of mind of an admittedly great work of art being objected to on moral grounds, not be an ignorant yokel or even an aesthetically sensitive untrained person, but by a person of great aesthetic sensitivity, in fact a professional literary critic and aesthete, is the attack on Shakespeare’s *Antony and Cleopatra* by Professor W. K. Wimsatt. His charge is that this play celebrates voluptuousness and sensuous abandon. Here is a bit of his description:

“What is celebrated in *Antony and Cleopatra* is the passionate surrender of an illicit love, the victory of this love over the practical, political, and moral concerns, and the final superiority of the suicide lovers over circumstances. . . . There is no escaping the fact that the poetic splendor of this play, and in particular of its concluding scenes, is something which exists in closest juncture with the acts of suicide and with the whole glorified story of passion. The poetic values are strictly dependent — if not upon the immorality as such — yet upon the immoral acts. Even though, or rather because, the play pleads for certain evil choices, it presents these choices in all their nature interest and capacity to arouse human sympathy.” (From his essay “Poetry and Moral”, in *Thought*, pp. 281-299. Reprinted in Vivas and Krieger, *The Problems of Aesthetics*, the above passage on pp. 541-2)

Now, one might question at length this interpretation of Shakespeare’s drama. But let us leave Wimsatt’s interpretation unquestioned, and ask, supposing that it is correct, would this justify us in banning or censoring the play? And I think the answer is surely No. I cannot reply in this case, as one could in most of the others, that the person in question is insensitive to the aesthetic values in the play or is approaching it in a non-aesthetic way. But I can adopt another line of defense: I can say that until there is some evidence that the play actually has (or has had) an undesirable moral effect on a considerable body of readers (such as causing them to do likewise), I can see no reason whatever for depriving mankind of a supremely valuable object of aesthetic experience. For where is there evidence that people who read the play will behave like the two lovers because they read the play to in any other way be demoralized thereby? On the contrary, if they read the play right, they will not be minus any moral stature — in fact the play is, at the very least, another example of a complex moral situation which

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they can reflect on — and they will be plus the aesthetic experience of a great drama to which they can return again for scenes of acute characterization, dramatic splendor, and poetry which is among the most sublime in our language. And this aesthetic experience is (as we have already tried to show) something of intrinsic value. To ban this play, then, would be to deprive ourselves of a source of intrinsic value and not to gain an instrumental value — a very bad deal indeed.

I am inclined to think that this is true in general, though not always as clearly so as in the *Antony and Cleopatra* case. We are told, for example, that American youth has been demoralized by such writers as Hemingway and Faulkner, and that although these men are excellent writers their views of life are demoralizing and they have set a bad example to the young. But I see no evidence of this. (1) To say that Hemingway or Faulkner or James Joyce or even Shakespeare is capable of demoralizing a generation of human beings is to attribute to these writers far too great a direct moral (or immoral) influence. How can they have demoralized our youth when very few of our youth, comparatively, have even read them, and most American youth have never even heard of them? Art has moral potency, but not, I think, that much. (2) Even among the intellectualist few who do read serious literature these days, I cannot see any harmful effects. What I do see is that they are better off, yes even morally, for having read the works of these writers; their horizons have been expanded to include other views of life than those they have previously known, and this acquaintance has been brought about through works of fine writing, sometimes even splendid writing, which they would do well to emulate; and which should have given them, in the reading of it, experiences well worth having for their own sake. And finally I must add, parenthetically, that those who are incited to lives of sensuous abandon by reading Hemingway or Faulkner must have been very much inclined in that direction to begin with — else the reading of a few novels could hardly have triggered off such a great response.

Again, it is said that novels of crime and detection should be censored because reading them may cause people to commit murders and thefts themselves. Again I can see that this might have been the case, but I can see no evidence that it is the case. People whose favorite bedtime reading is mystery or detective novels are, on the whole, extremely law-abiding people, who are in no way incited to commit robberies or murders no matter how many of them they read about in Agatha Christie or Mickey Spillane. In fact, if anything, the shoe is on the other foot: the reading of these things probably
helps the reader to work off any aggressive tendencies he may have to begin with; it helps to discharge innocently, in the experience of the novel itself. Any tendencies which might, if unreleased have become dangerous. Here we may put Aristotle’s theory of Catharsis to good use against those who say that art is morally dangerous.

It would seem, then, that no case at all can be made for the censorship or suppression of works of art. But let us consider two factors which we have not yet mentioned: (1) there are many works which may have bad moral effects, which can hardly be called works of art at all, no matter how generously we try to extend the use of this term; and (2) even great works of art, though not morally harmful, if taken in the right way are often not taken in the right way.

Thus, our elementary art student, though he was confronted with great works of painting, was not concentrating on them in an aesthetic manner, and perhaps at that time he was unable to do so. But in time he would, and the professor’s advice was probably wise: “You’ll just have to get used to it.” But the professor might have gone on to tell the student what he should look for in the painting, and by the time the student succeeded in doing this he would find that what bothered him initially no longer played any part in his response to the total aesthetic object.

In the case of the Botticelli, this is easy; but perhaps it isn’t always. No matter how great something is, it can always be misused by other people who have little appreciation for its true source of value and no conception of what the world can give them. There is nothing so wonderful in the world that it cannot be used, misused, and abused by other people who are alien or hostile in spirit and who will not or cannot seek in it the values which it has to give, but will attempt to eke out of it other, and wholly foreign, values (or disvalues) instead. This is unfortunate, but it is a fact; and it remains a possibility that we have to censor certain works because there exist in large number people who will always persist in doing bad things to good works of art. At least this is so in principle, whether or not there are ever actually cases in which the evil accruing from misinterpretation and distortion far outweighs the good (both instrumental and intrinsic) that the work of art is capable of perpetuating if it continues to enjoy public and uncensored perusal.

That is one factor; but the other, and far more important, is that most of the works from which people get their alleged cue to immorality are not works of any aesthetic value at all. Consider the case of the hoodlums who imitate the acts of crime they see pictured in comic books. Here there is not
even the pretense of aesthetic value to compensate for the undesirable moral effects. And for my part, I would experience not a tremor of regret in seeing every existing comic book thrown into the trash heap — good riddance of bad rubbish. If youngsters can’t read anything better than that, they might as well not read at all.

