

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Herbert C. Kelman

My work for nearly four decades has focused on the development and application of *interactive problem solving*: an unofficial, scholar-practitioner approach to the resolution of protracted, deep-rooted, and often violent conflicts between identity groups—particularly ethnonational groups—which is derived from the pioneering work of John Burton and anchored in social-psychological principles (Kelman, 1999c; 2002). My primary focus over the years has been on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but my students and associates have also applied the approach in a number of other arenas of ethnonational conflict, including Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and South Africa.

The central distinction in our work, following John Burton, has been between *settlement* and *resolution* of conflict (see, e.g., Burton, 1969, Chapters 11 and 12). In contrast to the negotiation of a political *settlement*, a process of conflict *resolution* goes beyond a realist view of national interests. It explores the causes of the conflict, particularly causes in the form of unmet or threatened needs for identity, security, recognition, autonomy, and justice. It seeks solutions responsive to the needs of both sides through active engagement in joint problem solving. Hence, agreements achieved through a process of genuine conflict resolution—unlike compromises achieved through a bargaining process brokered or imposed by third parties—are likely to engender the two parties' long-term commitment to the outcome and to transform their relationship. We have argued that an agreement emerging from such a process of conflict resolution and

the new relationship it promotes are conducive to stable peace, mutually enhancing cooperation, and ultimate reconciliation.

Thus, reconciliation, in this view, is a consequence of successful conflict resolution. It comes at the end of the process, with time: The test of a good agreement, and of the process that generates it, is its conduciveness to *ultimate* reconciliation. This does not mean (and has never meant, in my view) that reconciliation comes into play only after an agreement has been reached. Reconciliation is, after all, a *process* as well as an outcome; as such, it should ideally be set into motion from the beginning of a peace process and as an integral part of it. In this spirit, I have described the exchange of the letters of mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel—which I have always regarded as the most important feature of the Oslo accord (see Kelman, 1997)—as “a product of a rudimentary process of reconciliation” (Kelman, 1998a, p. 37). In the same spirit, the problem-solving workshops between politically influential Israelis and Palestinians that my colleagues and I have organized for some years (see Kelman, 2002; Rouhana & Kelman, 1994) represent tentative steps toward reconciliation, insofar as participants are encouraged to listen to and to try to appreciate each other’s narrative and to engage in a process of “negotiating identity” (Kelman, 2001).

As the Oslo process began to falter, I concluded that its step-by-step approach was no longer feasible, because of the decline in trust and partnership between the two sides, and that a new process was needed in which reconciliation would move to the fore. I would make that point even more strongly today, with the total breakdown of the peace process. I am not proposing that reconciliation is a precondition for negotiation or that it must precede a peace agreement. But significant steps toward reconciliation—in the form

of mutual acceptance of the other's nationhood and humanity—are necessary in order to resume negotiations and move them forward. “The process and outcome of negotiations must be consistent with the requirement for ultimate reconciliation” (Kelman, 1998a, p. 37). In my view, this requires negotiations committed to the search for a principled peace, anchored in a historic compromise.

Although reconciliation has been vital to my thinking in these different ways, I tended to conceive of it not so much as a separate process, but as a component and logical outcome of conflict resolution as my colleagues and I have conceptualized and practiced it. But the recent events that have increasingly focused the attention of social scientists and political actors on reconciliation have led me to view reconciliation as a distinct process, qualitatively different from conflict resolution—even conflict resolution within a needs-oriented, interactive problem-solving framework. Reconciliation is obviously continuous with and linked to conflict resolution and it certainly is not an alternative to it. But, whereas conflict resolution refers to the process of achieving a mutually satisfactory and hence durable agreement between the two societies, reconciliation refers to the process whereby the societies learn to live together in the post-conflict environment.

Combining the customary differentiation between conflict settlement and resolution, and the more recent differentiation between conflict resolution and reconciliation, suggests a conceptual model based on three qualitatively distinct processes of peacemaking: conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation. In adopting such a model, I am following in the footsteps of Nadim Rouhana (2004), although my formulation of the process of reconciliation, in particular, is rather different.