There are, then, times and places in which it would be much better if certain works (though usually these are not works of art) did not exist or were not shown. Should we say, therefore, that they should be censored? But this does not follow. It is one thing to say that something is bad in its influence on some people or even on everybody; it is quite another thing to say that therefore it should be banned or censored. It is one thing to know that the influence of something is undesirable, that certain people would be better off without it, and even to advise or preach against its being read or heard or seen; but to forcibly prevent someone from reading or hearing or seeing the work in question is to play God with other people’s lives. Shouldn’t they be free to make up their own minds whether they should see or read it nor not? How can a person’s character ever develop if he is not permitted to make his OWN decisions, for better or for worse, but must have them made by others while they yet affect his life? If a movie or novel is banned before I get to see it, I do not know from personal experience what it is that I am not permitted to see; I only know that a group of other people have by their action prevented me from making the choice myself — and I do not even know whether their choice was a good one, or that the novel or movie in question would have influenced me for the worse. I am supposed to take someone else’s word for it; and the assumption underlying this is that I am so weak as to be unable to make the decision for myself. Indeed, the assumption is that the censors are better able to make it than I am; and how does either the censor or I know that this assumption is correct? The censors themselves, after all, are not gods; they are finite and fallible human beings just as I am. When censorship occurs, one body of human beings is sitting in judgment over another body of human beings, telling them what they may and may not read or see. And who are they to tell me what I shall or shall not see? What guarantee is there that they are worthy to do this? And even if they are, is not every such act of censorship a loss to my own freedom? Perhaps I would be better off for not reading the book, but is it not better for me to take that chance, than to have the opportunity to exercise my own freedom of choice to be taken away from me without even so much as my consent? Viewed in this way, every act of censorship is an immoral act, involving
some people who sit in judgment upon others and so not permit other people to exercise their own human power of choice. The good that is achieved by some people not reading certain books is now counter-balanced by the evil involved in dictatorship — in one human being or group of human beings refusing to permit other human beings to make choices for themselves.

This last evil is so great that I am tempted to believe that, for this reason alone, the evils of censorship always outweigh the benefit. However, I do not want to assert this dogmatically for all the cases that might ever arise: there may be cases in which the people affected are extremely immature and unable to make wise choices, and in which there is an undeniable “clear and present danger” to morals in permitting the reading or showing of the works in question, so that even the great evil involved in censorship is more than offset by the evil resulting from the public availability of the product. I am not convinced that such cases exist, but I do not deny that they may. But human nature must be a weaker thing than I am inclined to think it is, if such a procedure is ever justified on a large scale. If someone is a mouse rather than a human being, I would rather see this shown by his own behavior than to see him prevented by the edict of others from exercising the choice that would show what manner of creature he is. Moreover, when one work is censored, there is a much greater chance that others will be; it is so easy to ban things at the source that the habit grows and increases like a bodily infection until it covers all of life’s activities. Even if one act of censorship is justified in extreme circumstance, other acts of the same kind will follow inevitably in its train, until the rivulet becomes a river; one act of censorship, justified by extreme conditions, will lead to other acts of censorship which are not thus justified.

As for the censorship that does exist in our society, it seems to me to be wholly misplaced. We make a big fuss over a few passages from D. H. Lawrence or Edmund Wilson’s *Memoirs of Hecate County*, and it never occurs to us to condemn the tremendous output of trashy literature that does not contain objectionable four-letter words of over-descriptions of immoral acts, but does contain a cheap, oversimplified, sentimentalized, and thoroughly misleading picture of what life is like. If anything is objectionable, it seems to me that it is superficial characterizations which make people out to be far simpler than they actually are, and Pollyanna endings which give the growing child (or even the immature adult) the rosy impression that there is always a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow and that everything always comes out all right for the people who are good, and that if your heart is in the
right place and you are an American you simply can’t lose. This attitude, I am sure, is extremely dangerous for our society; and it is exemplified — most of all in Hollywood movies, which unfortunately happen also to be the medium most consumed by the impressionable and aesthetically untutored. The Legion of Decency and other organizations condemn many fine motion pictures which contain a few eyebrow-raising words or amorous situations or refer to some subject which the respectable members find offensive to their pure and unsullied sensibilities; but at the same time they see nothing objectionable in the judge and endless mountains of trash that issue from the film capital of the world, which give the naive consumer of this trash the impression that the victory always goes to the man who can draw the fastest gun, that Americans always win over their enemies because they are more virtuous, that the people in the world are divided into the goodies and the baddies and it takes only a minute or two of causal acquaintance to tell which is which. Here are the harmful effects of mass media — I shall not say of art for of course this stuff isn’t art; here is the stuff consumed by youngsters ad nauseam, and which will send them into our next world catastrophe with completely empty minds, thinking that victory is certain because We are good and They are bad, or that ( on the other hand ) you might as well rock and roll because the world is going to the dogs anyway and there’s nothing that anybody can do about it. If anything should be censored, it is the literature that promulgates this utterly false picture, this ignorance, this slick and oversimplified distortion of human nature and the world. But our censors are even more stupid than those who endlessly consume these hideous movies and television melodramas. They strain at the gnat and swallow the camel.

One more word about censorship. I have talked as if censorship, if imposed at all, should be imposed on morally inflammatory material dealing with sex and crime. But there is something else that is, surely, even more important: the intellectual content of works of art, the ideas they contain (and of course not all works of art do). Much as I deplore the censorship of movies and plays for the things they are now censored for, I would rather see a hundred of them banned for indecency than to see one banned because it contained new or foreign ideas which the censors found disturbing or subversive. I do not say that it should never be done, but that it should be done only under conditions of the most extreme danger, and abolished the moment the danger lessens. As we have already observed, censorship of ideas deprives us of one of our most precious freedoms, the freedom to make up our own minds and arrive at our own decisions, even if in doing so we make mistakes. This
freedom of decision is vitally necessary in a democracy. In this connection, I can do no better than to remind you of one of the famous passages in John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty":

"If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. ...To call my proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny it if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty and (are fit to be) judges without hearing the other side."

(Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 2.)

And this is true even if the idea that is squelched is false. For how are we to know whether it is false if it is never permitted to be freely and openly discussed? How are we expected to know that Soviet Communism is bad if as some have suggested, we should not permit such views to be discussed in our colleges and universities? If an idea is false, then a free and open discussion in the full light of day should reveal this fact. If it is false, we should not be afraid to discuss it openly, to discover its falsehood for ourselves and expose the reasons for it publicly but if the powers-that-be simply say that it is false and then clamp the lid on it, then we have reason to be auspicious that perhaps the view is true after all and it is only to their interest to make us believe that it is false.

Besides, true views are appreciated only when they are contrasted with false ones; a false view is eminently worth discussing, and of having sincere proponents, so that we can discover and appreciate anew in every generation the worth of a true view. Once a view, however true, is taken for granted, people come to give only lip-service to it, and no longer appreciate it as did those who fought to preserve it. This is what has happened to democracy in our day: it was a living thing to Washington and Jefferson, but it is so taken for granted by 99 percent of our population now that we are not even concerned to defend its tenets rationally against opposing views which we believe to be false.

And what if the idea or view that is being suppressed is true? Then, even more, mankind is being deprived of something of inestimable value, perhaps for generations. Generations later, perhaps, the same truth will be rediscovered by someone, and not be banned or censored the second time, but meanwhile mankind will have been deprived of something that may be vitally important to its progress or welfare. Unfortunately there is nothing about truth per se that makes it come out triumphant, and countless times in the history of the world the ruling powers have kept truths from the people and thereby cheated not only their
people but generations of posterity. Even where the political power permits the truth, if the people are allowed to remain in ignorance or somnolence, or are so fearful to public opinion that they dare not openly defy it, the truth may once again be caused to die.

Never in the history of the world were we more in danger from this source than now. We live in a dream of indifference, and a tyranny of public opinion. And while we sit at our television sets absorbed in the latest escapist melodrama, systems of thought are arising around us in the world which, if they could, would impose on our freedom of thought the total suppression of a police state. The worst feature of such a system would not be its autocracy — Italy during the Renaissance was ruled by a series of autocrats who left considerable freedom of private life and creativity to the people. Even worse than this autocracy would be the rigorous suppression of all ideas opposed to the regime, through brainwashing and other techniques which are now being so thoroughly perfected that if the regime triumphed there would be no way of opposing it, for it could soon stamp out all opposition, even in thought. All works of the mind, including all works of art, which failed to conform to these ideas would be mercilessly suppressed, and all its proponents exterminated or psychologically conditioned into a passive acceptance of the ideas of the regime. In the light of such a threat, it is all the more essential that we be constantly sensitive to new and different ideas, subjecting them (whether true or false) to the fierce light of open and public discussion. If we do not do this, if we continue in our lassitude, then history may still write on the tombstone of our once-great nation. "Here lies a government that was of the cattle, for the cattle, and by the cattle, and therefore it perished from the earth."

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While describing the essential function of literary criticism Eliot, about two decades ago, gave an explanation of the nature of aesthetic experience also. In 1923 he conceived the function of criticism as "the elucidation of works of art and the correction of taste"; and in 1956 he 'simplified' this statement to put it 'more acceptably to the present age' by saying 'to promote the understanding and enjoyment of literature'. In his first statement he had to guard against the impressionistic critics and proposed that true criticism is not to offer only one's immediate experience obtained in literature. The critic needs an organization of the immediate experience, even of greater diversity, into a system of perception and feelings — a critic should be engaged in the organization and reorganization of his own aesthetic experiences for the purpose of arriving at an ultimate 'pattern' and 'order'. Thus the form-oriented classicist aimed at an organization of different individual tastes (i.e. immediate experiences obtained from literature), differing from each other because of two factors: personality of the individual and the 'group personality' of his time into a common 'pattern'; and this is what he meant by correction of taste.

But in later years this intellectualization of literary criticism became so varied and immense that the critics crossed the frontiers of criticism and their works became anything other than literary. Hence Eliot felt it necessary to modify his idea of literary criticism in 1956. And in doing so he stressed that the only duty of the critic is to enable the reader to appreciate
literature properly; appreciation meaning here understanding and enjoyment of literature. In stating the function of criticism he thus described the nature of aesthetic experience. Both the words used here expressing the nature of aesthetic activity have already been used by Eliot elsewhere in some other context: "...a very large number of people, I believe, have the native capacity for enjoying some good poetry: how much, or how many degrees of capacity may profitably be distinguished, is not part of my present purpose to enquire. It is only the exceptional reader, certainly, who in the course of time comes to classify and compare his experiences, to see one in the light of others; and who, as his poetic experiences multiply, will be able to understand each more accurately. The element of enjoyment is enlarged into appreciation, which brings a more intellectual addition to the original intensity of feeling. It is a second stage in our understanding of poetry, when we no longer merely select and reject, but organise. We may even speak of a third stage, one of reorganisation; a stage at which a person already educated in poetry meets with something new in his own time, and finds a new pattern of poetry arranging itself in consequence."4 Understanding is here a broad mental activity which comprises three stages — enjoyment, appreciation and criticism or organisation of a common pattern. Enjoyment means an 'intensity of feeling' — an emotional activity — and when added with an intellectual exercise it becomes appreciation. But in the present context enjoyment is purged of its mere emotionality and without being an element of the broader activity understanding appears to be synonymous with it or becomes its significant necessary co-activity or perhaps the position is just the reverse of the former: enjoyment appears as the main function of aesthetic experience of which understanding is the necessary co-activity. Both of the activities being simultaneous it becomes impossible for Eliot to distinguish them or to point out any order of their occurrence. "I do not think of enjoyment and understanding". he says, "as distinct activities — one emotional and the other intellectual. By understanding I do not mean explanation though explanation of what can be explained may often be a necessary preliminary to understanding. To offer a very simple instance, to learn the unfamiliar words and the unfamiliar forms of words, is a necessary preliminary to the understanding of Chaucer; it is explanation; but one could master the vocabulary, spelling, grammar and syntax of Chaucer — indeed to carry the instance a stage further one could be very well informed about the age of Chaucer, its social habits, its beliefs, its learning and its ignorance — and yet not understand the poetry... It is certain that we do not fully enjoy a poem unless we understand it;
and on the other hand, it is equally true that we do not fully understand a poem unless we enjoy it. And that means enjoying it to the right degree and in the right way....”8 If understanding is not purely an intellectual activity some sort of intellectuality in form of information, reasoning and explanation etc. is very much involved in the process of this activity; and, likewise, if enjoyment is not purely an emotional activity it refers to the very act of tasting literature when all the intellectual activities in understanding are transmuted into an organised experience. As the “poetic originality is largely an original way of assembling the most disparate and unlikely material to make a new whole”6 so also in the aesthetic perception of a connoisseur the intellectual and the emotional aspects are merged into a unique whole. Eliot, however, tries to maintain a balance between the subjective and objective aspects of aesthetic experience: “To understand a poem comes to the same thing as to enjoy it for the right reasons — one might say that it means getting from the poem such enjoyment as it is capable of giving: to enjoy a poem under a misunderstanding as to what it is, is to enjoy what is merely a projection of our own mind”7; and again: “...as for the meaning of the poem as a whole, it is not exhausted by any explanation, for the meaning what the poem means to different sensitive readers.”8 If on the one hand no critic can assert that this or that is the only meaning of a poem, on the other hand each variety of meaning must also be justified. And this justification undoubtedly needs “knowledge and experience of life”. There is nothing called pure literature in isolation from other branches of human thinking and experience. Literature, in fact, forms an organic part of human experience as a whole. “Poets have other interests besides poetry — otherwise their poetry would be very empty: they are poets because their dominant interest has been in turning their experience and their thought ( and to experience and think means to have interests beyond poetry ) — in turning their experience and their thinking into poetry.”9 So the critic who is interested in nothing but literature “would have very little to say to us for his literature would be pure abstraction...he must have other interests, just as much as the poet himself, for the literary critic is not merely a technical expert, who has learned the rules to be observed by the writers he criticizes: the critic must be the whole man......”10