Three Processes of Peacemaking

Although settlement, resolution, and reconciliation represent three approaches to peacemaking, they should not be viewed as three different ways of achieving the same goal. Rather, they are three ways of achieving different—though often overlapping—goals, all broadly linked to changing the relationship between groups, communities, societies, or states from one of hostility to one of peaceful coexistence. The specific goals and emphases of the three processes may be congruent and mutually supportive, but they may also be contradictory to one another.

I have already suggested that reconciliation is continuous with and linked to conflict resolution. In a sense, it can be argued that reconciliation, at least in its full form, presupposes conflict resolution: A long-term, cooperative relationship, based on mutual acceptance and respect, is not likely to take hold without a peace agreement that addresses the fundamental needs and sense of justice of both sides. Similarly, it can be argued that conflict resolution presupposes conflict settlement, at least in the sense that a political agreement negotiated by the legitimate leaderships of the conflicting parties and endorsed by relevant outside powers and international organizations must be in place if the two societies are to consider their conflict to have ended in a fair and mutually satisfactory way. The three processes may thus be related in a sequential way, with settlement as the first step, which may or may not be followed by resolution, which in turn may or may not be followed by reconciliation. However, there is no reason to assume that the three processes necessarily follow such a sequence. Steps in the direction or in the spirit of settlement, resolution, or reconciliation may occur quite independently, in any order and in any combination.

In short, possible relationships between the three processes need to be explored, conceptually and empirically, rather than assumed—or dismissed. The main purpose of the present exercise is to see whether we can gain some analytical leverage by thinking of settlement, resolution, and reconciliation as qualitatively different (though not necessarily always empirically separate) processes and identifying the distinct antecedents and consequences of each.

My special perspective on the distinction between conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation derives from the proposition that they broadly correspond to the three processes of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization—that I distinguished in my earlier work (Kelman, 1958 and 1961; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Very briefly, *compliance* refers to acceptance of influence from another in order to achieve a favorable reaction from the other: to gain a reward or approval from the other, or to avoid punishment or disapproval. *Identification* refers to acceptance of influence from another in order to maintain a desired relationship to the other and the self-definition anchored in that relationship; identification may involve taking on the role of the other or a role reciprocal to that of the other. *Internalization* refers to acceptance of influence from another in order to maintain the congruence of one's own value system; internalization may involve adopting new behavior because it is consistent with one's beliefs or consonant with one's identity.

I arrived at this three-way distinction early in my work on attitude and behavior change in individuals, out of an abiding interest in the quality of the changes induced by social influence: the depth of change, the durability of change, the independence of change from the external source from which it was originally derived, the integration of

the new elements into pre-existing structures such as the person's belief system, value system, or personal identity. Each of the three processes is characterized by a distinct set of antecedent conditions. For example, the source of the power of the influencing agent to induce change varies for the three processes. In the case of compliance, it is the agent's means control, i.e., control over rewards and punishments—material or psychological resources that are consequential to the person. In the case of identification, it is the agent's attractiveness, i.e., desirability as a partner in a continuing relationship. In the case of internalization, it is the agent's credibility, i.e., expertise and trustworthiness as a conveyor of value-relevant information (Kelman, 1958).

At the output end, each of the three processes is characterized by a distinct set of consequent conditions. Most important here are the conditions under which the new opinion or behavior is likely to manifest itself. The manifestation of compliance-induced behavior depends on surveillance by the influencing agent. Identification-based behavior is not contingent on surveillance, but it does depend on the continuing salience of the person's relationship to the influencing agent. That is, it is likely to manifest itself only when the person acts within the role defined by that relationship. Finally, internalized behavior becomes independent of the original source and is likely to manifest itself whenever it is relevant to the issue at hand, regardless of the surveillance or salience of the influencing agent.

I have extended this model to analysis of the relationship of individuals to the state or other social systems (Kelman, 1969), and to the nation or other collective entities (Kelman, 1998b). In this connection, we have distinguished between three types of political orientation: rule-, role-, and value-orientation (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) that

are coordinated with the three processes of influence. The rule, role, and value distinction has also been useful in analyzing people's relationship to legitimate authority and their emotional reactions to their own deviations from social norms. I have also distinguished between rule-oriented, role-oriented, and value-oriented movements of social protest. In an entirely different context, in my writing on the ethics of social research, I drew on my three-processes model to distinguish among three types of ethical concerns that research may arouse: concerns about the impact of the research on the interests of the individuals and communities who are the subjects of our investigations, on the quality of the relationship between investigators and research participants, and on broader societal values (see Kelman, 2006, for a discussion of these extensions).