One thing is clear from the above discussion that however clear may be the idea of Eliot about aesthetic experience, he grapples with the words like understanding and enjoyment to express the idea verbally. Understanding may not be purely an intellectual activity capable of conveying any cognitive
meaning about artistic creation, may not aim, so to say, at giving us any knowledge of truth or falsehood, it does nevertheless have a sort of cognitive function in so far as it keeps us informed about the events of the phenomenal world such as Coleridge was addicted to opium or Chaucer used particular forms of spelling and syntax etc.; and enjoyment is something different from it in not referring to such functions. There is, again, difference between the phrases like 'to enjoy' and 'to get enjoyment from' — the first being an activity directly connected with the object, say poetry, and the second an object derived from a source (i.e. poetry). Eliot admits that he fails to communicate his idea about the nature of this difference because of the limitations of language. But how are the two terms — understanding and enjoyment related? Are they synonymous? Eliot inclines toward such an idea, but is unwilling to assert. Then how are they related? Causally? or referentially? Use of two different words would be meaningless in the former case and the simultaneity of their operation will negate the possibility of either a causal or a referential relation, as cause and effect and referend and referred operate in succession. So the meaning and role of understanding and enjoyment remain indistinct in Eliot's writings and is left off ultimately, under the pretext of limitations of language. Centuries ago Sanskrit critics in India engaged in vigorous debates on the nature of aesthetic experience faced the same problem as of T.S. Eliot. They unanimously agreed that there is nothing as pure poetry. The subject matter of poetry being the affairs of the three worlds—Earth, Heaven and Hell. Poets have to know a lot about history, philosophy, grammar, lexicon, sociology, economics, politics, laws, astronomy, astrology, architecture, Sāmudrikas containing the symptoms of horses, elephants and swords etc. and what not? In a word the whole range of objects and activities that constitutes human life as a whole is to be experienced by a poet. All this jumbled up is not of course poetry. The diverse experiences are to be transmuted into an organic whole by the 'genius' of a poet which is *āūnborn as the subtlest form of poetic power — a distinguished type of perceptiveness found only rarely as a result of the experiences of previous lives. The principle of transformation is propriety, the success of this transformation depending upon continuous efforts according to the advice and instructions of the established poets and upon repeated reading of the masterpieces of literature. The requirements of a successful literary composition are, then, three in number: (a) poetic genius (the very seed or starting point), (b) knowledge of the whole universe and (c) continuous efforts and exercise. 11

A true critic, likewise, needs these factors, genius being in his case
contemplative or bhāvayitri (that in case of a poet is kārayitri or creative)\textsuperscript{12} and the critical method involved is tasting (or āsvādana) which is a direct sense-contact with the work of poetry. That is to say a poet tastes poetry as he tastes, for example, a glass of prapānaka or sarbat. He has nothing to do with the character, biography, personal likings and dislikings, peculiar habits or hobbies or range of reading of the poet. No Sanskrit critic has ever tried to investigate whether Kālidāsa was polygamous or Bhavabhūti was frustrated in his personal life, or whether there is any historical background (such as Samudragupta’s conquest) behind Raghū’s conquest in Kālidāsa’s great epic. Nor was a critic only a technician to analyse the lines and words of each stanza to squeeze out all the possible meanings by applying the principles of figures of speech. They rather declared that excellent poetry is possible even without any use of figures of speech, the only source of poetic excellence being a type of suggestive meaning (vyaujanā), other factors enhancing its beauty though.\textsuperscript{13} If, again, no meaning was exhaustive or the only meaning to be found in a poetic composition, any meaning, just out of one’s fancy or liking cannot be also suited to it: the meaning should be justified duly. Thus Sanskrit critics discarded, to use the words of Eliot, criticism by explanation of sources lemon-squeezing criticism and impressionistic criticism. The other type of criticism, which was primarily Eliot’s own, as he admits, namely workshop criticism was not practised by the Sanskrit critics. There were, of course, critics who were poets also. Bhojarāja (11th C.) and Viśvanātha Kavirāja (14th C.) may be cited as examples. But they did not start their career as critics writing on poets only whom they appreciated or whose works influenced them in their poetic compositions. Sanskrit critics were to a great extent free from bias because their method was mostly theoretical, that is they referred to individual poets only as examples in analyzing their theories. But this does not mean that they were incapable of criticism of individual poets or this method was unknown to them. Commentators on different works of poets were partly exercising this method: partly because they were not writing directly on authors, but they were believing that the picture of an individual poet will automatically emerge out of the analyses of his different works. Though Mallinātha did not write a critical book on Kālidāsa his commentaries on the works of this poet sufficiently make us aware of Kālidāsa’s poetic value. The theoreticians are busy in analysing the poetic work in general and the reader’s relation to it or, in other words, the nature of aesthetic experience. Once they are clear to us it is easy for us to judge an individual poet.
Now the question is: how to explain this tasting or āsvādana or carvaṇā? The Sanskrit words used refer, as we have said, to a direct sense-object contact. Hence aesthetic experience is first of all a kind of direct perception (sāksāt-kāraṇapratiṇītiḥ) which does not admit of any other means of knowledge such as inference, testimony or analogy etc. and this results in enjoyment as in case of a man tasting a glass of sarbat.14 Though we say — perception results in enjoyment, it does not mean that perception and enjoyment are related as cause and effect operating in succession; here perception is itself enjoyment though they are used separately in way of abstraction. To say ‘I taste a glass of sarbat’ is the same as to say ‘I enjoy a glass of sarbat’. It is not that tasting is the means of enjoyment as in the statement — ‘I get enjoyment from or by tasting a glass of sarbat’. So the proper statement in case of aesthetic experience is — I enjoy or taste a poem or a piece of work of art, enjoying and tasting being synonymous. This is how the Sanskrit critics could overcome the limitations of language which trouble Eliot in distinguishing the meanings of the phrases — ‘to get enjoyment from’ and ‘to enjoy’ as the statement ‘one gets enjoyment from poetry’ differs from ‘one enjoys poetry’.