I mention these various extensions of the original model because they suggest the possibility—or at least the hope—that it might also have some relevance to the analysis of conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation as three distinct processes of peacemaking. My original model of social influence emerged out of research on persuasive communication, but it has broadened to capture the interaction of individuals or groups with each other and with larger social systems in a variety of social contexts, and their integration within these social systems. In essence, my trichotomy distinguishes three foci for these interactions. The first centers on individual and group *interests*, whose coordination is governed by a system of enforceable *rules*, to which individuals are expected to *comply*. The second centers on the *relationships* between individuals or groups, which are managed through a system of shared *roles*, with which individuals *identify*. The third centers on personal and group *identities*, expressing a *value* system that individuals *internalize*.

As indicated, my original three-process model grew out of an interest in the quality of changes induced by social influence—their depth, durability, independence, and integration. My approach to conflict resolution has posed a very similar set of questions: What are the conditions under which negotiations to end the conflict will produce a high-quality agreement—an agreement that will be deeper, more durable, more sustainable, more fully integrated in the political cultures or societal belief systems (cf. Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004) of the conflicting societies than the settlements that are so often hammered together under the pressure of external powers? I have always assumed, therefore, that it should be possible to forge a link between my work on conflict resolution and the three processes of influence. Now, I feel, I have found that link. This is, of course, esthetically pleasing, but the important question is whether it is analytically useful. Does that link give us handles—metaphorically at least—for distinguishing between qualitatively different ways of making peace, with distinct antecedent and consequent conditions? Specifically, for present purposes, does the proposed correspondence of reconciliation to internalization suggest a useful way of defining and conceptualizing reconciliation?

I am not proposing an exact correspondence because we are dealing with different levels of analysis. In my original model of social influence, the unit of analysis is the individual—albeit the individual embedded in a social system. In a model of peacemaking, the unit of analysis is a pair of actors—the relationship between two parties, whether two individuals or two collectivities. My purpose here is to explore whether conceptualizing peacemaking processes in the terms of the broader trichotomy suggested by the three processes of compliance, identification, and internalization is

useful in suggesting relevant hypotheses about the determinants and outcomes of different approaches to peacemaking.

In this spirit, I propose that it may be useful to conceive of conflict settlement as operating primarily at the level of *interests*, conflict resolution at the level of *relationships*, and reconciliation at the level of *identity*.

Conflict Settlement and Resolution

Let me first compare conflict settlement and resolution in terms of the distinction I have proposed. Conflict settlement can be described as a process yielding an agreement that meets the interests of both parties to the extent that their respective power positions enable them to prevail. In other words, the terms of their agreement are heavily determined by the power they can bring to bear in the negotiations. Third parties—outside powers or international organizations—often play a role in brokering or even imposing an agreement, using their own power by way of threats or inducements. The agreement may be supported by the publics on the two sides because they are tired of war and have found the status quo of continuing hostility and uncertainty increasingly intolerable. Such support of the agreement does not rest in any particular change in public attitudes toward the adversary. The settlement process is not designed to change the quality of the relationship between the societies. As is the case in compliance as a form of social influence, the stability of a political settlement ultimately depends on surveillance—by the parties themselves, in keeping with their deterrent capacities, by outside powers, and by international organizations.

Conflict settlement is not a negligible achievement in a violent and destructive relationship with escalatory potential. In fact, conflict resolution can often build on political settlements, insofar as these involve a negotiating process in which each side pursues its interests and in which they are able to reach agreement on many outstanding issues through distributive bargaining in which power as well as international norms play a role. But conflict resolution, particularly if we think of it within an interactive problem-solving framework, goes beyond conflict settlement in many of the ways to which I have already alluded:

- It refers to an agreement that is arrived at interactively, rather than imposed or sponsored by outside powers, and to which the parties therefore have a higher level of commitment.
- It addresses the parties' basic needs and fears and therefore has a greater capacity to sustain itself over time.
- It builds a degree of working trust between the parties—a pragmatic trust in the other's interest in achieving and maintaining peace—and therefore is not entirely dependent on surveillance as the guarantor of the agreement (for the distinction between working trust and interpersonal trust, see Kelman, 2005).
- It establishes a new relationship between the parties, best described as a partnership, in which the parties are responsive to each other's needs and constraints, and committed to reciprocity.
- It generates public support for the agreement and encourages the development of new images of the other.

In all of these ways, conflict resolution moves beyond the interest-based settlement of the conflict and its dependence on the balance of power. It represents a strategic change in the relationship between the parties, expressed in terms of a pragmatic partnership, in which each side is persuaded that stable peace and cooperation are both in its own best interest and in the interest of the other. This is the kind of partnership that began to emerge between Israelis and Palestinians, especially at the leadership level, in the early post-Oslo environment (cf. Lustick, 1997).

Conflict resolution as described here clearly represents a transformation of the relationship between the parties, which resembles instrumental reconciliation, as defined by Nadler and Shnabel (2008). But there are limits to this new relationship, which make it vulnerable to changes in interests, circumstances, and leadership. Conflict resolution as a process of peacemaking—like identification as a process of social influence—involves the development of a new relationship, with an associated set of new attitudes *alongside*—or perhaps on top—of the old attitudes. The new attitudes are not necessarily integrated with one’s pre-existing value structure and belief system—with one’s worldview. This means that the old attitudes—including attitudes of fundamental distrust and negation of the other—remain intact even as new attitudes, associated with the new relationship, take shape. The coexistence of new attitudes toward the other as a potential partner in peace with old attitudes toward the other as a mortal enemy creates instability in the new relationship, particularly in the context of an existential identity conflict. Changing circumstances may trigger the old attitudes in their full force.

Reconciliation

The third process, reconciliation, presupposes conflict resolution of the type that I have described: the development of working trust; the transformation of the relationship toward a partnership based on reciprocity and mutual responsiveness; an agreement that addresses both parties' basic needs. But it goes beyond conflict resolution in representing a change in each party's identity (Kelman, 2004b).

The primary feature of the identity change constituting reconciliation is the removal of the negation of the other as a central component of one's own identity. My main empirical point of reference in this analysis is the Israeli-Palestinian case, in which mutual denial of the other's identity has been a central feature of the conflict over the decades (cf. Kelman, 1978, 1999b). The mutual negation of the other's identity is perhaps not as central in other cases of conflict and reconciliation—such as those of Chile, Guatemala, or South Africa, or the German-Jewish, the Franco-German, or even the Egyptian-Israeli case—yet, in each case, the negation of the other is somehow embedded in the identity of each of the conflicting parties and must be addressed in the reconciliation process.

Changing one's collective identity by removing the negation of the other from it implies a degree of acceptance of the other's identity—at least in the sense of acknowledging the validity and legitimacy of the other's narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative. The change in each party's identity may go further by moving toward the development of a common, transcendent identity—not in lieu of, but alongside of each group's particularistic identity. Development of a transcendent identity becomes possible with reconciliation and, in turn, reinforces reconciliation, but is not a

necessary condition or consequence of reconciliation. What is essential to reconciliation, in my view, is that each party revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other. As the parties overcome the negative interdependence of their identities, they can build on the positive interdependence of their identities that often characterizes parties living in close proximity to each other (Kelman, 1999b).

Reconciliation as I have defined it goes beyond conflict resolution in that it moves past the level of pragmatic partnership—which is the hallmark of identification and essential to peacemaking—and enables the parties to internalize the new relationship, integrating it into their own identities. New attitudes toward the other can thus develop, not just alongside of the old attitudes, but in place of the old attitudes. In contrast to the attitude change process that characterizes identification, internalized attitudes are not just taken over in full measure, but they are reworked. As the new attitudes become integrated into the group's own identity, they gradually replace the old attitudes. Working trust can gradually turn into personal trust. This does not foreclose the possibility that old fears and suspicions will reemerge, but the relationship is less vulnerable to situational changes.