The next question: how to account for the meaning of understanding and its role in enjoyment. Sanskrit critics concluded after age-long debates on the nature of aesthetic experience that it is a transcendental experience of which tasting of propāṇaka is only an ordinary example. As in propāṇaka all the ingredients like sugar, cheese, honey and spices lose their individual identity and are tasted by a man as a unique whole so also in a poem or a drama characters (vibhāva), their activities (anubhāva), gestures, dialogues and drifting thoughts etc. are dissolved into an organic whole when enjoyed by a reader or audience. The audience of Bhavabhūti’s Later Story of Rāma, for example, require knowledge of Sanskrit and Prakrit languages, the story of the Rāmāyana etc. for its enjoyment; but it cannot be said that they are the cause of enjoyment because even knowing them fully one may not enjoy the play. In fact, aesthetic experience is no knowledge — no cognitive function at all. The whole of the necessary intellectual background of the audience is so dissolved in the feeling of ecstasy that the cognitive consciousness is simply lost. No audience thinks: ‘I know the story of the Rāmāyana. So I am enjoying this play.’ Aesthetic experience is far from even the contact of any knowledge other than the experience itself. Viśvanātha Kavirāja best summarizes the nature of rasa: “Rasa, an organic whole, self luminous, bliss and consciousness, free of the contact of any other thing to be known (than itself only), twin of the Brahman-consciousness (of the yogin) is tasted only
by some (qualified) connoisseurs (having innate experience, knowledge of the activities and nature of both static and moving things of the whole universe—persons of a very high intellectual and emotional capacity so to say) when the state of pure consciousness rises in his mind."

Now the relation of the poetic object i.e. the character etc. (Vibhāvanubhāva vyabhicāribhāva) of a poem or drama and this (aesthetic) experience is not that of cause and effect or that of manifester (jñāpaka) and manifested (jñāpya). Because an effect exists even after the destruction of the cause, but no aesthetic experience continues when the aesthetic object is removed, say a dramatic performance is over or a poem is read. Nor does the object manifest the experience as light illuminates an object (a jug for example) which exists before the light illuminates it; because prior to the reading of a poem or witnessing a drama rasa does not exist in the connoisseur. Mammā distinguishes this experience from yogic perception, for a yogin perceives things without any sense-contact whereas aesthetic perception needs the contact of eyes and ears. Besides, a yogic experience is only self-perception while the aesthete perceives a piece of art, an object of the phenomenal world. Viśvanātha somewhat assimilates this experience with the yogin’s on the ground that both are supermundane. Nevertheless he is aware of the difference and describes it as the twin of the Brahman consciousness, not exactly the same.

But even after saying all this when one obstinately insists that the aesthetic object and experience are related as cause and effect, because without the knowledge (jñāna) of the characters no aesthetic perception is possible and the enjoyment or tasting (ānanda or upabhoga) follows this knowledge, thus giving an idea that an intellectual activity is the cause of aesthetic experience and the critic cannot waive out the problem of the co-existence of cause and effect (in a way that of understanding and enjoyment), Viśvanātha boldly argues that the Vedantins will solve this problem by referring to the Vedic texts that Truth, Knowledge and Bliss co-exist in Brahman or in the experience of Brahman. Though in way of abstraction it is said that the knowledge of Brahman (that is by understanding of Truth and Nescience) causes perennial Bliss, in reality the knowledge of Brahman is itself Bliss as both the cognition and the experience occur simultaneously. So also in aesthetic experience jñāna (knowledge or understanding) and ānanda (enjoyment) are synonymous for their simultaneity of operation, though only in way of abstraction we say that the knowledge of character etc. (Vibhāva etc.) precedes the enjoyment of a play.

Thus the Sanskrit critics were very confident in solving the problem of
of understanding and enjoyment and in doing so they faced no limitations of language by using a single word i.e. tasting (āsvādana or carvanā) that denotes both the functions. It was, however, quite natural for Eliot to feel confused in fusing these mental functions into a single experience as the language he uses and the people to whom he speaks are both incapable of conveying and conceiving respectively the essence of the Vedantic thought.

Notes and References —

2. ibid.
3. cf. “What taste is, I suppose, is an organization of immediate experiences obtained in literature, which is individually modified in its shape by points of concentration of our strongest feelings, the authors who have affected us most strongly and deeply. It cannot be had without effort, and without it, our likings remain insignificant accidents. To be immediately and without effort pleased by Donne is easy for some people, to be in the same way moved by Shelley is easy for another; the difficulty lies in that process which is not of abstract thought, but which is an organization of feeling making possible, not only to appreciate Shelley in one mood and Donne in another, but the inclusion of even greater diversity into a system of perception and feeling.” “Eliot, The Education of Taste” — Athenaeum No. 4652 (1919) P. 521. See also Fei-Pai Lu, T. S. Eliot, The Dialectical structure of his Theory of Poetry, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966. pp. 95-103.
5. “The Frontiers of Criticism”, ECE P. 50
6. ibid. P. 40
7. ibid. P. 50
8. ibid. P. 48
9. ibid. P. 51
10. loc. cit.
13. Viśvanātha’s Sāhitya Darpaṇaḥ Chap. I.
14. A type of drinking mixture famous in India.
15. SD III. 2.