Viewing reconciliation as identity change linked to the process of internalization has important implications for the nature of the identity change that it involves. Internalization represents a readiness to change an attitude because the new attitude—though induced by influence from an external source—is more consistent with the person's own, pre-existing value system. Thus, the change in a particular attitude actually strengthens the pre-existing structure in which it is embedded by responding to a potential challenge to that structure: One might say that we change in order to remain the same. By the same token, the change in each party's identity—the revision in its

narrative—that I am defining as reconciliation implies a strengthening, rather than a weakening, of each party’s core identity. I would argue that a revision in the group’s identity and the associated narrative is possible only if the *core* of the identity remains intact. In fact, changes in more peripheral elements of identity are often seen as necessary in order to preserve the core of the identity—just as changes in specific attitudes may be seen as necessary in order to maintain the consistency and integrity of a person’s value framework. This was the basis, for example, on which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians were (and I believe continue to be) prepared to revise the territorial dimension of their national identity in order to maintain the essence of that identity (Kelman, 2001).

This analysis points to a major dilemma of reconciliation. Reconciliation requires parties to change an element of their identity—the negation of the other—which is far from trivial for parties engaged in an existential identity conflict, while at the same time preserving, even strengthening, the core of their identity. This is more easily achieved in situations in which one of the parties has already rejected part of its identity—as was the case for many Germans in post-Nazi Germany and many whites in post-apartheid South Africa—although even in these situations resistances are bound to arise. It is particularly difficult, however, in conflicts in which each side insists on the justice of its cause and sees itself as having been wronged by the other. The dilemma is that the amount and kind of identity change that A requires from B in order to be ready for reconciliation may be perceived by B as undermining the core of *its* identity. A good example here would be the demand to acknowledge collective guilt to which even post-Nazi Germany was reluctant to accede (Auerbach, 2004; Feldman, 1999).

It is important to emphasize here that, in conflicts such as that between Palestinians and Israelis, negation of the other is a *central* element of each party's own identity, which it cannot give up easily. Given the nature of the conflict, each party finds it necessary to deny the other's authenticity as a people, the other's links to the land, and the other's national rights, especially its right to national self-determination through the establishment of an independent state in the land both claim, because the other's claims to peoplehood and to rights in the land are seen as competitive to each party's own claims and rights. Moreover, negation of the other is also important to each party in a violent conflict as a protection against negative elements in its own identity (cf. Kelman, 1999b). Insofar as the other can be demonized and dehumanized, it becomes easier for each party to minimize guilt feelings for acts of violence and oppression against the other and to avoid seeing itself in the role of victimizer, rather than only the role of victim.

Thus, in protracted identity conflicts, negation of the other is not a peripheral, marginal element of each party's identity that can be easily discarded. My argument is merely that, from an "objective" point of view, negating the identity of the other is not a *necessary* condition for preserving, and indeed enhancing the core of one's own identity. However, for conflicting parties to arrive at a point where they can be free to relegate negation of the other to the periphery of their own identities and eventually discard it requires the hard work of reconciliation. What is central to that work is the growing assurance that the other is not a threat to one's own identity. In that process of assurance, the conditions for reconciliation play a vital role.

Parties in a conflict in which both sides perceive themselves as victims are helped to deal with the dilemma of abandoning some elements of identity without threatening

the core of their identity by the reciprocal nature of reconciliation. Changes on the part of one group make changes on the part of the other group more attainable. But this view suggests that the process of reconciliation requires a certain amount of “negotiation” of identity, including negotiation of the conditions for reconciliation, which turn on such issues as truth, justice, and responsibility. It is my contention that reconciliation—especially in cases in which neither party is prepared to adopt the role of perpetrator—cannot be achieved on the basis of purely objective criteria of truth, justice, or responsibility, anchored in historical scholarship or international law, but requires some degree of mutual accommodation in the course of negotiating the conditions for reconciliation. I turn to a brief discussion of these conditions.

Conditions for Reconciliation

I want to identify five conditions that can help groups in conflict arrive at the difficult point of revising their identity so as to accommodate the identity of the other. One might also think of these as indicators of reconciliation, or steps in a process of reconciliation. They are both indicators of movement toward reconciliation and conditions for further movement in that direction.

Mutual acknowledgment of the other’s nationhood and humanity. Such acknowledgment is, of course, implicit in my very definition of reconciliation. Insofar as reconciliation means removing the negation and exclusion of the other from one’s own identity, it requires the accumulation of steps that indicate acceptance of the other as an authentic nation and inclusion of the other in one’s own moral community. Such steps include political recognition and acknowledgment of the other’s legitimacy, of the

authenticity of their historical links to the land, and of their national rights, including the right to national self-determination. Equally important are steps toward the humanization of the other, including respect for their dignity, concern for their welfare, and attachment of value to the other's lives and security. Reconciliation presupposes not only the rejection of the extreme acts of dehumanization of the other that characterizes violent conflicts, but also "the development and propagation of new attitudes, marked by inclusion, empathy, and respect" (Kelman, 1999a, p. 199).

Development of a common moral basis for peace. To create the conditions for reconciliation, it is necessary to move beyond a peace anchored entirely in pragmatic considerations—essential as these are—to a peace based on moral considerations. This condition is relatively easy to meet when the moral basis is widely accepted and shared from the beginning of the peacemaking effort—as in the rejection of Nazism or the rejection of apartheid. It is much more difficult to achieve in a conflict in which the common moral basis is not a given—such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the conflicts in Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, I have emphasized in this connection the need for commitment to a principled peace, which finds its moral basis in a historic compromise—a compromise that is presented to the publics as not just the best that can be achieved under the circumstances, but as the basis for a peace that is right because it is consistent with the principles of fairness and attainable justice for both sides (Kelman, 1998a). The definition of justice, in this and other such cases, will to some extent have to be negotiated between the parties, recognizing that there is some inevitable tension between justice and reconciliation. Such

negotiations have to experiment with different kinds of justice that an agreement might try to achieve, such as:

- Substantive justice, achieved through an agreement that meets the fundamental needs of both sides;
- Future justice, achieved through the establishment of just institutions, arrangements, and relationships;
- Procedural justice, achieved through a fair and reciprocal process of negotiating the agreement; and
- Emotional justice, achieved through the sense that the negotiations have seriously sought and to a significant degree shaped a just outcome.

Confrontation with history. Confronting history and coming to terms with the truth is an essential component of any reconciliation effort. The reexamination of historical narratives and the reevaluation of national myths—on both sides of a conflict—are valuable contributions to such an effort. Here again, however, I take the view that it is unrealistic to aim for the establishment of a single, objective truth and that one has to accept the need to negotiate the historical truth to a certain degree. I want to avoid the simple relativistic stance that each side has its own truth and that their conflicting narratives are therefore equally valid. But we have to recognize that the different narratives of different groups reflect different historical *experiences*—occasioned by the same set of facts and figures—and that, therefore, their experienced truths may in fact not be identical. Reconciliation, in my view, does not require writing a joint consensual history, but it does require admitting the other's truth into one's own narrative.

Acknowledgment of responsibility. Reconciliation also requires acceptance, by each side, of responsibility for the wrong it has done to the other and for the course of the conflict. Responsibility must be expressed symbolically, in acknowledgment of one's actions and their effect on the other and appropriate apologies, and concretely, in appropriate steps of compensation, reparation, and restitution. It is not surprising that I again take the view that the acknowledgment of responsibility cannot be based entirely on an objective set of legal or moral norms, but requires a process of negotiation in which different types of responsibility are identified and agreed upon.

Establishment of patterns and institutional mechanisms of cooperation. Promotion of functional relations—through cooperative activities in the economic sphere and in such domains as public health, environmental protection, communication, education, science, culture, and tourism—cannot in itself lead to reconciliation in the absence of a mutually satisfactory political agreement. It can, however, help increase openness to the search for political solutions and it can play an important role in peacebuilding in the wake of a political solution. “By establishing crosscutting ties, common interests, and personal relations,” cooperative activities “can help stabilize and cement a new peaceful relationship and create commitments, habits, and expectations” conducive to reconciliation (Kelman, 1999a, p. 201). To contribute to reconciliation, the patterns and mechanisms of cooperation must themselves meet certain critical conditions: They must be genuinely useful to both parties in meeting societal needs and achieving societal goals; they must be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity; and they must undercut rather than reinforce old patterns of dependency of one party on the other. An important variety of cooperative institutional mechanisms are institutions and

arrangements focusing on conflict resolution through joint problem solving in order to deal constructively, on a continuing basis, with the conflicts that will inevitably arise in the relations between the two societies.