Jyoti Vihar
Burla
Sambalpur : Orissa

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His references to my career (and of my tribe as a whole) are rather tangential. His guesses and presumptions are always loaded against me. He says that my range of Coleridge studies is limited and then adds: “This is only a guess”. Because I have been a professor, he remarks “several parts of the book read like notes”. In fact I have never taught Coleridge’s aesthetics to any class. I studied the subject because I loved it and I wrote out my six lectures on it when I was invited to deliver the Tagore lectures by Borada University. (The ex-chief justice also reads me homily on ‘lectures’ and their ‘development’, not caring to realise that publishers and printing presses take their own time to consider M. S. S. and to print them.) It would be easy for me also to say that his review is marked by the frustration of one who was compelled to choose the judicial line and give up the teaching profession; by the abundant legal quibbling of a judge and by an unusual lack of the judicial temper in one who has held some important position in the judicial line. But I desist from making such a statement. He presumes that I have not read Ch. xviii in *Biographia* when I have actually referred to the full context of the quotation on Page 53 and quote on page 66 only that portion of it which is relevant to the formulation of the principle of Taste, the
meaning of which can never be restricted to style alone as the reviewer would like to do. In my book there are 58 quotations directly taken from B.L., one from Coleridge’s other essays and three or four from the books by I.A. Richards and Fogle for want of adequate library facilities at the spot where the M.S. was prepared. I.A. Rechards quotes the passage on Taste without giving the page reference to B.L. Shall we say that he has ‘lifted’ the passage?

The reviewer has strange ideas about the meaning of the word ‘Aesthetics’. He thinks that ‘aesthetics’ means “the principles relating to the perception and exposition of the elements of beauty in a work of art, and the artistic pleasure given by it.” What about Nature? Is not beauty perceived in Nature? Half the field of beauty at least is omitted from the statement. Again, the great Oxford Dictionary speaks of ‘aesthetics’ as the science, philosophy or theory of taste or of the perception of the beautiful in Nature and Art. Now, ‘philosophy’ can vary from downright realism to transcendentalism, from individual to individual. The practical side of this ‘science’ or the psychology attached to this ‘philosophy’ will depend on the brand of philosophy that one accepts. Then will follow what the reviewer calls an explanation of the aesthetic pleasure and of its sources in a work of art. Each explanation of this kind will have to be based on the particular brand of philosophy and psychology accepted by the writer who sets out to explain. Otherwise there can be no explanation worth the name. I have, therefore, summed up Coleridge’s philosophy in Ch. I and the psychology the accepted for this purpose in Ch. II, IV and VI. I am concerned, as is apparent, mainly with his theory of poetry rather than with his theory of criticism. Chapters III and V have been devoted to an application of the findings in Coleridge’s philosophy and psychology to the sources of aesthetic pleasure in work of art. The reviewer’s fundamental error consists in assuming that aesthetics can exist without any reference to philosophy or psychology.

The reviewer fails to understand what my book is about. What he calls the criticism of individual poets and dramatists, including Wordsworth and Shakespeare, has been well-known for over a century. The same is true regarding Coleridge’s enunciation of first principles regarding topics like poetic Diction. On the other hand, not much work has been done regarding the general theory of aesthetics that lay at the back of Coleridge’s mind—a theory which finds a fairly adequate formulation in B.L. It is amusing to find the reviewer admiring the brilliance of the occasional observations of Coleridge on poets and principles, believing, at the same time, that they can proceed from a mind which has no general theory to support them. In fact, the reviewer himself refers to some
remarks of Coleridge which are repeated in B. L. and elsewhere too. The mere fact of repetition shows that these are not just ‘occasional’ statements.

The reviewer reduces Coleridge’s transcendentalism to the following gross entities: “The world of external phenomena...... might be called, Coleridge said, Nature, while the sum of all that was subjective, might compendiously be called self or intelligence”. All philosophies can be ground down to an elementary crudeness in this fashion. The reviewer remarks that, in the light of modern psychology many of the links of Coleridge’s theory appear to be fanciful”. He further says that the exposition of the theory as given in the B.L. is made up of ‘unverifiable speculations about the workings of the human mind’. This is clear proof that the reviewer has not understood Coleridge Transcendental philosophy, like Vedanta, is based upon assumptions which proceed from the experiences of mystics. Some of these can never be verified by reason for they are beyond reason. Nor can they be explained by modern psychology which has no use for the soul. It is not Coleridge who has got entangled into matters like “knowing, being, the representation in the finite mind of the infinite I Am”, etc. Coleridge has mastered them. It is the reviewer who has got lost in trying to understand them. He probably feels that it is not worth while understanding them either. He says that Coleridge explains by what “process of reasoning he carried his speculations about imagination into the realm of Transcendentalism.” This logical process which explains the supposed logical deficiencies of Hobbes, Hartly and others can always be countered and overcome by a more incisive logical process. What makes Coleridge’s position essentially different from that of Hobbes, Hartley and others is his act of bringing together subject/object, knowing, being and I AM. and his experience of them together, not the reasoning. Not understanding this means a constitutional inability to understand Coleridge’s theory.

The reviewer makes another astounding statement. He says that Coleridge does not use capital letters while referring to the Inner Sense. In Ch. XII of B. L., that the reviewer quotes from in this connection, (P. 172 Ch. XII Vol I Shawcross’ edition of B. L.) Coleridge makes every letter of the two words a capital letter. ‘SELF’ is also given in capital letters in thesis 9 in the same chapter. For ‘inner sense’, the reviewer substitutes another phrase : “philosophic Consciousness” which is a vague and shapeless monster. Coleridge has defined precisely the connotation of “Inner Sense”. The reviewer thinks that it would be an absurd statement to make if we were to say that “one may have more or less of soul than another”. This itself shows his limited understanding.
of transcendentalism. The soul is the evolving spiritual entity in man and it can evolve in different proportions in different persons.

I shall not discuss transcendentalism any more in this note. Any reader, who is not antipathetic to philosophies of this kind will find the entire position set forth clearly in my book. I am not out to prove that transcendentalism is a sound philosophy or that materialism is a hollow one. Nor am I interested in proving the superiority of one school of psychology over another. Having briefly summed up Coleridge's position in these matters, I have given a full and elaborate statement of what this means in the field of aesthetics and poetics. Coleridge made only incomplete statements and one could occasionally come across an inconsistency or obscurity.

I have written on the comprehensive plan that is implicit in Coleridge's statements. The reviewer objects to the prominence given to the Inner Sense. He does not realise that, without it, there is no transcendental philosophy. Briefly, the new points made by me are as follows:

1. The reviewer accuses me of not having read recent Coleridge criticism. He himself has obviously not read Fogle, for he attributes disparagingly to me the 'invention of several planes of consciousness' which really comes from Fogle. What I have done is to show that Reason is only one of the faculties listed by Coleridge and that it is the Inner Sense that is fundamental to Coleridge's aesthetics. Let Coleridge speak for himself: (Thesis IX Ch XII) "This principium commune essendi et cognoscendi as subsisting in a WILL or primary ACT of self-duplication, is the mediate or indirect principle of every science; but it is the immediate and direct principle of the ultimate science alone, i.e., of transcendental philosophy alone... In other words, philosophy would pass into religion and religion become inclusive of philosophy. We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the self in order to lose and find all self in God."

2. The faculties are enumerated by Coleridge. (on P. 193-94. B. L. Vol. I. Shawcross). I have elucidated the special way in which Coleridge sees them work, the inter-connections that exist and the three planes on which they function.

3. The 'fusions' affected by each faculty in the poetic process are explained.

4. The reconciliations of disparate qualities in a work of art and the faculties to which they are traceable have been fully discussed.
(5) I have given a new explanation of primary and Secondary Imagination.

(6) I have established the identity of Coleridge's theory of the origin of poetry with his theory of the origin of Metre.

(7) I have commented on the role of Taste.

It is amusing to find the reviewer insisting that any one, desirous of explaining Coleridge's theory should know "What made Coleridge adopt a metaphysical approach for his inquiry into the mysteries of the creative mind" and by what principles he attributed different functions to different faculties of the mind. This amounts to explaining why Coleridge is Coleridge and not Hobbes and why reason is reason and not will or imagination. The German impact was responsible for Coleridge's shift from Hobbes and Hartley to Schelling, from materialism to transcendentalism. But the new philosophoy only gave him a satisfactory explanation of some of his own deepest impulses and experiences. An analysis of this kind lies outside the scope of my book. Such an analysis is an attempt to catch a glimpse of some of the deepest recesses of Coleridge's personality, viewing it in its formative stage. I am concerned in my book with an elucidation of Coleridge's aesthetic fundamentals so far as they can be gathered from his writings. As for the distinctive functions of the various mental faculties, it would be good if the reviewer can look into his own mind, adding the glow of the "Inner consciousness" to each one of them, wherever required, if he does not possess it himself.

There are a few other points. The reviewer is not much bothered whether Coleridge is called an idealist, transcendentalist or integralist. There is evidence in Coleridge's writings on which any one of these claims can be based. It is in this context that I have emphasised the need to regard him as an integralist. I do not regard this as a major contribution. It clears the ground for what follows. The reviewer makes himself incomprehensible on the question of the friend's letter in Ch XIII. Coleridge thinned away substances into shadows and deepened shadows into substances. It was Coleridge's own idea of what readers might feel about the chapter and this was certainly one of the factors that prevented Coleridge from including the chapter in B. L. As for the unsympathetic climate that the Romantic poets had to face (Shelley's poetry was hardly read by a few and Keats' death was supposed, for a long time, to have been hastened by harsh reviews) in their own time, every student of romantic poetry knows about it, Coleridge was the hardest hit for he was involved in transcendental philosophy.
The reviewer has mixed up the changes in Coleridge’s critical views with certain psychological changes that he had to go through because of misfortunes that befell him. The recantation with regard to the Heaven-descended ‘know thyself’ is a psychological change. I have said with reference to such changes: “Be this as it may, the later pessimistic attitude of Coleridge towards his own visionary powers and early speculations need not prejudice us “against their permanent significance for any theory of art.” Having said this, I have remarked that one of the reasons why he wavered is to be “found in the fact that he had to write about the things he loved, in an unfavourable intellectual climate”. And I stand by this statement. The reviewer writes whole paragraph to prove what I have implied in my phrases “later pessimistic attitude” and “one of the reasons” I do not know why.

Coleridge’s borrowings from Schelling and other German philosophers have been referred to by the reviewer. Even supposing that it is going to be established that the borrowings have been extensive, Coleridge had undoubtedly absorbed them and made them his own. The German philosophers themselves borrowed freely from ancient Indian philosophy. It is not a sin to light our own lamp at another provided our own lamp is truly lighted and burning.

The reviewer objects to my system of abbreviations and to the lack of an index of topics in a book which runs only to 71 pages though there is a book-and author index. It is surprising that he does not comment on the omission of a bibliography.

To crown all this, he attacks my style ‘uniformly stilted’. I looked up the dictionary to ascertain the exact flavour of that word. It means “pompous, bombastic.” That is the usual fling at academics. Let the reader judge for himself. In any case, I am glad that my style does not bristle with spines like a porcupine. The reviewer quotes my sentence: “the substance of the moment of vision...has the increase of consciousness as its goal” and asks the question: “How can a moment, which is a point of time, or its substance have a goal?” Now, this substance of the moment of vision is an amalgam of knowing, feeling and doing. Such a moment is as long as eternity. Blake speaks of holding eternity in an hour. There is an increase of consciousness during such a moment and that is the goal, the desired result. Let Coleridge explain further: “whatever part of the terra incognita of our nature the increased consciousness discovers, our will may conquer and bring into subjection under the sovereignty of reason.”