In sum, all five of the conditions for reconciliation identified here are designed to facilitate changes in the collective identities of the conflicting parties, with particular emphasis on removing the negation of the other as a key element of each group's own identity.

Interests, Relationships, and Identities

In conclusion, let me return to my conceptualization of conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation as three qualitatively distinct processes, operating at the level of interests, relationships, and identity, respectively (see Kelman, 2004b, 2006). This distinction suggests the three broad tasks that all social entities—individuals, groups, organizations, societies, collectivities—must perform as they negotiate their social environments and seek to balance the requirements of self-maintenance and social order: protecting and promoting their interests, establishing and maintaining their relationships, and affirming and expressing their identities (Kelman, 2004a, p. 267).

In managing their interests, relationships, and identities, individuals and groups must attend to the requirements of both social order and self-maintenance, and of ensuring the proper balance between them. These two sets of requirements capture the cross-cutting dichotomies that have repeatedly emerged in the evolution of my original model. In my original three-process model of social influence, in illustrating the range of concerns that may motivate acceptance of influence—whether by compliance, by

identification, or by internalization—I came up, at first on a strictly ad-hoc basis, with a distinction between concerns that are primarily instrumental in nature and concerns that are primarily focused on self-maintenance. Thus, compliance may be motivated either by a concern with specific rewards and punishments or by a concern with approval and disapproval—i.e., with managing one’s public image. Identification may be motivated by a concern with meeting the expectations of one’s role in a reciprocal-role relationship, or by a concern with living up to the requirements of a role adopted from a role model. Internalization may be motivated by a concern with the cognitive consistency of our beliefs and actions as we seek to maximize our values, or by a concern with the affective appropriateness of our beliefs and actions, as we seek to confirm our self-concept.

This distinction between two types of personal concerns in social influence settings prefigures my crosscutting distinctions in the various extensions of the model to which I briefly alluded earlier. Thus, in the analysis of the relationship of individuals to state or nation, the distinction between three types of political orientation—rule-, role-, and value-orientation—is accompanied by a crosscutting distinction between two types of attachment: instrumental attachment, based on the extent to which people perceive the state or nation as meeting their needs and interests, and sentimental attachment, based on the extent to which they perceive it as reflecting their ethnic and cultural identity. In the analysis of people’s reaction to their own deviations from societal standards, anchored in rules, role expectations, or internalized values, I distinguished between two domains in which these deviations have occurred: the domain of responsibility and the domain of propriety—domains that correspond to the requirements of social order and self-maintenance, respectively.

The basic point is that, in all of these contexts, individuals must (a) coordinate their actions with others in pursuing their interests, performing their roles, and maximizing their values; and (b) ensure that, across time and situations, they live up to their public image, their role model, and their self-concept.

Interests, relationships, and identities are distinctly social-psychological concepts “in the sense that they refer to the relationship between the individual and the social system, and also in the sense that they refer to properties of both individuals and social systems. Individuals have interests, relationships, and identities, which they pursue and express through the various groups and organizations with which they are affiliated. The groups and organizations—formed, essentially, to serve their members—in turn develop their own interests, relationships, and identities, which become personally important to the members and which the members are expected to support” (Kelman, 2004a, pp. 267–268).

The concepts of interests, relationships, and identities broaden the original three-process model of social influences to capture interactions of individuals or groups with each other and with larger social systems, and their integration within these larger systems. The microprocesses of social influence can be subsumed under this broader framework by distinguishing three foci for the interaction between P and O—the target of influence and the influencing agent: a focus on individual and group *interests*, whose coordination is governed by a set of enforceable *rules*, with which individuals are expected to *comply*; a focus on the *relationship* between individuals or groups, which are managed through a system of shared *roles* with which individuals *identify*; and a focus on personal and group *identities*, expressing a *value* system that individuals *internalize*.

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