Picking up another sentence, the reviewer says that a work of art or poem, about to be born, does not itself have a shaping and modifying
power. We should therefore say: “the power of shaping or modifying the work of art or poem that is about to be born” and not “the shaping and modifying power of the work of art,” etc. My statement in its context runs as follows “As an independent faculty along with the others, Imagination has already achieved two specific fusions. As the shaping and modifying power of the work or poem that is about to be born, it uses its synthetic and magical power mainly in two ways.” The distinction in these sentences is between imagination as a faculty which makes its own contribution to the subtle substance of a work of art or poem and the secondary imagination. I have written about the latter; “it is made to preside over the birth of a work of art and is endowed with an additional shaping and modifying or synthetic and magical power.” The point, I suppose, is clear. The Secondary Imagination is not just “the power of shaping and modifying the work or poem that is about to be born” but the power that is put in charge of shaping and modifying” etc. It may be that both the reviewer and myself are imprecise in phrasing this idea. If the necessary legal precision were to be given to it and similar ideas, I am afraid the book may be unreadable. As it is, my imprecision, if that is what it is, is nearer the mark than the reviewer’s.

This is about examples selected from my 71 pages. Let me now select from the reviewer’s 27 pages. Here is a sentence on the side of substance. “Coleridge was the first, and so far has been the last, to try to place creative activity of the mind on a foundation of philosophy and establish thereby a causal link between the two which, ordinarily, one would not suppose to exist.” I should like to know which writer on aesthetics, from Bharata and Plato down to Croce and Tagore, has been able to eschew philosophy from his writings on aesthetics. The writer’s philosophy is inevitably present there, by the back or the front door, implicitly or explicitly. I have already commented on this basic error in the reviewer’s approach to the subject.

The second example I choose refers to his language: “One does not find it possible to accept the author’s own estimate of the worth of his book and that of his publishers.” I have offered no estimate of the worth of my publishers either in the preface or in the book. I hope the reviewer does not think that there is a legal dispute about it between my publishers and myself. What, I suppose, he wants to say is that he does not find it possible to accept either my estimate of the worth of my book or the estimate of its worth given by my publishers. Let him please himself.
BOOK REVIEW:

The concept of Imitation in Greek and Indian Aesthetics by Ananta Charan Sukla; published by Rupa & Co., Calcutta, 1977; 8vo demy, hard bound, PP iii+308+viii, Price: Rs. 60/-

The book under review is a doctoral dissertation of Jadavpur University (Calcutta) where the author has investigated the origin and development of the idea of 'imitation' in Greek and Indian aesthetics in two independent parts of equal length, and concludes with an ANALOGUE that makes a detailed comparative study of the two sets of ideas. The approach is historical—analytical, scholarship profound and insight illuminating.

Imitation or 'mimesis' is a notorious term in western aesthetics; and scholars tracing its origin in the writings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle have interpreted and misinterpreted it variously for about a thousand years last. In the present century, however, attempts have been made by scholars like Rechard Mckeon, John Warry, D. W. Lucas and G. F. Else etc. to present an objective view of the idea without any personal bias of theorists like Croce or Collingwood. But the significance of the present work is that in tracing the origin of the idea in the very pattern of Greek culture—in its imagistic way of thinking that was rooted in the Creto-Minoan and Mycenaian cultures of the western World, it has demonstrated with great cogency that the world and the concept originated neither in Plato nor in Socrates, but are both as old as the Greek thought; and secondly by setting it against a similar but somewhat different course of thought on the concept in ancient India the work has also tested its universality. Here lies the uniqueness of Dr. Sukla's contribution to the history of aesthetic thought.

The Greek Part consists of four chapters: The first finds the word and the concept in the very geographical settings of Greece, in its earliest culture, myth, religion and literature, the second in Socrates and pre-Socratic philosophers, the third in Plato and the fourth in Aristotle, the last two being the most perceptive and original in their analyses of the concept. Socrates demanded a soul of a product of art "a view that......was taken up and
developed over by Aristotle which shines as the light post of the Greek aesthetic thought" (P. 52). 'Mimesis' is neither a 'fatal word' nor 'rapped out' by Plato at all (as is described by Wilamowitz). Dr. Sukla's arguments are very much convincing that Plato discarded the idea of an artistic imitation as a mere copy of Nature. It is based on the twin principles of qualitative and quantitative proportions and as such Plato's objections against the imitative arts are from a metaphysician's or a practical moralist's point of view, not from an aestheteician's. The most remarkable portion in the chapter on Aristotle is the elucidation of poetic truth: since "art partly imitates and partly completes Nature" (P. 133), the truth of art is purely imaginary and cannot be judged by the standard of fact; "as a product of imagination it is neither true nor false like an illusion"; it is what the author calls a Conscious illusion, there being "no end to this illusion — it is ever true and ever false." (P. 114)

The Indian part consists of three chapters: the first deals with the ideas of Śilpa and Kalā in the Vedic and purānic texts showing cogently that both are synonymous and Śilpa as a pratirūpa is not a mere mimicry but a strange transformation of the prototype; the second explores the idea in the texts on architecture, painting, sculpture and in the various systems of Indian philosophy arguing, again, that art is not a mere likeness (sādṛṣya) but a transformation of Nature into an extraordinary creation possessed of what Abhinavagupta terms as Camaṭkāra; the third is the most critical and systematic of the three analysing in details the texts of Bharata, Abhinavagupta, Dhanañjaya and Viśvanātha etc. arguing out convincingly a case for that most misunderstood of Indian theorists Śaṅkuka, and asserts that "Abhinava's conception of generality (abhāsa) or re-perception differs from Śaṅkuka's notion of imitation (anukṛti) or artificial representation not so much in essence as in the methods of approach from two philosophers' different points of view ... Śaṅkuka is a realist while Abhinava is an idealist." (P. 277)

The 'Analogue' correlates the explorations of both the parts with an attempt to universalize the idea of imitation concluding that Aristotle's mimesis and Abhinavagupta's anuvyavāsāya are simply two names of the same process because "although Abhinava's conception of generality is foreign to the realism of Aristotle there is no virtual distinction between Aristotle's imaginative reality and Abhinava's idea of the dramatic characters and events etc. as generic forms or isolated abhāsas since both the ideas indicate loss of their causal efficiency." (P. 298)
disciplines as Greek and Indian aesthetics is by itself a stupendous task, and then to use the one to throw some significant light on the other, explaining certain ambiguities and lacunae in the well-known treatises is very much commendable. Except for the printing errors and cluttering foot notes the work is certainly a pioneering adventure in comparative aesthetics and proves a significant contribution to the field.

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Books Received:
(to be reviewed in the next issue)

1. Catara Jathara Jatra—The Theatre
   By Dhiren Das, Published by Smt. Padmini Das, Bhubaneswar (Orissa), 1976.

2. Essays in Philosophical Analysis